Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies. Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar. Selected Papers by BARTOVA Lubica et al.
Proceedings of the
107th EAAE Seminar
29th January  –  1st February, 2008
Sevilla, Spain
Modelling Agricultural
and Rural Development Policies
Editors: Lubica Bartova, José María Gil, Robert M’barek, Tomas Ratinger
Selected Papers
European
Association
of Agricultural
Economists
Modelling Agricultural and
Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar
Selected Papers
Editors: Lubica Bartova, José María Gil,
Robert M’barek, Tomas Ratinger
29th January – 1st February, 2008 
Sevilla, Spain
Mo
de
llin
g A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 R
ur
al 
De
ve
lop
me
nt
 P
oli
cie
s
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 20082
The mission of the IPTS is to provide customer-driven support to the EU policy-making process by researching science-
based responses to policy challenges that have both a socio-economic and a scientific or technological dimension.
European Commission
Joint Research Centre
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
Contact information
Address: Edificio Expo. c/ Inca Garcilaso, s/n. E-41092 Seville (Spain)
E-mail: jrc-ipts-secretariat@ec.europa.eu
Tel.: +34 954488318
Fax: +34 954488300
http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu
http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Legal Notice
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which 
might be made of this publication.
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union
Freephone number (*):
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed.
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/
JRC 42629
ISBN 978-92-79-08068-5
DOI 10.2791/86949
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
© European Communities, 2008
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged
Printed in Spain
3Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
FOREWORD
Agricultural and rural development policies have been continuously adjusting to meet new challenges. 
Quantitative assessments of the impact of policy changes and policy effectiveness are important to fuel the 
policy debate on the reform alternatives and to face the needs of both public and private players.
The present proceedings comprise the plenary papers and a selection of contributed papers of the 
107th European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE) seminar “Modelling Agricultural and Rural 
Development Policies” organised in Seville, in January 2008 by the University of Pablo de Olavide (UPO), 
Sevilla, in cooperation with the European Commission's Joint Research Centre - Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies (JRC - IPTS), the AGRILIFE Unit. 
The seminar was a follow-up to the successful EAAE seminars held in Bonn in 2000, and in Parma 
in 2005, which represented important reference points for European research in the field of quantitative 
agricultural and rural development policy analysis. 
The 107th EAAE seminar in Seville provided an opportunity to present newly developed and/or applied 
modelling approaches and tools for the impact assessment of agricultural and rural development policies. It 
was also an important meeting place for researchers and policy makers. 
The seminar was structured in plenary sessions, contributed sessions and poster sessions. Plenary 
sessions focussed on the three main approaches which agricultural policy modellers are currently working 
on: General Equilibrium (GE), Partial Equilibrium (PE) and Microeconomic Models. A main issue addressed 
in the plenary sessions was the potential for the complementarity of different approaches.
Contributed papers covered a wide range of topics: regional and national models for agricultural and 
rural development policy evaluation; models and methods for evaluating policy effectiveness and efficiency 
in the agricultural sector and rural development; models analysing the linkages between agricultural 
activities and the environment; modelling of the impact of increased biofuels production on agricultural 
markets; farm level models; household level models; integrated use of models (household models, partial 
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equilibrium models, GE models, environmental models); use of computer systems for modelling (databases 
and scenario analysis); new challenges for the empirical assessment of agricultural and rural policies; 
discussion of the results of models applied to specific agricultural and rural policy problems in different 
regions (inside and outside Europe). A pre-seminar session organised by the JRC- IPTS was devoted to 
quantitative assessment of biofuel polices. 
Presentations and discussions identified research gaps and pointed out issues that need further 
attention by researchers. Emerging topics, methodological and data issues to be dealt with in the near 
future were: the need for an integrated use of models which include iterative use of PE and GE models and 
integration of micro-econometric approaches into PE or GE models. Strong microeconomic foundations of 
modelling approaches, use of micro economic data and better data availability were identified as necessary 
conditions. Further discussions stressed the importance of modelling market risk and risk behaviour of 
economic agents by adopting stochastic approaches and dynamic models at a larger scale. Important issues 
mentioned were modelling structural changes, medium and long-term effects of investment, expansion 
of the scope of agricultural models and modelling the relationship between agriculture and environment 
(water, climate change, bio-diversity). 
The seminar showed that there is an increasing scope for efficiency and productivity studies, 
particularly in the context of the emergence of new markets and policy areas such as bio-fuels. Addressing 
market integration remains a significant challenge for agricultural sector models. Modelling rural 
economies and impacts of rural development policies require considering all relevant production sectors 
and factor markets of a functional territory. Small businesses are important agents of rural economies: 
household models and discrete choice models are very relevant in understanding their responses to 
market developments and policies. Further research policy relevance, collaboration of modellers and a 
cross-disciplinary work were stressed.
A total of 203 participants, coming from 24 countries around the world, attended the seminar. The 
selection of papers and posters was based on an assessment of 191 submitted abstracts. We kindly thank the 
members of the International Programme Committee and other reviewers for their valuable contributions to 
evaluation the abstracts. The highest number of abstracts was submitted on the three topics: Agricultural 
policy (39%), Methodological advances in quantitative assessment of policies (21%) and Agro-environmental 
policies (16%).
During the seminar 3 plenary sessions, 18 parallel sessions, 1 pre-seminar session and 6 poster 
sessions were held. Overall 6 plenary papers, 84 contributed papers and 32 posters were presented. Plenary, 
contributed and poster papers are available on the AgEcon Search website http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
handle/33708.
Plenary speakers were: Tomas Hertel (Purdue University, USA); Martin Banse (LEI, The Hague, The 
Netherlands); Patrick Westhoff (FAPRI, University of Missouri–Columbia, USA); Wolfgang Britz (University 
of Bonn, Germany); Alfons G. J. M. Oude Lansink (Wageningen University, The Netherlands) and Daniele 
Moro (Catholic University of Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy).
The International Programme committee was chaired by José María Gil (CREDA-UPC-IRTA, Spain) and 
included Giovanni Anania (University of Calabria, Italy); Filippo Arfini (University of Parma, Italy); Kelvin 
Balcombe (University of Reading, UK); Alfons Balmann (IAMO, Germany); Lubica Bartova (JRC – IPTS, 
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European Commission); Jean-Christophe Bureau (INAPG, France); Hervé Guyomard (INRA, France); Edward 
Majewsky (WAU, Poland); Wolfgang Münch (DG Agri, European Commission); Laura Riesgo Alvarez (UPO, 
Spain); Hans Van Meijl (LEI, The Netherlands) and Patrick Westhoff (FAPRI, USA). 
The local Organising Committee was chaired by Laura Riesgo Alvarez (UPO, Spain) and included Alfredo 
Ariza, Guadalupe Valera, from UPO, and Lubica Bartova, Tomas Ratinger, Robert M'barek, Monique Libeau-
Dulos, Ignacio Pérez Domínguez, from the JRC – IPTS.
The seminar was strongly supported by the European Commission’s JRC – IPTS and we appreciate all 
efforts made by the IPTS staff involved in the organisation.
We wish to thank all participants and presenters, in particular, for their efforts and contributions to 
the success of the seminar. We acknowledge the contributions of the authors and valuable comments of the 
reviewers to these seminar proceedings.
Editors
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Working at the Extensive Margin of CGE Analysis
THOMAS W. HERTEL1
Abstract
This paper has explored a few of the frontiers of CGE analysis – focusing on the extensive margin at which 
CGE analysis meets other disciplines – both within and outside of economics. In each case, the rigorous 
economic and accounting framework offered by CGE analysis can offer valuable insights into important 
policy questions, ranging from the poverty impacts of trade reform to the environmental consequences 
of biofuel mandates. In the end many different tools will be required to deliver sound policy analysis of 
agriculture and rural development issues. The key to success in this field will rest in choosing the right tool 
for the problem at hand. 
Keywords: CGE analysis, poverty, global land use, biofuel, trade policy
JEL classification: C68
1 Center for Global Trade Analysis Purdue University. Paper prepared for presentation at the 107th EAAE Seminar “Modelling 
of Agricultural and Rural Development Policies”. Sevilla, Spain, January 29th -February 1st, 2008
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1. Introduction
The last two decades have seen an explosion of policy-oriented economic research utilizing quantitative 
economy-wide models, commonly known as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Application of 
such models is now commonplace in research labs, government agencies and even in the classroom. This 
widespread use has been facilitated by the availability of powerful modelling software such as GAMS and 
GEMPACK (HARRISON AND PEARSON, 1997), improved data bases at the national level, a well-documented, 
widely supported, publicly available data base for global CGE analysis (GTAP: e.g., DIMARANAN, 2007), and 
well-documented, standard modelling frameworks which users can readily modify and extend (RUTHERFORD,
2005; HERTEL 1997). With standard CGE applications becoming commonplace, the question arises: What are 
the new frontiers in this area of research?
In thinking about the frontiers of CGE modelling, we believe it is useful to distinguish between the 
intensive margin and the extensive margin. For purposes of this talk, we will view the intensive margin as the 
one in which the user takes the existing model dimensions and policy applications as given, and research 
focuses on improvements to the theory, parameters and/or data. One area of important recent theoretical 
work at the intensive margin is provided by a number of different groups of authors seeking to incorporate 
Melitz’s theory of firm heterogeneity into CGE models (e.g., BALISTRERI, et al., 2007; ZHAI, 2007). This 
represents a significant departure from currently employed theory and holds the potential for important 
new insights into one of the longest-standing areas of analysis for CGE models – namely the impacts of 
trade liberalization. However, in our view, theoretical work is not the only important contribution at the 
intensive margin. Improvements in the estimation of parameters for existing models (HERTEL, et al. 2007a) 
and improvements in the data base and the way existing policies are represented in existing models (GOHIN
AND FEMENIA, 2007) are equally important for the future of CGE analysis. Indeed, oftentimes these factors 
are more significant for policy findings than are variations in the underlying theory. However, we will talk 
about none of this important work today. Instead, we will focus on the extensive margin of CGE analysis.
Following the definition that we am adopting in this talk, the extensive margin of CGE analysis refers 
to applications that seek to extend the “reach” of CGE analysis into either new dimensions of existing 
applications (e.g., poverty impacts of trade liberalization) or new areas of application (e.g., the economy-
wide impacts of biofuel mandates). Working at the extensive margin typically requires some sort of inter-
disciplinary collaboration in which knowledge from other fields is marshalled and organized into a format 
suitable for incorporation into a CGE model. Success in this area of work does not typically hinge on new 
theoretical developments (although it might), but rather it requires the authors to master new data sets 
and wrestle with ways to make these supplementary data consistent with the rest of the CGE modelling 
framework. Often a bit of modelling innovation is also required to make the bridge between the core model 
and the satellite analysis.
In this paper we have chosen to focus on three recent extensions of CGE analysis using new “satellite” 
data sets. The first of these relates to highly detailed trade data, which seek to take CGE analysis “to the 
tariff line”. The second satellite data set allows the researcher to focus on household impacts – particularly 
the impacts on the poor. For this purpose, household survey data become critical. The third extension 
entails a detailed analysis of land use in biofuels production, thereby necessitating introduction of a “land 
use module” into the CGE framework.
13
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2. “Tariff-line” Analysis 
Policy makers have long sought greater sector disaggregation from CGE modellers. The fact is that 
negotiations are typically conducted at an extremely detailed level, and the broad industries depicted in 
CGE models are simply too aggregate to be useful to them. To date, this problem has been handled via a 
suite of analytical tools, with CGE analysis providing the aggregate analysis: for example, “how large are 
the potential gains to the nation or the world?”, while and simple, supply-demand, partial equilibrium 
models are used to assess the impact on a particular type of footwear product (FRANCOIS, 1997). However, 
the fact is that the specifics of the negotiated outcome at the tariff line can have important implications 
for the aggregate welfare gains. For example, in the context of the Doha Development Agenda, JEAN et al.
(2006) and LABORDE, JEAN AND MARTIN (2007) find that, by allowing just 2% of tariff lines to be treated as so-
called “sensitive products” by developed countries, the impact of the overall liberalization is dramatically 
reduced. Thus, it would be attractive to be able to accomplish both goals within a common framework. This 
has led to the idea of taking CGE modelling down to the tariff line (GRANT, et al., 2007). (In reality, many 
countries specify their tariff schedules at the HS-10 level. This is too disaggregated to obtain reliable, 
consistent global data on trade flows, so instead most of this research just goes down to the HS-6 level. But 
this is quite a large leap beyond the typical level of CGE disaggregation.)
In this paper we will draw on the study by GRANT, HERTEL AND RUTHERFORD (GHR: 2007), who start with 
the GTAPinGAMS model developed by RUTHERFORD (2007) and nest a partial equilibrium model within that 
framework. The focus in their paper is on US dairy policy, so their partial equilibrium model breaks out the 
dairy products sector represented in their general equilibrium model into 24 HS-6 commodities. The US a 
very large dairy importer, with gross imports valued at $1.5 billion in 2001. 
As shown in Figure 1 (taken from GRANT, 2007), there is considerable heterogeneity in the level and composition 
of protection within the US dairy sector. Specific tariffs provide the bulk of the protection for the most highly 
protected products, and virtually all of the more heavily protected commodities also have a Tariff Rate Quota 
(TRQ) in place. This two-tier tariff structure was introduced into the WTO during the Uruguay Round negotiations 
as a vehicle for ensuring market access at a modest (in-quota) tariff, while protecting domestic producers from 
higher rates of access using a much higher (out-of-quota) tariff. This system of TRQs presents a huge problem for 
CGE modellers, as it is impossible to accurately capture their effects in an aggregate model when some are binding 
and some are not. Furthermore, as we will see below, the impacts of different modalities for liberalizing these 
TRQs can be extremely different. Therefore, it is necessary to model these TRQs at a disaggregated level.
Figure 2 (taken from GHR) portrays the partial equilibrium modelling framework adopted by GHR for 
the PE portion of their model. Starting at the bottom of the figure, we see that national dairy processing 
capacity is given (determined by the GE model). That capacity can be transformed into different commodities 
– any one of the 24 HS-6 products – subject to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. 
These products are then sold either into the domestic market, or exported. If they are exported, then 
they must be transported to the destination market, where they will compete with products from other 
suppliers. In the figure, we see Canadian and EU specialty cheeses competing for a share of the US import 
market where a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function determines the potential for one country 
to increase market share in the wake of a given decline in their supply price. Finally, at the top of Figure 2, 
aggregate specialty cheese imports are seen to substitute for domestically produce cheese, and thereafter, 
the composite cheese bundle substitutes for other dairy products. Total expenditure on dairy products is 
governed by the GE model. By disaggregating dairy production and consumption within each region of 
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their global GE model, GHR are able to model bilateral dairy products trade at the HS-6 level, thereby taking 
them down to a level at which meaningful analysis of TRQ liberalization can be conducted.
Figure 1. US Dairy Protection, 2001
Source: MacMap, 2001; as compiled by Grant, 2007 
Figure 2. Structure of the Partial Equilibrium Model 
Source: Grant, 2007
15
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The bulk of the US TRQs are allocated on a bilateral basis (i.e. a specific allocation of in-quota imports 
are allocated to a specific country, e.g., New Zealand, e.g., see GHR). However, some of the TRQs are available 
to the highest bidder (MFN basis), and most discussion of TRQ liberalization under the WTO has focused 
on expansion of the MFN quotas. Of course, another option is to simply reduce out-of-quota tariffs, while a 
final liberalization possibility would be to simultaneously expand the quota and cut the tariff. GHR explore 
all of these options and here we summarize a few of their findings to illustrate the value of this kind of 
disaggregated analysis.
Figure 3 plots out-of-quota imports for four key exporters into the US market against the bilateral quota 
expansion factor (EU imports on the right-hand scale). When every exporters’ quota allocation is expanded, 
in-quota imports substitute for out-of-quota imports and quota rents for the exporters typically rise for a 
time, eventually declining after the quota becomes exactly binding and the per unit quota rents begin to 
decline (the so-called “regime 2” of the TRQ). As can be seen from the Figure, this occurs first for Canada 
and the EU and later for Australia and New Zealand. As long as over-quota imports are still entering the US, 
domestic prices are held up by the over-quota tariff. It is only when the quota expansion factor hits 30% 
and import prices begin to decline that composite imports growth and market liberalization is achieved 
(Figure 4). So GHR conclude that those anticipating immediate market impacts from TRQ expansion in 
the US dairy market will be disappointed. Of course, this doesn’t mean the exporters will be disappointed. 
Indeed, GHR show that quota rents actually expand initially, as over-quota tariff revenue is transmitted to 
exporters in the form of quota rents!
Figure 3. Expansion of Bi-lateral Out-of-Quota US Imports of Specialty Cheese
Source: Grant, 2007
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As can be seen from Figure 5, the story for expansion of quotas on an MFN basis is quite different 
from that of the bilateral expansion. Presuming that the MFN quota is auctioned off to the highest bidder, 
GHR predict that the EU, with the highest unit values, will pick up this additional quota initially. Thus, 
out-of-quota imports for the other exporters are unchanged initially. And the EU simply substitutes its 
old over-quota sales for the new, in-quota opportunities. Indeed, aggregate specialty cheese imports are 
unchanged until the EU exhausts is supply of over-quota sales. At that point, a price effect is felt and other 
exporters get into the game of bidding for the expanded MFN quota. However, it is only when all of the 
major exporters have exhausted their over-quota exports that MFN quota expansion really has an impact 
on imports. This is evident in Figure 6, which contrasts the path to full liberalization in the US specialty 
cheese market using the four different policy tools. For 10% quota expansion/tariff cuts, the only tool 
that has a real impact on imports is the out-of-quota tariff cut. These cuts continue to have an impact on 
imports in a more or less linear fashion, until full liberalization is achieved (100% on the horizontal axis). 
Bilateral quota expansion doesn’t begin to have a strong effect until the expansion factors equal 40% of 
full liberalization; expansion from that point has a strong effect, and is nearly complete at 70%. MFN quota 
expansion, also takes a while to “cut in”, as over-quota imports are exhausted. However, once that process 
is complete, the path of liberalization is quite rapid (Figure 6).
Figure 4. Composite Imports and Price Bi-lateral In-Quota Expansion
Source: Grant, 2007
In summary, by extending CGE analysis to the “tariff line”, consider insight can be obtained about 
policies and their impacts, while retaining the overall rigors of general equilibrium analysis. Of course, the 
compromise made here is that we have used a very simplistic structure for the disaggregated commodity 
markets. In fact, many of these dairy products are joint products/by-products and should be modelled 
accordingly. The ideal model of a dairy sector would include a detailed specification of the ingredients of 
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each product and how these are traded and ultimately assembled into consumer goods. Such models exist, 
and should be used to their maximum possible extent. Unfortunately, to date, these dairy models have not 
come to grips with the subtleties of trade policy – specifically the treatment of bilateral and MFN TRQs. 
Figure 5. MFN In-Quota Expansion
Source: Grant, 2007
Figure 6. Comparison of All Scenarios
Source: Grant, 2007
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3. Poverty Impacts of Trade Policy Reforms
With the advent of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and its focus on the impacts of WTO reforms on 
poverty, there has been a sharp upswing in the body of research focusing on the links between trade and 
poverty. Winters MCCULLOCH AND MCKAY (2004) offer an excellent survey of the empirical evidence on this 
topic and HERTEL AND REIMER (2005) review the literature on ex ante simulation of the poverty impacts of trade 
reform. One of the most extensive evaluations of the poverty impacts of the DDA is offered by the collection 
of studies in the recent volume edited by HERTEL AND WINTERS (2006). At the heart of their study are a set of 
country case studies involving national CGE models –linked in some way to survey-based household models. 
Each of these models is different, and has been tailored to the issues most prominent in the country at hand 
– as well as to the unique abilities of the researchers. This approach was extremely useful for generating 
insights into the different types of linkages between trade and poverty in the context of the DDA. 
The insights generated from the country case studies were often very valuable; for example, prior to 
the presentation of this work in Brussels, it was “common knowledge” amongst EU decision makers that EU 
agricultural trade policy reforms would accrue to rich land-owners in Brazil – to the exclusion of the poor 
– thereby worsening income distribution in that country. Yet the country case study on Brazil overturned 
this conventional wisdom. By drawing on a very detailed micro-simulation analysis of labour markets in 
Brazil, FERREIRA-FILHO AND HORRIDGE (2006) were able to demonstrate how EU reforms could actually benefit 
some of the poorest households in Brazil – and potentially improve the income distribution there. These 
important insights notwithstanding, it was difficult to generalize from these highly differentiated country 
case studies about the impacts of the DDA on developing countries in general. And, at the end of the day, 
this is often what decision makers in Brussels (as well as Geneva and Washington) are seeking. 
Based on this experience, we look for a simpler approach to characterizing the broad linkages between 
trade policy and poverty. The basic idea is to capture those broad channels through which trade policy 
affects household welfare and poverty in every country. Thus, the proposed approach is not intended as a 
substitute for the detailed country case studies, but rather as a complement, designed to offer some broader 
generalizations which could be readily explained to policy makers. 
Building on earlier work with Maros Ivanic, John Cranfield and Paul Preckel (e.g., HERTEL et al., 2004), 
as well as the collaboration with L. Alan Winters discussed previously, we have chosen to emphasize 
the earnings, spending and tax replacement effects of trade reform. The general approach is laid out 
in HERTEL et al. (2007c). As in earlier work, we first group the population into seven strata, based on 
earnings specialization (for more details, see, for example, IVANIC, 2003). In this way, we capture the broad 
distinctions between the agriculture-dependent households, the self-employed in non-agriculture, as well 
as the wage-labourers. Distinguishing between rural and urban households is also potentially important as 
we know that trade reform typically generates winners and losers, and often these fault lines lie between 
the farm and non-farm, rural and urban, sectors. Households in each stratum are aligned from poorest to 
richest, the poverty line is identified, and the density of households around the poverty line, as well as the 
stratum earnings shares in the neighbourhood of the poverty line, are estimated. These will be the key to 
the subsequent poverty decomposition.
Spending patterns are also important to the incidence of trade policy reform, with the poor typically 
spending a much larger share of their income on food so that they are more vulnerable to food price hikes 
(once one controls for earnings sources). We capture this through an econometrically estimated consumer 
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demand system. This is estimated using a blend of international cross-section and national expenditure 
distribution data (e.g., CRANFIELD et al., 2004). For this purpose we use the AIDADS functional form (RIMMER
AND POWELL, 1996) which has been shown to perform particularly well in out-of-sample forecasts of food 
demand (CRANFIELD et al., 2003). We have recently been working on validating the AIDADS prediction for 
within country food expenditures across the income spectrum against household survey data. Preliminary 
results for food expenditure in Bangladesh (shown in Figure 7) are very promising (VERMA, 2007). It is 
particularly impressive how well AIDADS captures food expenditure at the extremes of the distribution. To 
understand why this is, let us turn to the AIDADS specification. 
The share-equation, estimating form of AIDADS is as follows:
( )
( ) ny
p
u
u
y
p nnnn
n ∀



−
+
+
+=
γβαγλ '1
exp1
exp
     (1)
where n  is the budget share of good n, n , n , and n  are unknown parameters, u represents utility, 
np  is the price of good n, and y is income. The following parametric restrictions are used to ensure well-
behaved demands: 1,0  nn   for all n, and  
 

N
n
N
n
nn
1 1
1 .
The AIDADS demand system is particularly attractive for poverty analysis, since it devotes two-thirds 
of its parameters to consumption behaviour in the neighbourhood of the poverty line. In particular, n  is 
the estimated subsistence level of demand for commodity n, and n  is the marginal budget share at the 
subsistence level of income, while the remaining n-dimensional parameter vector, n , is the marginal 
budget share at very high income levels. These parameters aid the functional form in pinning down 
expenditure at the very low and very high levels of income.
Figure 7. Performance of AIDADS: predicted vs. actual food budget share in Bangladesh (ME est. using ICP and 
income distribution data)
Source: Verma, 2007
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Having estimated these parameters2, we can now compute the change in the cost of living at the 
poverty line, 
pC , a critical piece of information for the poverty calculations. We find pC by minimizing the 
expenditure required to meet the poverty level of utility, pu , given prices. Thus the optimal consumption 
bundle of the household at the poverty line will vary depending on optimal demands (3) obtained from the 
AIDADS utility function (2). The specific cost minimization problem to be solved is as follows:
Choose ( )
1
,..., ,...,
p p p
i nx x x  , where i indexes the commodities consumed by the household at the poverty 
level of utility, to:
1
minimize ( )
ik i
n
p p
i ix i
C p x



subject to:
1
exp( )
ln 1
1 exp( ) exp( )
p pn
i i i i
p p
i
u x
u A u
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(3)
With these pieces in place, we are ready to compute the change in the national poverty headcount, ˆ rH
, as a function of the changes in pre-tax earnings ˆ
rjW , taxes (here the replacement tax is assumed to be a 
uniform income tax where the proportional change in the power of the subsidy is given by ˆrT ), and cost-
of-living at the poverty line in region r. (Earnings and the cost of living are both expressed relative to the 
change in net national income in the region, ˆ ry .)3
   ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆp pr rs rs rsj rj r r r r r r
s j
H W y T C y        	 	 (4)
where rs  is the share of stratum s (e.g., agriculture self-employed households) in the total poverty 
headcount, rs is the poverty elasticity with respect to income in stratum s, r rs rs
s
    is the national 
poverty elasticity, and prsj is the share of income at the poverty line obtained from endowment j in stratum 
s of region r.
With this framework in hand, we can not only estimate poverty changes across a wide range of 
countries, we can also use the decomposition to provide insights into any puzzles that might arise in the 
course of an analysis of the trade-poverty linkages. By way of example, consider one of the important 
puzzles to emerge from our recent analysis of the Doha Development Agenda (HERTEL et al., 2007b). It has 
long been argued that rich country agricultural reforms will reduce poverty in developing countries, since 
they will raise agricultural prices, thereby boosting incomes of the majority of the poor who live in rural 
areas and rely, either directly or indirectly, on agriculture for their livelihoods. This point is confirmed 
in our recent study (HERTEL et al., 2007c). However, we also find that one of the most poverty-friendly 
measures that can be undertaken as part of a global trade reform package is to cut tariffs on staple foods in 
developing countries. The explanation that we give is that the poor spend a large share of their income on 
2 Details on the estimation and region-specific calibration of this demand system are available in (2007b).
3 See Hertel et al. (2007c) for the derivation of this expression.
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food, so lower prices will benefit the poor disproportionately. However, this appears to fly in the face of the 
first assertion – namely that higher agricultural prices reduce poverty. Indeed, many developing country 
negotiators have come to the conclusion that they should raise tariffs on agricultural products! So this 
point of controversy bears closer investigation.
Figure 8. Impact of Rich and Poor Agr Lib on Poverty Determinants
Ĥr = Σs βrs εrsΣj α
p
rsj (Ŵmrj — ŷr) + εr ÎTr — εr(Ĉpr — ŷr)
Source: Hertel et al., 2007c
Figures 8 – 10 help to resolve this puzzle in the case of The Philippines – one of the staunchest 
supporters of continued tariff protection for staple products (particularly rice). Figure 8 reports the impacts 
on the individual “drivers” behind the decomposition in equation (4) –in the case of the Philippines– 
for the two types of experiments: Rich country agricultural reforms (RichAgr) and poor country reforms 
(PoorAgr), the latter of which includes the Philippines’ own agricultural reforms. In both cases, all trade 
policy distortions are removed (as opposed to just cutting according to proposed DDA formulae). The first 
four sets of bars show the changes in market wages (relative to net national income) for agricultural land, 
unskilled agricultural labour, unskilled non-agricultural labour, and wage labour (see HERTEL et al., 2007b 
for a complete report of all results). From these results, it is clear that RichAgr reforms boost returns to 
land and agricultural labour, as well as unskilled wage labour, whereas PoorAgr reforms boost returns to 
unskilled labour in the non-agricultural sector. So the earnings impacts of the two types of reforms are 
quite different.Figure 9 translates these earnings changes into changes in national poverty headcount, as 
contributed by the seven different earnings strata. Thus we see that the rise in agricultural factor returns 
following RichAgr reform lowers national poverty by lowering the poverty headcount in the agricultural 
stratum. This effect is even more pronounced amongst the rural diversified households, as they comprise a 
much larger share of the poor, and, despite their diversification, they rely on agriculture, as well as wage 
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labour for their income (and similarly for the urban diversified households). On the other hand, PoorAgr 
reforms lower earnings for these same households (relative to net national income), thereby, contributing 
to greater poverty – when viewed strictly from the earnings perspective. 
Figure 9. Contribution of earnings to National Headcount, by Stratum
βrs εrsΣj α
p
rsj (Ŵmrj — ŷr)
Source: Hertel et al., 2007c
Figure 10. Change in Poverty Headcount by Source
Σs βrs εrsΣj α
p
rsj (Ŵmrj — ŷr) + εr ÎTr — εr(Ĉpr — ŷr) = Ĥr
Source: Hertel et al., 2007c
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Returning to Figure 8, we find that the next pair of bars report the change in the power of the tax 
(negative in this case denotes a tax rise, needed to replace lost tariff revenue). Not surprisingly, the 
requisite tax rise is larger in the case where Philippine tariffs are cut. Finally, we have the change in the 
cost of living (relative to net national income). This is also distinctly different between the RichAgr and 
PoorAgr reforms. In the former case it rises, in the latter it falls. Figure 10 brings the three pieces of the 
poverty decomposition together to show how both sets of reforms can contribute to poverty reduction in the 
Philippines, but for very different reasons. In the case of the RichAgr reforms, the driver of poverty reduction 
is the earnings effect, which swamps the impact of higher food prices on the poor. PoorAgr reforms also 
reduce the national poverty headcount by roughly the same percentage. However, now the driver is the 
cost of living component. Lower food prices benefit all the poor. So, even though relative earnings fall for 
some key groups of households, national poverty falls nonetheless.
Figure 11 summarizes the outcomes for RichAgr and PoorAgr reforms across the 15 focus countries 
examined in HERTEL et al. (2007b). On average poverty declines for both sets of reforms – and somewhat 
more for RichAgr. However, it rises in some cases, and RichAgr reforms generally have a larger overall 
impact, as reported in the Average Absolute Value of the poverty headcount percentage change (AAV). 
In order to evaluate the overall sign pattern of the two sets of reforms, Figure 10 also reports the “sign 
consistency”: SgnC = Avg/AAV, which is bounded between -1 and +1. The fact that the sign consistency for 
PoorAgr is a bit more negative means that, by this measure, agricultural trade reforms in the poor countries 
is actually more poverty friendly than agricultural reforms in the rich countries. While this approach to trade/
poverty analysis is extremely simplistic, we believe that this kind of insight, based on relatively simple 
concepts, proves the value of this decomposition at the “extensive margin” of CGE analysis. 
Figure 11. Comparing total poverty impacts across 15 countries
Source: Hertel et al., 2007c
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4. Global Land Use Impacts of Biofuels Mandates
Recently land use has moved to the forefront in CGE analyses of a variety of important topics relating to 
energy, the environment and climate policy. Land-based climate mitigation policies, including forest carbon 
sequestration, have received special attention (ROSE et al., 2007). The potential impacts of economic growth 
on land use, deforestation and biodiversity has become more prominent. And, most recently, the global land 
use impacts of biofuel mandates in the US and EU are receiving attention (VAN MEIJL et al., 2008; GURGEL, et al.
, 2007; BIRUR et al., 2008). All of this work represents, in our opinion, research at the “extensive” margin of 
CGE analysis. New data sets are required, interdisciplinary collaboration is needed in order to appropriately 
disaggregate land endowments, relate these to current and potential land uses and characterize Greenhouse 
Gas (GHG) emissions associated with land use as well as land conversion. Many of the challenges associated 
with modelling land use and climate policy in global, general equilibrium are assessed in a forthcoming 
edited volume on this topic (HERTEL, et al., 2008). We will focus on one particular application of a global, CGE 
model with land use, namely the impacts of recent biofuels mandates in the US and EU.
The European Union Biofuels Directive requires that member states should realize 5.75% share of 
biofuels on the liquid fuels market by 2010 (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). This is an 
ambitious target that many analysts are expecting will not be attainable. Indeed, many are now arguing 
that such a target would have seriously adverse environmental consequences. In the US, subsidization of 
ethanol has a long history, beginning with the Energy Policy Act of 1978. Currently, the federal subsidy 
amounts to $0.51/gallon provided to blenders to encourage use of ethanol. In addition, the replacement 
of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) as a fuel additive, with ethanol, fuelled a big increase in ethanol 
demand. Add to this, the sharp increase in oil prices and one has the recipe for a biofuel boom. Most 
analysts expect that conventional (corn) ethanol capacity in the US will reach about 13.5 billion gallons by 
2010. This exceeds the 12 billion gallon target for conventional ethanol in the new US Energy Bill, and is 
just short of the 15 billion gallon cap specified for 2015. Thus, we expect that the US conventional biofuel 
mandates are not likely to be binding. In the subsequent analysis, excerpted from BIRUR, HERTEL AND TYNER
(BHT: 2008), the authors explore the impacts of increased biofuel production between 2006 and 2010, as 
shown in Table 1. In the US, all of the expansion is expected to take place in ethanol, while in the EU, the 
percentage expansion is assumed to be equal between ethanol and biodiesel, with the latter commanding 
the lion’s share of the total increase.
One of the big questions about the US and EU biofuel booms pertains to its impact on land use in 
the rest of the world. Will this result in rainforests being cut down in favour of palm oil plantations in 
Malaysia and Indonesia? What about pressure on the Amazon rainforest in Brazil? In order to accurately 
answer these questions, we need to have a good picture of how biofuel feedstocks compete with other land-
based activities, and, how those displaced activities in turn compete with agriculture and forestry around 
the world. By way of illustration, consider Figure 12, which shows the global intensity of cultivation for sugar 
crops and for soybeans (MONFREDA et al., 2007). One of the impacts of the biofuels boom has been a surge in 
exports of ethanol produced from sugarcane in Brazil. However, this, in turn has implications for the land 
available for other crops, including soybeans, which are also likely to be in greater demand due to the boom in 
biodiesel production in the EU. Thus, locations where the two intensities are high –note the areas in Brazil in 
particular– are likely to be “hotspots” of land demand, and these are, in turn, are likely to spill over to other 
crops and other land use in Brazil. One goal of the BHT study is to trace these follow-on effects.
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Table 1. Biofuels Mandates in the US and EU
US (billion liters) EU (billion liters)
2006 Ethanol Biodiesel Ethanol Biodiesel
Current Production
Share in Biofuels Market
Current Production Capacity
18.35
92.7%
25.9
1.46
7.4%
2.0
1.59
22.3%
2.8
5.55
77.7%
6.9
2010
Total Biofuels - Mandates for 2010 50.8 27.3
Mandates - keeping the composition same as in 2006 50.8 - 6.1 21.2
% Ch 2006-2010 176.6 2814 2814
Source: Birur et al., 2008
Details on the integration of the RAMANKUTTY et al. (2008) land cover, MONFREDA et al. (2008) crop land 
use and SOHNGEN et al. (2008) forestry data bases into a framework amenable for CGE analysis are available 
in LEE et al. (2008) and HERTEL et al. (2008). These authors adopt the Agro-Ecological Zone (AEZ) approach 
pioneered by DARWIN et al. (1995). In the present study, we utilize 18 AEZs, that are distinguished by length 
of growing period – the period during which there is adequate soil moisture and temperature – and climatic 
Figure 12. Density of cultivation of Sugar and Soybeans, worldwide
Source: Monfreda et al., 2008
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zone (boreal, temperate and tropical). The global distribution of these 18 AEZs is shown in Figure 13. In the 
CGE model, AEZs are also distinguished by economic region. Within each region, we assume that technology 
and input prices are identical so that non-land input intensities and cost shares are equal across AEZs. This 
means that land rents are inversely proportional to yields and, given a common output price, land rents 
will retain this proportionality in the face of external shocks. Therefore, it is appropriate to model the 
(e.g.) corn sector via an aggregate national production function in which different AEZs substitute to a 
very high degree, thereby ensuring that land rents, in a given use, move together. On the other hand, the 
mobility of land across uses, within a given AEZ, is limited, with this constant elasticity of transformation 
calibrated to existing studies of acreage supply response.
Figures 14 – 16 display the changes in land use, by AEZ, for three major crops, in the wake of the 
biofuel “mandates” shown in Table 1. The strong growth in corn-based ethanol generates a sharp increase 
in corn acreage in the US, as well as in Canada (Figure 14). The 11% aggregate increase in corn acreage 
in the US is close to what has already been observed since 2006, as many producers in the Midwest have 
altered their rotation practices to increase corn acreage. Substantial percentage increases are also observed 
in the Andean countries of South America as well as Australia. Even Brazil shows an increase in acreage 
devoted to coarse grains, while the declines are in Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. It is rather 
striking how widespread are these changes in coarse grains production across the globe.
Figure 15 shows the changes in oilseeds acreage in the wake of EU and US biofuels growth. Here, the 
pattern is reversed between the US and EU, with very strong expansion in the EU (more than 20% increase 
in effective acreage) and declines in the US. Once again, Canada shows strong expansion also, as do Brazil 
and part of Africa.
Figure 13. Global Distribution of AEZ’s
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Figure 14. Change in Land Area under Coarse Grains
Source: Birur et al., 2008
Figure 15. Change in Land Area under Oilseeds
Source: Birur et al., 2008
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Finally, Figure 16 shows the predicted changes in land area under sugar production (either cane or beet 
sugar). Here, the strongest expansion is in Brazil, which responds to the renewable fuels standards in the US 
and EU by exporting more ethanol, despite the high tariffs in those markets, to be used in the blending of 
gasoline. When combined with the increased demand for land use in coarse grains and oilseeds, we foresee a 
crop land boom in that country and expect the area devoted to grazing and forests to decline in Brazil.
This work on global land use in a CGE model just represents a first step in the direction of bringing more 
biophysical information to bear on issues relating to the role of land in global energy, environment and 
climate policy. Key concerns have to do with the specification of the demand for land in forestry (SOHNGEN,
GOLUB AND HERTEL, 2008, SANDS AND KIM, 2008), the supply of land to agriculture and forestry from other uses 
(EICKOUT et al., 2008), and the demand for land for recreational and non-agricultural uses (GURGEL, et al.,
2007). Innovative work is also underway on the “down-scaling” of CGE results on land use to more the more 
detailed level at which impact analysis is often conducted (e.g., GRÜBLER, 2007).
5. Conclusions
In summary, this paper has explored a few of the frontiers of CGE analysis – focusing on the extensive 
margin at which CGE analysis meets other disciplines – both within and outside of economics. In each 
case, the rigorous economic and accounting framework offered by CGE analysis can offer valuable insights 
into important policy questions, ranging from the poverty impacts of trade reform to the environmental 
consequences of biofuel mandates. Of course, even as the CGE framework can be useful for many purposes, 
it can, at times, be a bit confining. A good example is offered by the GHR analysis of US dairy policy. In the 
Figure 16. Change in Land Area under Sugar
Source: Birur et al., 2008
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end, the key insights regarding liberalization through bilateral vs. MFN quotas could have been obtained in 
a partial equilibrium framework. And there is nothing to prevent future analysis being conducted based on 
the assumption that total dairy capacity and dairy expenditure are fixed. This would free up the authors to 
work on additional details about the nature of the dairy sector. 
On the other hand, in the case of the trade/poverty analysis, labour markets are shown to be central to 
the results, and it is hard to model labour markets in a partial equilibrium context. Similarly in the case of 
biofuels, the linkages across sectors are complex. The future demand for biofuels will be increasingly linked 
to energy markets, and assessments of biofuels’ role in climate policy requires analyzing not only the direct 
impact on GHG emissions, but also the indirect effect through increased consumption of fertilizer and 
petroleum, as well as changes in forest land use in the rest of the world. In such cases, a CGE framework 
has obvious advantages. In the end many different tools will be required to deliver sound policy analysis 
of agriculture and rural development issues. The key to success in this field will rest in choosing the right 
tool for the problem at hand. 
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Abstract
This paper gives an overview on current and prospective modelling challenges for agricultural partial 
equilibrium (PE) models focussing on EU policies. Starting from the current debate on the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, the paper highlights the current capabilities and limitations 
of existing PE models and develops some ideas on future modelling directions to advance the usefulness of 
quantitative information provided.
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1. Introduction
The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is moving forward. The step by step implementation 
of the 2003 reform is still under way and further sectors such as sugar, fruits, vegetables, and wine are 
integrated into the single farm payment scheme. At the same time new steps are already discussed: the 
communication of the EU Commission to the Parliament and Council relating to the so-called “Health 
Check” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2007a) and the proposal for Regulations which followed in May 2008 (EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 2008) sets up a new reform agenda targeting the milk quota regime and dairy markets, 
questioning the remaining supply controls and market intervention measures, and proposing changes in 
the implementation of the single farm payment scheme. Some of these first pillar related proposals imply a 
further extension of the second pillar budget to address potentially negative environmental and social side 
effects in a region-specific, targeted fashion. These developments clearly indicate that integrated impact 
assessment of the CAP reform process will remain an important activity in the medium term future.
Hence, there is ample room for the use of quantitative modelling, with partial equilibrium models 
certainly remaining an important instrument given their ability to flexibly integrate the different CAP 
policy instruments, to take advantage of specific data sets for the agricultural sector and to represent 
outputs, inputs and externalities in physical units. Here we define a partial equilibrium model as a single 
quantitative simulation model or a combination of simulation models which cover both supply and demand 
for agricultural products, but do not integrate all sectors of the economy. This definition consequently 
excludes both, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models and stand-alone supply models, but does cover 
“model chains” where, for example, supply and demand representations are linked to full market models.
What are the most notable advances in the last decade in agricultural PE models? From our point of view, 
three major developments deserve to be mentioned: the first is the emergence of agent based approaches 
integrating markets for primary factors – most often agricultural land – and product markets, at least at 
the regional scale (e.g. HAPPE et al. 2006). Secondly, the increasing activities of more or less formally linking 
different models aiming to exploit the comparative advantages of different components without creating 
inflexible “super models” with high maintenance and management cost. (e.g. FLICHMAN 2006; JANSSON 2007). 
And thirdly, the increasing integration of agri-environmental interactions in PE models.
But of course, uncountable examples of improvements of PE models exist, regarding empirical estimates, 
novel solutions to model policy instruments, or extending product and regional coverage. In some cases, the 
paper will refer to such examples if they appear especially interesting in the light of the challenges arising 
from policy and market changes discussed in the following. However, the authors admit that the selection 
of topics and examples discussed remains subjective, to a certain extent also rooting in limited access to 
up-to-date model documentations or reports from research projects. A further decisive factor relates to the 
language used to document models and to report scientific findings. We regret that concentrating on papers 
published in English may lead to a bias in geographic coverage.
The following Table 1 lists some recent research projects funded under the EU framework program 
which comprise developments or applications of quantitative tools aiming at the impact assessment of the 
CAP or CAP reform options. The majority are so-called Specific Targeted Research Projects (STREPs) with 
a limited number of partners, where the topics were defined by policy makers. SEAMLESS and SENSOR are 
so called integrated projects with larger participation of up to 30 partners and corresponding extended 
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budgets compared to the STREPs. Beyond these research projects, it should be mentioned that quantitative 
models are regularly applied, mainly using already available tools, in the context of project tenders directly 
launched from different DGs in order to support policy decisions on specific policy questions.
The paper is structured into three main sections addressing specific modelling issues in the context of 
the current policy discussion. First the quantitative analysis of product markets – the classical domain of PE 
models – is addressed. We then look at modelling of agri-environmental interactions. Final considerations are 
given to primary factor use and markets, evaluating PE models’ (limited) ability to contribute information 
in this respect. A concluding section summarises.
Table 1:  Projects under Framework Program VI supporting CAP policies with quantitative tools
Projectacronym Work program Models applied foragricultural markets / land use
EDIM
Policy support for re-orientation of dairy 
markets
EDIM
EU-MedAgpol
Policy supports for trade negotiations EU-
Mediterranean
CAPRI, TASM, CGE for Tunesia
EU-Mercopol
Policy supports for trade negotiations EU-
Mercosur
CAPRI
CAPRI-Dynaspat Policy support for CAP reform CAPRI, CAPRI-Dynaspat
Genedec Impact assessment of decoupled payments
Aropaj, FARMIS, Teagasc 
model, PMP based farm models, 
PROMAPA.G, DREAD, ESIM
MEA-SCOPE
Micro-economic instruments for impact 
assessment of multifunctional agriculture
MODAM, Agripolis
TRADEAG Support to WTO negotiations
GTAP, PE product market 
models
INSEA
Development of tools to assess economic and 
environmental effects of enhancing carbon sink 
and greenhouse gas abatement measures on 
agricultural and forest lands
EU-FASOM, AROPAj
IDEMA
Development of tools and models for to provide 
a comprehensive socio-economic assessment of 
the impact of decoupling on the EU farm sector
ESIM, AgriPolis
SEAMLESS
Development of Sustainability Impact Assessment 
Tool for EU agricultural systems across disciplines 
and scales
GTAP, CAPRI, farm models
SENSOR
Tools for Environmental, Social and Economic 
Effects of Multifunctional Land Use in European 
Regions 
NEMESIS, CAPRI, GLUE-S
WEMAC
Development of a partial equilibrium model 
that will provide simulations of the global 
effect of agriculture policy, trade reform and 
macroeconomic factors on arable crop and 
oilseed markets
WEMAC
AGMEMOD 2020
Agricultural Member States Modelling for the EU 
and Eastern European Countries
AGMEMOD
Source: Project and EU Commission web pages
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2. Product markets
The so-called „Health Check“ of the CAP (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2007a and 2008) requires an analysis to 
what extent the combined impact of the reform process and the recent developments in product markets 
allow a removal of the remaining elements of supply control (set-aside, dairy quotas and other remaining 
elements of Common Market Organisations) while at the same time identifying regions and sectors where 
more targeted policies and policy instruments are needed.
2.1 Bio-fuels
Bio-fuels have become a hot topic. According to the EU biofuels directive (EU 2003) EU Member States 
should ensure that biofuels and other renewable fuels attain a minimum share of their total consumption 
of transport fuel. This share should lie, measured in terms of energy content, at 5.75% by the end of 2010. 
The so-called “Renewable energy road map” from January 2007 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2006a) acknowledges, 
however, that targets set for intermediate years had not been met and that the one for 2010 will most 
probably also not be reached, and therefore proposes a number of measures to promote bio-fuels further on. 
However, there are also growing concerns about negative impacts of producing bio-fuels (see for example 
UN 2007), both from an environmental point of view and with respect to related food price increases.
Integration of demand for bio-fuel processing in PE models has and will henceforth be on top of the 
agenda in many modelling teams. There are four major challenges to tackle when modelling bio-fuels. The 
first challenge consists in developing a behavioural model for the bio-fuel processing industry in order 
to describe the demand for the different agricultural bio-fuel feed stocks as a function of energy prices, 
agricultural raw product prices, further input prices and the different policy instruments as blending 
constraints, tax reductions or subsidies used in bio-fuels markets. The solution may require linking 
specialized energy or forestry models and the PE model for agriculture. The second challenge relates to 
the question of import substitution, which may refer to the bio-fuels themselves, the feed stocks used in 
their production or to indirect ones, such as rapeseed oil in the food industry being substituted by palm 
oil and used for bio-fuel processing instead. The import substitution analysis can draw on the experience 
in application of PE models in trade analysis; however this asks for an expansion of product and regional 
coverage of the models. Thirdly, the fate of by-products such as cakes, bran or gluten must be taken into 
account. And a fourth challenge relates to possible differences in farming practices between producing bio-
fuel feed stocks or targeting food or feed markets.
The methodologies adapted so far to model bio-fuels in PE models are rather diverse. SCHMIDHUBER
(2006) introduced exogenous shocks in the AT2030 modelling system of the FAO to analyze world wide 
effects of bio-fuel production. The supply functions for ethanol and bio-diesel in the AGLINK model (VON
LAMPE 2006) follow a double-log form depending on time, the cost ratio between bio fuel and fossil fuels 
and an exogenous adjustment factor to take into account policy determined growth. AGLINK also considers 
several by-products of bio fuel production. In some of the AGLINK country models, substitution between 
feed stocks for bio-ethanol production is modelled based on a CES function. The implementation in ESIM 
(BANSE et al. 2005) is rather interesting for at least three reasons. Firstly, ESIM explicitly differentiates 
between products grown for energy production on set-aside areas, and products grown elsewhere. Secondly, 
it takes explicitly the prices of fossil fuels into account when determining the processing level to bio-fuels, 
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applying a linear-log functional form. Thirdly, it integrates by-products from bio-fuel processing. The so 
revised ESIM model was used in the context of the SCENAR 2020 study (NOWICKI et al. 2007) and by DG-AGRI 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2007b). AGMEMOD is currently in the process of integrating bio-fuel demand, and VON
LEDEBUR AND CHANTREUIL (2007) propose to derive the demand for cereals for bio-fuel production exogenously, 
from Member State specific targets for bio-ethanol production, and to model rapeseed oil as the sole source 
for bio-diesel. A logistic function is then used to derive from the target in the final simulation year values 
for intermediate years. The CAPRI team has expanded the product list in the global market model by palm 
oil and gluten feed and improved the handling of by-products form the milling industry and sugar-beet 
processing, and explicitly links by-products to bio-fuel processing. So far, bio-fuel demand per product is 
treated as exogenous, derived from targets set for bio-ethanol and bio-diesel and exogenously determined 
shares for the feed stock.
For all approaches discussed, the parameterization of the chosen behavioural function remains a 
challenge as very few observations are available. Furthermore, this issue becomes complicated, as a robust 
integration of markets with considerable production potentials outside of the EU, for example in South 
America, is required for more meaningful modelling exercises.
2.2 Changing market integration within and across EU borders
The recent proposal by the EU Commission to remove any intervention measures from feed grain markets 
reflects the increased differences in production costs and market structures in the enlarged Union. In the 
past, world market prices below administrative ones in combination with well developed transport and 
market infrastructure in the EU-10, EU-12 and later EU-15 more or less levelled out price differences inside 
the EU and stabilized the prices everywhere at or above intervention price levels. After the east expansion, 
high price differentials between surplus and deficit regions inside the EU can be observed, partly due to 
transport costs. On top, the combination of high world market prices and reduced administrative ones 
has changed the picture. Analyzing policy impacts at EU level must thus take the fairly different market 
situations in the Member States into account, as they will impact on farm income, but also on the relevance 
of payment schemes or supply control measures. 
PE models have used different methodologies to describe price transmission between markets, 
including intra-European ones. There are basically three different approaches in use. The first one is based 
on estimated or assumed price transmission functions between each Member States and an anchor price. 
AGMEMOD uses generally a formulation which takes last year prices, the prices in the anchor region and the 
self-sufficiency in the domestic market as well in the anchor market into account. In the case of the anchor 
market, the world market prices, a possible intervention price and the EU degree of self-sufficiency is taken 
into account (CHANTREUIL et al. 2005). ESIM (BANSE et al. 2005) applies a logit function to describe price 
transmission between world and EU markets, depending on EU’s net trade position. The lower bounds of 
the logit function is the maximum of the intervention price and the world market price, whereas the upper 
limit is defined by the maximum of world market price and the EU threshold price. The Aglink model of the 
OECD (OECD 2007) uses linear price linkage equations including a margin representing transport costs and, 
when not explicitly modelled in the supply and demand equations, border measures as tariffs. Models using 
price linkage functions face a problem in case of the new Member States, where very few observations 
are available to estimate parameters or validate the model. Takayama-Judge type models as the second 
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approach use explicit bi-lateral transport costs defining price differentials as e.g. in the EU-FASOM model 
(ADLER et al. 2006) or EDIM (BOUAMRA-MECHEMACHE, REQILLART 2005a). And finally, the Armington assumption 
may be applied as in CAPRI (BRITZ et al. 2007) where EU-15, EU-10 and Bulgaria and Romania and further 
world regions or countries are treated as trade blocks, and price transmissions between the blocks is based 
on the Armington assumption in combination with bi-lateral transport costs. Inside the country aggregates 
blocks, however, a linear price transmission functions from Member States to an EU anchor price is used. 
The Armington assumption is also applied in DREMFIA (LEHTONEN et al. 2005), a Finnish sector model with 
fixed Rest-of-the-World prices. As it is generally the case with the Armington assumption, it allows an 
easy calibration to an observed vector of trade flows and prices, but in almost no case are the underlying 
parameters estimated from observations. All those approaches face data and/or parameterization problems 
and may need a review in the light of recent market and policy developments. In that context, it should 
also be mentioned that most teams working at EU level have or are extending their models to cover all EU 
accession candidates.
Another challenge for agricultural PE models is the increasing number of bilateral trade agreements
which often introduce new Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) at least during intermediate but often lengthy 
implementation periods. Price pressures from abroad into EU markets is – for the majority of the cases – 
not based on the WTO bound tariffs, but linked to preferential trade agreements. The highly differentiated 
nature of TRQs, especially in bilateral trade agreements of the EU, poses serious data problems, as often 
time series data on trade flows in quantities and values are hard or even impossible to obtain at the level 
of the relevant product definition. In the CGE world, sometimes simulation models working on single tariff 
lines are used to capture the bi-lateral tariff framework which are then used in a pre-model step to arrive 
at the regional and product aggregation of the CGE (see e.g. TRADEAG project). Access to those single tariff 
line data bases or the development of an equivalent instrument concentrating on agricultural EU imports 
could benefit the different market models currently in use for European policy impact assessment.
The second challenge relates to the structure of the PE models themselves, regarding product and 
country differentiation and the integration of trade policy instruments. In the context of the EU-MedAgPol 
project, the entry price system for fruits & vegetables along with bi-lateral TRQs was explicitly introduced in 
the model equations of the CAPRI trade model (BRITZ et al. 2007). In parallel, the non-EU part of the CAPRI 
trade model was further disaggregated to distinguish between several Mediterranean countries (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Israel, Algeria, Egypt). The sister project EU-MEDFROL used the newly developed AGRISIM 
model (KAVALLARI, SCHMITZ 2006) to analyze the effects of bilateral trade liberalization between the EU 
and Mediterranean countries. AGRISIM is a standard synthetic Multi-Commodity model using double-log 
behavioural functions. Nominal protection rate and price transmission elasticities link domestic to world 
market prices. Production quotas, minimum producer prices and subsidies are taken into account. Both in 
CAPRI and AGRISIM, olive oil, tobacco and tomatoes are modelled explicitly. A far more detailed description 
regarding Mediterranean products offers the TURKSIM model (GRETHE 2002) which comprises 15 fruits and 
vegetables. It was used in several studies on Turkey’s integration in the EU, but – as DREMFIA for Finland – 
worked with fixed import and export prices. CAPRI is applied as well in the EU-MercoPol project to analyze 
the effects of bi-lateral trade liberalization between the EU and Mercosur. The trade model is disaggregated 
to individual Mercorsur countries. Specific work packages aim at the estimation of supply and demand 
elasticities for major products.
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2.3 Market risks 
With the CAP moving out of market management, and reducing administrative prices to a basic safety 
net, price volatility in EU markets may be increasing. Most PE models are non-stochastic and not able 
to deliver higher moments of their result vectors, and do not take into account risk in their behavioural 
equations. For a few years, FAPRI provides a stochastic baseline (WESTHOFF et al. 2005) which is derived by 
a simplified version of FAPRI. Drawing from the error terms around a 22 year time series for major variables 
as crop yields or error terms of key demand equations, 500 sets of exogenous variables are drawn and 
then simulated with that model version. It is somewhat astonishing that the paper does not discuss the 
necessity to modify the stock change equation.
A somewhat similar exercise was conducted a few years back with CAPRI, drawing yield shocks from 
the co-variance matrix of the error terms of the de-trended crop yields for cereals (BAECKSTRAND, BRITZ
2005), which required the introduction of short-time stock changes in the market part of the model.
Generally, it can be expected that analyzing market risks will be important in the years to come, and 
be also discussed in the context of the health check and the further reform process of the CAP. Both the 
FAPRI and the CAPRI exercises may hint at necessary structural adjustments in existing PE models. Firstly, 
processing time and storage demands for bootstrapping exercises are enormous and may require slimmer 
versions of the models. The necessary simplifications could, for example, be based on statistical response 
surfaces of the non-EU part of the models. Care should be given to not oversimplify reduced forms by 
removing the effects of TRQs. Secondly, introducing stochastic shocks may require a revision of behavioural 
equations. This may include a short-run stock agent to avoid overestimation of price volatility, but also 
revisions of supply equations driven by price expectations. Last but not least, it may be necessary to take 
the risk attitude of the agents into account.
2.4 Dairy quota abolition 
Clearly on the agenda for the next decade is the liberalization of dairy markets as indicated already 
during the health check (EU COMMISSION 2007a and 2008). Several attempts have been made to estimate 
marginal production costs of raw milk and shadow prices of milk quotas in the last years. FADN data were 
used by SCKOKAI (2005) and CATHAGNE et al. (2006) to estimate marginal cost curves at EU15 Member State level 
for different time horizons, and again by WIECK AND HECKELEI (2007) to estimate short-run production costs of 
milk for major European production regions. There is hence ample room to base dairy supply and quota rents 
in PE models on econometrically estimated parameters. An example is the EDIM project which updated the 
EDIM model and used it to analyze the effects of a WTO agreement and WTO plus increase in dairy quotas at 
pan-European scale (BOUAMRA-MECHEMACHE, REQILLART 2005a). The analysis was complemented by applying the 
EU-FARMIS modelling system. EDIM also estimated own demand elasticities for dairy products in the EU.
Supply of raw milk, production and demand of dairy products are covered in all major PE models; 
however, equation structures and parameterization differ substantially. Most models allocate milk protein 
and fat explicitly to dairy products. The methodology chosen however differs. In AGMEMOD (CHANTREUIL,
HARANHAN 2007) milk protein with the exemption of butter and a residual product is allocated according to 
own and cross-prices of the dairy products (fluid milk, butter, skimmed milk, cheese, whole milk powder, 
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other dairy products). A residual product closes the protein balance. Milk fat allocated to butter is again 
price dependent. The milk fat allocated to the products driven by the protein allocation is based on fixed 
coefficients. The remaining milk fat, e.g. the one not allocated to milk and other products, is then allocated 
to the residual category. The teams involved in AGMEMOD made an effort to estimate the elasticities used 
in those behavioural equations from time series. AGLINK (OECD 2007) again uses balances for milk fat 
and non-fat solid, where butter and skimmed milk powder close the balance. Supply of dairy products is 
driven by product prices in relation to the value of milk fat and non-fat solids in the products; for the 
latter, butter and skimmed milk powder prices are used as proxies. CAPRI (BRITZ et al. 2007) employs a 
normalized quadratic profit function at dairy level assuming fixed protein and milk fat content of the dairy 
products (butter, skimmed milk powder, whole milk powder, cheese, cream, concentrated milk, fresh milk 
products) to derive production for the dairy products and demand for raw milk, under explicit constraints 
for protein and milk fat linked to milk fat and protein prices. The output quantities depend on own and 
cross processing margins, i.e. the difference between the dairy product prices and the value of milk fat and 
protein. In EDIM, as in CAPRI, the market price of the dairy products (butter, skimmed milk powder, whole 
milk powder, condensed milk, casein, liquid milk, cream, fresh products and five categories of cheese: 
fresh, semi hard, hard, processed, blue and soft cheese) is equal to the value of the fat and protein content 
plus a margin. That margin is defined by the derivative of the cost function at the production level of the 
relevant dairy product. Both CAPRI and ESIM derive their behavioural models from assumed elasticities, 
whereas the sources for the elasticities used in AGLINK and EDIM could not be located. ESIM (BANSE et al.
2005) covers butter, skimmed milk powder, cheese and other dairy products, but does not cover separated 
fat and protein balances, but uses raw milk equivalents. Processing output depends on own and cross prices 
for dairy products, the price for raw milk and the prices for all remaining products.
Generally, there seems to be a good basis for policy support regarding changes in the CMO for milk and 
dairy, based on different econometric exercises aimed at capturing production costs and well developed 
model structures. 
2.5 The research agenda
Generally, we may observe that there is still a notable tendency to prefer clearly structured equations 
in combination with synthetic parameters over econometric work (see also VAN TONGEREN et al. 2001). 
The synthetic models either employ flexible functional forms for behavioural equations and calibrate 
parameters accordingly, as in CAPRI, or apply constant elasticity equations, as in ESIM and AGRISIM. In 
two trade liberalization projects based on CAPRI, work packages either dealt with estimating parameters 
(EU-Mercopol) or with the integration of parameters of existing country specific models (EU-MedAgpol).
There are only a few projects were behavioural parameters are estimated (AGMEMOD, EDIM, EU-Mercopol). 
Generally, we can observe that there are two approaches when estimating parameters for PE models. Where 
estimations are based on single farm observations, often using FADN, system estimations rooting in micro-
economic theory are used. Milk output is certainly especially appealing as the analysis may then only 
distinguish raw milk and other agricultural outputs. In some cases, as in EDIM, supply response from the 
micro-economic models is aggregated to national level and implemented in PE models. Far less popular seems 
a stringent application of micro-economic theory when estimating behavioural parameters at national or 
regional level for a larger range of products. The large-scale projects developing the econometrically based 
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AGMEMOD country modules all applied single equation models. An exception is the work of JANSSON (2007), 
who estimated parameters of a cost function for all EU-15 regions in CAPRI simultaneously for all annual 
crops under an explicit land constraint with a Bayesian estimator.
3. Agri-Environmental interaction
3.1 Policy context
The CAP reorients itself towards the three pillars of sustainability, and that will require new tools to 
assess the impact of existing and new policy instruments not only by economic, but as well by environmental 
indicators. Under pillar I, the relevant policy is Cross-Compliance (CC), applied since 2005 to 19 EU legal 
acts and the so-called Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAEC). Under Pillar II, the so-called 
Axis 2 (Improving the environment and the countryside) aims at ensuring the delivery of environmental 
services by agri-environmental measures in rural areas, and preserving agricultural land use in areas with 
physical and natural handicaps. So far, there are only a limited number of studies employing quantitative 
economic models to assess the effects of CC on farming decisions. This equally applies to analyzing the 
impact of agri-environmental measures at a larger scale.
Pillar II, accounting for 9% of the EU budget 2007-2013 compared to 34% for pillar I, comprises a rather 
diverse mix of programs. There are three EU priority areas in Axis 2 for the programming period 2007-2013: 
(1) bio-diversity and preservation of high nature value farming and forestry systems, (2) water quality 
and scarcity and (3) climate change. Funds under Axis 2 allow payments to farmers in disadvantaged 
areas (LFA), Natura 2000 payments, agri-environment measures, animal welfare payments and support for 
forestry. A minimum of 25% of co-funded expenditure under Pillar II has to be spent on Axis 2 with a 
maximum EU co-financing rate of 55%. Considerable challenges for quantitative analysis are the agri-
environmental measures, programmed by the Member States and approved by the Commission, due to 
their diverse nature, the limited availability of data, and empirical difficulties to estimate costs related 
to program participation. Further policy fields of interest regarding environmental impacts of agriculture 
relate to green house gas (GHG) emission or other gaseous emission, especially ammonia.
3.2 Modelling aspects
Quantitative analyses of the measures under CC (including GAEC) and Axis 2 face three challenges. 
The first relates to data availability. Contrary to other elements in the CAP which are rather consistently 
implemented across the EU, environmental concerns require to take the regional and local situation 
into account. EU legislation therefore only defines a framework, laying out the targets of the legislation 
and some rather general rules, whereas actual implementation is done by national or even sub-national 
legislation. That renders it already rather tedious just get an overview of the measures and even more so 
to address their actual implementation. Secondly, given their often specialized nature, a clear mapping in 
the “language” of quantitative models in categories such as higher costs, upper limits on certain decision 
variables or incentives for others, is often impossible. The third challenge relates to structural properties of 
the quantitative models themselves.
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Classical PE models with supply and demand functions and some representation of international trade 
are by definition less suitable for environmental impact assessment (see e.g. MITTENZWEI et al. 2007) as 
their interface to policies is linked to a triple defined by region, product and item of the market balance 
(supply, demand, trade). This set-up proved highly suitable for the analysis of market related policy 
instruments, but the spatial resolution is rather high and rather unsuitable for environmental impact 
assessment. Therefore, it is not surprising that none of the models covering most of the agricultural sector 
and mentioned above such as FAPRI, Aglink or ESIM offer environmental indicators, albeit the models often 
run crop supply by separate behavioural functions for yields and areas. An exemption is the FAPRI-Ireland 
model (BEHAN, MCQUINN 2002) which uses land allocation, fertilizer application rates per crops and animal 
herds in combination with fixed coefficients to estimate GHG emissions. Several teams from the AGMEMOD 
partnership are now linking IPCC coefficients to the results of the national models (SIMOLA 2006). The 
integration of measures relating to CC and GAEC or measures from Axis 2 is hardly possible in PE models, as 
any measure must be mapped into change of prices.
Besides the ones mentioned above, the DREMFIA model for Finland (LEHTONEN et al., 2006) provides 
an example comprising nutrient balances, a Shannon index to measure crop diversity and pesticide 
applications. DREMFIA is however a regionalized Programming model where price endogeneity is achieved 
by integrating the sum of consumer rents under linear demand in the objective function, i.e. a Takayama 
and Judge type of model. A similar layout is given to the newly developed EU-FASOM (SCHNEIDER, SCHWAB
2006) model, which comprises detailed GHG balancing and forestry. In EU-FASOM, the objective function is 
linearised to get a fully linear model. The model documentations suggest that both DREMFIA and EU-FASOM 
only cover own price effects in demand.
Already the two examples above belong to the class which employs aggregate programming models. 
Most of those are based on production activities, which are characterized by input and output coefficients, 
and their spatial resolution is typical at administrative regions or farm types inside administrative regions 
below country level. They offer hence interfaces related to input and outputs, and to activities, as e.g. 
payment per ha or hectares. Many of the models also model substitution between mineral and organic 
fertilizers, and between own produced fodder and concentrates. The activity based structure rendered them 
quite successful in evaluating the reform process of the CAP since 1992 with its switch from market support 
to payments linked to production activities, and the introduction of supply control measures as quotas 
and set-aside. Their success over the last decade was further promoted by the introduction of PMP (HOWITT
1995) which solved the over-specialization problem of pure LP models and allowed for perfect calibration 
to a base year. The extensions of PMP led finally to a class of hybrid supply models combining a Leontief 
technology for certain inputs with econometrically estimated dual costs function (HECKELEI, BRITZ 2000; 
JANSSON 2007). The structure of programming models allows as well the definition of passive environmental 
indicators based on emission factors linked to the input/output coefficients or the activity levels; these 
indicators are able to measure the side effects of the reform process on the state of the environment, as, 
for example, in RAUMIS (GÖMANN et al. 2005), Aropaj (DE CARA et al. 2004) or PASMA (SCHMID, SINABELL 2007). 
However, the introduction of the so-called “accompanying measures” in 1992 clearly showed the limits of 
this approach. In order to allow for price feedback, aggregate programming models need either be linked to 
a market model or integrate the integral under demand curves as in DREMFIA or EU-FASOM.
But in the majority of cases, as for CGEs, aggregate programming models feature a one to one relation 
between activities/sectors and outputs, which renders them less useful for policy measures related 
to decisions at the process level as, for example, the type of soil cultivation used. Unfortunately, agri-
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environmental measures and CC typically do not target production activities per se, but specific processes 
such as storage and application of organic manure or plant protection. Such aggregate programming models 
are therefore subject to over-estimating the costs related to environmental restrictions as the decision 
space is restricted to changes in activity levels. In order to successfully assess agri-environmental measures 
structural adjustments are required in the medium term.
Some models have already started in this respect: At least for a test region, Aropaj (GODARD et al. 2005) 
introduced yield functions depending on N-Input, determining the curvature of the yield function from 
a crop-growth model, and assuming that the N-P-K composition is kept fixed, whereas other intermediate 
inputs per ha are kept unchanged. A similar approach was used for RAUMIS already in 1995 (WEINGARTEN
1995), using observation from crop growth experiments, where, however, also other input coefficients 
besides fertilizers depend on yield.
However, only certain types of farm models comprise individual processes as soil preparation, 
fertilization, feeding practise etc. as decision variables and thus offer interfaces suitable to model in detail 
environmental standards and incentives (e.g. FLICHMAN et al. 2006). A rather interesting example in this 
context is EU-FASOM (ADLER et al. 2006) as it does not work at the single farm level but at the Member State 
level. It takes different soils and different technologies into account, sourced in parts by EPIC; however, 
the authors admit that the model is not yet fully functional.
The evaluation of CC reforms or a general increase of spending under Axis 2 of the rural development 
policy likely increases the demand for models explicitly modelling technological choices. Modellers struggle 
however with the fact that – more than for product market related modules – observations on detailed 
technological processes are generally not available to an extent meaningful for pan-European modelling 
systems. This renders already the definition of a probable status quo difficult and even more so the validation 
of the behavioural response. This implies two major challenges: firstly, generation of appropriate data bases 
to define plausible definition of processes available to farmers including their costs, and secondly, access to 
time series or cross-sectional data on to what extent they are currently used.
In order to overcome the shortcomings of large scale, multi product PE-models in environmental analysis, 
modelling teams have linked market models with regional or farm type models. A typical example is CAPRI, 
where the supply models comprise inter alia nutrient balances and GHG inventories (see e.g. MITTENZWEI
et al. 2007). A similar approach is adopted in the SEAMLESS project where a model chain comprising bio-
physical models, farm type models and CAPRI is set-up (FLICHMAN et al. 2006). There are other projects 
where programming approaches are combined with market models, for example IDEMA, but project reports 
are often not very clear about the details of model linkages. Currently, it seems not yet decided if highly 
specialised farm models coupled with an extrapolation algorithm to expand results to regional or European 
level will be superior to template models implemented at regional or farm type level across Europe.
Finally it should be mentioned that there are some instruments in current agri-environmental policy 
which go beyond the typical process definition in specialized farm models, and some elements of both cross-
compliance and agri-environmental measures are falling in that category. An example is the prohibition to 
remove landscape elements such as hedges or trees. And in some cases, even knowledge necessary to define 
policy targets and appropriate indicators is missing, for example when it comes to assessing landscapes. 
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3.3 Topics addressed
Agricultural sector models in Europe in the field of agri-environmental interaction seem to concentrate 
mostly on water quality issues, often linked to phosphate and nitrate emissions from agriculture. In some 
models explicit constraints capture elements from the Nitrates Directives and thus elements of cross-
compliance (e.g. HELMING, PEERLINGS 2005). Nitrogen and/or phosphate balances seem to be implemented in 
almost all programming models. Little attention seems to be given to the questions of water scarcity and 
irrigation in Pan-European System, contrary to other modelling teams, e.g. in the US (ATWOOD et al. 2000). 
Albeit there are specialized models for single regions (e.g. IGLESIAS et al. 2004; JUDEZ et al. 2001; RIESGO,
GOMEZ 2005), there seems to be no pan-European model covering irrigation water as a constraint. CAPRI 
covers irrigation water requirements as an indicator in the 1x1 km grid result set (BRITZ 2007).
GHG emissions and abatement are covered by several models and respond to the third priority area 
mentioned above (climate change). Aropaj (ADLER et al. 2006) models abatements of GHG gas emission in 
agriculture for EU-15 in combination with carbon sequestration based on farm models derived from FADN 
abatement costs are derived at exogenous prices. The parameterization of Aropaj in that study as part of 
the INSEA project is in part based on the results from EPIC. INSEA also developed the large scale EU-FASOM 
model including forestry and modelling GHG abatement under endogenous prices in a LP with linearized 
demand functions. PÉREZ (2005) has implemented GHG inventories in CAPRI and estimated abatement costs 
of CO2 with endogenous prices for agricultural products. As mentioned above, several national models of the 
AGMEMOD system are also linked to GHG emission coefficients. LEIHTONEN et al. (2006) analysed changes in 
land use in Finland based on DREMFIA with a focus on peat lands. Due to high soil organic carbon content, 
peat land emit considerably more N2O compared to other soils and is therefore deemed a major source of 
agricultural GHG emission in Finland. The study analyzed a possible climate change policy allowing no or 
only grassland or fallow on peat lands, but also the effect of the MTR compared to Agenda 2000. 
A recent project for DG-ENV (OENEMA et al. 2007) linked emission coefficients from RAINS (AMANN 2004) 
into CAPRI to analyse abatement options for ammonia. Both ammonia and GHG emissions are also addressed 
in the model chain comprising the PE model ESMERALDA for Denmark (WIER et al. 2000), in the FAPRI-
Irland model (BEHAN, MCQUINN 2002) and in RAUMIS (GÖMANN et al. 2005).
A recent review of economic models dealing with bio-diversity (EPPINKA, BERGA 2007) clearly shows 
that the topic is typically not addressed in agricultural sector models. MATTISON AND NORIS (2007) argue 
that economic models for agriculture are able to provide the necessary data as changes in land cover and 
farming intensity to analyze impacts on bio-diversity, and cite a wide range of studies analyzing relations 
between bio-diversity loss and changes in agriculture or effects of conservation programs as, for example, 
the agri-environmental measures under pillar II. The examples underline, however, that the analysis 
requires in-depth knowledge about the factors impacting on the distribution of species, rendering large-
scale analysis difficult. That view is also shared by the EU Commission (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2007b) stating 
in the “biodiversity action plan for agriculture” that a “site-specific approach is necessary in order to offer 
an accurate picture of the interrelations between local farming activities and specific biodiversity assets.” 
An example for a large-scale application is the EURURALIS study (VERBURG et al. 2006) where a bio-diversity 
index is defined composed of a species index, nitrogen level and level of disturbance to the ecosystem. A 
bio-diversity index is also included in the RAUMIS model since middle of the nineties (e.g. GOEMANN et al.
2005). The European Environmental Agency (EEA 2007) has proposed a set of agri-environmental indicators, 
which specifically for agriculture comprises the nitrogen balance and area under management practices 
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potentially supporting biodiversity which is linked to High Nature Value Farmland. Many other indicators 
discussed in the EEA document are indirectly linked to agriculture as well; examples are nitrogen deposition 
linked to ammonia emissions or freshwater quality. Generally, bio-diversity can only be analyzed based on 
spatially explicit data and is, therefore, linked to down-scaling approaches discussed below.
3.4 Downscaling approaches
There seems to be growing recognition of the fact that infra-regional analysis of environmental effects 
below NUTS 0-III level is necessary as farming practice and its environmental impacts depend inter alia on 
soil, slope and surrounding land cover. There are basically two “schools” in that field.
The first one generates from local information possible technologies, often integrating bio-physical 
models, and uses traditional LP or PMP models to derive the optimal farm practice at local scale, as, for 
example in SEAMLESS. That approach has a long-standing history dating back to the late eighties (GASSMAN et 
al. 2005). The major research question is here in fact how to validate and calibrate the farm/regional model 
layer, and how to link it with market models for large-scale analysis. A recent example is the model chain in 
SEAMLESS (FLICHMAN et al. 2006) which comprises as a novel aspect an extrapolation procedure mapping the 
supply behavior of farm type models into the regional programming models from CAPRI. Equally, in INSEA 
(ADLER et al. 2006) in total 1,084 HRUs (Homogenous Response Units) for EU-25 were delineated as the unique 
combinations of elevation, slope, soil texture, soil depth and volume-of-stones which are then masked with 
land cover, irrigation and NUTS II region to define individual simulation units (ISU) for EPIC. Simulation 
results for different tillage systems were then analyzed regarding carbon sequestration in the farm type 
models Aropaj, a specialized model for a NUTS I region in Germany, and in EU-FASOM. LUMOCAP (www.riks.nl/
projects/LUMOCAP) uses a constrained cellular automaton to downscale land use from national results of an 
agriculture PE model, and then applies local agricultural models to analyze effects on the environment.
The second approach disaggregates model results at national or regional scale to small geographical 
referenced response units. I/O coefficients, crop hectares and stock densities for larger regional units are 
taken as given from ex post data or scenarios, downscaled and then mapped in the language of bio-physical 
models and indicator calculators. The major challenge for these top-down-approaches consists in ensuring 
compatibility between the way the I/O coefficients are generated in the top level PE model and in the 
down-scaled layer, for example regarding the relation between nutrient loads and yields.
FATE (GRIZZETTI et al. 2007) uses a pan-European 10x10 km grid for simulations with EPIC, and 
downscales to 1 ha resolution for river basin modelling in some instances. Results published so far refer 
to the base year situation. Applications linked to scenario results with CAPRI are currently undertaken. 
CAPRI-Dynaspat developed an approach (LEIP et al. 2007) where model results at NUTS II level for EU27 are 
consistently downscaled to about 200.000 so-called Homogenous Soil Mapping Units, clusters of 1x1 km pixel 
cells uniform in soil type, slope class, land cover and administrative unit. The result sets comprised crop 
shares, stocking densities as well as input and output coefficients for around fifty agricultural activities, 
and drives the bio-physical crop growth model DNDC to analyze the nitrogen, water and carbon cycle. The 
approach is further developed to allow the spatial allocation of farms in SEAMLESS (ELBERSEN et al. 2006). 
In GENEDEC, a down-scaling of crop shares was implemented for a French region based on Aropaj results 
(CHAKIR 2007). SENSOR down scales at least the land cover based on the GLUE-S (JANSSON et al. 2007). 
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3.5 The research agenda
Given the growing need for environmental indicators, the linkages between farm/regional models and 
market models need to be strengthened, as well between bio-physical models or indicator calculators and 
agricultural sector models. That requires on the one hand a clear strategy on how either the price feedback 
from the market model can be integrated in regional or farm scale modelling, or how the supply response 
from those lower layers can be employed by the market model to achieve mutual consistency in results 
between interlinked models. 
In many of the models and their applications, environmental impacts of agriculture were so far 
modelled as passive indicators, i.e. they are part of the results reported but do not impact on the decision 
space captured by the models. Using the indicators as restrictions in the model most often will require 
major structural adjustments. In many of the models the decision variables are single production activities 
per main output (one activity producing wheat, a second for barley etc.) with a fixed vector of input and 
output coefficients. Farmers however react to environmental legislation by adjusting variable input use 
per ha as well. In opposite to crop areas and herd sizes where different data sets allow for cross-regional 
and time series analysis in order to estimate supply behaviour, observations on input/output coefficients 
are scarce. That challenges perhaps less the parameterization of the technology choices open to farmers 
which can be derived via a combination of expert knowledge and bio-physical modelling (VAN ITTERSUM et al.
2008). It is however a challenge for the behavioural part of the model regarding how the switch between 
technologies is modelled as it is linked inter alia to investment decisions, risk attitude and imperfect 
information. Empirical information on technology substitution would allow to bring relevant modelling 
approaches such as the one provided by RÖHM and DABBERT 2003 to their full potential.
From the topic side, it is rather obvious that the question of water scarcity in the Mediterranean 
requires more attention in modelling activities. More specialised environmental concerns with potential 
for improvement in modelling coverage are bio-diversity issues and the analysis of High Nature Value 
Farmland.
4. Primary factors
The analysis of primary factor use and prices, especially for labour and capital, has traditionally not been 
the stronghold of PE models, which focused more on agricultural commodity markets and relevant policy 
measures. However, recent developments on Agent Based Models, econometric exercises to allocate labour 
use to production activities and envisaged future model links shall be mentioned as current and potential 
advances towards improving the understanding and the projection of the use of land, labour and capital in 
the agricultural sector.
4.1 Land markets
Decoupled payments introduce a novel element in European land markets. In the absence of cross-
compliance and entitlements, and neglecting transaction costs and market imperfection, introduction of 
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payments paid per ha of agricultural land should increase as a direct effect rental prices by the premium 
amount compared to the absence of premium payments. Indirect effects such as changes in income 
uncertainty may improve access to money for investments or affect the labour-leisure allocation, but 
are generally considered to be of minor importance, at least at the aggregate level. An addition to the 
well known complexities of analyzing agricultural land markets due to quality differences and spatial 
dependencies, the on-going CAP reform process adds at least four additional complications compared to 
the text book case of a decoupled payment. A first one is the partially decoupled nature of the premium 
scheme resulting not only from the payment being linked to land allocated to specific crops, but also from 
CC. The costs incurred may vary between member states, farms and plots. Estimation of these costs is 
difficult in itself, but in turn their impact on market outcomes, for example due to the uncertain degree 
of compliance, implies further challenges for quantitative analysis. Secondly, possible path-dependencies 
may exist from past policy and market developments such as the coupled payment schemes and other 
elements of the CAP implemented in the nineties. A third distinct issue is the specific implementation 
of the entitlements at Member State, or even sub-Member State level as in the U.K., in combination 
with the complex rules governing the transfer of entitlements. Fourthly, the simultaneous introduction 
of decoupled payments and changes in supply control and market intervention measures requires the 
representation of complex interactions.
Traditional PE models are certainly not well suited to analyze effects on land markets, as they 
typically do not break down regional entities into groups of agents competing for land. Outside the PE 
world, different types of statistical estimators may be used in time-series and/or cross-sectional analysis 
to shed light on the question if there are significant changes in land prices due to the reform process. 
Agent based models (ABM) combined with modules allowing for market feedback may help to understand 
how the specific implementation of the decoupled payments in the CAP may impact on land markets and 
structural change. Basically, only model chains comprising programming models and/or ABM with a land 
market are able to provide deeper insights in the development of land markets after the latest CAP reform 
(HAPPE et al. 2006). The contribution of programming models is however limited as they are only able to 
estimate changes in shadow prices of land. Interpretation of the results is far from straightforward. In 
classical LP models as Aropaj (DE CARA et al. 2004), land is often the sole primary factor modelled as a 
constraint, so that the shadow price of land and its changes are most probably overestimated, capturing 
returns to family labour and capital as well. In models applying Positive Mathematical Programming 
(PMP) or extensions, an increase in market revenues and premiums at the new optimum compared to the 
starting situation will be distributed both to the duals and the cost function, and even a decrease in the 
land rent cannot be excluded a priori. 
Interlinked with the question of land markets is the development of land use in marginal areas, 
often connected to the provision of social and environmental benefits. There are at least three interesting 
questions regarding marginal land use linked to recent policy developments. The first question asks if the 
decoupling of animal premiums will threaten the economic viability of extensive grassland production 
systems and lead to land abandonment. The second one relates to the costs of cross-compliance and the 
question if land drawing relatively small decoupled premiums per ha could be abandoned as when cross-
compliance is induced by a combination of increased controls and higher penalties. This could, for example, 
lead to the reduction of set-aside in marginal areas often considered important for bio-diversity. And the 
third question refers to the potentially countervailing effect of the high price level of agricultural products 
and the increasing demand for bio-fuels specifically on marginal farm land. 
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4.2 Primary factor modelling and rural development indicators
The current rural development policy of the EU (programming period 2007-2013) includes the so called 
Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) which applies a set of common indicators used to 
describe inputs and outputs, the baseline situation, the immediate results and the wider impact of the 
rural development programs (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2005). The “impact indicators” are the most relevant for 
modelling purposes as they shall evaluate the net effect of the implemented measures, i.e. subtracting 
changes caused by other developments and including indirect effects (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2006c). With 
“employment creation” and “labour productivity”, two out of the seven common impact indicators relate 
to primary factors specifically. In addition, baseline indicators differentiated by sector are listed defining 
the benchmark against which the success of the programs shall be measured. For agriculture, also the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in Agriculture is mentioned in addition to the labour related indicators 
Gross Value Added per Annual Working Unit (GVA/AWU, total and per sector) and “employment”.
Modelling labour and capital use in agriculture is not at the core of traditional PE models and this is 
unlikely to change in the future for several reasons: 
(1) the main objectives of PE models are the evaluation of market oriented policy instruments and 
projection of market developments with respect to product prices and the elements of the market 
balances; 
(2) the income distribution over different primary factors is generally an interesting indicator for 
policy assessment, but the availability of the needed data on factor prices and quantities is very 
limited with respect to coverage and quality;
(3) the aggregate use of primary factors in agriculture strongly depends on the interaction with other 
sectors of the economy (which are ignored in PE models) and the factor market conditions are 
highly differentiated by regional policy and economic conditions.
Given the small potential benefit with respect to the main objective, the high cost of developing and 
maintaining primary factor modules and the conceptual limitations of PE models in this respect explain 
the limited attention given to primary factors, which are often not treated explicitly (for example in the 
AGLINK model, OECD 2007). The role of primary factor in the ESIM model (BANSE et al. 2005) is restricted 
to labour and capital price indices influencing product supply quantities. Implied factor quantity changes 
could conceptually be derived from the maintained assumption of profit maximisation, but this is apparently 
not used, possibly because the strong simplification in the context of labour and capital allocation is 
understood by the modellers. Recent econometric exercises in the context of the CAPRI modelling system 
try to estimate labour input coefficients of agricultural production activities using single farm FADN data 
for the EU (GARVEY, KEMPEN 2008). This approach gives some insight into labour demand effects resulting 
from a change in production structure by a post-model analysis. However, feedback from regional primary 
factor markets is not implemented. Finally, even the value of the base year information suffers from the 
limited quality of the FADN labour data, especially in the southern regions of Europe.
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4.3 The research agenda
As already discussed above, the further development and increasing use of ABMs potentially 
provides an improved understanding of policy impacts on agricultural land markets incorporating spatial 
interdependencies and the heterogeneity of the resource. The major challenge for ABMs is the validation of 
these complex modelling systems for the use as projection tools. A possible path to advance in this respect 
could be the comparison of results from systematic experiments evaluating ABMs’ sensitivity to changes in 
key drivers with empirical estimates. 
A promising direction for improving the ability of PE models to contribute to a meaningful analysis 
of labour use is the incorporation of farm structural change, as labour use differs significantly by farm 
specialisation. Here, models with differentiated farm types allow for a change of their weight in projections. 
This could either be done based on forecasts using models allowing for the impact of exogenous drivers or, in 
addition, in an endogenous fashion, where agricultural product market outcomes affect structural change. 
In the EU context, such an approach requires the completion of a demanding preliminary econometric 
exercise. First approaches in this direction are implemented for an Austrian regionalised sector model 
(WEISS et al. 2003) and conceptualised for the EU within the SEAMLESS project (ZIMMERMANN et al. 2007).
Despite some of these possibilities, the partial nature of PE models will always limit the scope of 
agricultural labour and capital modelling as important feedback with the general economy is left out. The 
last two years, however, sequential calibration methods have been suggested and implemented to link 
more detailed PE with CGE models (e.g. BANSE, GRETHE 2008). This allows for a flexible joint application 
of models depending on the question of analysis without creating inflexible “super models” with all the 
negative consequences in terms of their maintenance. The link between regional CGEs and agricultural 
PEs could certainly provide an excellent tool for rural development analysis spanning agri-environmental 
interactions and economy wide developments, thereby explicitly representing primary factor linkages 
between the regional sectors.
5. Summary and conclusions
The paper reviewed current policy questions regarding European agriculture and analysed available tools 
and methodologies to answer them, with a focus on partial equilibrium models. Generally, the review hints 
at an active and well developed research community which continues to improve tools and methodologies 
in order to support, but as well to question, policy making in the EU. The number of PE models continues 
to increase and existing models are gaining in coverage and complexity. This is also due to the political 
instruments which increase in number as well as complexity; in parallel grows the needed quantitative 
information. Examples are the implementation of the (semi)-decoupled payments and the list of indicators 
proposed by the EU Commission for impact assessment. Consequently, quantitative modelling activities for 
agricultural policy analysis will stay important and likely even grow in the mid-term future. 
New challenges in modelling agricultural commodity markets are faced due to increased price volatility 
following further opening of EU borders, the EU enlargement, and the policy driven bio-energy boom. 
Further development of stochastic PE models, explicit representation of spatial interdependencies, and 
inclusion of new processing activities as well as links to energy market models are among the current 
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responses of the modelling community. Adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in addition to 
more and more transparent environmental problems related to bio-mass production for energy use are 
good reasons why the modelling of agri-environmental interactions will remain important. Significant 
progress has been made lately in this area by linking economic and biophysical models approaching a better 
consistency between economic and environmentally relevant modelling results. The key challenge here is 
the modelling of intensity adjustments to changing economic conditions as many environmental impacts 
of agricultural production directly depend on the quantity and quality of inputs used. The same holds 
for the environmental accounting part, i.e. if bio-physical models or indicator calculators are used, care 
must be given to the fact that core results are compatible. Monitoring and evaluation of rural development 
programmes as well as land market impacts of decoupled payments require quantitative information on 
employment and return to primary factors in agriculture. The performance of PE models in this area is 
weakest due to limited spatial differentiation, the traditional commodity market orientation, and the 
sectoral focus of the tools. Agent Based Models made significant advances in recent years with a more 
realistic representation of primary factor uses in agriculture, specifically land markets. Promising avenues 
to improve the generated quantitative information on policy impacts regarding labour and capital use is 
the incorporation of structural change modules and the formal links to CGE models. 
Generally, the linking of models across disciplines and scales is one of the more prominent responses of 
the scientific community to increased complexity and integration of policy impact assessment activities. In 
order to do this successfully, i.e. at low cost, development of conceptual links need to go hand in hand with 
flexible and transparent software design helping to document the models and facilitate the actual linking. 
This issue has been left out of this overview, but will be important for the dynamics of future large-scale 
modelling activities.
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Dynamic Microeconometric Approaches
to Analysing Agricultural Policy
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Abstract 
Micro-econometric models have become a standard and powerful tool in analysing agricultural policies. 
In this paper we assess the contributions that have been made in the agricultural economics literature 
to dynamic microeconometric models of firms and households that are estimated using microdata. After 
discussing developments in dynamic investment models, dynamic household models, dynamic discrete 
choice models and dynamic efficiency models we give promising directions for future research and indicate 
implications for future data collection.
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1. Introduction
Micro-econometric models have become a standard and powerful tool in analysing agricultural policies. 
Demand for these models has been spurred by the strong policy involvement in agriculture. Research on 
microeconometric models in our field strongly benefited from the wide availability of data in agriculture. 
And with more and more data being available nowadays via national farm accountancy data networks 
(FADN), household panels, internet sources or specific repeated surveys the future opportunities for micro-
econometric models are increasing. 
One of the standard divisions in micro-econometric models has been between static and dynamic models. 
Static models assume the absence of intertemporal dependence of decisions over time and consequently 
the firms or households investigated find themselves in a situation of stochastic equilibrium (CAMERON AND
TRIVEDI 2005:10). Static models have dominated the agricultural economics literature and classic examples 
can be found among primal and dual models of cost minimization and profit maximization, agricultural 
household models, technology adoption models, efficiency analyses etc. A static model describes the 
equilibrium situation of a particular economic process. Although it can be investigated how the equilibrium 
situation changes if certain variables change exogenously (comparative statics), static models do not explain 
the transition path of variables over time.
A model is dynamic if it describes the evolution of variables over time (STEWART 2005:23). In other 
words, in dynamic models it is explicitly recognized that actions taken now affect future states. For 
example current investment raises the capital stock now (if there is no long delay in building) but also 
in the future. Moreover, it changes the financial situation (solvability). Related examples can be found in 
household modelling: saving, labour supply, or college enrolment decision, all have impact on current and 
future situations.
But why is it so important to know how variables change over time? In other words, why should we 
spend effort in specifying dynamic models and collect longitudinal datasets on various firms or households 
(panel data) to quantify the parameters of such models? A straightforward answer is of course that we want 
to know how behaviour of economic agents evolves over time due to changes in the economic environment 
or due to changes in policies because that is just what dynamic models do. Static models can be used to 
predict how much we would invest, save or work if certain variables are different but they do not explain 
how these changes occur. More importantly, static models may even lead to wrong predictions since the 
dynamics of the economic system are not considered. For example although we could assess the (static) 
effects on output of an increased capital stock due to investment using comparative statics, the capital 
stock considered in the analysis would probably be wrong since effects of depreciation, discounting and 
increased output in periods in between are ignored. Especially, the last effect is crucial. Static models 
simply ignore what happened in between the periods considered. Since static models are not able to describe 
this evolution they can also not be attained via performing a sequence of comparative static predictions 
over multiple time periods.
The ongoing need for dynamic microeconometric models was recently stressed again by WOLPIN (2007) for a 
different reason. Microeconomists have recently spent much research on assessing treatment effects of policy 
interventions (see e.g. LEE 2005). The methods developed in this literature allow for assessing causal policy 
effects ex post, i.e. after policies have already been introduced. Wolpin argues that there remains a need for 
sound ex ante policy evaluation that is best performed using dynamic structural microeconometric models.
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In this paper we assess the developments that were made in dynamic microeconometric models in 
the agricultural economics literature. Given the width of this class of models we restrict the discussion to 
dynamic microeconometric models of firms and households that are estimated using microdata. Therefore, 
we do not consider dynamic CGE models or simulated microeconomic models. 
The next section proceeds with an overview of four research areas in agricultural economics where 
microeconometric dynamic models have been prominent and are expected to remain prominent. This is 
followed by a discussion of promising future methodological challenges and a critical discussion of the 
usefulness of current microeconometric dynamic models for analyzing agricultural policies.
2. Overview of different microeconometric dynamic models
In this section we give an overview of four major groups of dynamic microeconomic models that have 
received considerable attention in the agricultural economics literature. In four subsections we discuss 
dynamic investment models, dynamic household models, dynamic discrete choice models and dynamic 
efficiency models, respectively. Each subsection starts by indicating why it is important to take a dynamic 
approach in that particular class of models and is followed by a review of major contributions in that area 
and some comments on the research that has been done.
2.1 Dynamic investment models
Undoubtedly, dynamic microeconometric models are most prominent in research on investment, or 
more broadly adjustment of quasi-fixed factors labour, capital and sometimes land. The vast literature on 
this subject that appeared in the last two decades is characterized by two major elements: adjustment costs 
and uncertainty. 
Adjustment costs were introduced in the economics literature by the end of the 1960’s (GOULD
1968; TREADWAY 1969) and started to appear in the agricultural economics literature in the 1980s. The 
adjustment costs hypothesis states that firms incur additional costs in adjusting their stocks of quasi-fixed 
factors, inhibiting immediate adjustment. Examples of adjustment costs are foregone production due to 
implementation of new machinery, administrative fees or search costs. Originally, most studies assumed 
symmetric convex adjustment costs, providing a theoretical explanation for sluggish adjustment, but later 
studies also considered more flexible adjustment costs specifications that were able to explain asymmetries 
in adjustment and periods of zero investment often observed at the micro-economic level (OUDE LANSINK,
STEFANOU 1997; GARDEBROEK 2004; GARDEBROEK, OUDE LANSINK, 2004).
Just like with static micro-econometric models of production, primal and dual approaches can be 
discerned in dynamic investment models. In the primal approach, first-order conditions are derived from 
the multi-period objective function. By combining these conditions for different periods, the unobserved 
dynamic shadow price can be substituted out, yielding a condition that equates marginal costs and 
benefits of investment in period t to marginal costs and benefits in period t+1, the so-called Euler equation. 
Assuming rational expectations, i.e. farmers know the underlying process that determines future values of 
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crucial variables, expected values of period t+1 variables can be replaced by their observed counterparts. 
The resulting equation is usually estimated using panel data and a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. Although this approach is very common in general economics, in agricultural economics it 
became less popular than the dual approach. Notable exceptions are LOPEZ (1985), THIJSSEN (1994), GARDEBROEK
(2004) and GARDEBROEK, OUDE LANSINK (2004). An advantage of the primal approach is that the production 
and adjustment costs functions are explicitly specified so that alternative specifications can be tested 
and compared. The dual approach to specifying dynamic investment models, as developed by MCLAREN AND
COOPER (1980) and EPSTEIN (1981) has gained substantial popularity in the agricultural economics literature. 
Crucial in this approach is the assumption of static expectations on prices and technology, i.e. each period 
producers assume that current values of these variables remain indefinitely. Under a set of regularity 
conditions, the continuous long-run objective function can be approximated by a convenient differentiable 
functional form (e.g. quadratic). Differentiating this value function with respect to the rental rate of capital 
and rewriting the obtained expression yields an expression for optimal investment. VASAVADA, CHAMBERS
(1986), LEBLANC, HRUBOVCAK (1986) and VASAVADA, BALL (1988) applied the dual dynamic model to annual 
data on U.S. agricultural production. HOWARD, SHUMWAY (1988) used annual data on U.S. dairy production 
to investigate dynamic adjustments in the dairy industry. LUH, STEFANOU (1991, 1993) extend measures of 
growth and learning to the dynamic case using annual data of U.S. agricultural production. Applications 
of the dual dynamic model using panel data include FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL. (1992) focusing on long term 
measures of economies of scope and scale and STEFANOU ET AL. (1992) who focus on the production structure 
of the German dairy industry before and after the introduction of the milk quota. CHANG, STEFANOU (1988) 
and OUDE LANSINK, STEFANOU (1997) analyse asymmetric adjustment costs using panel data of dairy and cash 
crop farms that display a typical pattern of disinvestments, zero investments and investments in farm 
assets. Two important contributions that focused explicitly on expectations formation are LUH, STEFANOU
(1996) who allowed for non-static expectations in the dual framework and THIJSSEN (1996) who compared a 
dynamic investment model based on rational expectations with a model based on static expectations and 
rejected the rational expectations model. RICHARDS, JEFFREY (1997) investigated the impact of dairy quotas 
on investment using a dual dynamic approach. A final study worth mentioning is PIETOLA, MYERS (2000) who 
explicitly considered uncertainty in a dual adjustment cost model.
Given all these contributions to the scientific literature, how should we judge the impact of this 
adjustment costs literature, which has been around for a number of decades, on policy analysis? It is 
striking that the number of scientific articles where the explicit aim is to analyse a particular policy or 
development in the agricultural sector using an adjustment cost framework is limited. Most papers combine 
methodological contributions with an empirical description of an agricultural sector based on the estimated 
dynamic model. Authors compare static with dynamic elasticities, provide dynamic measures of economies 
of scale and scope etc. The studies with the strongest policy implications are a number of studies (e.g. 
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL. 1992; RICHARDS, JEFFREY, 1997) that analyse the effects of production quotas using 
a dynamic adjustment costs framework, but these studies also only give general implications. It seems that 
these models are hardly being used to analyse dynamic policy effects or to predict long-term changes in 
farming sectors. Maybe (researchers think) there is less potential for such articles to be published, or maybe 
researchers are more interested in contributing to the modelling library instead of using models to answer 
policy questions. Nevertheless, the impact of this literature on the policy debate has been very modest.
Another critical remark should be made on the concept of adjustment costs itself. Despite all the 
theoretical work performed, adjustment costs remain a rather theoretical concept. We can estimate functions 
that approximate them, but the investment pattern predicted by adjustment cost models is usually not 
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observed in micro data sets. Instead, micro data sets display an investment pattern characterised by years 
of inactivity followed by years of significant investments. And even if adjustment costs are present, are 
they really big enough to prevent or slow down adjustment? Moreover, given that most data available used is 
yearly data, the question arises whether we can really assess adjustment costs in this time span. Although 
for buildings that might take more than one year to be finished this may be plausible, for machinery which 
is usually bought at once within a given year this is harder to believe. Overlooking the literature, one can 
question whether convex adjustment cost functions were included in our optimization problems because 
we were convinced on the existence and importance of adjustment costs or primarily because of the nice 
implication that the first-order condition of an optimization problem with convex adjustment costs can be 
rewritten into an equation where current investment is a linear function of one period lagged investment. 
In other words, theoretical models with convex adjustment costs directly result in a dynamic equation that 
can be estimated. Whatever the answer to this question, it is striking that with the dawn of option models 
to explain investment the concept of adjustment costs seems to have disappeared. 
Whereas adjustment costs models stress the presence of adjustment costs as a reason for sluggish 
adjustment of quasi-fixed factors, investment models based on real options theory (DIXIT, PINDYCK, 2004) 
focus on the role of uncertainty in combination with irreversibility of investments. In those circumstances 
firms have an option to wait to invest until new information on uncertain events arrive, and the uncertainty 
is therefore responsible for investment thresholds. This flexibility in combination with the stochastic 
process of the uncertain variables (e.g. prices or policies) provide the dynamics of these models.
Most studies based on real options theory use simulation techniques to calculate investment 
thresholds and option values of waiting. However, there are also a number of studies that used microdata 
to estimate these models. RICHARDS (1996) estimates a friction model of asymmetric investment for 
the Alberta dairy industry and uses option theory as an explanation for the obtained thresholds in 
cattle investment. RICHARDS, PATTERSON (1998) use option theory to explain reluctance of workers to 
take agricultural jobs. In their empirical analysis they use wage rates and a parity bounds model to 
calculate option values. Using a similar empirical approach and panel data for Dutch specialised pig 
farms WOSSINK, GARDEBROEK (2006) estimated an option model to show how policy uncertainty on a system 
of environmental market permits led to reluctance of farmers to investment and hence failure of the 
system. In a dynamic dual framework PIETOLA, MYERS (2000) estimated the stochastic transition equations 
for output and rental prices as a Geometric Brownian motion and showed that this framework allows for 
deriving a consistent system of variable input and dynamic factor demand equations under stochastic 
transition equations. Based on this framework they derive implications for structural adjustment in the 
Finish hog industry. PIETOLA, WANG (2000) derived thresholds for investment in piglet contracts using 
time-series data on piglet prices.
What is striking in these applications is that the models estimated can hardly be called structural models 
of firm behaviour. Some studies estimate a system of switching regressions explaining different regimes 
of adjustment and yielding investment thresholds and use the option theory as a theoretical motivation. 
Other studies just use time-series econometrics to assess the time-series properties of the available data 
and then simulate thresholds and option values. Major steps need to be taken to connect option theory to a 
structural system of equations that fully describe firm behaviour. However, it is interesting to observe that 
the limited number of studies reported here mostly have a clear policy interest.
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2.2. Dynamic household models 
The connection between the farming business and the farmer’s household that is characteristic for 
family farms has led to research on agricultural household models. In household models consumption, 
production and labour supply decisions are integrated in one model. Many of these decisions have long 
term consequences, e.g. dissaving to consume durable goods, investing or taking a permanent off-farm job. 
In principle, these long-run effects can be analyzed with static long run models. However, decisions taken 
now usually also have direct effects on future circumstances. For example, borrowing for investment implies 
repayment in subsequent years. Investing in a milking robot may lead to a weakened financial position 
blocking other big investments in the near future, but on the other hand also leads to a reduced labour 
need. Therefore, it is natural to focus on the dynamics of household decisions. Dynamic household models 
are more commonly known as intertemporal household models. See DEATON (1992) for an introduction to 
dynamic household models. In terms of structure and empirical strategies used they have much in common 
with primal investment models. From the dynamic utility maximization problem, first-order conditions are 
derived and solved yielding a set of Euler equations that are estimated using dynamic panel data methods.
The first dynamic household models, often denoted as life-cycle models mainly focused on optimal 
intertemporal consumption (consumption smoothing) in relation to borrowing, lending and insurance. 
LANGEMEIER, PATRICK (1993) estimated a life-cycle model using time-series and cross-section data to 
investigate whether farm family consumption is liquidity constrained. PHIMISTER (1995) investigated the 
effect of borrowing restrictions on farm family consumption using 2 years of panel data of Dutch dairy 
farmers. Despite the use of panel data, panel data estimation techniques are not used in this paper.
BENJAMIN, PHIMISTER (1997; 2002) used dynamic household models to analyze farm investment decisions. 
Their models allow taking the financial situation of the farm household into account. It is obvious that 
these models are closely related to dynamic investment studies, e.g. by including an adjustment cost 
function. Both studies use panel data and the Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator. A related study 
is CHAVAS, THOMAS (1999) who analysed the dynamics of land prices assuming dynamic utility maximization 
with a budget constraint that includes consumption and costs and benefits of different farm assets. 
Analysing dynamic effects of labour allocation decisions is another motivation for the use of dynamic 
household models. PHIMISTER ET AL. (2002) use a dynamic theoretical household model developed by HYSLOP
(1999) to analyze differences in female labour participation in rural and urban areas in Canada. Their 
empirical analysis consists of a static and dynamic random effects probit model with included covariates 
based on the theoretical household model. 
Looking at the number of studies based on dynamic household models, it can be concluded that this 
type of model is not frequently applied in agricultural economics focusing on developed countries. More 
applications can be found on households in developing countries (see DE JANVRY ET AL. 2002 for a review), 
which is natural given the relatively greater connection between farm business and household in these 
countries. Some recent interesting studies are BELLEMARE, BARRETT (2006) who investigated the simultaneity 
of market participation and production decisions, PARK (2006) who analysed households’ joint production, 
storage and trade decisions taking transaction costs and price and yield risks into account, and HOLDEN ET
AL. (2004) who integrated bio-economic elements (soil degradation and agronomic factors in crop growth) 
in a dynamic household model in order to analyse the effects of increased non-farm income on welfare, 
production and soil degradation.
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However, the greater emphasis on rural development issues in Western countries could lead to an 
increased interest in dynamic household models. Issues like rural incomes and labour supply are naturally 
analyzed from a household perspective. The limited number of studies can also be explained from the strong 
data requirements for estimating these models. Not only does one need panel data on the farming business, 
but also on the household situation, information that may be more difficult to obtain. Another explanation 
for the limited use of dynamic household models lies in the solution of the optimization problem. Just like 
is the case with static household models, closed form solutions can only be obtained under the assumption 
of separability, i.e. absence of market failures. Since this assumption is too strong in most applications 
only reduced form equations can be estimated.
2.3. Dynamic discrete choice 
Dynamic discrete choice models typically elaborate on a framework in which a firm operator decides 
among K possible alternatives in N (finite) discrete periods of time. Alternatives are indicated by a set 
of dummy variables dk(t), with dk(t) = 1 if alternative k is chosen at time t and dk(t) = 0 otherwise. The 
condition∑
=
=
K
k k
td
1
1)(  indicates that alternatives are mutually exclusive. Also, each alternative option is 
associated with a one period reward function Rk(t) that is known to the firm operator at time t, but that is 
random from the perspective of periods prior to t, i.e. the firm operator does not know the outcome with 
certainty prior to t. It is assumed that reward represents short-term profit, which is defined as revenue 
minus variable costs. 
The objective of the firm operator at any time t = 0,..,N is to maximise the discounted present value of 
the short-term profits, Rk(t). The optimal value function V(r) for the problem then solves:
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where R>0 is the discount factor, E(r) is the mathematical expectations operator, and S(t) is the 
predetermined state space at time t. The state space consists of all factors, known to the firm operator 
that affect the current period short-term profit (e.g. input and output prices, fixed inputs and firm-specific 
factors affecting the production technology). Maximisation of (1) involves choosing the optimal sequence 
of control variables (dk(t)) over the finite horizon of t = 0,..,N. The optimal value function can also be 
rewritten as (KEANE, WOLPIN 1994):
)}),(({max)),(( ttSVttSV kKk       (2)
where Vk(S(t),t) is the choice k specific value function that satisfies the Bellman equation and after 
augmenting Vkt by an error term vkt , equation (2) can be written in a reduced form where discrete choice k
is chosen if kjvVvV jtjtktkt  ,      (3)
The dynamic theoretical model given in (1) usually simplifies into a reduced form expression such as 
(3) and is frequently estimated using standard univariate or multivariate probit models. However, such 
models typically ignore the interdepence of production decisions that may be caused by adjustment costs in 
changing between discrete choices. Dynamic discrete choice estimation methods are capable of accounting 
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for such time-interdepencies in discrete choices. This is accomplished by employing a Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) (HAJIVASSILIOU, 1993) simulated maximum likelihood method or any other estimation method 
that accounts for correlation of errors over time. The GHK method estimates the parameters of the reduced 
form equation along with a variance-covariance matrix of error terms. The method requires panel data, but 
becomes computationally burdensome in case the time period is long.
Dynamic discrete choice models have been applied to a wide variety of policy related problems in 
agriculture. A number of authors have applied these models to technology choices. PIETOLA, OUDE LANSINK (2001) 
modelled farmers choices between organic and conventional farming technologies using an endogenous Probit-
type switching model estimated with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Their estimation accounted for 
the possibility of serial correlation of the period-by-period choices since the farmers’ choices may be expected 
to have persistency over time (e.g. due to adjustment costs). In their model, serial correlation may also 
arise if next period choices are affected by past revenue shocks. Furthermore, PIETOLA, OUDE LANSINK (2006) 
employed the GHK simulated Maximum Likelihood method to estimate energy saving technology choices of 
Dutch glasshouse firms. Their model allowed for time-constant, firm-specific effects and serial correlation 
of errors and it is estimated on panel data. The unobserved error sequences are simulated in the model such 
that they are consistent with the observed technology choices. The authors found evidence for persistence of 
technology choices over time through error terms that are correlated over time.
Dynamic discrete choice models have also been used to estimate farmers´ occupational choices. PIETOLA
ET AL. (2003) analyse farmers’ choices between three discrete occupational options: (1) exit and close down 
the farming operation; (2) exit and transfer the farm to a new entrant; (3) continue farming and retain 
the option to exit later. The optimisation problem is formulated as a recursive optimal stopping problem. 
The unknown parameters are first estimated by a switching-type multivariate probit model and then by the 
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) method, controlling for serial correlation of the errors.
MIRANDA, SCHNITKEY (1995) estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of dairy cow replacement by 
solving Bellman’s equation every time that model parameters are perturbed. Their model results suggest 
an unobserved premium on replacement which provides an explanation for the higher than recommended 
replacement rate of livestock. The unobserved replacement premium is likely caused by genetic improvements 
causing higher expected yields for new livestock and by imperfections in the market for heifers.3
This short overview demonstrates that discrete choice models have been applied to a rather wide range 
of policy related issues. The concept of discrete choice models is applicable to a host of decisions that are 
dynamic in nature and applications to other policy related areas are feasible, e.g. non-farm activities and 
participation in agricultural and environmental policy programs.
3 Another group of studies analysed the dynamics of consumer choice behaviour. Keane (1997) used data on ketchup purchases 
and estimated a dynamic discrete choice model using simulated maximum likelihood. His estimation method accounts for 
heterogeneity in preferences and persistence of consumer choices. He found evidence for true state dependence in the 
choice process, after controlling for heterogeneity. Simulating his model, he found that the long-term effect of a promotion-
induced purchase on future purchase probabilities is positive but small. Gould, Dong (2003) used a household panel over 
such a short time period to analyse the interdependence of cheese purchases over time resulting from e.g. habit formation. 
Their model specified an autocorrelated error structure. The authors found empirical evidence for serial interdependence in 
cheese purchases. 
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2.4. Dynamic efficiency models
The economics profession has by now developed a vast literature on analysing technical and economic 
efficiency with parametric and nonparametric approaches. Prominent in the category of nonparametric methods 
is Data Envelopment Analysis, which is essentially a Linear Programming technique that builds on early work 
of BANKER ET AL. (1984). Parametric methods mainly centre around stochastic frontier analysis which finds 
its origin in the work of MEEUSEN, VAN DEN BROECK (1977) and AIGNER ET AL. (1977). Theoretical and empirical 
studies on analysing efficiency have typically ignored the presence of adjustment costs and the consequential 
interdependence of production decisions over time. This may lead to incorrect measures of efficiency, i.e. 
measures of efficiency which suggest unattainable efficiency gains. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
In Figure 1, A represents an observation of input x1 on a farm in a particular time period. The curve 
starting at A’ represents the optimal adjustment of this input over time and A’’ represents the long 
term optimal value. Static approaches typically assume that firms adjust to long term optimal values 
instantaneously and would measure efficiency as the ratio of A and A’’. Dynamic approaches on the other 
hand account for the optimal adjustment path and would measure efficiency as the ratio of A and A’.
Only few authors have by now modelled dynamic aspects in the analysis of production efficiency. 
SENGUPTA (1995, 1999) introduces the first order conditions of dynamic optimisation in Data Envelopment 
Analysis. NEMOTO, GOTO (1999, 2003) include the stock of capital at the end of the period in the DEA framework 
in a similar way as outputs. SILVA, STEFANOU (2003, 2007) develop nonparametric measures of technical, 
allocative and economic efficiency using an inter-temporal cost minimisation framework with technology 
that accounts for costs of adjustment. Their efficiency measures are explicitly inter-temporal as they describe 
the efficiency at a particular point in time along its adjustment path. SILVA, OUDE LANSINK (2007) also develop 
technical, allocative and economic efficiency measures within a similar framework as SILVA, STEFANOU (2007). 
However, their paper introduces the concept of a directional distance function. Econometric approaches to 
measuring dynamic efficiency that explicitly account for the interdependence of production decisions over 
time are rare to date. A few studies have implicitly accounted for interdependence of production decisions 
over time by modelling the dynamics of efficiency. LEE, SCHMIDT (1993) use a nonlinear model that allows for 
any arbitrary pattern of temporal change in technical inefficiency but with the restriction that the pattern 
Figure 1.Efficiency and dynamic adjustmtent
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is identical for all firms. BATTESE, COELLI (1992) model technical inefficiency as an exponential function of 
time. CORNWELL ET AL. (1990) allow firm effects to vary over time but in quadratic form. KUMBHAKAR (1990) 
allows for an alternative specification, where technical inefficiency is an exponential function of quadratic 
time. Finally, AHN, SICKLES (2000) estimated a model in which technical inefficiency levels are permitted to 
be serially correlated with potentially different patterns across firms. TSIONAS (2006) extended this model to 
allow for a simultaneous estimation of the inefficiency effects.
However, there are several promising paths for further development of econometrically estimated 
dynamic efficiency measures. One promising path for future research is the application of parametrically 
estimated dynamic directional distance functions. This concept allows for a computationally more simple 
estimation method and more easily allows for the use of a self-dual flexible functional form such as the 
quadratic, than the radial distance functions that are predominantly applied in the literature. Using self-
dual functional forms allow for a more straightforward decomposition of economic efficiency into technical, 
scale and allocative efficiency. Moreover, the efficiency measures developed within the directional distance 
function context satisfy the condition of additivity in its decomposition (of economic efficiency into scale, 
allocative and technical efficiency). 
Table 1: Main aspects of the four major groups of dynamic microeconomic models
Dynamic 
investment models
Dynamic 
household models
Dynamic discrete 
choice Dynamic efficiency
Economic problem
Investment in 
capital, labour and 
land
Household saving, 
borrowing
Labour supply
Optimal timing 
in discrete choice 
problems
Long run adjustment 
to efficient production
Assumptions
Maximization of 
long run profit
Adjustment costs
Uncertainty
Expectations: static 
or rational
Maximization of 
long run utility
Budget constraint
Rational 
expectations
Maximisation of 
long run profit (or 
minimum costs)
Uncertainty
Static price 
expectations
Maximisation of profit 
(or minimum costs)
Adjustment costs 
Static price 
expectations
Theoretical 
approaches 
Primal approach
Dual approach
Option theory
Primal approach
Dual (reduced 
form) Approach
Primal Approach
Dual Approach
Data and 
estimation issues
Panel or time-series 
data
GMM, system 
estimation, limited 
dependent variables
Panel data
Dynamic panel 
GMM
Reduced form 
Panel data
Simulation-based 
estimation (e.g. 
GHK)
Panel Data
Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis
Current use for 
policy analyses
Quotas
Dynamic elasticities
Policy failure due to 
uncertainty
Household income 
analysis
Market 
participation
Entry and exit
Technology 
adoption
-
Future potential 
for policy 
analysis
Agricultural policy 
reforms
Long run structure
Analysis of rural 
policies
Multifunctionality
New technologies
Long run structure
Impact subsidies
Long run structure
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A second promising avenue for future research is the application of the GHK simulated maximum 
likelihood method which allows for measuring correlation into error terms over time. Proceeding on 
this avenue requires estimation of a composite error term, with both one-sided and two-sided errors. 
Successful application of the GHK simulated maximum likelihood method would provide insight into the 
interdependence of inefficiency over time, in addition to interdependence of the error term over time. 
Table 1 summarises the main aspects for the four major groups of dynamic microeconomic models 
discussed in this section.
3. Challenges in future work on dynamic microeconometric models
3.1 Incorporation of behavioural economics and bounded rationality
The behavioural economic literature that recently caught much attention has shown that economic 
agents often act in ways that conflict with the rationality hypothesis (CAMERER ET AL. 2004). For example 
many studies have found that economic agents value losses differently from similar-sized gains and this 
valuation also depends on the reference point, e.g. a high or low income. Other studies showed that economic 
agents are often overconfident (DITTRICH ET AL. 2005) and impatient with respect to immediate gains that 
are discounted differently than gains in the more distant future (‘hyperbolic discounting’ see e.g. LAIBSON
1997). Behavioural economics tries to improve the realism of the psychological foundations of economic 
theory. Many of its results were obtained from experimental studies that tested particular behavioural 
aspects. Therefore, there is a challenge to incorporate these findings in dynamic micro-econometric models. 
Moreover, many behavioural economic studies focus on consumer choices and it is, therefore, interesting 
to investigate how these findings relate to decision making by firms, e.g. in investment decisions. Are 
key findings of behavioural economics like loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting also relevant to firm 
decision making or are there other psychological processes that are important? DE BONDT, THALER (1994) 
indicate how general findings from the behavioural economic literature relate to financial decision making 
by firms. Another important lesson from the behavioural economic literature is that economic agents are 
heterogeneous in their behaviour. They discount the future at different rates, use different reference points 
etc. This heterogeneity may also be expected in firm investment decision making. 
Whereas the behavioural economic literature links economic choices with psychology, the related work 
on bounded rationality focuses more on formal modelling of limited cognitive capacity (CONLISK 1996). An 
interesting line of work in this area focuses on the use of rules of thumb in economic decision making. 
Examples of rules of thumb in decision making are ‘spend all accumulated profits if output prices rise again 
after a period of decline’ or ‘invest in exceptionally good years’ or ‘invest if my colleagues or competitors 
invest’ (herd behaviour (SCHARFSTEIN, STEIN 1990)). Characteristic for rules of thumb is that they represent 
simple decision rules and differ from the mathematically optimal rule that characterizes the mainstream 
literature discussed above. The behavioural economic literature often denotes rules of thumb as heuristics 
(see GILOVICH, GRIFFIN 2002 or KAHNEMAN ET AL. 1982). Although the literature on this topic is scarce and 
hardly taken up the earliest applications go back several decades. BAUMOL, QUANDT (1967) already recognized 
that information gathering for rational optimizers may be costly and that it may be more optimal for firms 
to take pricing decisions using rules of thumb. DAY ET AL. (1974) presented a static model for firms’ decisions 
on production and investment and compared their approach in qualitative terms to the neoclassical 
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investment model. Following this early work a small number of other studies have appeared that focused on 
rules of thumb in economic decision making, mostly with respect to consumer choice. LETTAU, UHLIG (1999) 
give an overview of the limited work that has been done in this field. They contributed to the literature by 
integrating a simple ‘spend-all-in-good-times’ rule of thumb in an explicit dynamic framework and allowing 
for agent learning on the success of rules of thumb for consumption. Their approach might be extended to 
dynamic household models or even to dynamic models of firm behaviour.
3.2 Bayesian econometrics
In recent years Bayesian econometric methods have become more and more popular. Although Bayesian 
econometric theory already has been around for decades, it is the combination with sampling techniques 
(MCMC methods) that has spurred the empirical implementation of Bayesian methods. See KOOP (2003), 
LANCASTER (2004) or KOOP ET AL. (2007) for accessible texts on this subject. Bayesian methods have a lot to 
offer for dynamic microeconometric models. First, of course the well-known feature of Bayesian techniques 
that prior information can be used in the estimation procedure. Although some researchers may consider 
this to be subjective, we think that for many variables in dynamic models this makes sense. There exist 
natural bounds on discount factors, depreciation rates, risk parameters or production elasticities that can 
be specified as prior information. A second advantage of Bayesian methods is that they are very well suited 
to deal with heterogeneity in behaviour. Bayesian random coefficient models are superior to classic random 
coefficient models (GARDEBROEK 2006) and can be used to obtain firm specific slope parameters. This allows 
for modelling of individual slope parameters but also for differences in discounting, depreciation of capital 
goods and interest rates. Heterogeneity in behaviour can also be taken into account using so-called model 
averaging (KOOP 2003). For example different behavioural objectives or different expectation formation 
processes lead to different models and instead of choosing one particular model, Bayesian model averaging 
attaches probabilities to different models yielding an averaged model that can be used in subsequent policy 
analyses. So, where Bayesian random coefficient models allow for parameter heterogeneity in one model, 
Bayesian model averaging takes into account the existence of different models. Model averaging also allows 
for comparing models based on bounded rationality assumptions with standard investment models based 
on the assumption of full rationality. Interesting in this respect is the recent work by HOUSER (2003) who 
uses an empirical Bayesian approach to estimate a labour supply life-cycle model that is flexible in the 
specification of expectations and can be used to infer one homogeneous agents’ decision rule.
3.3. Data collection and revision of EU-FADN
The EU-FADN is expected to be revised in the near future and this leads to the natural question: what 
improvements can be made with respect to the current FADN to improve the contribution of dynamic 
models to policy analysis?
First, econometrically estimated dynamic models would benefit from increasing the time period that 
farms are observed in the panel. This is because longer time periods improve the information on unobserved 
heterogeneity within farms. Also, the analysis of an important policy issue like farm entry and exit would 
benefit from observing farms over a longer period. 
Second, related to the first issue, the estimation of dynamic models would greatly benefit from including 
more household characteristics such as composition of the household, off-farm work employment, education 
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of the operator and social network of the operator. These variables may make a very important contribution 
to explaining dynamic decisions and allow further development of dynamic household models.
Third, it is observed that the current FADN contains a limited list of capital goods used on the farm; 
more detailed information on investments in different capital goods would therefore be desirable. Also 
information about investments in intangible assets such as production rights, intellectual property rights 
and emission rights are currently missing and will surely be an important element in dynamic decision 
making now and in the future. Finally, investments in certificates or shares of the agribusiness would allow 
for a better analysis of the chain organisation.
4. The usefulness and use of dynamic microeconometric models for 
policy analysis
The overview of the literature on dynamic micro-econometric models in section two demonstrates a wide 
domain of applicability, with many potential implications for policy analysis. Dynamic micro econometric 
models have the potential to provide better insights into the long-term impacts of policy measures 
than static models. This is because dynamic models can explicitly account for changes in factors which 
are believed to be fixed in the short-term such as capital, production rights, land and (family) labour. 
Nevertheless, the literature on analyzing policy changes is still dominated by static models (e.g. BOOTS
ET AL. 1997), also for the analysis of policy impacts in the long run. Clear examples of static models that 
dominate the analysis of policy measures are GTAP and CAPRI (see ARFINI 2005).
An explanation for the limited policy relevance of the current literature on micro-econometric models 
is threefold. First, micro-econometric dynamic models often do not perform very well in terms of their 
explanatory power; hence researchers are reluctant to use dynamic rather than static models for policy 
analysis. The worse performance of dynamic micro-econometric models is largely explained by the fact that 
decisions on quasi-fixed factors such as land and labour are driven by other objectives (e.g. household-
specific objectives) than decisions on short-term variable factors of production. 
Second, developments in the long-term are determined by a wide range of conditions (on e.g. prices, state 
of technology, policy parameters) that are not under the control of the operator at the moment the decisions 
are made. Therefore, the operator has to base its decisions on its own expectations on such future conditions. 
Worse, such future conditions have to be specified in dynamic models and may become an important source 
of error and hence cause worse predictive power and lower reliability of policy simulations. Third, the domain 
of microeconometric dynamic models is less well developed than that of static models and researchers may be 
biased to making methodological contributions rather than providing insights into important policy issues. 
And important policy issues are abounded. The ongoing reform of the Common European Policy, the impact of 
biofuels crops combined with rising demand for food crops on agricultural world markets, demands for food 
safety etc. all require in depth long-run analyses that specifically account for dynamic processes.
Clearly, there is a scope for a much more prominent role for dynamic models in the analysis of policy 
measures than their role to date. For this to be achieved, it is necessary to allow policy issues determine 
more prominently the specification and use of dynamic models. Researchers should become more aware of 
the potential to let model innovation go hand in hand with sound analyses of cutting-edge policy issues. 
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Market and Policy Issues in Micro-econometric
 Demand Modelling
DANIELE MORO1
Abstract
Micro-econometric demand modelling has been receiving growing attention in empirical research, mainly 
due to the increasing availability of micro data. This paper provides a review of some relevant market and 
policy issues that can be encountered in empirical analysis of demand using micro-data. Empirical problems 
arising from the treatment of micro data are also revised, mainly with reference to the standard neo-
classical framework, although other approaches are also briefly outlined.
Keywords: Micro-data, micro-econometrics, demand analysis. 
JEL classification: C9, D11, D12.
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1. Introduction
Agricultural policy simulation models are founded on the specification of market supply and demand and on 
the relations between stages in the vertical chain; as such, they benefit from a correct specification of the 
market fundamentals. Advances in supply and empirical analysis of demand can greatly improve the quality 
of policy modelling, and the increasing availability of micro-data allows for a more in-deep specification, 
opening to new challenges. Here, we review some of the relevant issues in micro-econometric demand 
analysis that have been receiving growing attention in literature, outlining their role and significance in 
policy modelling. 
Demand models have a microeconomic foundation, with rational agents seeking utility maximization. In 
the past, most of the empirical work has been based on macroeconomic data (time-series analysis), therefore 
aggregation issues (either across individuals or goods) have played a central role in both theoretical and 
empirical investigation. Aggregate data require a reference to goods’ aggregates and to invoke the notion of 
a representative consumer to justify empirical analysis and testing of microeconomic theory, thus imposing 
strong restrictions on individual preferences. Micro-econometric models refer to the analysis of the behaviour 
of purchasing units (individuals and/or households) using individual-level data; although not completely ruling 
out aggregation, given that information needs to be aggregated if we were to use results from micro-econometric 
analysis as an input for (policy) simulation models, they allow for more flexible specifications, while posing 
new challenges in the empirical investigation. In fact, micro-econometric models have also stressed the role of 
individual heterogeneity, something that cannot be accounted for by the notion of a representative consumer. 
Micro-data have shown that even ‘identical individuals’ (individuals with the same observable characteristics) 
behave differently: therefore unobservables (i.e., tastes) should not be ignored in empirical research. 
Microeconomic data (cross-section and panel-data) also give more information and gain efficiency in 
estimations, although requiring to employ proper econometric techniques and to challenge new empirical 
problems, like a treatment of discrete variables or missing observations. Data quality is also crucial if we want 
to extend results at the aggregate level; a bias can arise when representativeness is missing, and therefore the 
way data are collected should of course be considered. Furthermore, when collecting data we may be subject to 
a selection bias, and we need to recognise this to avoid a bias in policy evaluation. Micro-econometric models 
also provide a coherent framework to test economic theory and to explain empirical facts; furthermore, by 
accounting for heterogeneity of individuals agents, they may offer a powerful tool in policy analysis, mainly in 
the distribution effects of policy intervention. Of course, in order to evaluate the welfare impact of policy tools 
we need a coherent specification of welfare measures in demand models. 
Policy analysis as well as marketing research are often based on simulation models, either reduced form 
models or structural models. For policy and/or marketing simulation, it is crucial to refer to ‘rich’ models, in 
terms of their specifications: for the demand side, it means that we may be willing to account for additional 
variables (advertising, quality, information, and the related uncertainty, as well as demographics), and their 
effect on households’ decisions: micro-data are a powerful source of statistical information. For example, micro-
data at the store level (i.e., scanner data) may provide useful information on the role of in-store advertising/
promotion with respect to other forms of advertising or on the competition among products and/or brands; on 
the other hand individual data may provide useful tools to detect informational issues, such as food safety. 
Therefore, some marketing issues, involving different demand model specifications are briefly introduced. In 
addition, one of the most important aspects in agricultural policy modelling is that of price transmission 
among stages/markets, basically between agricultural and consumption markets. The analysis of the agro-food 
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system has shown that the common assumption of perfect competition along the vertical chain is not realistic, 
and that efforts should be made to model imperfect competition: the increasing dynamics in agricultural prices 
also stresses the crucial role of a better specification of price transmission equations in policy models to avoid 
biased responses on the magnitude and the direction of price changes.
Micro-econometric models do not rule out ‘dynamics’ from demand studies; the growing availability 
of individual data on a repeated basis (for example, repeated annual surveys at the household level) allows 
choosing the best ‘time’ specification of the model and to track the evolution of individual consumption 
behaviour through time: consumption behaviour, also for non-durables such as food, may in fact present a 
dynamic component, that can be the result of simple exogenous trends and/or myopic behaviour and/or more 
sophisticated inter-temporal rational allocation models and ‘inventory’ levels in some ‘good’ (for example, health 
or knowledge). 
Finally, we would also like to briefly draw attention on the use of experimental methods in demand analysis; 
although results from experimental methods are not easily extended to aggregate models, experimental demand 
analysis may provide valuable information when, for example, new products or informational aspects, need to 
be modelled. 
2. Collecting the data
Microeconomic data (individual-level data) are of different nature: cross-section data, longitudinal sample 
survey data, census data, ad-hoc sampling data, scanner data. Basically, we can distinguish between 
observational data (survey data, census data, scanner data) and experimental data (data from social or 
laboratory experiments; CAMERON, TRIVEDI 2005; p. 39). Data can be collected using different sampling 
procedures; institutions (National Bureau of Statistics and Government agencies) and private companies 
are mainly responsible for collecting observational data. A key concept is that of representativeness of the 
samples: results must be evaluated according to the quality of the data and can be extended to population 
only if a correct sampling procedure has been used. 
Basically, we have two types of sampling procedures: probability or random sampling and non-probability 
sampling. In probability or random sampling it is more likely to obtain a sample that truly represents the 
population. Different probability sampling procedures can be used: simple random sampling, systematic sampling,
stratified sampling and cluster sampling. An alternative to random sampling is non-probability sampling: for 
example convenience sampling (e.g., a person ‘randomly’ selecting people to be interviewed at a certain location) 
and quota sampling. Under non-probability sampling non-representativeness is likely. Sampling procedures also 
affect the empirical specification, that is, the econometric techniques to be used.
A ‘selective’ sample may also be the consequence of agents’ behaviour: variables of interest may be observed 
only if agents have taken previous choices, while no information is available for other individuals. This situation 
is known as a self-selection problem. It is crucial to identify the possible sample selection bias, arising when a 
rule, other than random sampling, is used (HECKMAN 2001); the consequence is a biased representation of the 
true population in the sample. According to HECKMAN (2001), the selection bias can be interpreted in terms of 
a weighted function altering the distribution of variables of interest: knowledge of the weighting function is 
necessary to recover the true population density and, therefore,, to make inferences on the population itself. 
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Finally, microeconomic data are different in nature with respect to aggregate time-series data, providing 
new challenges for econometricians. HECKMAN (2001) summarizes the main issues: a) outcome variables can 
be discrete (for example, dichotomous choice variables); and b) missing data are frequent, also due to choices 
made by individuals (for example, goods are not purchased, thus showing a zero response in consumption).
3. Issues in micro-econometric demand modelling
3.1 Differences in microeconomic data and socio-demographic changes in population
Many of the available consumer surveys are cross-sectional (i.e., individuals observed at one point in time); 
other data are panel-data, where the same units are surveyed at many different points in time2. With cross-
section data we can only evaluate differences within people at one point in time, while panel data may allow 
evaluating the dynamics in household behaviour through time. Panel data, when available, have advantages 
over cross-section data: they may allow to decompose an average effect on consumption/expenditure among 
consumption units, therefore explaining why individuals may behave differently over time (VERBEEK 2004), and 
distinguish between inter-individual and intra-individual effects. Many of the available household surveys 
are based on a rotating panel, with a certain rotation/replacement rate3, or even on different samples (i.e. 
unbalanced panel data). One possible alternative is that of building-up pseudo-panel data (see FERNANDEZ-
VILLAVERDE, KRUEGER 2007): assuming that the sample is representative of the population, although it would 
not be possible to track individuals through time, we may consider that each randomly chosen household 
gives statistical information on the means of the ‘group’ it belongs to (i.e., it is randomly chosen from the sub-
population corresponding to that group), where the membership to that group is fixed and predetermined by 
some exogenous characteristics4, thus “observed group” means can be used to construct a ‘complete’ panel over 
a certain period for different population groups5. Generally, such exogenous characteristics are observables and 
overlap with demographic variables.
Demographic variables are usually collected in these surveys, and their role should be disentangled from 
that of unobservable characteristics. Accounting for socio-demographics variables (age, household size, sex, 
level of education, place of living, family size, employment, etc.) is crucial with micro-data; it is often argued 
that relevant trends and/or the apparent structural change in preferences shown by aggregate consumption data 
could be partly explained by changing in the distribution of demographic variables through time (for example, 
aging, women labour participation, low fertility rates, and so on). A unified approach to the specification of 
demographic effects, ensuring integrability of demand models, can be ascribed to LEWBEL (1985), through the 
notion of the modifying function6:
2 Constructing a panel data set over a long-time horizon is not always the optimal solution, given the problem of attrition 
and the possible lack of representativeness through the years.
3 For example, a rotation rate of 20% indicates that every household/individual is maintained in the sample for five surveying 
periods before being substituted; therefore we may distinguish between balanced panel data (a fixed sample) and unbalanced 
panel data (a rotating sample).
4 For example, a ‘cohort membership’ is a way of selecting groups, where cohorts refer to individuals born in the same 
year(s). 
5 Of course, this implicitly assume restrictions on the preference of individuals within the group.
6 This approach will include demographic scaling and demographic translating, and their generalizations, as special cases. 
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( ) ( )( )( )DVpDVpgucfDVpuc ,,,,,, *=
where u  is utility, p  the set of prices and iDV  the set of demographic variables, while f and g are some 
restricted functions ensuring that c(u,p,DV) will be a proper cost function. The empirical implications 
of this approach are relevant, since different demand models can be derived. Usually demographics are 
introduced in empirical demand models as shifters7 (on intercept terms but also on behavioural parameters)8,
mainly by means of dummy variables. A simple demand shifter DS  can be interpreted as (see DENTON ET
AL.1999):
( )∑
=
=
m
i
ii DVhDS
1
that is, as a linear combination of functions ih  of the iDV ; also note that a DS can be interpreted as one 
special case of the above modifying function approach. As an example, it could be specified as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sizetrendbirth-of-yearage
4321
hhhhDS +++=
where the so-called ‘cohort effect’ is included (MORI ET AL. 2006; FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE, KRUEGER 2007). A 
‘cohort’ is a ‘group with fixed membership formed by individuals which can be identified as they show up in 
the surveys (DEATON 1985 and 1997; KAPTEYN ET AL. 2005; ARISTEI ET AL. 2007). A common way to proceed is that 
of tracking households in surveys according to the age (date of birth) of the household’s head. Repeated cross-
section data (panel or pseudo-panel data) are needed to disentangle a ‘cohort effect’, allowing to understand 
if changes and/or differences in demand are due to trends, aging, household size or cohort membership, 
thus involving the generational substitution of consumers, since consumers in different cohorts may behave 
differently due to different education and social conditions. The cohort effect can have a considerable impact 
on consumption patterns, especially when addiction and/or habit formation in demand may be present.
3.2 The role of unobservables 
Unobservable variables are related to heterogeneity, and have a potentially large impact on micro-models: 
an empirical indication of their role is given by the low 2R ’s usually found in cross-section estimations9. The 
use of micro-data allows accounting for unobserved heterogeneity: if individuals do not have identical tastes, 
then the nature of heterogeneity plays an important role in determining unbiased responses and allowing for 
welfare analysis10. To account for unobserved heterogeneity either in panel data or in pseudo-panel data, proper 
estimation techniques have been developing for the last years. Consider a causal function (i.e., a demand 
function) for individual h, ( )  ,= , where q  is consumption,  hhh zypx ,, , with p  and hy
observable prices and individual’s income and Zh observable variables (i.e., demographics), and ωh unobservable 
7 SEE BLUNDELL et al. (1993), and MORO and SCKOKAI (2000) for an application to food demand.
8 The rank (i.e., the dimension of the space spanned by its Engel curves) of a demand system will put restrictions on how 
demographics enter demand equations.
9 The presence of zero-responses in micro-data on consumption is one outcome of the impact of unobservables.
10 For example, if heterogeneity were not random but correlated with income, then estimates of income responses would 
be biased, given that differences in income cannot be distinguished by differences in tastes; CHRISTENSEN (2007), using a 
rotating panel-data set found that tastes and income are correlated for almost half of the goods.
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variables (i.e., tastes). The simplest empirical model that may be traced to define the problem can be the 
following11,
( )   ++=,
with unobservables simply introduced as affecting the intercepts of a linear model through the term 
ωh. This is the so-called individual-specific effects model (see CAMERON, TRIVEDI 2003); basically, the model can 
be estimated as a fixed effects (FE) model (ωh are random variables potentially correlated with the observed 
regressors) or as a random effects (RE) model (ωh  are random variables independently distributed from observed 
regressors). In the FE model the ωh accounts for the constant effect of unobservables (i.e., fixed unknown 
group-specific parameters); in the RE model the ωh are assumed as drawings from a unique distribution, that 
is, ( )2,~   12. Therefore, the model could also be rewritten as13:
( )   +++=,
Once panel data are sufficiently long, several econometric techniques are available: developments have 
been made to deal with systems of equations, non-linear models, unbalanced panel-data. 
3.3. The treatment of missing data (zero responses)
In micro-data set zero observations are frequent: i) corner solutions, that is, the individual does not 
purchase the good at actual prices and income (for example, the price is higher than the one at which the first 
unit of good is purchased); ii) the individual does not consume the good, independently of prices and income 
(for example, the individual will abstain from purchasing GM food); iii) infrequency of purchase: within the 
period in which the survey has taken place the individual does not purchase the good. Econometric tools are 
available to deal with these different situations; unfortunately, it is not possible to identify a priori the source 
of a zero observation.
Take the single-equation case; with corner solutions (i.e., the existence of a reservation price), the most 
widely used approach is the Tobit model, with consumption defined as14:



 

0
0
*
* 


where q* is latent consumption (incompletely observed), x  is a vector of explanatory variables, к is a 
vector of parameters and υ is an appropriate error term. 
11 In this simple specification unobservables (i.e., individual-specific effects) affect outcomes basically as a shifter on the 
‘average’ constant term (i.e., they can be interpreted as coefficients of individual dummy variables); of course, more 
complex specifications are possible, where individual-specific effects may also affect marginal responses (i.e., the vector β is 
individual specific). In terms of interpreting the model, the effect is similar to that of making slope coefficients β depending 
on values of observed variables (demographics). In other terms, we can model slope coefficients as 
_
+ .
12 Differences across individuals are a stochastic element; then heteroskedasticity affects the sample. 
13 According to this formulation, in the FE models the random term is given by ( )h , while in the RE model is given 
by ( )hh u+ .
14 Reference is made to the exposition in ANGULO et al. (2007).
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Under infrequency of purchase (i.e. transitory abstention), the appropriate specification is the infrequency 
of purchase model, where the decision of purchasing is modelled as:
( )


>>+=
=










where     is an indicator of purchasing decision, with r a vector of explanatory variables, τ a 
vector of parameters and ε an appropriate error term, and Φ(D) the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function (i.e., the probability of purchasing).
Finally, the double-hurdle model is suitable when the zero response may be also due to a complete abstention 
from the market: each individual then takes two decisions: first the participation decision and then the (level 
of) consumption decision:



 

0
0and0if
** 	


The extension to demand systems is not trivial and different approaches have been proposed. Although 
far from being exhaustive, a list includes the Kuhn-Tucker approach (WALES, WOODLAND 1983; LEE, PITT 1986: the 
demand system is derived from a random preference representation), the Amemiya-Tobin approach (AMEMIYA
1974; GOLAN ET AL. 2001; YEN ET AL. 2003; DONG ET AL. 2004: the demand system is derived from a non stochastic 
preference representation with an error term added to the demand functions, and estimated using different 
techniques), or alternatively a number of less efficient estimators, such as a large class of two-step estimators 
(HEIEN, WESSELLS 1990; SHONKWILER, YEN 1999; PERALI, CHAVAS 2000; YEN 2005; YEN, LIN 2006).
3.4 Inter-households comparisons: equivalence scales’ estimation
Micro-data allow for inter-household comparisons and welfare analysis. Welfare comparisons among 
households require the use of equivalence scales, assigning to each household type a ‘scaling value’ based 
on its needs15. Household needs increase with the number of components16; however due to intra-households’ 
economies of scale and members’ heterogeneity, this increase is not proportional (i.e., ‘an additional child 
member is different from an additional adult member’). It is then obvious to weigh each component, for 
example to express any household in terms of adult equivalents: equivalence scales provide the weights for this 
re-scaling17. Simply, an equivalence scale e is defined as:
( ) ( )( )0
1
01
,,
,,
,;,
zupc
zupcupzze =
15 Food shares have been largely used as a welfare indicator (Engel method for equivalence scales): the ratio of the income of 
two different households having the same ‘level of utility’ (i.e., equivalent expenditures) is equal to the ratio of the income 
of two households having the same food share. Thus, this method relies on Engel’s law, for which the ‘standard-of-living’ is 
negatively related to the share of expenditure spent in food. 
16 This brief discussion is centred on the household size; however, equivalence scales can be used to account for any further 
demographic difference among households (for example, to account for disabled members). 
17 As an example, EUROSTAT uses a scale in which a weight of 1 is assigned to the household head (i.e., a one-person 
household), while each additional member is weighted 0.5 for an adult member and 0.3 for a child. 
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where ( )zupc ,,  is the household expenditure function, indexed by demographics characteristics18: thus, 
an equivalence scale is the ratio between the minimum expenditure of a household with characteristics 1z
and the minimum expenditure of a ‘reference’ household with characteristics 
0z  to reach the same utility level 
(standard-of-living) u.
Micro-data contain information to estimate the response to demographic variability, although 
recovering equivalence scales from the empirical analysis is not an easy task. Equivalence scales cannot be 
obtained by household demand behaviour (identification problem), since the same behaviour is consistent 
with a non-unique system of preferences. Therefore, recovering the expenditure function implies further 
identification requirements (BLUNDELL, LEWBEL 1991): for example, equivalence scales being independent of 
the utility reference level, that is: 
( ) ( ) ( )upgzpmzupc ,,,, =
and therefore:
( ) ( )( )0
1
01
,
,
,;,
zpm
zpmupzze =
This property is called independence of the base (IB) or equivalence-scale exactness (ESE).
To estimate equivalence scales different empirical specifications are possible within the demand-system 
approach. A fairly general specification (called generalized equivalence-scales exactness, GESE) has been recently 
proposed (see DONALDSON, PENDAKUR 2004)19: the cost function can be specified as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zpnupgzpmzupc ,,,,, =
where the function ( )zpn ,  is functionally dependent on ( )zpm , 20. Since by construction 
( ) ( ) 1,, 00 == zpnzpm  (see DONALDSON, PENDAKUR 2004, for details), we can derive a (modified) expression for 
equivalence scales, defined as21:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]1,11
1,
101
1
1
,
,,,;,
−
−
=
=
zpn
zpn
yzpm
upgzpmupzze
As we said, equivalence scales can be used in different contexts; support policy programmes in food 
(i.e., food stamps) and also agricultural (market and non-market support) can be tailored according to 
their impact on inter-household distributional effects and on the definition of a threshold for poverty (a 
18 For example, if 0z  represents a household with two adults and 1z  a household with two adults and a child, then the ratio 
(equivalence scale) measures the (percentage) cost of a child. Obviously, given two different households, with characteristics 
0
z  and 1z , but with the same income, the equivalence scale allows to determine which household is well-being. 
19 DONALDSON and PENDAKUR (2006) provide a further generalization, called generalized absolute equivalence-scales exactness,
GAESE.
20 Lemma 2 in DONALDSON and PENDAKUR (2004) shows that:  
( ) ( )∑ ∂
∂
= j
jp
zpmzpn
ln
,ln
,
21 Empirical specifications can be derived under these identification restrictions; DONALDSON and PENDAKUR (2004) use the 
quadratic almost ideal demand system (QAIDS) of BANKS et al. (1997). 
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‘poverty line’), adjusted on household differences; although the major issues are those related to poverty, 
especially in the LDCs, the policy impact on less favoured areas (i.e., rural development policies) may also 
be relevant in developed countries.
3.5. Dynamics in demand models
Empirical models with aggregate time-series data have frequently accounted for dynamics, even in a very 
simple ad-hoc manner. Aggregate data often show clear trends in time, frequently interpreted as an empirical 
evidence of a structural change in demand behaviour (i.e., a change in tastes). There have been a number of 
empirical studies dealing with the issue of structural change in preferences (MOSCHINI, MORO 1996), mainly 
in the context of aggregate data; the existence of a ‘change in preferences’ poses the question of a ‘dynamic 
structure’ at the individual consumer level, while trends in aggregate data, as said above, may just derive from 
aggregation issues. The availability of longitudinal data allows evaluating dynamic components in the data, and 
eventually provide more conclusive support for the existence of a structural change in consumption. Structural 
change has been mainly related to behavioural parameter instability and often modelled as an exogenous 
trend (i.e., a trend affecting behavioural parameters); other alternative specifications are available, allowing 
for stochastic and/or deterministic time-varying structural parameters. Consider a general representation for a 
demand function:
( );,,   =
where θt represents the set of behavioural parameters; in a dynamic context, parameters can be time-
dependent22:  ( )   += −1D
with ( )tD  being a dynamic equation (matrix) for the set of parameters and εt an error term23. Different 
estimation techniques can be employed for estimating the complete model24.
As food consumption reaches saturation levels, as in developed countries, substitution effects prevail and 
dynamics in demand are driven by demographic, nutritional and service characteristics. Increasing attention is 
paid by consumers to food safety and health issues, and to the link between health problems and diet. Relevant 
and recurring food crises have affected food demand in the last years, requiring to understand the long-run 
effect of food safety alarms, that is whether these are temporary or permanent25. An increasingly larger share of 
food expenditure is devoted to the consumption of food away from home, and this type of demand may easily 
be habit forming (BROWNING, COLLADO 2007). Even ‘marketing issues’, like the effect of advertising, may have a 
dynamic component (ACKERBERG 2003). Furthermore, failures in empirical testing of the underlying economic 
theory can be an indication that consumer’s choices are taken in a dynamic context (LAFRANCE 2001): in fact, 
a common assumption in demand analysis is that of time-separability, (i.e., inter-temporal weak separability), 
22 We have the state-pace form of a (dynamic) demand system, with ( )   += ;,,   being the measurement 
equation and ( )   += −1D  the transition equation (see MAZZOCCHI et al. 2006).
23 A non-stochastic version, with an exogenous trend t affecting each parameter θi, can be represented as ( )1, - −+=   
; the trend t has been often substituted by an explaining variable (for example, a health information index). 
24 For example, the Kalman filter technique may be applied (see MAZZOCCHI et al. 2006: results from the long-run model are 
introduced in the cointegrated vector error correction demand model). 
25 MAZZOCCHI et al. (2006) deal in fact with the impact of a food crisis, with sudden shocks on demand.
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with demand models specified as static models of demand, where each period outcome does not have any 
impact on other period outcomes (i.e., current consumption only depends on current prices and income). 
Dynamic specifications have been applied for many years in demand estimations, developing the idea 
that individuals do not instantaneously adjust to a new equilibrium, as in a static model, but they only fully 
adapt in the long-run; therefore, a short-run disequilibrium is possible (habit persistence, adjustment costs 
and/or inertia, incorrect expectations, misinterpretation of real price changes, and so on)26. Habit formation 
(and addiction)27 and intertemporal non-separability in preferences have important ‘aggregate’ implications 
(see BROWNING, COLLADO 2007)28; when we consider aggregate (composite) goods, we may find consumption 
persistence because some components may exhibit durability and/or habits over time. In dynamic models (with 
habit formation) and panel data, it is important to distinguish between heterogeneity and state-dependence 
(HECKMAN 2001). If we observe a persistent behaviour in consumption (for example, high frequency and/
or high level) two explanations are possible: first, the individual is intrinsically a frequent/high consumer 
(heterogeneity) or at some point ‘something’ has induced a frequent/high consumption and this ‘new habit’ has 
been continuing (state-dependence). Empirical testing of this hypothesis, which is basically a way to rephrase 
structural change, can be done within empirical demand models29.
Malnutrition (over-nutrition) is a central issue in food and health policy, and obesity is becoming 
a growing concern: a large share of the population of the most developed countries is affected by weight-
problems, with relevant impacts on public policy and transfer programmes (health care). The role of health 
issues in food demand opens to the specification of more complex models of demand, obtained under a dynamic 
optimization process. The existence of health problem related to food consumption (obesity and food-related 
illnesses) introduces dynamic behavioural specifications, since utility at each period in time is affected by past 
consumption. Inter-temporal models may include the formation of expectations on future economic factors 
26 See ANDERSON and BLUNDELL (1983) for a general representation of flexible dynamic demand systems and a testing procedure 
on dynamic behaviour (autoregressive/partial adjustment dynamic models vs. static models). Also, static demand models 
have been augmented to account for statistical properties of the data (i.e., non-stationarity of economic variables): error-
correction (dynamic) models are then estimated using cointegration approaches (see, for example, ATTFIELD 1997). 
27 Keeping things simple, in a model with habit formation demand functions include lagged dependent variables; in a model with 
rational addiction, also future values for the dependent variables must be included in the LHS. An interesting specification 
can be found in RICHARDS and PATTERSON (2006), in their research on obesity; the dynamic demand model is specified as 
(heterogeneity and demographics are discarded):
( )  		  ++++= +−
In this formulation, habit formation (or myopic addictive behaviour) is signalled by the coefficient γ1 being different from 
zero; further, a positive γ2 indicates rational addiction. The term Δqht, specified as the (negative) deviation from mean 
consumption, may account for the role of adjustment costs in driving addictive behaviour.
28 BROWNING and COLLADO (2007), using Spanish data (rotating panel), found evidence that food away-from home, differently 
from food at home, exhibits habit formation. Furthermore, they found that expenditure (income) elasticities are quite 
sensitive to accounting for heterogeneity, especially for food at home.
29 See the strategy proposed in BROWNING and COLLADO (2007); demand functions specified as:
( ) hthhtThtThththt qzypq   ++++= −
will present residual autocorrelation due to either heterogeneity or state-dependence; however, constant autocorrelations 
would arise if there were only effects due to heterogeneity, while habit formation will produce decreasing autocorrelations. 
Further, a test of intertemporal separability is a test on the significance of the γ coefficient in the demand specification, 
once we account for heterogeneity: a significant coefficient will be an indication of state-dependence in consumption. 
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(such as prices and individual income) and the role of stocks, also for durable goods30. Empirical applications 
require extensions of duality results31.
As an example, consider a model with health issues (i.e. obesity): the consumer problem is given by: 
      FgWWtsdtWhpFyFue
T
t
F
  
	



The current period utility is given by ( )HCFuU ,,=  (ANTLE 2001; LAFRANCE 2001; LAKDAWALLA, PHILIPSON,
2002 and 2005; ZHEN, WOHLGENANT, 2006), where F  is food consumption, C  is other goods consumption and 
H  is health. Individual health depends also on individual weight32W , ( )WhH = . The transition equation for 
weight is given by ( ) ( )FgWW +−=  , where δ is a sort of ‘weight depreciation rate’ and γ the consumption 
capital depreciation rate, while  	Fg  is a (concave) function increasing in nutritional intake F 33; also, the 
budget constraint34 yCpF =+ , where p  is the price of food and y  is income, has been substituted in the 
utility function. Finally è  is the time discounting rate. 
In order to derive an empirical model of demand we exploit the fact that there exists an indirect utility 
function v  solving the following static problem and dual to the direct utility function u :
     


	







yCpX
kWhHtsHCFu
Wypv
,..,,
max,,
Then the dynamic problem becomes:
       FgWWtsdtWypveWypV
T
t
F
   
	



where, the function V  is a dynamic indirect utility function (Arnade, Gopinath 2006). The optimal 
value of the maximisation problem (the Bellman equation) is given by:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }aFgWVaWypvaWypV W
F
 +−+=
then, by setting a primal-dual problem as:
30 For example these stocks can be interpreted as consumption habits. Habit formation implies time non-separable preferences, 
since current utility depends not only on current expenditure/consumption but also on a ‘habit stock’ (DYNAN 2000; LaFrance 
2001; COPPEJANS et al. 2007).
31 For an extensive treatment of inter-temporal models in demand analysis see LA FRANCE (2001). 
32 As in ANTLE (2001) health may also depend on other variables, like the level of food safety, medical expenditure and cautious 
behaviour.
33 We do not consider a model with ‘addiction effects’ although the extension is possible (LAKDAWALLA, PHILIPSON 2002). Simply, 
in models with rational addiction, the current consumption depends on both past and future levels of consumptions (see, 
for example, LABEAGA 1999; for an application to obesity, see RICHARDS, PATTERSON 2006). RICHARDS et al. (2007), adopting 
a refinement of the random utility model, found rational addiction in nutrients, taking it as a cause of the ‘obesity 
epidemic’. 
34 Again, for simplicity, we have introduced the strong assumption that the budget constraint is given only by current 
income. 
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we may use this specification to derive dynamic demand functions by Roy’s identity:




WVV
WVV
v
v
F
Wyy
Wpp
y
p
−
−
−=−=
Thus by resorting to an appropriate flexible functional form to approximate the function V  we may 
obtain empirical specification for the Marshallian demands35.
Furthermore, a common assumption in demand analysis is that of time-separability, (i.e., inter-temporal 
weak separability): demand models are specified as static models of demand, where each period outcome 
does not have any impact on other period outcomes (i.e., current consumption only depends on current 
prices and income).
3.6. Imperfect competition and price transmission 
There is strong evidence that food markets/chains, even in the international trade, are not perfectly 
competitive. Demand models can be used to estimate the degree of market power in a food supply chain, 
following the general framework of HYDE and PERLOFF (1998) and GOHIN and GUYOMARD (2000). Assuming profit 
maximising, firms may exert market power (for simplicity, we consider only monopolistic/oligopolistic market 
power at the retailing level), and given (inverse) demand functions for each product, ( )yqpp ii ,= , FOC’s of 
profit maximisation provides the following price transmission equation for each firm k :
( )


=
∂
∂
−+ ∑∑ k
h
kk
i j
k
jhij
k
iik
h
h
q
qCfqp
q
p
where i
j
j
i
ij p
q
q
pf
∂
∂
=
 are price flexibilities, 





 




∂
∂
=
 are conjectural elasticities of the thk firm 
on the final market and ( )kk qC  is the firm’s cost function. By adopting a parametric specification of 
the price transmission equation, parameter estimates can be obtained by estimating simultaneously the 
demand and price transmission systems of equations. Micro data can be useful in estimating models of this 
type, although in principle estimations may also be carried out with aggregate data. For example, scanner 
data on purchases distinguished by brand can be used to estimate the degree of market power for different 
brands36, including private labels and/or store brands, thus allowing to derive a degree measure of market 
power at the consumption level. The implication on policy analysis is straightforward; discarding market 
power in economic models for policy simulation and/or forecasting may produce large distortions, leading 
to incorrect indications.
35 One of the main problems is of course that of data availability; in fact we do not have many empirical applications in 
estimating demand systems related to obesity issues (ASFAW, 2007). Often, we have a sort of approximating approach, where 
health/obesity issues are approximated through nutrient intake (see for example ARNADE, GOPINATH 2006; ANGULO, GIL 2006; 
RICHARDS, PATTERSON 2006; SMED et al. 2007). The suggestion for future research is that of trying to combine (micro)-data 
from different sources or surveying new variables, registering information on measures of obesity, such as the BMI (Body 
Mass Index).
36 Alternative specifications for measuring market power are possible, with extensions towards oligopsonistic power: see for 
example COTTERILL et al. (2006). 
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3.7 Marketing issues
Micro-econometric models may be useful also for market research; it is obvious that studies on household 
behaviour accounting for demographic differences provide a potentially useful tool for forms to segment the 
market. Of course, it is possible to exploit the same strategy (i.e., inclusion of additional variables) to account 
for marketing variables, like promotion, advertising, reputation of brands, information, thus evaluating 
interventions made by firms and/or institutions. For this purpose the availability of highly disaggregated data 
at the marketing level is crucial. Panel data and scanner data are collected and elaborated by private firms (i.e., 
market research companies like A.C. Nielsen and I.R.I. Infoscan) and increasingly used in empirical analysis (see 
CAPPS 1989, for a pioneer analysis, and CAPPS, LOVE 2002). These data will allow to analyze the competition among 
private labels and/or store and firm brands, providing relevant information to both processing and retailing 
firms. Consumers’ sensitivity to price (i.e., price elasticities) and promotion policies and the substitution effects 
among brands can be evaluated. Scanner (panel) data provide the required statistical information37.
Scanner (panel) data can also be used in models with discrete choices (MCFADDEN 1974; 1981); founded 
on utility theory, these models are an alternative empirical specification to model consumption behaviour. 
Discrete choice models (for example, Random Utility Models) start from the modelling of individual behaviour 
and can be used to predict the impact of various market scenarios. Their empirical treatment is standard, 
and they are mainly based on a single-unit purchase. However, when using data at the brand level it is also 
important to recognize that discrete choice models may be mis-specified for some goods if the single-unit 
purchase assumption of the most popular models (for example, probit and/or logit models) is violated (DUBÈ
2004). The random utility model, assuming a restriction on a single-unit purchase for the ith good/category, is 
given by the standard relation: 


  +−= A
where iA  is a vector of the 
thi  product attributes and ip  its price, while β is a parameter vector and γ
is the marginal utility of money, while εi is the stochastic component: a single-unit purchase indicates that 
the utility associated with that purchase was the highest among other possible alternatives. However, we may 
consider that households in any shopping trip to the store may purchase a basket of different alternatives 
within the same category in anticipation of a number J  of future consumption occasions; in any of these 
occasions utility from consuming one of the I  products in the category can be modelled as:


  







 
1
where τij is the household’s perceived quality for alternative i in occasion j, and ijq  is the quantity chosen, 
while the parameter αprovides curvature for the utility function. The perceived quality can be defined as:  
( )  A,0max=
therefore, conditional on J , the total utility at each shopping trip is given by:
37 For example, in a recent analysis (HUANG et al. 2007), marketing variables are included in demand functions using a 
demand shifter on the constant term: the demand system estimation then provides price elasticities for firm brands and 
private labels. As for demographics, shifters could also be imposed on price parameters, thus hypothesizing that marketing 
variables could affect behavioural parameters in a more profound way; in fact, this would produce a more complex impact 
of marketing strategies on brand price elasticities. 
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∑
=
+=
J
j
j euu
1
where e  represents expenditure on other items in the shopping trip. By taking a shopping budgety , and 
substituting, we obtain:
	






 ++−= ∑ ∑∑
= = =1 1 1
that generalizes the standard random utility model38.
4. Experimental demand analysis
A growing body of literature is that related to the use of ‘experiments’ in analyzing economic behaviour. 
There is a large variety in methods within this area, moving from so-called ‘conventional lab experiments’ 
to ‘natural field experiments’ (HARRISON, LIST 2004). Several applications can also be found in demand 
analysis; in fact, when policy and/or market indications about some new issues (for example, consumers’ 
attitude towards new products or characteristics) are required, this approach may be the only feasible, thus 
‘creating’ new markets not existing in reality. Recent applications refer to Genetically Modified (GM) food 
(ROUSU ET AL. 2004; LUSK ET AL. 2006), to food technologies, (food irradiation: HAYES ET AL. 2002; NAYGA ET AL.
2006) or use of antibiotics (LUSK ET AL. 2006), to environmentally certified food (LUSK ET AL., 2007), to health 
risks/food safety (HAMMITT, HANINGER 2007). 
Mainly, the interest is on measuring the willingness-to-pay (WTP) or to-accept (WTA) by consumers for 
the good of interest39. Experimental methods usually try to solve problems that can be encountered when 
hypothetical questions are posed to individuals (i.e., biases in WTP/WTA estimates: hypothetical bias)40, by 
introducing some ‘real’ alternatives. Basically, experiments are based on models derived from utility-maximizing 
consumers; their WTP/WTA can be elicited by setting an auction mechanism, (MELTON ET AL. 1996; LUSK ET
AL. 2006) or by conducting other types of field experiments (NAYGA ET AL. 2006). As was said, experiments 
are associated with some real choices and the auction mechanism can be different (often, a second price 
auction, but also thn  price auctions are employed, or even random thn  price auctions). The idea of an auction 
mechanism (for example, a second-price auction) is that of letting participants in the experiment bidding (for 
example for a GM vs a non-GM product), then the lowest (highest) bidder will accept (or pay) the second lowest 
(highest) bid. Normally, the auction is repeated for several rounds in order for participants to reveal their 
true preferences (thus, bidding the ‘true’ amount), once realizing that being truthful is a dominant strategy. 
A second ( thn ) price auction is largely used because it is weakly demand revealing and the market-clearing 
38 By using this model of multiple discreteness for carbonated soft drinks, with demographic effects and brand loyalty, DUBÈ
(2004) found that the measurement of sensitivity of consumer demand to the marketing mix may be improved, evaluating 
for each brand the elasticities with respect to price, advertising and display.
39 There are other important applications of experimental design analysis; for example, the conjoint analysis is a widespread 
tool in marketing research (see for example JAN et al. 2007 for an application on GM products).
40 In FOX et al. (1998) and LIST and SHOGREN (1998) methods for calibrating results of hypothetical surveys with results from 
experimental auction markets have been proposed.
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price is endogenous41. WTP and WTA can be used to evaluate the value of certain product characteristics, food 
safety issues, information and so on. For example, in ROUSU ET AL. (2004), results from an experiment are used 
to evaluate the value of information (VI) for GM and non-GM food, as the change in consumer’s surplus before 
and after the provision of information: 
( ) ( )nonGMnonGMGMGM PWTPPWTPVI −−−=
Other collected data (for example, demographic variables) can be used to explain WTP/WTA values; 
econometric techniques can be employed42.
Alternative approaches to experimental methods are available; for example, NAYGA ET AL. (2006) elicited 
WTP for irradiated food by using a dichotomous choice field experiment. The simplest environment is that in 
which the participant is confronted with some fixed cash amount and he must accept/pay it. The resulting 
model reflects discrete choices, where a consumer chooses the alternative that maximizes utility: however, 
differently from auction methods, we do not have a ‘precise’ measure of the individual WTP/WTA. Alternatively, 
several applications of Contingent Valuation (CV) methods for detecting WTP/WTA can be found in the empirical 
literature; differently from field experiments based on a controlled environment and on real alternatives, 
CV methods usually survey a sample from the population, collecting socio-economic information on the 
respondents. Double-bounded models seem to provide a more efficient route (HANEMANN ET AL. 1991; NAYGA ET AL.
2006; other recent applications in eliciting WTP are in HAMMITT, HANINGER 2007, on reducing the probability of 
health risks in food; and LIN ET AL. 2006, on GM foods)43. Adapting the model in NAYGA ET AL. (2006), considering 
the alternative between GM and non-GM food, a consumer will accept/pay the proposed bid B , thus exchanging 
the two alternatives, if:
( ) ( )yqvByqv ,, 01 ≥±
where v represents a (restricted) indirect utility function, while 1q  and 0q  are the two alternatives. In 
double-bounded models, the elicitation process takes place in two stages: each participant is (randomly) 
confronted with two bids, where the level of the second bid is contingent on the response to the first bid44.
By adopting this method it is not possible to know with certainty the real WTP/WTA, that is *B  for which 
( ) ( )yqvByqv ,, 0*1 =± 45.
41 However, evidence suggests that a more rational behaviour can be obtained in more complex settings (such as a second price 
auction tournament; see SHOGREN 2006).
42 For example, in Tegene et al. (2003) a censored regression analysis is run to explain the difference in bid prices between GM
and non-GM food ( )nonGMGM WTPWTP − ; in LUSK et al. (2006), a quantile regression method is used to explain the WTA
for GM food with an auction mechanism; in HAMMITT AND HANINGER (2007), maximum likelihood methods are employed to 
explain WTP for food risk reduction. 
43 Alternatively, WTP/WTA in CV studies may be elicited with different methods; for example, a payment card method (BOCCALETTI,
MORO, 2000), where participants are presented with a range of alternative bids and asked to identify their maximum WTP;
or a randomized card sorting method, where alternative bids are written on separate cards, and cards are then randomly 
chosen and presented to the participant, who is asked to accept or reject any bid. 
44 For example, if the participant accepts the first bid 1B , then the second bid will satisfy 12 BB > , otherwise if the participant 
does not accept the first bid 1B , then the second bid will satisfy 12 BB < ; obviously four different outcomes are possible. 
45 We must then refer to probability choice models, that is modelling the probability as ( ) ( ) ( )( )0,,PraccepttoPr 0*1 ≥−±= yqvByqvB ,
according to a random utility-maximization response For example the probability that the participants will accept both bids can 
be defined as: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BWTPBWTPBWTPBBB aa 	  −=≤=≤≤=
where Φ(B) is the (cumulative) distribution function of the individual’s true maximum WTP. Therefore a log-likelihood 
function for the survey participants can be constructed, based on probabilities for the different outcomes; ML methods can 
be used to estimate the model.
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5. Concluding remarks
The purpose of the paper was to review some of the main market and policy issues that are relevant in 
micro-econometric models of demand; of course, far from being exhaustive, we have only tried to outline 
some issues, providing references and hopefully a first insight to practitioners in conducting empirical 
work with micro-data and providing inputs for macro policy models. Attention must be given to the quality 
of the data and the way in which the data are collected; the use of individual data and of different survey 
methods opens the question of a selection bias in the sample, with not always clear implications on the 
interpretation of the results and their use in policy simulation. Individual data also pose new relevant 
econometric and modelling issues: first of all, how to account for demographic differences, and the impact 
of demographic differences on economic evaluations, such as in the case of welfare measurement; then, 
individual data require an econometric evaluation of heterogeneity among individuals, stressing the role of 
unobservables in empirical models, and of missing and or zero responses as well as of discrete variables. 
Dynamic models have been gaining an increasing attention over the last years: the urgent need of 
consciousness on the impact of diet on health and the growing relevance of issues like food safety and obesity 
require the use of dynamic models to evaluate a possible intervention, ruling-out the common assumption of 
intertemporal separability in food consumption decisions: the information may also be useful to improve macro 
models, although no clear route has been indicated, thus opening the way to future research. The assumption 
of perfect competition is still pervading agricultural policy modelling: empirical evidence has shown that such 
assumption should be relaxed, and that efforts should be made to include imperfect competition: in this paper, 
a possible solution is presented, where demand analysis can be exploited to derive estimates of the degree of 
market power along the chain, modifying price transmission equations. 
A brief presentation of experimental methods in demand analysis is finally given: experimental demand 
analysis is obviously conducted on micro data, also with the use of econometric techniques, and may provide 
information on new issues, although it is not obvious how to exploit it in macro policy models.
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Price Effects of an Emissions
Trading Scheme in New Zealand
J. A. LENNOX1, R. ANDREW2, V. FORGIE3
Abstract
The New Zealand Emission Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) for Greenhouse Gases should begin in 2008. Phased 
implementation begins with forestry, then extends to energy and industrial emissions, and finally 
agricultural emissions, which account for over half the total. Agriculture is economically critical, its basic 
and processed products accounting for a third of exports. We use an environmental input-output model 
to analyse direct and indirect cost impacts of emissions pricing on food and fibre sectors. At NZ $25/t 
CO2-eq, energy-related emissions cost the food and fibre sectors very little, but agricultural emission costs 
substantially impact sheep, beef and dairy farming. Cost-effective mitigation and land use changes should 
help reduce micro– and macroeconomic impacts, although the latter may also risk ‘emissions leakage’.
Keywords: emissions trading, input-output price model, agricultural greenhouse gases.
JEL classification: C67; Q11; Q54, Q58.
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1. Introduction
1.1 New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS)
New Zealand’s GHG emissions profile is unusual for a developed country, being dominated by agricultural 
emissions. These account for 48.5% of the total, not including agricultural energy use. Of the six GHGs 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol, CO2 accounts for 46.5%, CH4 for 35.2%, N2O for 17.2%, and the other gases 
for 1.1%. New Zealand is obliged to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels in the first 
commitment period (2008–2012) of the Kyoto Protocol. Recent government projections are that the most 
likely net emissions position will be a deficit of 45.5 Mt CO2-eq. This assumes that 58 Mt of net removals by 
forests (RMUs) will be applied to offset emissions. In September 2007, the government announced a new 
set of climate policies, the centrepiece being a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS). This paper 
considers how the NZ ETS may impact on costs and GHG emissions in the food and fibre sectors, which are 
central to New Zealand’s economy. 
The NZ ETS is broad, in that it proposes to eventually cover all major categories of emissions (i.e. 
forestry, transport, stationary energy, industrial process, agriculture and waste) and all six GHGs covered 
by the Kyoto Protocol. There is a phased implementation process (Table 1), so that ‘by the start of 2013 all 
major sectors will be exposed at the margin to the international price of emissions at the margin for all 
operations’ (p6, MfE and NZ Treasury 2007).
Table 1: Summary of coverage and phased implementation of NZ ETS4
Sector Entry Gases Comments
Forestry 
(pre-1990)
Jan 2008 CO2
Emissions from change of land use (no liability if 
forest is replanted). Free allocation of 21Mt CO2, and 
from 2013, an additional 34Mt CO2.
Forestry 
(post-1989)
Jan 2008 CO2
Forest owners may opt-in, in which case there is a 
credit/liability for net changes to carbon stocks. 
Liquid fossil fuels 
(primarily transport)
Jan 2009
CO2 (incl. end-
use emissions)
No assistance to upstream points of obligation
Stationary energy 
(coal, gas, geothermal)
Jan 2010 CO2
None to fuel producers/importers and electricity 
generators. Possible assistance to industrial producers 
for stationary energy and electricity use.
Industrial process 
emissions
Jan 2010
Assistance for 90% of 2005 emissions (incl. indirect 
emissions from electricity use)
Agriculture Jan 2013
CH4, N2O (see 
main text)
Assistance for 90% of 2005 emissions, declining 
linearly to zero in 2025
Waste and all other 
emissions
Jan 2013 CO2 No assistance for landfills
Source: MfE and NZ Treasury (2007).
4 The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill has subsequently been modified in the Parliamentary 
process, which is still ongoing as of August 2008. Changes include delay of liquid fossil fuels until 2011 and imported hydro 
fluorocarbons and per fluorocarbons until 2013.
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In the initial stage (2008–2012), substantial assistance will be provided to industries likely to be 
negatively affected. This will probably be through the free allocation of units, with remaining units 
to be auctioned. The government intends to progressively remove assistance between 2013 and 2025. 
While the final details remain to be seen, in-principle decisions have been made regarding entry into 
the scheme and levels of assistance. The framework outlines alternative approaches of ‘free allocation’ or 
‘progressive allocation’ and six ‘allocation principles’ that will be applied to determine the level and type 
of assistance applied in each sector. ‘Free allocation’ is only loosely defined and might cover emissions-
based grandfathering and many forms of benchmarking (although the document hints at a preference 
for grandfathering with no updating). Thus, with free allocation, firms would be immediately exposed to 
the full opportunity cost of their emissions, which would vary according to the price of NZUs. Progressive 
obligation refers to ex-post emissions-based allocation and would effectively subsidise each NZU required 
by firms to cover their emissions, reducing the opportunity cost of emissions by the extent of the subsidy 
(e.g. with 20% obligation, the opportunity cost is 20% of the NZU price). 
Agricultural emissions to be covered by the NZ ETS are N2O from synthetic fertilisers use, enteric CH4,
and emissions from manure management. In the 2005 inventory, these account for 4.7%, 63.9%, and 2.1% 
of total agricultural emissions respectively (Table 3). The government’s preferred points of obligation for 
agricultural emissions are meat and dairy processors, and fertiliser manufacturers, mainly because it avoids 
the complications of measurement, verification and administration of farm-level obligations. Fertiliser 
manufacturers have argued that this does not incentivize alternative reduction methods on-farm, such as 
denitrification inhibitors (p3, GRAHAM 2007). Free allocations may be granted either to farms, processors, or 
sector bodies. The document allows that progressive allocation ‘could also be an option to consider for the 
agricultural sector’ (p65, MfE and NZ Treasury 2007).
Unlike energy and industrial emissions, there are not proven technologies for abating most emissions 
from pastoral agriculture. This is problematic for New Zealand, given that almost half the country’s GHG 
emissions come from agriculture and that this sector is a mainstay of the economy. That is despite New 
Zealand having the lowest agricultural subsidies among OECD nations (OECD 2007), and its farmers being 
exposed to international market pressures and fluctuating exchange rates. In 2005, the agriculture industry 
contributed $5.6 billion (approximately 4.5%) to New Zealand’s GDP and employed 82,440 people (over 2% of 
the population). Exports of food and fibre products consistently contributed more than 45% to total export 
earnings between 1985 and 2005 (BALLINGALL AND LATTIMORE 2004), and high reliance on these exports is 
expected for the foreseeable future. 
Forestry is the first sector included in the ETS with different treatment of pre- and post-1990 forests. 
Including emissions from deforestation of pre-1990 forest should reduce the sale value of this land, as 
it makes changing the land use costly. There should be partial compensation through free allocations. 
Increased allocations from 2013 reflect the age profile of this forest. For post-1989 forest, credits are gained 
for net increases in stocks, and, liabilities are incurred for net decreases. The age profile of the current 
forest stock means that over the first commitment period the current forested area is a net sink.
Like the EU ETS, the NZ scheme will be based on a domestic unit, the New Zealand Unit (NZU). The NZ ETS 
will be open to some form of bi-lateral or multilateral trading. Each NZU will be backed by an AAU and Kyoto 
units will be interconvertible with NZUs, although with some limitations (p46, MfE and NZ Treasury 2007).
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1.2 Agricultural emissions and LULUCF in New Zealand
Agricultural emissions of CH4 and N2O in 2005 are shown in Table 2. Most of the emissions (90.8%) 
come from all forms of sheep, beef and dairy farming (italicised). Deer farming accounts for 2.7%, while 
all other forms of farming, horticulture and forestry account for the remaining 6.5%. Estimated emissions 
are distinguished by source in Table 3. A notable feature is the difference between the emission profiles of 
predominantly extensive sheep-beef, sheep, and beef farming on the one hand, and increasingly intensive 
dairy farming on the other hand. Emissions from fertiliser application account for only 2.4% of the total 
for sheep and beef (combined), while they account for 9.0% of the total for dairy. The dairy sector also has 
relatively higher emissions from waste and manure management.
Table 2: Agricultural GHG emissions in kt CO2-eq
ANZSIC industry* ANZSIC code CH4 N2O Total
Sheep Farming A012400 9349 4305 13698
Dairy Cattle Farming A013000 7938 4567 12653
Beef Cattle Farming A012500 3292 1488 4798
Sheep-Beef Cattle Farming A012300 1534 721 2263
All other agriculture –– 2264 1193 3592
TOTAL –– 24377 12274 37004
* Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification. ANZSIC classifies establishments according to their 
primary activity, so most sectors have multiple outputs. In particular, horticultural sectors have some livestock 
production and corresponding emissions.
Source: Own calculations, based on Statistics New Zealand (2003); MfE (2007)
Table 3: Detailed emissions of top agricultural sectors (kt CO2-eq) 
Sheep
& Beef Sheep
Beef
Cattle
Dairy 
Cattle
All
other Total
Waste management (N2O) 0 0 0 13 45 62
Direct soil (animal waste) (N2O) 2 4 3 101 80 190
Animal production (grazing) (N2O) 470 2907 990 2461 634 7463
Enteric fermentation (CH4) 1512 9233 3243 7611 2029 23629
Manure management (CH4) 21 108 46 322 232 729
Leaching (manure) (N2O) 83 510 174 453 128 1348
Deposition (manure) (N2O) 94 583 199 517 147 1540
Direct soils (fert) (N2O) 56 232 95 868 217 1469
Leaching (fert) (N2O) 11 45 18 169 42 286
Deposition (fert) (N2O) 6.3 26 11 96 24.1 163
Other (see note) (N2O and CH4) 8.5 49.1 16.5 41.1 11.5 117
TOTAL 2263 13698 4798 12653 3592 37004
Source: Own calculations, based on Statistics New Zealand (2003); MfE (2007)
Note: N2O and CH4 from field and savannah burning plus N2O from N-fixing crops, crop residues and histols.
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The land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) section of New Zealand’s inventory (Table 4) is 
dominated by net removals from forests. Other components of LULUCF currently make only a small net 
positive contribution to the total. Not all of the forestry in Table 4 is attributed to the forestry sector, 
because of the importance of farm forestry and the classification of enterprises in the industry classification 
scheme by their primary activity.
Table 4: Land use, land use change and forestry
ANZSIC industry Forestry Lime Grassland
Cropland 
Conversions
Total*
Horticulture -182 24 5 -48 -200
Mixed livestock and cropping -457 25 12 -142 -560
Sheep and beef cattle farming -5918 370 533 -333 -5341
Dairy cattle farming -1074 256 164 -58 -711
Other farming and services to agriculture -259 32 34 -35 -227
Forestry -16021 2 5 -7 -15993
TOTAL -23911 709 753 -623 -22934.7
* Scaled, to account for minor omissions in the accounts illustrated.
Source: Own calculations, based on Statistics New Zealand (2003); MfE (2007)
Practically all timber is now produced from exotic forests, of which about 90% are Pinus radiata. Forestry 
net removals depend on the size and age structure of the forest stock. Over the last 30 years afforestation 
and reforestation has averaged 43 000 ha per year. This rose to 69 000 ha/yr over 1992–1998 but has fallen 
to only 6 000 in 2005 (p76, MfE 2007).
1.3 Modelling prices under GHG taxes or cap-and-trade
An industry-by-industry input-output table relates production to levels of final demand, and industry 
prices to factor and import prices, and taxes on products and production. Specifically, output prices are 
determined by Leontief cost functions, in which inputs are combined in fixed proportions. The Leontief 
price model is the dual of the better known quantity model, which has been widely used to analyse 
relationships between final demands and environmental pressures, including emissions of greenhouse gases 
(e.g. LENZEN 1998 and 2002). IO models have also been used to estimate price effects of CO2 taxes on prices 
in different countries: e.g. UK (PROOPS et al. 1993; SYMONS et al. 1994), Australia (CORNWELL et al. 1996), 
Spain (LABANDEIRA et al. 1999) and more recently, New Zealand (CREEDY AND SLEEMAN 2006).Those studies have 
focussed mainly on distributional impacts on households, supplementing IO analyses with either household 
microsimulation techniques or econometrically estimated expenditure functions.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and partial equilibrium (PE) models provide alternative 
means of studying price impacts of carbon or GHG taxes. IO models are considerably simpler than CGE 
models, facilitating more detailed representations of the productive and household sectors. The latter is 
particularly important to the study of distributional impacts. The Leontief cost functions do not model 
possibilities for substitution in production (of fuels, other intermediate and factor inputs), but this 
inflexibility may often be an appropriate representation, especially for relatively homogenous industries 
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and in the short run. SCRIMGEOUR et al. (2005) used a CGE model to assess efficiency and distributional 
impacts of petroleum products, energy and carbon taxes in New Zealand. Infometrics Ltd. (2007) modelled 
the impacts of the NZ ETS for several exogenous carbon prices and different scenarios for the post-Kyoto 
period. The latter scenarios include a price on methane and nitrous oxides, but the agricultural sector is 
represented at a high level of aggregation. PE models focussed on particular sectors within the economy 
and facilitate very detailed representations of technologies. However, these models do not capture the 
economy-wide linkages and consequent indirect price effects, which are particularly important in the 
case of energy-related emissions. SAUNDERS et al. (2006) extend the ‘Lincoln Trade and Environment Model’ 
(LTEM) to model GHG emissions from the dairy sector, and analyse the impacts of EU and OECD trade 
reforms on outputs, prices and emissions in New Zealand and the EU. This model could be extended to 
model the direct impacts on agriculture of inclusion within the NZ ETS, given an NZU price. 
HENDY et al. (2006) use the LURNZv1-climate model (a spatial microeconometric model of primary 
production sectors focussing on land use) to explore the impacts of a high charge of NZ$50/t CO2-eq on 
agricultural emissions (assuming fixed per-hectare emission factors). They find that from 2003–2012, this 
causes an 11% reduction of dairy farm revenues and a 1% contraction of area compared to an increase 
of 1.2% without the tax. Impacts for sheep and beef are worse, with a 22% reduction of revenue and an 
additional 0.3% contraction in area. There are negligible effects on the baseline 17% expansion of forestry. 
The resulting emissions are reduced 6% over the first commitment period relative to the baseline, and 
the authors conclude that this is not a cost-effective policy, although suggest that more targeted policies 
considering stock numbers and fertiliser use might perform better.
2. Method
2.1 Leontief price model
The Leontief price model relates relative prices p of industry output to prices of primary inputs with 
prices f and costs shares B via a matrix of direct input cost coefficients A:
p       f   B  I A( ) 1T T −= −        (1)
Factor and input coefficients are usually derived from surveys-based tables showing the estimated 
supply and use of different commodities by different industries. Standard methods for deriving such input-
output coefficients from supply and use tables under various assumptions regarding industries’ secondary 
outputs are described in (MILLER AND BLAIR 1985). The matrix (I-A) must be positive definite.
The matrix B may have rows for compensation of employees, depreciation, gross operating surplus, 
taxes on production, taxes on commodities, and subsidies. To analyse the impact of pricing GHG emissions, 
this matrix can be extended with coefficients Bg for the intensity of different GHG emissions in tonnes CO2-
eq per NZ $m. We distinguish emissions from use of liquid fuels for transport, emissions from electricity 
generation, emissions from other stationary energy, industrial emissions, and agricultural emissions. These 
correspond to different rows of Bg. It is inappropriate to include net emissions from land use change and 
forestry as reported in the GHG inventory in these cost functions, since they are not simply proportional to 
current industry outputs. We are limited to qualitative analysis of the treatment of forestry in the ETS.
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It is assumed in the Leontief price model assumes that prices equal total average costs. It is convenient 
to work in terms of relative prices, taking prices in the base year to be unity. This implies that values are 
identical to quantities in the base year. The model can be used to simulate a pure cost-push effect, whereby 
a relative change in primary input prices is transmitted via the multiplier matrix ( ) 1B I  A −−  to give the 
relative changes in output prices. Since the model is linear in input prices, it can be applied directly to 
a vector containing GHG emission prices g, assuming that other input prices (of labour, capital, etc) are 
constant (see below): 
    1
0
T
T f
g
B
p I A
Bg
 	 	   
 

   
      (2)
The vector g simply contains zeros for categories of emissions (in rows of Bg) not covered by the ETS at 
any given stage, and the NZU price for emissions that are covered. Intermediate values of g could be used 
to reflect partial obligations (i.e. NZUs are required to cover only a specified percentage of total emissions) 
for certain categories of emissions. Further categorisation of emissions by type and/or sector would be 
reflected in additional rows of the matrix Bg.
2.2 Empirical implementation
The matrix A is derived from a 123 sector inter-industry transactions table for the year ending March 
2004. That table is the result of updating original survey-based tables for 1995-96 (STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND
2001) using a variety of sources (MCDONALD 2007, pers. comm.). GHG emissions from energy use by sector 
are estimated from EECA database 2002, various editions of the Energy Data File and applying standard 
emission factors5. Other GHG emissions by sector are sourced from the National Emissions Inventory (MfE 
2007), including unpublished data. For agricultural sectors, more detailed GHG inventory data were generally 
aggregated to the level of the IO sectors. For some sectors (including within horticulture), energy and GHG 
inventory data had insufficient sectoral detail, and in these cases were allocated in proportion to sectoral 
output. MILLER AND BLAIR (1985) is a standard reference on the derivation of economic and environmental 
coefficient matrices in IO analysis.
Direct costs are calculated by applying a price to the direct emissions of each sector that are within the 
scope of the ETS. In addition to the actual direct emissions of sectors, those associated with electricity use are 
also allocated to users, with only emissions associated with self-use and losses being allocated to the electricity 
generation sector itself. It is preferable to allocate emissions this way in the IO model, because of price and 
product heterogeneity within sectors6. For example, price heterogeneity occurs because of discounting for 
bulk and off-peak electricity users. Product heterogeneity is for sectors producing fuels and fertilisers, which 
are used by industries in different proportions, and have different GHG emissions intensities.
5 These data are available respectively from the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (www.eeca.govt.nz), Ministry 
of Economic Development (www.med.govt.nz), and from the authors on request.
6 A further benefit of this approach is that to reduce aggregation bias associated with the electricity sector. The source 
IO tables include substantial electricity retailing activity within the electricity generation sector, because many of the 
companies in this sector are vertically integrated Olsen, A. 2002. “General perfect aggregation of industries in input-output 
models.” Statistics Denmark: Copenhagen, Denmark..
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Costs are calculated for the five major categories of sectors/emissions to be covered by the ETS. Whether 
emissions are priced up- or down-stream has no effect on downstream prices in the model, but it does mean 
that upstream sector prices (for e.g. electricity) are not representative of the corresponding market prices. 
Actual upstream prices can be recovered by adding to the modelled upstream prices the direct costs of any 
emissions allocated downstream. Net credits or liabilities for LULUCF in each sector (most importantly, 
credits for afforestation) are not modelled. The main reason for this is that the credits are not simply 
proportional to sectoral outputs. Inclusion of forestry in the ETS is likely to affect prices in forestry and 
other sector through several mechanisms though, as discussed further below. 
A price of NZU of NZ$25/t CO2-eq is used for modelling in this paper. This value has been widely used 
in studies and discussions of the ETS (e.g. INFOMETRICS LTD 2007). Since in the Leontief model, output, prices 
vary in direct proportion to the NZU price (assuming a uniform price applies to all emissions covered), 
changing the NZU price will merely increase or decrease the results proportionally (e.g. the percentage 
changes are halved for a price of NZ$12.5/t CO2-eq). We do not suggest by this that the actual economic 
effects would vary linearly with the emissions price, a point that is discussed further below. 
3. Results
The price model is used to estimate pure cost-push effects on New Zealand food and fibre prices as GHG 
pricing is extended throughout the economy (Table 5). Emissions are included sequentially beginning with 
liquid hydrocarbons (1), then electricity generation (2) and other stationary combustion (3), industrial 
emissions (4) and finally agricultural emissions (5). At each stage, cumulative cost increases are shown. 
Note again that the first stage considered in this analysis is actually preceded by the introduction of 
forestry in the ETS. Also note that we have not considered the inclusion of the waste sector in the final 
stage, since those emissions make a trivial contribution to the total. The price increases shown in Table 5 
would be required if the opportunity cost of direct and embodied emissions, at current emissions intensities 
and $25/t CO2-eq, were not to be absorbed by producers. However, as will be discussed further below, partial 
and general equilibrium effects and exposure to international competition make this unlikely. The results 
should rather be seen as indicative of potential short-term cost pressures on primary and downstream 
processing sectors as the ETS is phased in. 
The first stage of the ETS includes only liquid fuels. There is likely to be a high pass-through rate for 
these costs because (pre-ETS) New Zealand fuel prices are largely determined by the world market. While the 
domestic market is relatively concentrated, there is no compelling evidence of non-competitive pricing. For 
most industries, these costs are passed on via direct input of fuels, and purchase of road freight transport. 
Pass-through of costs in freight transport is also likely to be high. Table 5 shows that cost pressures on 
agricultural sectors are relatively slight in the first stage (0.22–0.26%). The impacts are relatively uniform, 
although the aggregation level of the IO model and underlying data may mask some heterogeneity of cost 
impacts. Direct fuel use accounts for at least half of the cost increases, while road freight accounts for a 
further 20–24%. Road freight cost impacts for dairy farming are less significant, possibly because milk 
collection is mainly performed by the dairy processing sector. Cost pressures downstream are slightly worse 
for meat processing, but slightly less for all other downstream sectors. This is due to the relatively lower 
amount of CO2 emissions from fuels per dollar output of these processing sectors. Costs in the forestry sector 
increase most significantly (disregarding any possible effects related to LULUCF credits). Cost increases 
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are most significant for the logging sector, mainly due to its own fuel use (88%) for the operation of 
logging trucks and machinery. However, cost impacts are substantially mitigated even after the first step 
of processing (0.37% for timber milling and dressing) and are still less further downstream (0.21% for other 
wood product manufacturing and 0.18% for paper and paper product manufacturing). 
Broadening the scheme to include electricity generation (stage 2) causes additional costs greater 
than 0.1% only for the three wood and paper processing sectors (an additional 0.22%–0.35%). Other 
stationary generation is included simultaneously and again has minor impacts on agriculture, but affects 
most processing sectors more significantly. For the dairy manufacturing industry, pricing emissions from 
stationary energy increases costs by 0.17%. Inclusion of industrial emissions increases costs by a further 
0.04% and 0.08%, with higher values generally for the processing sectors. At this point, total cost increases 
for all agricultural sectors remain below 0.4%. Costs downstream are now slightly higher. The largest 
industries, meat and dairy processing suffer cost increases of 0.52% and 0.54% respectively. Forestry and 
downstream industries remain worst affected, with cost of the latter increasing from 0.71% to 0.76%.
Table 5: Cost-push effects of ETS on NZ food and fibre sector prices (% change)
Stage of ETS (2–4 are simultaneous)
1 2 3 4 5
Other horticulture 0.25% 0.30% 0.34% 0.38% 1.57%
Apple and pear growing 0.26% 0.32% 0.36% 0.41% 1.01%
Kiwifruit growing 0.25% 0.31% 0.34% 0.38% 0.89%
Other fruit growing 0.26% 0.31% 0.35% 0.40% 1.27%
Mixed livestock and cropping 0.22% 0.26% 0.30% 0.34% 3.09%
Sheep and beef cattle farming 0.25% 0.30% 0.34% 0.39% 11.17%
Dairy cattle farming 0.24% 0.29% 0.34% 0.37% 5.90%
Other farming 0.25% 0.30% 0.34% 0.42% 5.42%
Services to agriculture, hunting and trapping 0.26% 0.31% 0.36% 0.43% 1.88%
Forestry 0.52% 0.55% 0.58% 0.64% 1.03%
Services to forestry 0.21% 0.23% 0.27% 0.33% 0.43%
Logging 1.09% 1.12% 1.15% 1.22% 1.39%
Meat processing 0.27% 0.35% 0.48% 0.53% 6.09%
Poultry processing 0.21% 0.28% 0.42% 0.46% 1.63%
Bacon, ham and small-good manufacturing 0.16% 0.24% 0.42% 0.46% 1.72%
Dairy product manufacturing 0.23% 0.32% 0.72% 0.77% 4.82%
Fruit & vegetable, oil & fat, cereal & flour manufacturing 0.18% 0.24% 0.35% 0.40% 0.83%
Textile manufacturing 0.18% 0.24% 0.38% 0.43% 2.47%
Log sawmilling & timber dressing 0.37% 0.59% 0.81% 0.87% 1.11%
Other wood product manufacturing 0.21% 0.49% 0.76% 0.84% 1.02%
Paper & paper product manufacturing 0.18% 0.54% 0.68% 0.74% 0.84%
Notes: Contributions of own emissions and of road freight services to total cost increases are available on request.
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By far the most significant impacts of the ETS on food and fibre sectors will be felt in 2013, when 
agricultural emissions are to be included. The total cost increases for a majority of these sectors are above 
1%; however, the most dramatic impacts are felt exclusively in the sectors related to ruminant animals. 
It is important to note that much of the cost increase for sectors such as ‘other horticulture’ are in fact 
associated with livestock production that is included in these sectors because of the ANZSIC classification 
of establishments according to their primary activity only. The backbone sectors of sheep and beef farming 
and dairy farming suffer cost increases of 11.2% and 5.9% respectively. The higher impact on sheep and 
beef compared to dairy is due mainly to the higher value of dairy production per animal. These costs are 
again mitigated at the processing stage, with increases of 6.1% and 4.6% respectively. Nevertheless, these 
are significant cost pressures, even in the context of exchange rate fluctuations and the substantial trade 
barriers to NZ imports into the EU and USA. 
4. Discussion
Pricing GHG emissions has two aims. It should stimulate reductions in emissions intensity of production and 
changes in compositions of intermediate and final consumption, so as to decrease consumption of more GHG-
intensive products. Industry-average emissions intensity (defined for the present purposes as kt CO2-eq per 
$m output) can be cut by reducing emissions intensity at firm/farm level, and by changes in output or entry/
exit of firms/farms with differing GHG efficiencies. While these two effects are equally capable of lowering 
emissions intensity, they are likely to differ in other important respects (e.g. substantial industry turnover may 
cause loss of human capital, loss of investment confidence and disruption to small communities). Tietenberg 
(2003) provides a comprehensive review of experience with emissions trading in other environmental areas 
(e.g. air pollution, fisheries, water quantity) and the lessons that may be drawn for climate policy.
4.1 Prospects for technical mitigation of agricultural emissions
There are a wide range of options that may allow reductions in agricultural GHG intensities, especially 
in the longer term. However, it is difficult to estimate their real potential as they are as yet unproven. As a 
result there is limited information on their practical effectiveness and costs, and just how regionally specific 
these are likely to be. One question that arises in Europe, but not in New Zealand’s pasture-based systems, 
is the efficiency of different intensive feeding and housing systems. Animal breeding and other measures to 
increase fertility in breeding stock, milk-solids output for dairy cows, and shorten fattening periods (for meat 
production) may help reduce emissions. These are generally compatible with maximising profit.
 Nitrification inhibitors such as Dicyandiamide (DCD) and 3,4-Dimethylpyrazole Phosphate (DMPP) 
show promise for mitigating N2O emissions from intensive grazing systems. SUTER et al (2006) review 
experimental studies in which N2O reductions of 61–91% and pasture yield increases of 0–36% are achieved. 
Nitrification inhibitors may also reduce nitrate leaching, and hence groundwater contamination, which 
is a major problem in some areas of New Zealand. However, there remains much uncertainty about their 
effectiveness at the farm scale and in long-term use. 
Mitigation of ruminant methane emissions is possible through general increase of dietary efficiency and 
by specific dietary manipulations. The latter seek to improve animals’ fermentation of fibre (which produces 
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CO2, H2 and volatile fatty acids as end products) and/or to reduce subsequent methanogenesis (which produces 
CH4 from CO2 and H2). In New Zealand, productivity improvements in the dairy industry from 1990 to 2003 
have reduced product emission intensity from 8.4 to 6.6kg CO2-eq/kg milk solids (p96, MfE and NZ Treasury 
2007). Nevertheless, over the same period, total agricultural emissions have increased at 1% per year. There 
is extensive experimental research into the use of different pasture cultivars and feed additives. As yet, none 
of these options appear to provide cost-effective GHG mitigation for extensive grazing systems (Waghorn and 
Clark 2006). For intensive grazing systems, emissions intensity may be reduced by a combination of pasture 
improvement, management and animal selection (WAGHORN AND CLARK 2006). 
While waste treatment and manure management makes only a slight contribution to total agricultural 
emissions, these are sources of emissions that may be more amenable to mitigation by applying proven 
technologies.
4.2 Increased efficiency and substitution of energy and other inputs to agriculture
As well as reducing their direct emissions intensity, industries may also be able to mitigate against 
GHG-related cost increases by reducing use of or substituting for other inputs that have high embodied GHG 
emissions. Such measures are rarely considered except in specialised studies. In partial and general equilibrium 
models, energy substitutions are sometimes considered, although infrequently with particular attention to 
agriculture. Other inputs are usually considered only in the aggregate, if at all. The significance of freight 
transport for many sectors suggests that increasing logistical and fleet efficiency may be worthwhile.
4.3 Partial and general equilibrium effects
Land use changes between farm systems and between farming and forestry systems are likely to be 
important avenues for reducing overall NZ emissions. Native reforestation (which would generate carbon 
credits) and possibly bioenergy production may also play a role. Land use decisions of individual landholders 
depend on many factors (e.g. experience, attitude to risk, lifestyle preferences), but an important driver is 
the expected returns per hectare from alternative activities. Sheep, beef and dairy production are highly 
export-oriented, with 64% and 72% of output by value driven ultimately by export demand in 2004, and 
meat and dairy products accounting for 12% and 13% respectively of NZ exports. Thus, there is little ability 
for farmers to pass on costs in this sector. Given the substantial differences in emissions intensities per 
hectare of different activities, even low emissions prices may lead to significant changes in land use and 
reductions in land values. 
Given the extent to which emissions costs in primary sectors are likely to be absorbed by changing 
land rents, we might have fixed output prices of these sectors and introduced variable sector-specific land 
prices (adapting the numerical solution method accordingly). However, it is not clear that this would be 
more realistic. Firstly, costs of many primary products supplied for domestic consumption can be passed 
on to a significant (e.g. consider fresh milk sold domestically, versus powdered milk exports), so average 
output prices of these industries are not entirely fixed. Thus, it is useful to model the indirect effects of 
price increases even in such sectors, although the modelled prices will not reflect the average prices of 
industry output. Secondly, land use changes will generally mitigate against industry-average land rents 
falling by the full price of per hectare emissions. 
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While not included in the analysis above, treatment of credits and liabilities associated with pre-1990 
and post-1989 forests are also likely to affect land values and land use change. In particular, it creates a cost 
for converting forest to other uses, so should slow deforestation of at least pre-1990 forests. For example, 
it may prevent planned conversion to dairy pasture of 14,000 ha of Wairakei Estate (CCMAU 2007). While 
the ETS should increase afforestation, the net effects are very sensitive to assumptions on future emissions 
prices and investors’ risk-adjusted discount rates (see e.g. p118, MfE and NZ Treasury 2007). An interesting 
finding of this study is that there are potentially greater (although still quite small) cost impacts on the 
forest sector compared to those faced by agricultural sectors. Until agricultural GHGs are also included in 
the ETS, this may hinder achievement of the policy objectives.
A possible undesirable consequence of changes in land use may be international ‘emissions leakage’. This 
means that output is reduced (or increased less than otherwise) because New Zealand producers face higher 
marginal costs than in other producing countries. While land is of course an immobile factor of production, 
the ETS may still cause leakage of agricultural emissions if moving land out of emissions-intensive (i.e. 
ruminant) production systems in New Zealand encourages compensating increases in ruminant production 
in other countries where producers are not subject to emissions pricing. If these have higher GHG emissions 
per unit output, the ultimate objective of ETS will be undermined. In this context, it is important to note 
that the costs above are in domestic currency. A factor often ignored in arguments about international 
competitive risk is that reduced exports will tend to weaken the currency and help to mitigate the impact 
of domestic price rises. 
There have been some quantitative assessments of potential international emissions leakage in the 
agricultural and forestry sectors. For example, LEE et al. (2007) suggests that there may be significant 
international leakage from if agriculture emission pricing was implemented unilaterally by the USA, or 
even multilaterally by Annex-I countries. GAN AND MCCARL (2007) estimate that international leakage from 
the forest sector under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism could be in the range of 42-95%. 
GREENHALGH et al. (2007) discuss trade exposure and leakage in relation to the NZ ETS in some detail. They 
suggest that border tax adjustments (BTA) selectively applied to trade-exposed emissions-intensive products 
could be an effective policy, especially if coordinated with other countries. Alternatively, or pending 
introduction of a BTA, output-based allocations (i.e. where free allocations are made proportional to current 
or recent years’ output, rather than to a benchmark year/s output) would be a simpler instrument that could 
also effectively reduce emissions leakage. Certainly, negative impacts of the ETS would be substantially 
less if major export competitors also instituted emissions pricing. Equally, they might be reduced if major 
importers such as the EU implemented emissions pricing with BTA, or alternatively, a consumption tax on 
‘embodied’ agricultural emissions.
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5. Conclusions
In the first stage of the ETS, the effects of a $25/t carbon price are arguably insignificant for New Zealand’s 
food and fibre industries, at least in the context of other changes in their economic environment. Prior to 
inclusion of agricultural emissions in 2013, emissions pricing has a rather uniform impact on the different 
agricultural sectors, although the aggregation level of the model and underlying data may mask some 
heterogeneity. Forestry is relatively more strongly impacted by pricing of emissions from liquid fuels. 
Farming and forestry are less affected by the inclusion of emissions from stationary generation in 2010, but 
the downstream food and fibre processing industries see cost increases in the order of 2-3 times those from 
liquid fuels’ inclusion.
Potentially more significant effects in the first five years will be result from the treatment of forestry 
sources and sinks. While these effects could not be quantified using the present methodology, qualitatively, 
they should involve increased afforestation or less deforestation. This may affect agriculture by putting 
further pressure on some marginal sheep and beef country (i.e. increasing the incentive to bring this land 
into forestry), and further constraining the amount of land available for the rapidly expanding dairy 
sector. Of course, over five years, changes in international prices for meat, wool, dairy and forest products 
might have much greater and perhaps entirely different effects. 
Introduction of agricultural emissions in 2013 evidently is likely to have a relatively strong impact on 
ruminant-based farming systems, although the cost increases on-farm are significantly mitigated through 
the value-adding stages. For these sectors, technologies for direct mitigation of CH4 and N2O emissions 
is very important in the long term. Equally, pricing of agricultural emissions by other major producing 
countries, or pricing of embodied emissions by major importing countries could substantially mitigate 
negative effects on New Zealand agriculture, and consequent carbon leakage. Alternatively, reductions of 
current trade barriers to New Zealand exports in the EU and elsewhere could more than offset the negative 
effects of a $25/t carbon price; although New Zealand might be relatively disadvantaged against competing 
exporters with no emission costs, like Australia and Chile.
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Micro-simulation as a Tool to Assess Policy
Concerning Non-point Source Pollution:
the Case of Ammonia in Dutch Agriculture
GIDEON KRUSEMAN1, PIETER-WILLEM BLOKLAND1, FOPPE BOUMA1, HARRY LUESINK1, AND HANS VROLIJK1
Abstract
Ammonia emissions form a non-point source pollution example of difficult to assess. Since the mid 1980s 
the Dutch government has sought to reduce emissions through a wide variety of measures, the effects of 
which are monitored using modelling techniques. 
This paper presents the current generation of mineral emission models from agriculture based on micro-
simulation of farms in combination with a spatial equilibrium model for the dispersion of manure from 
excess regions with high livestock intensities within the country, to areas with low livestock intensities. 
The micro-simulation approach retains the richness in the heterogeneity of farm household decision 
making: the core cause in the difficulty of assessing non-point source pollution, while using the best 
available data to track corresponding pollution.
Keywords: micro-simulation, spatial equilibrium model, non-point source pollution
JEL classification: C61 ; Q12; Q13 ; Q53
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1. Introduction
Non-point source pollution is notoriously difficult to asses, precisely because it is diffuse, usually with 
many sources that are often difficult to monitor. At best aggregate figures can be provided based on selected 
measurements which tend to be unsatisfactory for policy assessment purposes where the precise effects 
of policy interventions is desired. Relevant examples are ammonia emissions and nitrate and phosphate 
leaching from agriculture to ground and surface water in the Netherlands.
One of the ways of addressing the issue of non-point source pollution is to use models to estimate 
emissions of pollutants into the environment. In this paper we discuss combined micro-simulation models 
with a spatial equilibrium model to deal with the fore mentioned pollution issues from agriculture. We 
believe that micro-simulation is a powerful tool to address the issue of non-point source pollution because 
it deals with the processes that cause pollution. In this paper we present MAMBO a micro-simulation model 
of livestock and agriculture looking at mineral flows within the sector and the resulting emissions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the issue of ammonia emissions 
from agriculture and the issue of excess application of minerals in agriculture. Next we present the model 
itself and its mathematical equations with reference to data needs. We then go on to briefly discuss the two 
cases to which the model is applied, namely monitoring of emissions from agriculture and livestock and the 
effect of environmental policies on economic performance. We finalize our paper with a brief discussion of 
the results and model.
2. Emissions from livestock and agriculture 
In the past decades point-source pollution to air and water have been lowered dramatically. Effective 
legislation with both command and control measures and economic instruments have reduced emissions of 
many pollutants to a bare minimum. 
Identification and quantification of non-point source pollutants have proven difficult and have thus 
limited the implementation of appropriate and effective solutions. Currently, most strategies addressing 
non-point source pollution are driven by dissociated economic, political and ecological interests that are 
difficult to reconcile. As a result non-point source pollution is typically not well regulated. 
Atmospheric Ammonia in the Netherlands is amongst the highest in the world, partly because of natural 
circumstances (peat bogs) but importantly due to the high population density of farm animals (dairy and 
beef cattle, poultry, pigs, sheep, goats, horses and fur animals). The high animal density also threatens 
water quality through the leaching of nitrate and more importantly phosphate to groundwater. The role of 
livestock and agriculture in emissions can be represented graphically in Figure 1. The flags represent points 
within the system where ammonia emissions occur. At flag number 6 we also find the emission of nitrate 
and phosphate to ground water.
The ability to monitor the effects of policies influencing the processes in this system allow legislators 
to construct meaningful policy frameworks that address both ecological and economic indicators. In the 
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Netherlands we have a long history of addressing emissions from agriculture and livestock, both analytically 
and in terms of legislation.
Figure 1. The manure and ammonia emission model structure
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3. MAMBO model
Following the structure of mineral flows in agriculture highlighted in figure 1 we develop a model  MAMBO 
is a suite of modules written in GAMS (General algebraic modelling system (MCCARL, 2006). Predominant 
component is the microsimulation of firm behaviour related to manure and minerals, with data obtained 
from the agricultural census. The notion of micro-simulation to study economic phenomena dates from the 
pioneering work of G.H. ORCUT  from the late 1950s onwards (ORCUTT ET AL. 1976; ORCUTT, 1990; MERZ 1991). By 
micro-simulation, we mean a model in which economic decision-makers are individually modelled, and then 
policy relevant quantities are generated via the aggregation of the agents’ ‘microeconomic’ actions. The 
model is described in VROLIJK ET AL. 2008. We describe there the essential components of the model except 
some minor issues for expositional reasons.
In the first calculation modules of interest in this context, animal numbers are converted into manure 
quantities by taking into account the housing situation of the animals and whether or not they are grazing 
in the grazing season. The basic outputs we want to generate here are manure production per animal 
category on firm (Bmanure), Mineral production through manure per animal category on firm (Mmanure), and 
ammonia emissions that can be attributed to animals and their location (EStable, EPasture).
This is done in the following manner at the level of animal categories (not individual animals) on 
establishments of firms located in specific municipalities (for expositional purposes we will suppress 
indices related to level of aggregation, namely firms identifier, establishment number and municipality 
code). Manure production depends on the number of animals (Nanimals), the ration (ρ) animals fed, excretion 
volume (v) of the animal and time spent in various departments (stable and pasture) in which the animal 
is located. Department is an animal housing structure. Time fraction (τ) is used to assign more than one 
department (pasture in summer and stable in winter) to animals during a year, where relevant. Within 
MAMBO, manure categories (subscript f) are defined in terms of the animals that produce the manure, the 
departments where the manure is produced, and the type of rations fed to animals:
daaa
animals
da
manure
da vNB    (1)
manure
da
manure
daf BB   (2)
Mineral (subscript m) production (Manimal) of an animal in a department for a manure category depends 
on the mineral content of the manure excreted (μ). There is a further difference in definition of the 
mineral content. The scientific manure mineral content is the content prior to emissions, while the fixed 
manure mineral content is net of emissions:
  mfmanuredafmanuremdaf BM 

  
(3)
The mineral content of manure warrants a little extra explanation. In principle depending on the 
specific circumstances on the farm the mineral content of manure will differ. This is the basis of the 
multiple mineral accounting framework used in the modelling procedures. In the first place we have the 
legal mineral content of manure (this is a relevant concept in Dutch agriculture). These are the mineral 
contents used for evaluating if firms comply with the manuring standards for the cropped area. In the 
second place MAMBO also uses the best scientific knowledge concerning mineral content of manure in order 
to provide as accurate calculations as possible concerning emissions of minerals into the environment. In 
the third place for the specific case of dairy cattle (in the Dutch case), there is an alternative method for 
determining mineral contents of manure based on milk urea content and average milk production per cow. 
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Emission factors (subscript J: NH3, NO, N2, N2O in the case of nitrogen and ammonia monitoring in 
the Netherlands)  for grazing (εpasture) is different from that of the animal housing (εstable). Hence, mineral 
emissions (E) from animal manure inside the animal house and from grazing are expressed separately in 
equations 4 and 5:
stable
fmd
scientificmanure
afmd
stable
afmd sss ME  
,
    (4, flag 1 in Figure 1)
pasture
fmd
scientificmanure
afmd
pasture
afmd ppp ME  
,
    (5, flag 2 in Figure 1)
Mineral production per animal after stable and pasture emission is calculated by adding up the two 
emission sources. Mineral production (M) after emissions of minerals at animal level is given in equation 6:
  


stable
mdaf
pasture
mdaf
scientificmanure
mdaf
emissionsafterscientificmanure
mdaf EEMM
,,,
  (6)
Emissions from manure storage at farm level are calculated at the level of housing type: 

a
emissionsafterscientificmanure
mdaf
storage
dodo
storage
mdfo MsE
,,

 (7, flag 4 in Figure 1)
Surplus manure can be processed on farm prior to transportation. Although on-farm processing is not 
yet implemented in MAMBO the principal is highlighted anyway.
As presented in equation 8, emissions from processing depend on the amount of manure processed, the 
mineral content of that manure and way of processing:
 
 
 





 		
Rrm
average
MRrm
FE
process
FERrmM
process
M
process
M RQE ,,,,,  
(8, flag 5 in Figure 1)
Firms with both animals and crops and or pastures will apply their manure to their own fields to the 
extent legislation permits. Farm firms with pastures and crops (A) are faced with legal standards regarding the 
amounts of minerals from manure and other fertilizers they can apply on their land. Firms have to take into 
account the maximum amount of minerals from manure that may be applied to crops. This amount depends 
on the legal manure standard (lm) that is defined for different crops and whether or not the firm is eligible for 
derogation. In addition in 2006 in the Netherlands, government provided firms with the possibility of applying 
an additional 5% manure to ease the overheated manure market, by not fining the first 5% excess manure 
placement over and beyond what is permitted by law. This extra allowance (lallowance) can take on the value 
zero if such an allowance is not in place in a specific year. This is summarized in equation 9. Furthermore the 
maximum allowable manure deposition can also be limited by another set of legislation covering all minerals 
from all fertilizer sources. Here we deal with legal fertilizer standard (lf) which is soil specific and can be at 
any level of aggregation. We also need to take into account the fact that there are certain minimum levels 
of artificial fertilizer applications based on information from manuring experts (e). The degree to which 
minerals count towards the maximum application constraint depends on the minimum effect coefficient. This 
coefficient is 1 for phosphate but unequal to 1 for nitrogen from manure (organic fertilizer). The value of this 
coefficient depends on source (own farm or from outside the farm), soil type, crop, and fertilizer or manure 
category (γMin effect coef), which is also regionally specific. This is summarized in equation 10:
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(10)
The actual amount of minerals from manure applied on crops depends on fertilizer categories that 
capture feeding strategies pursued by the farmers. The amount of minerals the firm has to take into 
account is based on the fixed mineral contents (equation 11a)2. Alternatively it can be calculated over the 
scientific knowledge-based mineral production of stable manure (equation 11b)3:
( )∑=
fad
fixedmanure
afmd
cropsActual
m
s
sMM ,,
(11a)   
( )∑=
fad
scientificmanure
afmd
cropsActual
m
s
sMM ,,
(11b)
The farm household is faced with an optimization problem, what manure to apply to which crops in 
order to minimize the surplus manure that has to be disposed of. Trading manure is costly. Farmers are 
faced with transaction costs related to finding a destination for their manure, transportation costs for 
tacking the manure to the destination. This firm can be another farmer with more crop area than own 
manure or a manure processing plant.4
The minimization problem faced by the farmer is twofold. In the first place the farmer will minimize 
the surplus manure. If there is no surplus manure, the farmer will optimize manure application by directing 
the manure to those crops that are best served with manure from an agronomic perspective:
farmownappliedmanure
daf
manure
daf
surplusmanure
daf BBB
,,
min −=
      (12)
In order to abide by the constraint presented in equation 10 the following equation can be derived 
with two choice variables: cropped areas with own manure and manure volume applied to crops:
( ) ( )








∗≥+∗∗∗ ∑
∑
∑
a
manure
daf
a
fixedmanure
mdaf
cropsownapplmanureown
dfsc
allowancemanureowncrops
scdf
m
cm
derogation
B
M
IlAlD
,
.,
1
δ
δδ
(13)
2 In the current situation (post 2005 legislation) the amount of minerals the firm has to take into account are based on the 
legally fixed mineral contents after emissions
3 This was the case up till 2005 where scientifically based firm level mineral accounts were used to determine allowable 
application.
4 In the Netherlands farmers with surplus manure currently pay to have the manure removed in terms payments to the firm 
at the destination. In other countries and in the Netherlands in the past farmers have to pay to get manure if the do not 
have sufficient amounts. In both cases trading is costly and include the opportunity costs of not applying the manure on 
the own farm.
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where
∑∑ =
a
farmownappliedmanure
daf
sc
cropsownappliedmanureown
dfsc BI
,,
      (14)
In a similar way we derive an equation to capture the constraint related to the legal fertilizer 
standards:
( ) ( )
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We also define a manure volume balance (equation 17) and a cropped area balance (equation 16):
( )∑≥
df
manureownwithcrops
scdf
crops
sc AA
(16)( )∑∑ =
sc
cropsownappliedmanureown
fscd
a
manure
afd pp BB
,
(17a)  
( )∑∑ ≥
sc
cropsownappliedmanureown
fscd
a
manure
afd ss BB
,
(17b)
Note the difference between pasture and stable manure. Pasture manure is manure deposited by 
grazing animals on pastures during grazing and constitutes a volume that cannot enter into the surplus of 
the farm, while for stable manure this surplus can exist. 
The second optimization is a step by step process for those cases where:
0
,
=
surplusmanure
dafB (18) and
( ) 0≠− ∑
df
manureownwithcrops
scdf
crops
sc AA
   (19)
The objective function becomes:
manureownwithcrops
scdfAmax          (20)
for the crop with first preference for manure, given constraint equations 13-17, and abiding by non-
negativity constraints and rules regarding allowed crop fertilizer combinations. If equation 18 holds we 
repeat the process for the crop with second preference for manure holding farmownappliedmanuredafB
, for the crop 
with first preference fixed at the optimal level. We repeat the process until all manure has been applied to 
crops and these are held fixed. After the manure has been placed on the own firm to the extent that rules 
and regulations allow, some firms are confronted with surplus manure they need to dispose of. Some firms 
with little or no livestock will still have fields that can be manured.
Surplus manure that cannot be applied on own fields can be disposed of in several ways. It can be 
transported to other firms, exported from the agricultural sector, processed or stored. In the case of storage 
one should also take into consideration the amount of manure in store from the previous period. We 
simulate this in the spatial equilibrium model:
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(21)
Processed manure is converted in manure products based on fractions that go into each of the (by) 
products:
 
	
	

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The transported manure and manure products can be applied to fields of farmers willing to accept the 
manure and/or products. Acceptance of manure depends on the potential application area comparable to what 
happened to own manure applied to own fields, which depends on legislation and an acceptance degree factor 
(Ac) which is crop and regional area specific. The acceptance degree factor depends on perceived risk of using 
off-farm manure and is based on empirical information from the Dutch Farm Accountancy Network:
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Where the mineral content of manure product is defined as follows:
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The left-hand side of equation 23 signifies potential demand. The right-hand side is supply. In 
equilibrium there is a quantity of manure and manure products that are applied to crops on soils. In order 
to determine how the surplus manure is distributed we apply a spatial equilibrium model based on linear 
programming techniques and distribution costs. The objective function becomes:
revenuesAggregateostAggregateCC min         (25)
Where CAggregate Cost are the aggregate costs, and 0Aggregate revenue are aggregate revenues from manure 
distribution:
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For surplus manure in a specific region the following possibilities exist: supply within the region; 
supply to other regions; export.
We can calculate the area available for fertilization with inorganic fertilizers based on the initial area 
and subtracting the areas with full fertilization based on placement of own manure (from equation 12-20) 
and placement of off-farm manure and manure products (from equation 21-27):
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These equations are holding for each soil type with crops. We now have all the organic and inorganic 
fertilizer applications and can calculate application emissions:
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For artificial (inorganic) fertilizers a different equation is used:
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|    (32, flag 6 in Figure 1) 
4. Results
4.1 Monitoring pollution
Monitoring pollution is one of the primary goals of MAMBO. The results of the ammonia emission 
inventory are published regularly (MNP, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; BROUWER ET AL., 2002; HOOGEVEEN ET AL.,
2007; LUESINK, 2004; STARMANS ET AL, 2007).
Table 1 presents the Dutch ammonia emission from different sources over time. The data presented in 
this table are the official ammonia emissions of the Netherlands as reported to the European Union. 
Currently the national ammonia emission is half of the maximum value calculated in 1985. A few of the 
reasons why ammonia emissions declined are: (1) introduction and reduction of the milk quota caused a 
reduction in the number of dairy cattle from 4.2 million heads in 1985 to 2.6 million heads in 2004; (2) laws 
prescribing manure application techniques with low emission factors were implemented in 1988 at arable 
land and in 1991 at grassland. In 1995 these were fully implemented for all areas in the Netherlands; and 
(3) buying animal production rights by the government in 2001 and 2002 caused a decrease of about 15% 
in the amount of pigs and poultry.
The last few years the trend of a declining ammonia emission from agriculture has stabilized at around 
120 million kg ammonia per year. The ammonia emission from non-agricultural sources in the Netherlands 
is about 13 million kg. Thus, the total ammonia emission in the Netherlands ranges from about 130 to 135 
million kg in the last few years. This is almost the NEC target of 128 million kg in 2010 (MNP, 2006b). 
Besides the structural decline in the number of grazing animals, decreases also originate from changes 
in the amount of nitrogen in fed roughage. Due to the Dutch manure laws (MINAS-system) the use of 
nitrogen fertilizer on grassland declined from more than 250 kg per hectare in 1998 to about 170 kg in 
2002 and 2003, which led to a lower nitrogen content in on-farm produced roughage (LUESINK AND WISMAN,
2005). The decline of ammonia emission would be even more when the grazing systems in the same period 
did not change from day and night grazing, to more limited grazing and summer feeding.
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4.2 Ex-ante evaluation of tightening legislation
In 2006, new manure laws were introduced in the Netherlands. Application norms are an essential 
element of these new laws. From 2006 until 2015 application norms will become even tighter. In 2015, the 
application of phosphate from animal manure and artificial fertilizer should be in balance with the use of 
the crops it is applied on. The study described in this section was conducted on behalf of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in order to establish the expected impact of these norms on the Dutch manure market in 2009, 
2012 and 2015. The MAMBO model was used to calculate this impact. In this section some of the results are 
shortly presented.
Figure 2 displays the predictions of the production of phosphate for four different years. Figure 3 displays 
the total application of phosphate (from animal manure) for four different years. The results for nitrogen are 
in line with these results except for a level difference (application of nitrogen is a 2.3 factor higher). 
The estimated phosphate production for 2009 is slightly higher than for 2006 (see figure 3). This is 
due to the fact that the calculation for dairy and calving cows for 2009 is based on the firm specific values 
based on the milk productivity and ureum content of milk,  and the calculation for 2006 is based on the 
Figure 2. Estimated production of phosphate
in 4 different years
Figure 3. Estimated application of phosphate
(for the year 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015) 
Table 1. Ammonia emission from Dutch agriculture 1980 - 2004 (million kg of ammonia) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Animal manure 204 227 210 166 128 111
Housing & storage  77 86 89 89 73 60
Grazing 14 16 16 14 10 9
Application 114 125 119 63 45 43
Fertilizer 15 12 13 13 11 9
Total agriculture 220 239 237 179 139 120
Emission per ha
Agriculture area (kg NH3)
107 118 110 90 71 62
Index (1980 =100) 100 110 108 81 63 55
Source: (LUESINK, 2004 and HOOGEVEEN et al, 2007)
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excretion values according to the WUM (base year 2004). The firm specific values result in a 5% higher 
value than the WUM values. In 2015, the phosphate production is more than 1% lower due to a decrease in 
the number of poultry and dairy animals. 
Due to the tightening of the application norms the amount of applied phosphate from manure decreases 
between 2006 and 2015 from 90 million kg to 84 million kg (see figure 3). Due to the lower acceptance of 
manure produced at other farms and the tighter application norms the application of manure from other 
farms is 7 million kg lower in 2009 then in 2006 (a 15% reduction). 
The further tightening of the phosphate application norms after 2009 will result in a further decrease 
of 7 million kg of the application of manure produced on other farms. An increase in export (5 million kg) 
and the introduction of the manure incineration facility in Moerdijk will result in an increase of 12 million 
kg phosphate that is applied outside of Dutch agriculture. Figure 2 also displays the amount of produced 
manure that cannot be applied. In 2006, 2,5% of the manure production (4 million kg phosphate) could 
not be applied and the same will apply for 2009. This amount will increase up to 8% of the production (13 
million kg phosphate) for the year 2015.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In the paper we presented MAMBO a combined micro-simulation model and a spatial equilibrium model 
for simulating relevant actors behaviour with regard to manure and artificial fertilizers in order to handle 
emissions of pollutants (nitrate, phosphate and ammonia) from livestock and agricultural activities. The 
models were calibrated with empirical data from regulatory agencies. Validation of model components has 
been conducted on a number of occasions. The results from the modelling framework are robust and form 
the basic input into policy discussions in the Netherlands on non-point source pollution from agriculture. 
The results are being used to evaluate both ex-post and new policies, to see the impact these policies on 
emissions and on economic indicators related to the manure market.
We feel that micro-simulation for addressing policy issues related to non-point source pollution is the 
way forward. The modelling framework MAMBO we use is flexible enough to take into account changing 
policies while still capturing the behaviour of economic actors. Our choice of model has been a combination 
of micro-simulation and a spatial equilibrium model for the manure market. Obviously there is still a lot of 
work that can be done to improve the performance of the model, especially where it concerns explorations 
of the future. This is primarily due to the fact that the current applications of the model concentrate on 
monitoring current levels of pollution where a lot of variables are known (prices, investment decisions, 
production structure). By linking the model to investment modules we will be able to simulate possible 
changes in the structure of agriculture. 
At present it suffices to say that MAMBO is able to deal with the complex issues of non-point source 
pollution in a way that offers scope for the future.
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Incorporating Biofuels into a Partial Equilibrium Model
of the EU Agricultural Sector
JULIAN BINFIELD1, PATRICK WESTHOFF1, AND ELODIE LE CADRE2
Abstract
The impact of recent growth in the consumption of biofuels on agricultural markets has been substantial. 
It will continue to increase as countries seek to expand the proportion of their energy from renewable 
sources. Models of the agricultural sector must therefore consider the demand for agricultural products 
for biofuels and the by-products that are produced during the process. This paper discusses the method 
of introducing biofuels into the FAPRI GOLD (grains, oilseeds, livestock and dairy) model. A scenario was 
undertaken whereby the EU is assumed to introduce a binding 10 percent target by 2020. The aim of this 
paper is to highlight major issues in building a model of this type.
Keywords: Biofuels, partial equilibrium model, agricultural sector
JEL Classification: Q18 
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In response to the 2003 Biofuels Directive (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003), EU Member States have introduced 
a variety of policies in order to meet their own national targets for biofuel’s contribution to overall transport 
energy consumption. These policies are a combination of exemptions from specific taxes applied to fossil 
fuels, mandated levels for the incorporation of biofuels and more complex policy tools combining these. The 
result of these policies will be an increase in the demand for biofuels and, therefore, feedstocks that are used 
to produce them. The increase in demand is significant for a number of feedstocks, with demand for rapeseed 
oil for biodiesel already becoming larger for example than that for food use. Biofuel markets therefore have to 
be addressed by models designed for policy analysis in the agricultural sector.
The modeling task is complicated, however, by the multiplicity of policy instruments determined at 
Member State level and the need to address the demand for all fuels from the transport sector. In this paper, 
a small model of the EU biofuels sector is presented. It is integrated into FAPRI-MU’s dynamic, simultaneous, 
partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector - the EU GOLD model. The model is a system of single 
equations the parameters of which are, on the whole, imposed rather than estimated econometrically, given 
the lack of data and the huge policy changes experienced by the sector during recent years. The model 
separates the markets of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the ‘rest of the EU’ region. It estimates petrol 
and diesel prices, fuel use for the transport sector and the supply and demand of ethanol and biodiesel for 
each of the regions. The model solves for EU ethanol and biodiesel prices by determining trade at EU level.
The model is simulated to generate a baseline simultaneously with the GOLD model thereby capturing 
the impact of biofuels policy on the agricultural sector and vice versa. The model is then simulated to 
analyse the impact of the introduction of the proposed 10 percent of transport fuel use mandate at EU 
level. The response of the model to this shock is presented and discussed, with the aim of highlighting the 
challenges that are faced by modellers of the interaction between agriculture and fuel markets.
The impact of increased demand for biofuels can already be seen in markets as both the EU and US, 
along with many other countries in the world, aim to increase the proportion of energy that is sourced from 
renewable sources. In 2007 the surge in demand for agricultural products was widely blamed for the significant 
increase in global commodity prices, although in many cases it was not the major driving factor. This example 
illustrates the need for biofuel markets to be built into models used for policy analysis in the agricultural sector 
as they impact on both the level of demand and, importantly, the elasticity of commodity prices with regard 
to external shocks. This paper aims to present an example of how this could be addressed, and to stimulate 
discussion of both methodological issues and the impact of biofuels policies on commodity markets.
1. Challenges for the model
Models seeking to represent the EU have been presented with a number of challenges in recent years. The EU 
has enlarged twice, from 15 to 25 member states in 2004 and then to 27 in 2007. Some of these New Member 
States have agricultural sectors that are significantly different from those in the EU-15, complicating the 
analysis. As the EU has grown, the volume of data that has been available for the agricultural sectors 
has sometimes shrunk. For example where the USDA scaled back its country coverage and several 
important series published by EUROSTAT and the European Commission have been discontinued. Thus, the 
maintenance and the expansion of the models have been difficult, even without considering the changing 
policy environment. 
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In addition to the enlargement there has also been a radical reform of the CAP. The introduction of 
the Single Farm Payment (SFP) scheme has resulted in a need to model a different type of payment of 
which there is little historical precedence. Although there are some studies on the impact of decoupling of 
payments neither the studies of the old CAP payments, nor of the similar direct payments made in the US 
have provided definitive answers as to how the SFP scheme would influence production. These changes are 
occurring against a background of international prices that are at record levels and, in some cases, at two or 
three times higher than those witnessed historically. As a result of these changes some of the agricultural 
markets in the EU are experiencing situations that were unthinkable five or ten years ago, such as the EU 
being a net importer of beef or an exporter of dairy products without subsidy aids.
Policies promoting the use and production of biofuels result in new challenges for modelling. In many 
markets energy policy is having a greater impact than the CAP reform. For example, the elimination of 
wheat intervention in the EU, should it come about, is likely to have little impact as long as the EU’s 
Renewable Energy Directive (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007) is implemented along with pro-biofuels policies in 
other countries. This is mirrored in the US where the agreement of a new Energy Bill will probably have a 
bigger impact on agricultural markets than whatever is agreed in the final farm bill.3
Modelling the biofuels sector requires a somewhat different approach than that taken with other 
commodities. Biofuels have been produced within the EU for many years, but the scale of production has 
changed dramatically only in the last three years. This means that there is not a longtime series of data 
with which to work and the econometric estimation of a system is not possible or desirable. Biofuels on 
this scale are new globally, so there are a limited number of studies upon which to parameterize the model. 
Inevitably the model must be calibrated on a short time series using parameters that are based on previous 
studies and economic theory, validated through scenario simulation with feedback from experts.
The amount of data and sources have increased in the last couple of years. For the fossil fuel energy 
market a comprehensive dataset is available from EUROSTAT. Exogenous variables used in the model 
are from Global Insight for the macroeconomic and global energy variables, with projections for global 
agriculture and biofuels markets from FAPRI’s global modelling system. Some biofuels data is available from 
EUROSTAT, but most of the biofuels model data is from the Biofuels Barometer. Prices are sourced from F.O. 
Lichts where available. For the remaining data needed there are two problems, the first is that many of the 
data are commercially sensitive, such as industry costs and returns, and also that many of the markets for 
by-products do not have extensive data such as prices.
Another of the problems for the biofuels model data is the variety of different units that are used. In 
the model, units are chosen to be consistent with those used in the FAPRI global modelling system, and 
otherwise collated from a variety of sources. Some sort of review of these conversion coefficients would 
benefit the modelling community as the difference between estimates can, in some cases, be substantial.
In an ideal world it would be desirable to incorporate a model of the transport energy market into the 
analysis. Within some range of prices, biofuels compete with fossil fuels (in Europe this has been the case 
with the help of tax incentives) and so their demand will, in part, be determined by the relative prices 
3 The interested reader is directed to FAPRI-Missouri’s website (www.fapri.missouri.edu) where analysis of both the Energy Bill 
and proposals for the Farm Bill are available for comparison.
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of different fuel options. In other cases, compulsory blending requirements are utilized so projections of 
diesel and gasoline usage are required. These can sometimes be sourced externally, but there are some 
scenarios, for example if one wanted to look at the impact of different oil prices on the demand for biofuels 
and the subsequent impact on agricultural markets where an endogenous model would be necessary.
It is clear that, even if the EU tried to reach the 2003 Biofuels Directive target of 5.75 percent of total 
transport fuels from biofuels, a considerable amount of this would need to be imported in some form. A 
significant challenge for the model is to decide in which form this will be seen. Feedstocks themselves could 
be imported and the trade barriers to these are well-known. In the case of biodiesel, however, whether 
rapeseed or oil is imported is hard to model since this depends on the crushing capacity, which is difficult 
to determine where crush margins are not the only factor influencing capacity changes. Also, Genetically 
Modified Organism (GMO) considerations are important because much of the rapeseed produced globally 
is of this type. Biofuels themselves can be imported, but the trade barriers to accomplish this are not 
clear. The fuel itself can be imported under different tariff lines. However, national policies themselves 
will determine whether fuel or feedstock is imported. If the imported fuel can be counted towards the 
French Taxe Générale sur les Activités Polluantes (TGAP) or the British Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation 
(RTFO), or similar other programmes, it is likely that it will be imported from outside the EU.
This brings us perhaps to the biggest challenge of the modelling project which is the interpretation and 
incorporation of national policies. For each country the policies for reaching the biofuels targets are different. 
Under current policy, even the targets themselves are different. It is relatively straightforward to model where 
a country imposes a compulsory blending requirement. But some of the schemes operated by other countries 
(e.g. the TGAP or the RTFO) employ more complicated approaches where the targets might not be met under 
certain market circumstances. It is also questionable whether rigid targets would be adhered to the rapidly 
increasing prices of either feedstocks or biofuels. The language included in the 2007 Renewable Energy Source 
Directive regarding energy balances and sustainability of feedstock production will add to this complexity.
2. The model
Details of the GOLD model itself can be found in the manual (HANRAHAN, 2000). It is a partial equilibrium 
dynamic model of the agricultural sector. The GOLD model that was used in the generation of these results 
covers the EU-25. On the supply side, it includes components for France, UK, Germany, Italy, UK, Ireland, 
rest of EU-15, Poland, Hungary, rest of NMS-10 (New Member States). Due to data constraints the demand 
side is limited to the EU-15 and NMS-10. The biofuels model has a different level of aggregation with France, 
UK, Italy and Germany modelled separately and the rest of the EU in a composite group.
The level of aggregation is an important issue for the model, since the EU currently leaves the individual 
Member States to set their own targets and make their own policy. As always there is a trade off with the 
complexity of the model. In the biofuel model there are components for France, UK, Italy, Germany and the 
rest of the EU-25. Those four countries together account for about 60 percent of total EU energy transport 
usage. One of the major concerns in aggregating the rest of the countries is that the evolution of transport 
energy varies between the Member States in that group. In particular, countries in the EU-15 generally 
have stable or declining energy transport use, whereas the NMS-10 countries generally have fast growing 
incomes and fuel use. In a compulsory blending type environment with different targets this could lead to 
systematic errors in the estimation of the biofuel requirements.
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A simple representation of the interaction between the biofuels model and the GOLD model is presented in 
Figure 1. The biofuels model takes the prices of feedstocks used for biofuel generation from the GOLD model, 
and the subsequent feedstock demand from the biofuels model is added to food and feed demand determined 
in the GOLD model. The models are solved simultaneously to determine equilibrium prices. In the discussion 
below the main equations of the model are presented and this is not an exhaustive list of equations.
One significant drawback of the models as they are structured at the moment is on the inputs side 
in the GOLD model. Production is determined by the ratio of output prices to an index of input costs. 
These costs include weighted prices for the feedstocks modelled, with the rest of the costs linked to a GDP 
deflator. This means that variations in oil prices are not incorporated into the input costs of agricultural 
commodities in the GOLD model, a particular problem when energy costs (and therefore costs of fertilizers 
etc.) go up faster than general inflation, which is currently the case.
For the baseline (a constant policy, normal weather simulation that forms a yardstick for policy 
evaluation), world prices are determined as exogenous and come from the FAPRI global system. When 
the model is used to generate a policy scenario, reduced form equations of the global system are used to 
estimate the impact of changing EU biofuels trade on world prices.
The model could take the energy market as being exogenous and projections of fuel prices and 
consumption from external sources. Projections of fuel consumption are available, but prices are also 
needed since, in some markets, biofuels will compete with fossil fuels (with the benefit of tax incentives). 
Increasingly, however, compulsory blending requirements are likely to drive the market, and the demand 
for biofuels is likely to be a simple function of the total fuel requirements of the market. So that an 
increased number of scenarios can be simulated (such as those involving different oil price projections), an 
energy market component was constructed using data from EUROSTAT, a diagram of which is presented in 
Figure 2. The energy model is a very simple representation, given the constraints posed by model size and 
it cannot reflect the complexity of the market, so projections can be validated against external projections 
or even replaced by them if necessary.
As has been noted, the econometric estimation of the whole model is not possible due to the lack of 
data, the short time series available and the huge changes in the industry over such a short time. The model 
is, therefore, calibrated to exogenously assumed elasticities. The selection of these elasticities is guided 
Figure 1: Biofuel/GOLD model interaction.
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by those available in the literature, those used in the US model where there is slightly more experience of 
a biofuels industry, and modeller judgement. Where there are longer time series, such as in the transport 
energy part of the model, some simple econometrics is carried out too. In the FAPRI process much emphasis 
is placed on validating the models through contact with industry experts, and so the model will be exposed 
to a large audience and parameters changed on the basis of feedback.
In the energy model the world oil price and GDP deflator come from Global Insight, Inc. The gasoline 
and diesel price are determined by the oil price and the GDP deflator. Interestingly, there is some evidence 
that the diesel price has been rising relative to the gasoline price in recent years, perhaps as a result of 
the increasing proportion of diesel demanded.4 With the proportion of the selling of diesel cars increasing, 
this share is likely to increase over time and could become a major issue. The important equations from the 
energy model are:
MGPRi = f(POILERAP, G3EITi), DIPRi = f(POILERAP, G3EITi)
FUTOTCi = f(FUWPRi, RGDPCi)
DIPROPi = f(DIMGPTi, trend) 
MGPRi = gasoline price; DIPRi = diesel price; POILERAP = oil price; G3EITi = GDP deflator; FUTOTCi = total 
energy use in transport; FUWPRi = weighted fuel price; RGDPCi = GDP per capita; DIPROPi = proportion of 
diesel in fossil fuel use; DIMGPTi = relative diesel and gasoline prices, where i denotes country/region.
4 Once the proportion of diesel that is extracted from oil is increased beyond a certain level then the cost of that extra diesel 
rises rapidly (KABALOV AND PETEVES, 2004).
Figure 2: Energy market component of biofuels model.
135
Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
The weighted fuel price is calculated by taking the prices of all the fuels, fossil and biofuels, and 
weighted by their level of use. Since the biofuels prices are determined endogenously in the model, changes 
in biofuels policies or agricultural markets can then impact on the total demand for transport energy, 
athough that impact is small. The trend chosen for the proportion of diesel in fossil fuel use is an important 
variable, as it has a direct impact on biodiesel demand where there are mandatory incorporation rates. In 
the projections seen here, a trend is chosen such that the increase in the proportion of diesel in total fuel 
slows down over time, but still rises to 70 percent at the end of the period. Over the projection period the 
taxation policies of the Member States, with regard to fossil fuels, is kept at current levels, athough for 
many countries the tax advantage for diesel has been reduced over time.
The output from the energy part of the model is an important determinant of the level of demand for 
biofuels. An attempt is made in the model to separate the demand for biofuels into three distinct categories:
i. Demand for biofuels that comes from sources such as public fleets where vehicles will always be 
operated on biofuels as a policy decision. Demand is very inelastic with respect to changing prices 
in this market.
ii. Markets where biofuels compete directly with fossil fuels (mostly with the aid of tax incentives), 
such as in the E-85 or B-100 markets, or when a blending rate decision is made based on relative 
competitiveness. This market will be more elastic than (i).
iii. Mandatory incorporation or blending rates imposed by the member states, or by the EU in the case 
of the Renewable Energy Source Directive. Here demand is very inelastic, though in practice in the 
model there is a small response in that higher biofuel prices will lead to an increase in the weighted 
fuel price and therefore a drop in the demand for total fuels. This is small given the low elasticity for 
total transport energy usage and the small role that biofuels take in meeting that demand.
A simplified diagram of the demand for biofuel is given in Figure 3. In practice, the demand equations 
are made more complicated by the diverse policies operated at Member State level. Italy, for example, only 
Figure 3: Biofuel demand in the model.
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operates a tax incentive that is subject to a quota, so the demand for fuels is either at that level, if the tax 
incentive makes fuel cheaper than the fossil equivalent, or zero if it does not. The schemes in operation in 
the UK and in France operate like a mandatory level that is binding for a range of biofuel prices. However, 
if biofuel prices rise to very high levels then the limits under the RTFO and TGAP will not be binding. The 
different demand equations for the countries attempt to take this heterogeneity into account.
The equations for the demand component of the biofuel model can be summarised as:
BDTOTCi = f(max((biodiesel/diesel pump price, biodiesel/diesel refinery price), country level mandated 
volume, EU mandated volume)))
ETTOTCi = f(max((ethanol/gasoline pump price, ethanol/gasoline refinery price), country level 
mandated volume, EU mandated volume)))
BDTOTCi = biodiesel transport energy usage, ETTOTCi = ethanol; transport energy usage
The specific structure of the country or regions model differs, but in each case several markets are 
assumed to operate. The lack of data for these different markets makes the calibration of this part of the 
model difficult. However, there is some historical and ad hoc data on which to base assumptions. As most 
countries switch to some sort of mandatory use or a blending rate approach, the need to segregate the 
markets like this becomes less important. 
The production component of the model is based on the approach taken by FAPRI-MU in their US 
modelling system. In this approach shown in Figure 4, the capacity of the industry is estimated first 
then the utilization capacity which together give the production. Separating production into these two 
components allows for a greater range of behaviour to be exhibited and more closely approximates to the 
way industry actually works as opposed to just modelling production itself.
The equations of the model can be summarised as:
BDCAPi = BDCAPi(-1) – 0.05*BDCAPi(-10) + f(BDNRTi/GDPDi (lag 0 – lag3))
BDUCROi = f(BDNRTi/GDPDi)
ETCAPi = ETCAPi(-1) – 0.05*ETCAPi(-10) + f(ETNRTi/GDPDi (lag 0 – lag3))
ETUCROi = f(ETNRTi/GDPDi)
BDCAPi = biodiesel capacity, BDNRTi = biodiesel net returns, ETCAPi = ethanol capacity, ETNRTi = ethanol 
net returns
The capacity in the current period is, therefore, determined by the capacity in the previous period 
minus some loss in capacity that is assumed to become obsolete, plus additional capacity (which could be 
zero) based on a set of lagged returns to the industry. The coefficients on these returns in the equations 
are weighted to represent the fact that it takes several years to plan and build capacity. Utilization is based 
on current period returns and is defined between 0 and 100 percent.
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Returns are the key variables in these equations and it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data on 
the costs and profits of the industry. The returns that are used in this simulation come after a review of 
the various published estimates of returns that are available in the public domain (such as International 
Energy Agency, 2004; FAS/USDA, 2003). At present, in the model virtually identical returns are used for 
each of the countries (differing only by the cereal prices produced for each country by the GOLD model), 
and are based on producing ethanol from wheat and biodiesel from rapeseed. This is an area where greater 
access to data will improve the model significantly.
Once the volume of ethanol produced is determined it is then converted into cereal equivalents. The 
cereal demand is divided up into demand for wheat, barley and maize on the basis of historical use. Some 
substitution between cereals is allowed on the basis of relative prices. Biodiesel comes from rapeseed, 
soybean or palm oil (or an “other” category). Limited substitution is allowed but, overall, the fact that 
there are technical restrictions on the type of biodiesel that is used is respected and most of the biodiesel 
comes from rapeseed in both the baseline and the scenario below.
At present non-cereal sources of ethanol are determined outside the biofuels model. There is no wine 
model in GOLD and the ethanol from that source is assumed to remain constant. Ethanol from sugar is 
determined in the sugar model, and there is feedback between that model and the rest of the agricultural 
sector through crop returns and the biofuels model through the price of ethanol. Together they determine the 
amount of non-quota beet that is produced. All non-quota beets are assumed to be converted to ethanol.
Production and consumption are estimated at the country/region level detailed above but the model is 
solved for prices at an EU-25 level. At present, stocks are ignored in the model due to lack of data and the 
model is balanced on net trade. The net trade equations are simplified as:
BDNED25 = f(preferential agreements, world ethanol price/EU ethanol price)
ETNED25 = f(preferential agreements, world ethanol price/EU ethanol price)
BDNED25 = biodiesel net trade for the EU-25, ETNED25 = ethanol net trade for the EU-25
Figure 4: Production of biofuels in the model.
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Net trade is estimated using the volume imported under trade agreements and then on the basis of 
the relationship between the world price and the EU price comparison, taking into account the cost of 
transportation and tariffs. As alluded to above, this is a key part of the model but also one of the most 
difficult to specify. Firstly, biofuels can be imported in a variety of forms such as B-100, B-99, or B-5 in the 
example of biodiesel and these face different tariff restrictions. As far as the EU targets are concerned, 
imported biofuels count. However, in some cases imported fuels may not receive the same benefits as 
domestically produced fuels in terms of tax incentives, and may also be hindered by the variety of different 
standards that are applied across the EU. Import demand, therefore, may be a lot less elastic than just 
a comparison of the relative prices and tariffs might indicate. Additionally, in the case of biodiesel, the 
countries most likely to export to the EU are the US, Brazil and Argentina, countries which are most likely 
to produce their biodiesel from soybeans.
3. Results of the simulations
In this paper, the results of a simple scenario are presented to give further insight into the model. The 
scenario is designed to give some insight of the consequences of adopting a 10 percent target for transport 
fuels. The only binding mandate for biofuels in transport, rising to 7.5 percent in 2016, was implemented in 
the model. The scenario does not constitute an analysis of the Renewable Energy Source Directive, where 
the target for 2016 will differ, but does include a number of other provisions that will have an impact on the 
actual outcome of the policy.5 It is important to note that no estimate is made for the output of biofuels from 
other sources in the model, in particular second generation biofuels such as ethanol from cellulosic material.
The results of the analysis for the biofuels sector are presented in Table 1. The scenario is modelled as if there 
is the same proportionate mandate for incorporation of ethanol and biodiesel in gasoline and diesel respectively. 
So, there is no opportunity to switch between sources of biofuels as a result of their relative price changes. 
The impact on the energy sector is small and so it is not presented. Fossil fuel prices are determined through 
exogenous projections of oil prices and the GDP deflator, therefore they do not change with the scenario.
It is important to consider the baseline when examining the results. Under the baseline, biofuels share 
of total transport fuel is below even the 2010 target of 5.75 percent even in 2016. That is because only 
actual Member State policies such as tax exemptions and mandates were included in the baseline (which 
would differ again from the stated targets in response to the Renewable Fuels Directive). In the baseline, 
both ethanol and biodiesel capacity utilisation is low, at 58 percent and 65 percent respectively.
In the scenario both ethanol and biodiesel production approximately doubles, partly because capacity 
for both industries rises by about 50 percent and partly due to capacity utilization increases. There is 
an increase in the net imports of both ethanol and biodiesel, with the latter being lower for the reasons 
outlined above. The price of biofuels increases to levels that spur sufficient production to fill the mandates. 
The price has to rise higher for biodiesel as the price of its feedstock increases more than for ethanol as 
discussed below.
5 Not least of these is the fact that the Renewable Energy Source Directive also includes targets for non-transport energy from 
renewables which may further drive up agricultural prices, for example, through the use of palm oil for electricity generation.
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The key to the results for the biofuels part of the model is the responsiveness of trade. Although the 
changes in imports seem considerable here, in relation to the baseline, they are not are not as much as the 
likely global capacity, at that date, and the simulation does include a divergence in European and global biofuels 
prices. If imports were very elastic, then there could be a situation where much of the increase in demand is 
met by imports, which would still drive up the costs of feedstocks to similar levels as they are driven by global 
demands. This could lead to lower returns for the EU biofuels producers and, therefore, lower utilisation rates.
The impact on the agricultural sector is presented in Table 2. The impact of the mandate on the ethanol 
feedstock market and the biodiesel feedstock market is different. Vegetable oil prices rise much more rapidly 
than cereal prices, in response to a similar shock in demand for products. This is because, for rapeseed in 
particular, biofuel demand comprises a much larger part of the overall demand than for cereals. Vegetable oil 
prices rise over 40 percent in the scenario whereas the rise in cereal prices is less than half of that.
Given the fact that only a small part of the additional demand for biodiesel is met through imported fuel, 
for the reasons outlined above, and that the ability of area to expand for the production of more oilseeds is 
limited (given the high area in the baseline, and the fact that cereal prices are rising too, albeit more slowly) 
then the bulk of the increase in biodiesel production must be supported by imported feedstocks. Most of this 
is in the form of rapeseed oil in the model, with a smaller increase in rapeseed itself. 
For cereals, the EU is still a net exporter of wheat and barley in the baseline. The result of this scenario 
is that the EU is barely self-sufficient in wheat and barley, and net imports of maize increase. There is an 
Table 1: Impact of a 10 percent mandate on the biofuels sector, 2016.
Baseline Scenario Difference % Change
Ethanol thousand tonnes
Production 4,883 9,475 4,593 94.1%
Capacity 8,475 12,753 4,277 50.5%
Utilisation 58% 74%
Consumption 5,240 10,583 5,343 102.0%
Net exports -358 -1,107
euro/m3
Price 539 755 216 40.2%
Biodiesel thousand tonnes
Production 8,572 17,673 9,101 106.2%
Capacity 13,162 20,058 6,896 52.4%
Utilisation 65% 88%
Consumption 8,724 18,229 9,505 108.9%
Net exports -152 -556
euro/m3
Price 835 1,343 508 60.9%
Biofuels of total fuel 3.57% 7.39%
Source: FAPRI estimates.
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increase on area and, therefore, some increase in domestic cereal production. Ethanol imports rise faster 
than biodiesel imports, and this fact coupled with the smaller share of gasoline relative to biodiesel means 
that the impact of the scenario on the cereals sector is smaller. 
The results that are presented here are significantly different than those produced by the Commission 
in their analysis of a 10% mandate. For example, the Commission analysis has smaller impacts on prices, 
and has the EU as a significant net exporter of wheat and rapeseed oil even after the policy simulation In 
part the different results reflect a different set of assumptions used regarding the EU’s biofuels policy, and 
also may be due to important omissions from our model that are discussed below. In general our conclusions 
would be that there would be a greater impact on agricultural markets, particularly for rapeseed, than in 
the Commission report.
4. The further integration of biofuels into the model
The model outline presented in section 2 of this paper represents the first attempt to incorporate the 
biofuels sector into the EU modelling system. It is hoped that the model can be improved as more data 
becomes available The main priority areas are:
i. A more detailed understanding of the trading restrictions and possibilities is paramount, not only 
for modelling in the context of the EU, but also for the global modelling system where the EU is a 
key market, and the leading market for biodiesel.
ii. At present, there is no feedback in the model for the by-products from ethanol production, which are 
fed to livestock. Rapeseed meal is incorporated into the model, with all the meal being fed to animals. 
This may not be an accurate representation of reality since some of this is burnt for energy.
Table 2: Impact of a 10 percent mandate on the agricultural sector.
Baseline Scenario Difference % Change
thousand hectares
Rapeseed area 6,735 7,581 846 12.6%
thousand tonnes
Rapeseed oil imports 1,673 7,604 5,932 354.7%
euros/tonne
Rapeseed oil price 750.0 1073.8 324 43.2%
thousand hectares
Wheat area 23,100 23,411 312 1.3%
thousand tonnes
Wheat netexports 3.07 0.98 -2 -68.1%
euros/tonne
Wheat price 137.2 162.9 26 18.7%
Source: FAPRI estimates
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iii. Incorporation of second generation fuels. At present, it is impossible to project what production 
of these fuels will be in five or ten years’ time. Some consideration of biofuels from products not 
currently modelled, like jatropha may also be necessary.
In addition to these improvements, work is ongoing at FAPRI on US and global models for biofuels and 
it is probable that FAPRI will be in a better position to analyse changes in the biofuel policy in future.
5. Conclusions
The modelling of the biofuels market is a complex task. In order to model the sector properly, one must 
consider both the energy markets that are the outlet for the product and the agricultural markets that are 
the source of the inputs. For the EU, analysis is complicated by a large number of policies that influence the 
sector, some of them set by the Commission in the form of targets or through standards pertaining to the 
composition of fuels, and some of them set by the Member States themselves. The Member State’s policies 
generally differ from country to country and are themselves often a combination of mandates and tax 
exemptions. Policies are regularly revised.
Biofuels themselves can, and currently are, produced from a variety of inputs, with different technical 
processes, sourced both domestically and internationally. The by-products of biofuel production will have 
an impact on agricultural markets. All of these considerations mean that to model the sector properly 
significant amounts of data are needed, some of which are not readily available. The fast growing nature 
of the sector means that long time series of data sets are largely not available or not useful, meaning that 
econometric estimations are not possible.
In this paper, one approach is proposed that is largely shaped on the data that is available. The model 
must be able to reflect some of the complexities of the system, but also fit into and interact with the 
existing model of agricultural markets. The model is validated partly by running simple scenarios, one of 
which is presented here, where the EU is assumed to impose a mandated level of biofuels consumption on 
the way to meeting a 10 percent target. The result of this is to greatly increase the demand for vegetable 
oils and cereals. To meet the extra demand for biodiesel, the EU has to look to imports of either oilseed, 
vegetable oil or biodiesel and the impact on world prices is significant. For the cereals sector, the extra 
demand can, in part, be met by the EU becoming a net importer of cereals.
In recent years there have been many significant changes for agricultural economists in the EU to 
analyse them, with CAP reform and enlargements at the forefront. The results presented here indicate that 
the impact of biofuels policies, especially when they are considered in conjunction with other countries 
policies increasing the demand for biofuels, are likely to have a big impact on agricultural markets. 
Therefore, incorporating biofuels into policy models for agriculture is necessary for those models to produce 
accurate and relavent information
Mo
de
llin
g A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 R
ur
al 
De
ve
lop
me
nt
 P
oli
cie
s
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008142
References
ß EUROBSERV’ER, Biofuels Barometer, various issues.
ß EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003. Biofuels Directive. Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels 
or other renewable fuels for transport (OJ L 123, 17.5.2003).
ß EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Promotion of the Use of Renewable Energy Sources.
ß FAS/USDA, 2003. EU: Biodiesel Industry Expanding Use of Oilseeds.
ß HANRAHAN, K. 2000. GOLD manual.
ß INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 2004. Biofuels for Transport, An International Perspective.
ß KAVALOV, B. AND S. D. PETEVES, 2004. Impacts of the increasing automotive diesel consumption in the EU.
European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
Modelling
Milk Quotas 
 Dairy Quota and Farm Structural Change: A Case Study on the Netherlands 145
 Roel Jongeneel, Axel Tonini 
 An Examination of Milk Quota Expansion at EU Member State Level 
 with Specific Emphasis on Ireland 157
 Julian Binfield, Trevor Donnellan and Kevin Hanrahan 

145
Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
Dairy Quota and Farm Structural Change:
A Case Study on the Netherlands
ROEL JONGENEEL1, AXEL TONINI2
Abstract
This paper sets out to analyse the impact milk quotas had on the dairy farm structure of the Netherlands. 
Projections on the likely farm structure under different milk quota scenarios are explored and mobility 
indicators are developed and calculated. A Markov probability model is estimated relying on generalized 
cross entropy. The introduction of milk quotas initially froze the dairy farm structural adjustment. Later on 
mobility started to increase. Milk quota has increased concentration of dairy production among farms with 
50-69 cows. If after quota abolition the dairy farm structural dynamics would be the same as in the 1972-83 
period, then quota abolition in 2015 will lead to a substantial increase in the number of farms in 2022.
Keywords: dairy, farm size, The Netherlands, Markov chain, generalized cross entropy.
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1. Introduction
This paper sets out to analyse the impact of milk quotas on the dairy farm structure of the Netherlands. 
We have a twofold objective. The first objective is to examine how the farm structure has changed over 
time and to detect to which extent the introduction of milk quotas in 1984 affected this structural change 
process. In order to assess these, the Markov transition probability matrixes (TPMs) and mobility indicators 
are estimated. The second is to use estimation results to run a counterfactual for the period 1984-2006 
to project how the farm size distribution would have evolved if there would have been no milk quota. In 
addition, some tentative projections on the likely Dutch dairy farm structure in the coming decade are made 
and compared. The Markov probability model (LEE et al., 1970) of farm size distribution is able to analyse 
movements of individuals between different states when only aggregate data on finite size categories are 
available for a given time period. A generalized cross entropy (GCE) estimator, which is suitable when 
dealing, with limited data, is used (see GOLAN et al., 1996; MITTEHAMMER et al., 2000; PERLOFF et al., 2007). The 
standard Markov inverse problem of GOLAN et al., (1996) is estimated initially following a recursive-like type 
of estimation (JOHNSTON, DINARDO, 1997: 117-118). In doing so one sample point is added at a time until all n
sample points are used. This approach allows detecting the information content of each data point as well as 
turning points and other systematic time variation in the estimated coefficients due to policy changes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes milk quotas and dairy farm 
structure in the Netherlands. Section 3 specifies the information-theoretic Markov model. Section 4 
discusses the sample data as well as prior information. Section 5 discusses results. Section 6 presents a 
counterfactual projection for the period 1984-2006 and two forward-looking policy scenarios. In Section 7, 
the conclusions are presented.
2. Milk Quotas and Dairy Farm Structure in The Netherlands 
The introduction of the milk quota with super levy system in 1984 implied that each producer received a 
farm-specific quota. Producing in excess of this quota was not rational since the fine that had to be paid for 
surplus-milk was more than the milk price. As an initial reference point for determining the amount of quota 
in the EU, the level of milk production in 1981 (increased with 1 percent) was chosen. In the Netherlands, 
quota was distributed over farms based on production levels of 1983. Since in the last years before introducing 
quota, milk production significantly increased. Therefore, reductions had to be imposed on the 1983 reference 
in order to limit production to the level established by the EU (see KRIJGER, 1991 for further details). However, 
it already soon appeared that this restricted EU milk production was still evaluated by policy makers as too 
high and, therefore, insufficient to ‘solve’ the EU’s surplus problems. In subsequent years, therefore further 
reductions of the dairy farmers’ quota took place. As compared to the 1983 production level, the reductions 
imposed implied an allowed raw milk production volume in 1988/89 which was nearly 20 percent lower. 
Initially most farmers exceeded their quota and had to pay a super levy. However, rather soon farmers learned 
how to adjust their production process in such a way as to come rather close to their allowed quota level. 
The quota regime which was first announced as a temporary measure (for a period of 5 years), was extended, 
initially to three years (till 1992), and is likely to achieve a total lifetime of 30 years. 
Since quotas fix output at farm level, they are generally assumed to ‘freeze’ the structural adjustment. 
Moreover, since both relatively efficient and relatively inefficient farms are restricted in a proportional way, 
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they are likely to introduce inefficiencies in production, implying that milk is not produced in the least-
cost way (BURRELL, 1989). The milk quota framework allowed Member States to pursue an active structural 
policy, although this option has not been used by the Dutch government (KRIJGER, 1991: 193). However, 
in the first 5 years since quota was introduced, the Dutch government acquired about 5 percent of the 
quota (by buying quota and by imposing general reductions) which was redistributed over farmers in 
‘specific situations’(BOOTS, 1999:22). Moreover, in the same period about 7 percent of the initial quota was 
re-allocated through the market.
In the course of time the tradability of quota became more flexible and well-functioning buyer-seller 
and lease markets were established. In general milk quotas are attached to land and cannot be freely 
traded. If a whole farm is transferred, reference quantities are referred to the new owner. If only part of 
a farm is transferred, an amount proportional to the number of hectares (or another objective criteria) 
used will be transferred. In the Netherlands in particular this latter rule has been used to transfer quota 
permanently via a temporary lease of land, thus circumventing the link between quota and land (BOOTS,
1999: 25). In general, in the Netherlands there is a maximum of 20 thousand kilograms of milk per hectare, 
whereas there is also a minimum to the amount of kilograms of milk transferred per transaction. Alongside 
buying and selling, already soon after the quota introduction, leasing has been used by farmers since 
1989/90 as a management tool to absorb expected over-quota production (OSKAM, SPEYERS, 1992). 
A graphical illustration of the evolution of the cow milk production and dairy farm size distribution 
in The Netherlands is given in Figure 1. The Dutch cow milk production increased by about 48 percent from 
1972 to 1983 and decreased by about 18 percent from 1984 to 2006. The Dutch dairy farm size distribution 
from 1972-2006 comprises 7 size classes. The farms consisting of size classes (1-29) show up till 1984 a sharp 
Figure 1:  Cow milk production and dairy farm size evolution in The Netherlands, 1972-2006
Notes: Data are in terms of absolute number of farms.
Source: Own calculations based on LEI-CBS, (various years).
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reduction that smoothly continues after the introduction of the milk quota. The mid size class (30-49) 
shows a clear downward trend with a slight increase for the years immediately following the introduction 
of milk quotas. The three largest size classes (50-69, 70-99 and 100-…) show an increase over the pre-quota 
period, a decline in the first five years after the introduction of the quota, and stabilize thereafter.
Over the period 1984-2006 the total number of active farms declined by 37,932 farms or about 63 
percent. The annual decline in the total number of active dairy farms for the pre-quota period (1972-1983) 
was 4.83 percent, whereas for the with-quota period (1984-2006) it was 4.39 percent.
The average annual growth rates are summarized in Table 1. The full sample and two sub-samples 
1972-83 and 1984-06 are considered. Only farm sizes with more than 50 cows increase over the whole time 
period, with a 9.0 percent average annual growth rate for dairy farms with more than 100 dairy cows. The 
strongest decline is for farms with 1-19 cows with an average annual decline rate above 10 percent over 
the whole period. In the 1970s and early 1980s a large part of the dairy farms did switch or were ‘enforced’ 
by the dairies to switch their milk delivery system. The investments and adjustments associated with 
this discouraged, in particular, small farms to continue their dairy farming business. At the same time it 
stimulated others to make strategic investments and expand in order to lower the fixed costs per unit of 
output. Looking at the sub-sample 1984-06 it appears that the initial growth rate registered for farms with 
more than 50 dairy cows is reversed into a decline. In addition, the rate of decline appears to be stronger in 
the small sizes as compared to the medium and large sizes.
Table 1: Average annual growth rates on Dutch dairy farm size
1-9 10-19 20-29 30-49 50-69 70-99 > 100 Total
1972-06 -10.12 -10.32 -7.81 -3.59 2.70 5.64 9.03 -4.53
1972-83 -10.40 -13.64 -8.10 -1.07 12.23 22.62 28.13 -4.83
1984-06 -9.99 -8.74 -7.66 -4.79 -1.86 -2.48 -0.11 -4.39
Notes: Annual growth rates are computed by constructing logarithmic growth rates per year, and then averaging the 
yearly rates across the different sub-samples.
Source: Own calculations based on LEI-CBS, (various years).
3. The Information-Theoretic Markov Model
The Markov chain approach is very suitable when the only data available are count data in the form of 
observable proportions or aggregates rather than data at the level of micro units. Movements from state 
to state are represented by a stochastic process and are typically modelled by estimating the so-called 
Markov transition probabilities. In this context, the maximum entropy (ME) algorithm developed in GOLAN
et al., (1996) and MITTELHAMMER et al., (2000) and PERLOFF et al., (2007) is a suitable candidate for extracting 
the maximal signal from an initial ‘out-of-focus’ problem. Our paper is based on a GCE formalism which is 
founded on the directed divergence or minimal discriminability principles of KULLBACK, (1959) and GOOD,
(1963). The standard Markov inverse problem of GOLAN et al., (1996) is estimated recursively (JOHNSTON,
DINARDO, 1997: 177-188). First the model fits the first two t observations (i.e. one transition); in this case 
the estimated TPM will fit the data perfectly. Next the model is fitted using the first t + 1 observations and 
another TPM is estimated. This procedure of adding one sample point at a time is repeated until another 
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TPM is estimated based on all T sample points. The model follows the standard model of GOLAN et al., (1996) 
with t = 2, t + 1,…,T and l, k = 1,…,K an index fro the number size classes as given by
      
t k h
tkhtkhtkh
l k
lklklktkhtkhlklk uwwqppuwqpI /ln/ln,,,min
(1)
subject to the following constraints:
∑ +=
l
tklktltk epxy
        (2)
with
∑= h tkhtkhtk wVe          (3)
and 
∑ =
k
lkp 1 ∑ =
h
tkhw 1
        (4)
Equation (1) represents the GCE criterion which minimizes the divergence between the data in the 
form of posterior transition probabilities lkp  and the transition priors lkq ; lkp  denotes the probability a farm 
in size class l at time t will move to size class k at time t+1. Probabilities lkp  are elements of a KL×  squared 
matrix of transition probabilities where l, k =1,…,K and lkq  are the counterpart prior elements; tkhw are the 
elements of a 1×TKH  vector of error posterior probabilities and tkhu  are the counterpart prior elements. 
Equation (2) represents the Markov data consistency constraints, where tky  are the elements of a 1×TK
vector of known proportions falling in the k-th Markov states in time (t+1), tlx  are the elements of a 1×TL
vector of known proportions falling in the l-th Markov states in time (t).
The error term tke , included in equation (2), is reparameterized as given by equation (3), following the 
classical maximum entropy formalism (GOLAN et al., 1996: 107-110). Given that each Markov state can be 
characterized by a different variance, a specific definition of support bounds for each Markov size class is 
considered following the statistical model presented in GOLAN et al., (1996: 182-185). Equations (4) represent 
the set of additivity constraints for the required Markov row constraint and the proper probabilities of the 
reparameterized error. The relative information content of the estimated parameters is evaluated through 
the normalized entropy measure as well as by its complement, the so-called information index described in 
GOLAN et al., (1996: 93). 
A salient characteristic of the obtained TPMs is that these matrices will be diagonally dominant: from 
one year to another most farms remain in the same size class. Most of the probability mass is, therefore, 
expected to be concentrated on the diagonal, implying little overall transitions. The literature (e.g. 
SHORROCKS, 1978; which is extended by GEWEKE et al., 1986; and more recently by JAFFRY, SCHUERMANN, 2003) 
has developed a number of mobility indices, which maps the mobility information inherent in the KK ×
TPM into a scalar metric ( )PM . A good example of such an index is the SHORROCKS, (1978) mobility index M. 
With P being the TPM and n being the number of size classes. M is equal to
)1(
))((
−
−
=
n
PtrnM          (7)
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If there would be no mobility, the TPM would be an identity matrix (all diagonal elements equal to 1) 
and the trace of the TPM would be equal to n. M would be equal to zero then. In case of perfect mobility M 
is equal to one, because then all diagonal terms of the TPM except for one will be equal to zero. Because of 
this the trace of P is equal to 1 and M reduces to 1. The Shorrocks index gives information on mobility but 
not on its direction. Here, two additional indices are developed in order to provide information about this. 
It could be stated that probabilities in the lower (off-diagonal) triangle part of the TPM indicates downward 
shifts. In contrast, the upper triangle represents upward shifts. Note also that the sum of upward and 
downward shifts is the mirror side of what happens at the diagonal. Let’s define kkp−1  the mobility part 
of the diagonal element k. Aggregating all these diagonal mobility elements gives a sum which is exactly 
equal to the aggregated value of all off-diagonal terms. This sum of the mobility part of the diagonal is 
used as a ‘deflator’ in the upward and downward mobility indices. An upward mobility index UM could then 
be the sum of the upper triangle probabilities of the TPM deflated by the deflator described above, or
∑
∑∑
−
=
>
n
k
kk
n
i
n
ij
ij
U
p
p
M
)1(         (8)
If there would be maximum or full upward shift and no downward shift the index would be 1, since the 
sum of the upward triangle probabilities of the TPM would then be exactly equal to the sum of the mobility 
part of the diagonal elements. If there would be no upward shift the index would be zero since then the 
sum of the probabilities of the upper triangle of the TPM would be equal to zero. Likewise, if we sum the 
lower triangle TPM elements and divide this by the deflator, we obtain an index for the downward mobility 
DM . If all mobility would be downward shift the index would be 1; if no downward shift, the index would 
be zero. Note that by definition it should hold that 1=+ DU MM  or 
.1
UD MM −=
4. Data and Prior Information
Aggregate data on the size distribution of dairy farms in the Netherlands are used. Holdings were classified 
according to their herd size classes. The data cover the period from 1972 to 2006 and allow the recovery of 
the number of dairy farms belonging to seven farm size classes: 1-9 cows, 10-19 cows, 20-29 cows, 30-49 
cows, 50-69 cows, 70-99 cows, and > 100 cows (LEI-CBS, various years). 
The prior information on Markov transition probability estimates may concern three types of information: 
the probability of a farm persisting in the same farm size class (i.e. persistency), the probability of a farm 
entering and/or exiting the sector (i.e. entry/exit), and the probability of moving to another farm size class 
(i.e. net shifts). In this study we followed the extensive investigation of previous research performed by 
TONINI AND JONGENEEL, (2008) and the lessons (general patterns) drawn from this, formed the basis of the 
prior information used. Based on these findings in the literature, the priors on the diagonal transitional 
probabilities were set, moving from the top left corner to the low right corner of the TPM from 0.65 to 
0.80 (i.e. 
65.0
22
=p , 70.0=kkp for 3=k , and ,5=k 75.0
44
=p  and for 7,6=k ). As regards exit and 
considering the already specified priors on persistency, the priors on the exit probabilities 
0lp  for 7,...,2=l
were set at 0.35, 0.25, 0.20, 0.15, 0.05 and 0.05 respectively. It was decided to specify no positive priors on any 
entry probabilities 
).0,0(
0
 kp k  Our prior estimate of the switch size class below, which farms tend to 
decline and, above, which farms tend to expand, is set at the size class with 50 to 69 cows (see also Table 1). 
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As regards the farms in this size class, our prior is that they have a larger probability to expand rather than 
to contract because of their relatively large capital stock. Their probability to move down was equal to 0.05 
(i.e. 
05.0
43
=p ) with a probability of moving up equal to 0.10 (i.e. 
10.0
45
=p ). Farms in larger size classes 
are assumed to move up to the adjacent size class with a probability of 0.15, whereas farms in lower size 
classes are assumed to move down to the next size class with a probability of 0.05.
5. Estimation Results
The Markov model was initially estimated following a recursive-like type of estimation, adding one sample 
point at a time. This procedure allows to evaluate the information content attached to each sample point 
detecting turning points and systematic time variations. The information content of each sample data 
is assessed by computing the normalized entropy for the signal part and its counterpart, the so-called 
information index.
In Figure 2 the information index is presented for each recursive sub-sample starting from 1972-74. 
In a cross entropy framework, when the information index is zero, priors and estimates are equivalent. 
From an inspection of Figure 2 it appears that the information content sharply increased from 1976 to 1985 
indicating that the addition of each single data points in this period increased the overall information 
content of the model estimates. The contribution of each data point was rather stable between 1985 and 
1999; one could also say that the priors were conforming to the final estimates (i.e. posteriors). These 
findings suggest a turning point in the information content of the data after 1984. Therefore, it was 
decided to split the sample 1972-06 into two sub-samples: 1972-83 and 1985-06, excluding year 1984 when 
milk quotas were introduced.
Figure 2:  Information index evolution for recursive samples
Notes: The information index is computed as ( )p~1 S−  where ( )p~S  is the normalized entropy.
Source: Own estimates.
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In Table 2 and Table 3 the estimated TPMs are reported for the sub-samples 1972-83, 1985-2006. The 
normalized signal entropy ( )p~S  for the system was 0.6707 and 0.6165 for the period 1972-83 and 1985-
06 respectively. The information index ( )p~I  was 0.3292 and 0.3835 for the period 1972-83 and 1985-06 
respectively. The entropy indicators suggest a slight increase in information for the with-quota period. The 
estimated TPMs already provide insight into the dynamic adjustment of dairy farms. For example, during 
both periods considered there was a strong tendency for farms to persist in the same size class from one 
year to the next (see transition probabilities on the diagonal containing elements kkp ). 
The off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix provide information on the extent to which dairy 
farms are going to scale up or down. For example considering Table 2, from one period to the next, about 
4 percent of all farms with 30-49 cows will probably grow into dairy farms with 50-69 cows. In the period 
1985-06 entry is found for the class sizes with more than 30 cows (see Table 3), whereas in the period 
1972-83 entry is found only for farms with 50-69. At the same time between 1972 and 1983 small farm size 
classes are attracted towards the middle size class with 30-49 cows, whereas a similar growth process is 
found towards the large size classes with more than 70 cows when using the full sample.
Table 2: TPM for sub-sample 1972-83
Class Exit 1-9 10-19 20-29 30-49 50-69 70-99 > 100 S(pi)
Entry 0.9999 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.9973
1-9 0.1718 0.8258 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6282
10-19 0.1058 0.0589 0.8241 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7115
20-29 0.0652 0.0000 0.0364 0.8981 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4203
30-49 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.9547 0.0447 0.0000 0.0000 0.0594
50-69 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9090 0.0848 0.0000 0.3850
70-99 0.0281 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8985 0.0734 0.4849
> 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9999
Notes: S(pi) is the normalized entropy measure for the signal part of the estimated parameters.
Source: Own estimates.
Table 3: TPM for sub-sample 1985-06
Class Exit 1-9 10-19 20-29 30-49 50-69 70-99 > 100 S(pi)
Entry 0.9893 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0031 0.0068 0.0002 0.6362
1-9 0.1806 0.8194 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6396
10-19 0.1215 0.0609 0.8176 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7101
20-29 0.0860 0.0000 0.0680 0.8460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6839
30-49 0.0193 0.0000 0.0000 0.0323 0.9303 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000 0.1891
50-69 0.0373 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9305 0.0322 0.0000 0.2875
70-99 0.1831 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8162 0.0007 0.7856
> 100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9999 0.9998
Notes: S(pi) is the normalized entropy measure for the signal part of the estimated parameters.
Source: Own estimates.
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In Figure 3 the Shorrocks mobility index is reported for the two sub-samples, showing how the addition 
of one sample point at a time affected the mobility index in these two sub-samples. In the sub-sample 1972-83 
mobility shows an inverse U-curve pattern, which is likely to be related to the switch in milk delivery system 
and associated farm investment strategies discussed before. In the second sub-sample, after 1984 mobility 
decreases to its lowest level in 1991, whereas afterwards 1990s it gradually increases. As such, this confirms the 
hypothesis that the introduction of the milk quota system, at least immediately after its introduction, froze 
farm size adjustment in the Dutch dairy sector. However, in the course of time mobility increased, which is 
likely to be related to the increased possibilities to trade and lease of milk quota and the continued pressure on 
farmers to increase their scale as a strategy to minimize (fixed and labour) costs per unit of milk output.
In Table 4, the mobility indices based on the two estimated TPMs are reported. Overall we can say that 
Dutch dairy farms are rather immobile and mobility is larger when considering the with-quota period. As 
compared to the pre-quota period, the introduction of the quota increased the downward mobility and 
lowered the upward mobility. This is not surprising since in order to expand one farm production rights 
have to be acquired, which can only be obtained by buying out other farms or leasing quota. This fits in 
with the estimated relatively large probability of exit during the with-quota period.
Figure 3 Shorrocks index for recursive samples
Source: Own estimates.
Table 4: Mobility indices for the estimated sub-samples TPMs
1972-83 Sample with Quota 1985-06 Sample without Quota
Shorrocks Index 0.0986 0.1215
Upward Mobility 0.3145 0.0726
Downward Mobility 0.6856 0.9275
Source: Own estimates.
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Projections
In this section the projections for the Dutch farm size dairy distribution are derived based on the 
estimated Markov transition probability. First, a counterfactual projection is made in order to assess how 
the farm size distribution would have evolved if there would have been no milk quotas. In doing so, the 
estimated TPM for the period 1972-83 was used selecting year 1983 as a base year for projections. Figure 4 
presents projected and actual farm size distribution in percent for the year 2006. As the Figure shows in the 
no-quota case, the fraction of farms in size classes 30-49 cows and >100 cows would have been larger than 
is actual. The actual number of farms during the quota period suggests a concentration of milk production 
towards medium farms with 50-69 cows. Note that without the quota, the number of very large dairy farms 
(‘mega’-farms with herd sizes >100 dairy cows) would have significantly increased.
The second set of projections is more tentative as it tries to assess what would have been the Dutch dairy 
farm size distribution if after 2015, the structural adjustment in the Dutch dairy sector would be similar to 
that observed during the period 1972-83 when there were no milk quotas. Therefore, two additional types 
of projections are made for the period 2007-2022. In the first scenario (i.e. Scenario 1) we assume that 
milk quotas will remain until 2022 (continuation of status quo) and projections are performed using the 
TPM estimated for 1985-06. In the second scenario (i.e. Scenario 2) we assume a temporary continuation 
of milk quotas until 2015, whereas for the period 2015-22 milk quotas will be abolished and projections 
for this second period are made using the TPMs estimated for 1972-83. It is assumed, that irrespective of 
which anticipatory trajectory is chosen, milk quota will remain binding for the Netherlands until 2015. 
Comparing Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, it shows that the abolition of milk quotas leads to an increase in the 
number of farms with more than 30 cows (see Table 5) whereas a decline is predicted for small farms. This 
has to do with the fact that during the period 1972-1983 many small dairy farms went out of business (see 
Figure 1) and no significant entry probabilities were estimated in the 1972-83 TPMs (see Table 2). As Table 
5 illustrates the predicted total number of dairy farms in case of quota abolition would be 11469, which is 
about 20 percent above the Scenario 1. In 2022, whatever the scenario the number of dairy farms will be 
half than the number in 2006.
Figure 4:  Projected versus actual farm size distribution for the year 2006 (percent)
Source: Own estimates.
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Table 5:  Projected farm size distribution for 2007, 2016 and 2020 
Year Scenarios 1-9 10-19 20-29 30-49 50-69 70-99 > 100 Total
2006 1, 2 804 913 1520 4444 6724 3496 2887 20788
2015 1, 2 279 442 863 2906 4287 1269 2891 12937
2022
1 157 280 591 2010 2868 753 2891 9550
2 126 208 445 2549 2948 1885 3308 11469
Source: Own estimates.
Conclusions
This paper analysed the impact of milk quotas on the dairy farm structure of the Netherlands. Initially, 
how the farm structure has changed over time was examined detecting to which extent the introduction 
of milk quotas in 1984 affected this structural change process. In doing so, Markov TPMs and mobility 
indicators were estimated for two sub-periods: 1972-83 and 1985-06. The estimation results were then used 
to run a counterfactual scenario for the period 1984-2006 to project how the farm size distribution would 
have evolved if there would have been no milk quotas. In addition tentative forward looking projections on 
the evolution of the Dutch dairy farm structure were made for the period 2007-22, assuming two scenarios: 
milk quota prolongation up to 2022 and the phasing-out of milk quota by 2015.
As the Shorrocks mobility indicator shows, the introduction of milk quotas in April 1, 1984 at least 
initially reduced mobility and structural adjustments. However, after some years mobility started to 
increase, which is likely to reflect the developed possibilities to trade and lease quotas. On average, the 
introduction of quota has not reduced farm mobility, but rather increased it (as is reflected in the estimated 
pre and post-quota TPMs). The introduction of quota significantly affected the direction of farm mobility. 
Relative to the without quota period, after 1984 the downward mobility increased at the expense of upward 
mobility. This finding emphasizes that the quota system increased the interdependencies between dairy 
farms as regards their structural adjustment. For a farm to expand, it has to acquire production rights, 
which can be obtained only by buying or leasing them from other farms.
There is evidence for the statement that the milk quota system favoured a concentration towards 
medium farms (i.e. farm with 50-69 cows). On the one hand, milk quota might keep milk production in 
certain areas where otherwise dairy farms would have been closed. However, milk quota limit milk output 
and with the ongoing increasing farm scale tendency this drives down the number of dairy farms and 
dominates other effects. Without quotas it was found that the number of mega-dairy farms (herd size > 100 
dairy cows) strongly increased.
The estimated model does not explicitly account for changes in economic signals (price support, direct 
payments). In the pre-quota period there was no limit on output, but generous price support, making 
dairy farming an attractive business. When quota is abolished milk price is expected to be not or much 
less supported and is likely to be much lower. So, although in both cases there are no quotas, economic 
conditions are expected to be rather different. Projections need therefore to be interpreted with due care. 
On other hand, the farm structure shows a tendency to gradually adjust and to be rather well-approximated 
by Markov models. An important element for further research would be to derive the implications of the 
evolution of dairy farm structure in terms of evolution of milk production. 
Mo
de
llin
g A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 R
ur
al 
De
ve
lop
me
nt
 P
oli
cie
s
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008156
References
ß BOOTS, M. (1999). Micro-economic analysis of alternatives policies for Dutch dairy farming. PhD Thesis, 
Mansholt Institute, Wageningen: University of Wageningen.
ß BURRELL, A. (1989). The microeconomics of quota transfer, in Burrell, A. (ed): Milk Quotas in the European 
Community. Ashford: CAB International, 100-118. 
ß GEWEKE, J., MARSHALL, R. C., ZARKIN, G. A. (1986). Mobility indices in continuous time Markov chains, 
Econometrica, 54(6), 1407-1423.
ß GOLAN, A., JUDGE, G., MILLER, D. (1996). Maximum Entropy Econometrics: Robust Estimation with Limited 
Data. Chichester: Wiley.
ß GOOD, I. J. (1963). Maximum entropy for hypothesis formulation, especially for multidimensional 
contingency tables, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 34(3), 911-934.
ß JAFFRY, Y., SCHUERMANN, T. (2003). Metrics for comparing credit migration matrices. Working Paper 03-09, 
Financial Institution Center: Wharton.
ß JOHNSTON, J., DINARDO, J. (1977). Econometrics Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill.
ß KRIJGER, A. (1991). Reacties van Nederlandse melkveehouders op de superheffing. PhD Thesis, Amsterdam: 
University of Amsterdam.
ß KULLBACK, J. (1959). Information Theory and Statistics. New York: John Wiley.
ß LEE, T., JUDGE, G., ZELLNER, A. (1970). Estimating the Parameters of the Markov Probability model from 
Aggregate Time Series Data. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
ß LEI-CBS (various years). Land- en tuinbouwcijfers (Agricultural and horticultural statistics). The Hague, 
Agricultural Economics Institute (LEI) and Central Bureau of Statistics, The Netherlands.
ß MITTELHAMMER, R. C., JUDGE, G. G., MILLER, D. J. (2000). Econometric Foundations. Cambridge: University 
Press.
ß OSKAM, A. J., SPEIJERS, D. P. (1992). Quota mobility and quota values influence on the structural 
development of dairy farming, Food Policy, 17(1), 41-52.
ß PERLOFF, J. M., KARP, L. S., GOLAN, A. (2007). Estimating Market Power and Strategies. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
ß SHORROCKS, A. F. (1978). The measurement of mobility, Econometrica, 46(5), 1013-1024.
ß TONINI, A. AND JONGENEEL, R. (2008). The distribution of dairy farm size in Poland: A Markov approach 
based on information theory, Applied Economics (Forthcoming).
157
Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
An Examination of Milk Quota Expansion
at EU Member State Level
with Specific Emphasis on Ireland 
JULIAN BINFIELD1, TREVOR DONNELLAN2 AND KEVIN HANRAHAN2
Abstract
The CAP Health Check in 2008 may result in fundamental changes in EU dairy policy. Expansion of the EU 
dairy quota is being strongly considered a prelude to the elimination of the quota mechanism by 2014/15. This 
paper addresses the implications of such a reform for EU and Irish dairy commodity markets. We use a suite of 
partial equilibrium multi commodity structural models of EU agricultural commodity markets to project the 
impact of an expansion in the dairy quota on milk and dairy commodity production, dairy commodity prices 
and milk prices at an EU and Member State level. A number of experiments are conducted involving differing 
annual rates of expansion of the milk quota using national quota rents from the literature.
Key words: Milk Quota Expansion, Partial Equilibrium, Commodity Modelling
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the impact on the European Union and Ireland of an increase in the EU milk quota 
in advance of its anticipated abolition at the end of the 2014/15 milk quota year. The impact which this 
increase in quota will have on dairy commodity prices, production, consumption, trade, stock levels and 
farm milk prices is of interest to consumers, policy makers and farmers alike. Further impetus to the reform 
of the EU dairy regime has come from the recent buoyancy in dairy markets, which has allowed the EU to 
remove export subsidies and maintain relatively high milk prices. The possibility to allow an expansion 
of production and increased export opportunities may mean that an expansion in milk quota can now be 
achieved with minimal impact on farm profitability.
The EU Commission has agreed a two percent increase in milk quota in 2008, while further increases 
are almost certain to follow as part of the EU Health Check. This paper utilises the FAPRI-Ireland and 
FAPRI-EU Gold Models to examine a number of milk quota reform scenarios. 
Most international modelling organisations now treat the EU as a single entity (EU-27) or they combine 
the various Member States (MS) to form two blocks (EU-15/NMS12). Agricultural policy models are then 
designed around these definitions. The milk sector across the EU differs considerably between EU MS. 
Differences exist in terms of milk production systems (pasture, feed grain and hybrid systems), production 
costs (land, labour and other inputs) and milk utilisation (fresh products, specialist food ingredients and 
basic commodities). 
The models used for this analysis address this heterogeneity by examining the agricultural sector in 
so far as is practical at a MS level. The model comprises both MS level models France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Hungary, Poland and United Kingdom as well as models representing MS aggregations, other EU-15 
and other 10 NMS. Due to difficulties in compiling a useable dataset, models for Bulgaria and Romania have 
yet to be developed and these MS are not considered within this analysis. Some notable dairy producing 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark are modelled as part of the other EU-15 block.
2. The EU Milk Quota System and the debate on its reform
Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and, in the early years of Irish membership, there was an exceptional 
expansion and modernisation of the Irish dairy sector at both farm and processing level and milk 
production increased significantly. A similar picture emerged in other Member States (MS). At this time, 
milk production throughout the EU increased at a rate which led to surpluses that were a significant cost to 
the EU budget, and which generated negative publicity for the CAP. 
The growing milk surplus was initially managed through intervention buying, but it was never the 
purpose of the intervention system to handle a persistent and growing surplus. The surplus began in the 
late 1970s and continued into the 1980s. In 1984, the milk quota system was introduced for an initial period 
of four years. The stated purpose of the milk quota system was to contain the growth in milk production so 
that the EU’s agriculture budget could manage the cost of the price support framework. The alternative to 
the milk quota system would have been a cut in support prices for dairy products. In other words, a policy 
that was felt would have a considerable negative effect on agricultural incomes. 
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The quota system was renewed and the reference quantities were reduced in successive years. In 1992, 
the system was extended until the end of the century. As part of the MacSharry CAP reforms in 1992, it 
was initially proposed to reduce the quota by another three percent, but ultimately, this policy was not 
contained in the reforms that were finally agreed upon. However, the co-responsibility levy was abolished 
at this time. There were no further changes to the quota system in the 1990s. 
Originally, many producers were strongly against milk quotas because it constrained expansion, a 
particular issue since increasing dairy yields per cow meant that fewer dairy cows (and less land) were 
required to produce a given milk quota. However, the milk quota found favour with some producers after a 
time and they regarded it as a license to produce milk, which they could ultimately sell, in order to provide 
a retirement income.
In 1999, Agenda 2000 (Berlin Agreement) provided for increases in milk quotas in the EU-15. Ireland 
was among five EU MS which were granted quota increases in the 2000/01 and 2001/02 milk years. The 
Irish milk quota increased by 2.9 percent over this period with no change in the butterfat reference level. 
Quotas in four other EU MS were also increased at this time. The remaining EU MS each received a quota 
increase of 1.5 percent to be spread over a three year period later in the decade. In total these quota 
increases represented a further 2.4 percent increase in the quota available to the EU-15.
While a majority of EU MS supported the continuation of the milk quota system, at this point there was 
also pressure from Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Italy for quota elimination on the basis that it inhibited 
the EU’s access to growing export markets. As a compromise it was agreed that the milk quota system would 
be reviewed in 2003, noting the intention to retain quotas until at least 2006. However, by 2003 sentiments 
had changed little and political support for retention of the milk quota remained quite strong. As part of 
the Mid Term Review of the Agenda 2000 (Luxembourg Agreement), it was agreed that milk quotas would 
continue to 2014/15 and that there would be a review of the system in 2008.
In 2004, 10 NMS joined the EU. Milk quotas for these NMS were negotiated as part of the accession 
process. Of these 10 countries, only Poland had a significant level of dairy product exports. Similar quota 
arrangements were made for the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
In 2006, EU Commission officials began to indicate that they could see no prospect for the continuation 
of milk quotas beyond 2014/15 on the basis that the required level of political support for their extension 
would not be forthcoming. Attention then began to turn to the mechanism by which milk quotas would be 
removed. 
Reform of dairy policy will form a central plank of the 2008 review of EU agricultural policy, known 
as the CAP Health Check (CEC 2007a).3 Several mechanisms for the relaxation of the milk quota have been 
proposed. The most likely means of reform will be a gradual quota expansion which may be accompanied 
by other measures such as a reduction in the rate of a super levy and further reform of the intervention 
system. These are seen as the most reliable means to achieving the so called soft-landing for the dairy 
sector post quota. Other options are seen as less attractive for a number of reasons. For example, overnight 
3 The CAP Health Check is likely to cover a range of other issues in addition to the Dairy Common Market Organisation (CMO). 
See the Communication to the Council from the Commission CEC (2007) for further details. 
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elimination would involve rapid change and would not allow producers and processors sufficient time to 
adjust. Quota trading between MS might face legal impediments. A reduction in the rate of super levy 
alone might unnecessarily complicate the milk production decision process at farm level, with an adverse 
impact on farm management and farm efficiency and would also impact to the greatest extent on the most 
efficient producers.
The rapid and dramatic improvement in international dairy commodity prices which began in mid 2006 
and accelerated in 2007, led to a debate about an immediate increase in EU milk quotas in the 2008/09 
milk quota year. The issue was addressed at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council in Brussels on 26 and 
27 September 2007. While there was outright opposition to an increase in milk quotas in these discussions 
from only three EU MS, some of the more influential MS were relatively non-committal on the basis that 
further research on the issue was required. 
Overall, the balance of opinion at the Council seemed to favour an increase in milk quotas of the order of 
three percent in 2008/09. Subsequently in the report from the Commission to the Council (2007 b) on the status 
of the EU dairy market, a recommendation was made for a two percent increase in the EU milk quota in 2008.
3. Recent Developments on Dairy Markets
International commodity prices underwent significant changes in 2006 and 2007. It is projected that world 
prices will change considerably in the future, also. Here, the origins of the world price projections used in 
the analysis are explained. In addition, details on the quota rents used for the analysis are provided.
In 2007, a number of factors, economic, policy and climate related, converged to produce price increases 
that surpassed all expectations and projections for the dairy sector. Additionally, adverse weather conditions 
and increasing input prices led to a fall off in the supply of dairy products on the world market. This comes 
at a time when international dairy product consumption is growing strongly.
The ongoing drought in the southern hemisphere had detrimental effects on the supply of dairy products 
from Australia in particular. Furthermore, world stocks generally have been depleted and countries, which 
traditionally held significant stocks, no longer have the capacity to release large volumes of product onto 
world markets with the effect of stabilising prices. Simultaneously, demand for dairy products continues 
to increase. Strong macroeconomic growth, for Southeast Asia in particular, is contributing to increased 
consumption of dairy products. All of these factors combined have led to sharp increases in prices for dairy 
products in 2007. Figure 1 shows the Irish Dairy board Milk Price equivalent for butter and SMP.
Concerns relating to oil security, together with political tensions in the Middle East have led to oil 
prices reaching their highest level in real US dollar terms since the early 1980s. High energy prices, coupled 
with an increasing political focus on the climate change issue, has resulted in a wave of biofuel policies 
across the world. In key exporting countries, this has led to an increase in cereal area as well as a significant 
shift of cereals out of food and feed use and into fuel production. As a result, animal feed prices have risen 
and in turn this has negatively affected the cost of dairy production. 
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Every year, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) produces a global outlook 
using its suite of international commodity models. The production of these projections, with the various 
models, is a detailed task. Consequently, the model simulations are based on information that is available 
at the time when the models projections are finalised, usually in the month of January.
The world price projections that are generated as part of FAPRI’s process usually differ from what 
transpires, even in the very short run, as a result of the vagaries of the weather or due to other unpredictable 
shocks on both the production and consumption side. Recent international examples for the meat sector of 
such shocks would include the various BSE, FMD and Avian Influenza (AI) occurrences, each of which impacted 
on both production and consumption. To address such shocks FAPRI, at the University of Missouri–Columbia 
(MU) produces a baseline update in July, without running the entire global FAPRI model system.
The most recent FAPRI world price projections come from the July 2007 update and reflect some of the 
long run behaviour of the January Global Projections. Further updated market information has become 
available since July and along with spot and future commodity prices, this information has been used to 
modify the July 2007 projections used in this report.4 The intention is to reflect the spirit of the update 
– to adjust the projections from the earlier modelling effort with current market information. The next 
round of official FAPRI World price projections from the global models will be available early in 2008.
4. Milk Quota Scenarios and Related Assumptions
The CAP Health Check is likely to cover a range of other issues in addition to the Dairy Common Market 
Organisation (CMO). Other suggested elements of the CAP Health Check proposals are increased compulsory 
modulation of single farm payments, moves to end partially decoupled direct payments, and simplification 
4 For more details on the FAPRI GOLD model see Hanrahan (2001).
Figure 1: Irish Dairy Board Butter/SMP Equivalent Price from 2005 to 2007
Source: Irish Dairy Board
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of the single payment scheme, which would appear to imply a movement towards a flat area payment 
scheme system across the EU (Agra Facts, 2007). Proposals for the CAP Health Check will be published in 
Brussels on 21 November 2007. A decision in relation to the details of the CAP Health check is expected by 
June 2008. For the purposes of this analysis, it was decided to examine the following scenarios:
The first scenario analysed, anticipated the recent proposal from the Commission to allow an increase in 
milk quota (CEC 2007c). This scenario itself would not be sufficient to bring much sought-after soft landing 
elimination of milk quotas. Consequently, a second scenario was developed which would involve successive 
annual increases in the EU milk quota up to the point when it is eliminated in 2014/15. Such a scenario might 
reflect one of the outcomes of the EU Health Check reform process. Both scenarios are specified below:
Scenario 1: Additional three percent increase in EU milk quota in 2008/09
s  )NCREASE IN  %5 MILK QUOTA AS PER #OUNCIL 2EG .O  
s  0LUS A FURTHER THREE PERCENT INCREASE FROM  !PRIL 
s  -ILK QUOTAS ARE REMOVED ON  !PRIL 
Scenario 2: Series of 3 percent per annum increase in EU milk quota
s  )NCREASE IN  %5 MILK QUOTA AS PER #OUNCIL 2EG .O  
s  0LUS A SERIES OF  PERCENT ANNUAL INCREASES FROM  TO  TOTAL QUOTA INCREASE 
of close to 20 percent)
s  -ILK QUOTAS ARE REMOVED ON  !PRIL 
Agricultural policy assumptions other than those related to milk policy are unchanged from the 
baseline assumptions. The CAP is largely that agreed upon within the Luxembourg Agreement of June 2003 
with differential national level implementation of the CAP, as allowed for under the Luxembourg Agreement. 
The expansion of the EU that occurred on 1 May 2004, with the accession of 10 NMS, is incorporated in the 
baseline. The Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) remains in place, i.e. no Doha Round Agreement 
occurred. The set-aside derogation agreed to by the Council of Minister’s in September will be applied in 
2008. It is assumed to be retained for the rest of the baseline projection period. In later years, export 
subsidies are reintroduced to prevent stock building as prices decline from the highs of 2007.
5. Methodology
The price of a commodity can be altered by regulation of the market and there are many means by which this 
can be achieved. In the CAP, intervention and disposal has been used in the past to remove commodities 
from the market in order to support the milk price and, ultimately, improve dairy farmer incomes. 
Policy makers may find that intervention and disposal measures are an expensive way to regulate the 
price of a commodity and for the dairy CMO this was the case in the 1970s. From a budgetary perspective, 
a cheaper alternative is to regulate the supply of the commodity. This was the basis for the introduction of 
the EU milk quota. 
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Generally, the lower the level at which the quota is set relative to the unregulated level of production, 
the greater will be the difference between the price of the commodity under quotas and the price under an 
unregulated or less regulated market (quota rent). It follows that if a quota is set a level higher than the 
unregulated level of production, it will have no impact on the price level of the commodity. In the EU at 
present quotas limit milk production. Their removal would allow some increase in milk production and this 
study quantifies the increase in production and the resulting decrease in milk prices.
Quota rents vary between MS over time and depend on prevailing market prices, input costs and the 
institutional framework involved in the transfer of the milk quota within MS. In some EU MS, the price 
of traded quota is, to some extent, indicative of the quota rent while in some other MS this may not be 
the case. Each country has its own peculiarities as to how the milk quota system is implemented and this 
complicates the assessment of the quota rent.
The empirical determination of quota rents is a study area in itself. It ideally requires very detailed 
MS level farm specific micro data. In general, such data cannot be easily produced on a consistent basis for 
many EU MS. Accordingly, this study avails of quota rents developed in other studies and combines these 
with some additional assumptions.
There have been many studies as to the level of quota rents in the EU-15. The paper by Lips and 
Rieder (2005) has been used as the basis for the rents for this study (Table 2).5 There are different 
estimates of the level of quota rents in other studies. If these other estimates were used, it would 
alter the results of the scenarios examined in this study, as would different projections of world dairy, 
cereal or oil prices. A further complication is that there are no studies on quota rents in the NMS. Of 
particular interest is the milk production potential in Poland. In the 1980s, Poland had a level of milk 
production that was about double its level of current production. In addition, accession to the EU 
has resulted in significantly higher dairy prices in Poland. However, the costs associated with dairy 
production in Poland have also risen due to the introduction of EU quality standards. In this study, a 
large positive rent is assumed for Poland, based on the increase in its milk prices relative to the pre-
accession period. Also, is the fact that the country has filled its deliveries quota more rapidly than 
most expected. This evidence is taken as an indication that the strong production potential implied by 
the rents used is well justified.
Table 1: Lips and Rieder (2005) quota rents used in model (% of milk price)
France 0.22
Germany 0.2
Ireland 0.31
Italy 0.3
Other EU 0.19
5 The choice of rents is, of course, key to the results. Some sensitivity analysis was carried out and can be obtained from the 
authors on request.
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Using the model, output and input prices are projected forward into the future. This facilitates the 
calculation of the future level of rents and the future level of milk production. Over the short-term, rents 
increase marginally under the baseline as the output price to cost ratio increases because feed prices 
decline from the very high levels experienced in 2007, while the decline in milk prices (in the presence of 
the milk quota) is less pronounced. Over the medium-term, rents decline as feed and oil related input prices 
decline at a slower rate than the milk price.
A synthetic equation is used to project milk deliveries as a function of:
Ë milk deliveries in the previous year 
Ë real milk price adjusted to reflect quota rents 
Ë milk to beef price ratio and 
Ë real value of the milk compensatory payment.6
6. Milk Quota Scenario Results
The analysis of the impact of the milk quota scenarios begins with the generation of a baseline outlook for 
the next ten years. Full details of that baseline outlook are contained in (Binfield et al. 2007). A very brief 
summary is provided below to provide a frame of reference for the scenario outcomes. This is then followed 
by sections summarising the impact of the scenarios on the dairy sector.
6.1 Key Points of Baseline Outlook
In general, EU and Irish agricultural commodity prices increase over the baseline projection period 
(Table 2, Table 3). Milk, dairy commodity and meat prices are all projected to increase between 2006 and 
2016. Prices are particularly high in the period 2007/ 2008 and 2009, then decline to a level which is still 
considerably above the average for the earlier part of this decade. Cereal prices decline from the high prices 
observed in 2007 but by the end of the projection period, they are well above the intervention price levels 
experienced in the early years of this decade. 
The volume of Irish agricultural output, with the exception of milk and dairy products and cereals, 
declines between 2006 and 2016. The decoupling of direct payments, increased costs of compliance with 
6 In the GOLD model payments that are incorporated into the Single Farm Payment are assumed to continue to have an 
impact on production decisions. The degree of impact depends on the commodity, but this is small in the case of the dairy 
payment.
165
Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
environmental regulation and increases in other production costs offset the positive impact of higher 
nominal output prices.
With quota remaining in place, the Irish milk price is projected to increase 12 percent over the period 2006 
to 2016. Overall, the value of Irish agricultural sector output at producer prices remains unchanged with gains 
in the cereals and milk sector being offset by declines in the value of output from the livestock sectors.
6.2 Quota Expansion Scenario 1 (3 percent increase in 2008/09)
Under this scenario, the increase in the quota prior to elimination in 2015 is very modest and so the 
impact on production, prior to quota removal, is small 
(Table 4, Table 5). The expansion of quota has two effects. In the first instance, to some degree it 
relaxes the constraint on low cost producers and there is an increase in milk production. However, the 
expansion in milk production reduces the price of milk. Lower milk prices lead some higher cost producers 
to reduce or cease production.
EU Level
The three percent quota increase has only a modest impact in terms of both milk production and 
prices across the EU. Many EU MS have the capacity to produce this increase in milk production. In many 
cases, the quota increase is required to keep pace with the increase in dairy product domestic use, which is 
largely driven by cheese consumption growth.
In recent years, some EU MS have demonstrated difficulty in filling their existing milk quota and, in 
the analysis; the quota expansion is not met by increased production from a number of MS. At an aggregate 
EU level, the three percent quota increase provides a two percent increase in milk production by 2014. 
Relative to the 2015 baseline milk price, the milk price in scenario 1 in 2015 is down about five percent 
at the EU level. It is assumed that where prices fall to prompt intervention level, intervention prices are 
lowered rather than allowing stock levels to build up. In this scenario butter intervention prices have to be 
reduced by 5%. 
Thereafter, quotas are removed and milk production continues to increase in some MS, while production 
actually contracts in other MS. The impact of these positive and negative movements in production is 
that, by 2016, aggregate EU milk production increases by an additional one percent when milk quotas 
are removed. The milk price under scenario 1 in 2016 is six percent below the 2016 price in the baseline. 
Overall, scenario 1 means little change in the location of EU milk production. 7
7 Note that the current projection period extends to 2016, which is only 21 months after quota elimination. This period is 
insufficient for the model to reach the long-run equilibrium regarding dairy production that would prevail in the absence of 
quotas.
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Ireland
Ireland takes up the full increase in milk quota, although in the early years of the projection period 
the increase in Irish milk production may appear to be below the three percent quota increase. However, 
this is due to a projected continuation of the increase in milk fat content (which requires a butter fat 
adjustment), as well as a decrease in imports of milk from Northern Ireland. 
Of greater interest is that Irish milk production expands by six percent in the two years after milk 
quota elimination, while the Irish milk price is eight percent below the corresponding baseline level. The 
price reduction that takes place in the last couple of years of the projection period is due to the expansion 
in EU milk production post quotas and it reflects the fact that Irish milk production is still increasing by 
the end of the projection period and has not reached its long run equilibrium level. Figure 2 illustrates the 
path of milk production and milk prices under scenario 1.
The increase in milk production in scenario 1 slows the historical rate of reduction in the number of 
dairy cows, since cows are required to produce the additional milk produced. The growth in milk yields in 
Ireland in scenario 1, is more or less unchanged relative to the baseline.
6.3 Quota Expansion Scenario 2 (3 percent annual increase in 2008/09-2014/15)
It is likely that if the milk quota was increased as described in scenario 1, a further increase in quotas 
would be required in due course, in advance of the elimination of the quota system in order to achieve the 
‘soft landing’ sought by policy makers.
Scenario 2, therefore, represents another path towards quota elimination in that it involves a series of 
annual milk quota increases (Table 6, Table 7). In scenario 2, the milk quota is increased by an additional 
three percent each year against the base 2008/09 level up to the assumed point of elimination in 2015. 
This would represent an increase in milk quotas of close to 20 percent in advance of quota elimination. 
Figure 2: EU and Irish Dairy Production and Milk Prices under Scenario 1(S1)
Milk Production Volume (fat adjusted) EU and Irish Milk Price
Source: FAPRI estimates
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Equally, policy makers might choose a smaller or larger annual percentage quota increase and select a 
shorter time period over which to implement these increases. The aggregate EU outcome under scenario 2 is 
more complex in that the total change in milk production represents the sum of both positive and negative 
changes in production in various MS. Additionally, the relative scale of production in MS is an important 
factor. With France, Germany, the UK and Italy accounting for half of total EU milk production, the outcome 
of the scenario in these countries heavily influences the aggregate outcome.
EU Level
While most MS take up the increase in quota in the first couple of years of expansion, in successive years, 
the annual increase in milk quota in scenario 2 is taken up by relatively fewer MS. Among the MS for which 
there are individual models in this analysis, only Ireland takes up the full increase in quota offered up to 
2014/15. Overall, EU milk production increases by just four percent by 2014 and the average EU milk price 
is projected to be almost seven percent lower than the 2014 baseline milk price. Over the projection period, 
none of the larger milk producing countries in the EU is in a position to take up a significant portion of the 
quota increase and hence, at an aggregate EU level, the expansion in milk production is relatively limited. A 
key feature of scenario 2 is the negligible impact of quota removal given that much of the EU in aggregate will 
have achieved its productive capacity in the quota expansion phase preceding the elimination.
Relatively little change in price or production occurs at aggregate EU level beyond 2009/10. Production 
increases and some MS tend to be offset by production contractions in other MS. As a consequence, when 
the milk quota is removed, aggregate EU milk production is more or less unchanged on the preceding couple 
of years. Accordingly, milk prices are virtually unchanged between 2010 and 2016. In this scenario, butter 
intervention prices need to be reduced by about 10% by the end of the period to prevent stock build up. An 
alternative to allowing stock build up would be to spend more on export subsidies for all products which are 
below their WTO restricted level, however this option is not examined in this paper.
Ireland
Irish milk production continues to increase once quotas are removed (up 3.4 percent between 2014 and 
2016) while milk prices, at this point, remain relatively stable since aggregate EU milk production does not 
increase any further. The increase in Irish milk production is achieved although a combination of increased 
milk yields, which grow at a higher rate than under the baseline, and an increase in dairy cow numbers. 
This higher rate of increase in yields is achieved mainly through improved herd productivity and increased 
feed utilisation. Figure 3 illustrates the path of milk production and milk prices under scenario 2.
It is assumed that the additional milk produced in Ireland is mostly absorbed in butter and SMP 
production, with some small additional volume of cheese produced. The projected price for Irish milk reflects 
this choice of product mix. Ultimately, it will be for processors in Ireland to decide how the additional milk 
volume should be processed. Additional processing capacity will need to be put in place in Ireland to handle 
the additional one million tonnes of milk that would be available. It is possible that export opportunities 
may arise in other MS markets that cannot be anticipated through this analysis. It is conceivable that the 
product mix could be different and might favour cheese production over the intervention products.
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Under scenario 2, dairy cow numbers in Ireland in 2016, at 1.12 million, are actually up two percent 
on the 2006 level. Yields grow at a rate closer to two percent per year, compared with just one percent per 
year, in both the baseline and in scenario 1. This additional rate of yield increase in scenario 2 represents 
an extra 300 kg of milk per cow by 2016 (compared with the baseline yield in 2016) and is achieved through 
a better rate of improvements in overall herd genetics, a modest increase in feed grain usage of the order of 
100kg per head and a decrease in the amount of milk fed on farms.
7. Conclusions
The balance of opinion suggests that the EU milk quota will not persist beyond 2015. This paper has 
examined two options relating to the removal of the EU milk quota, varying the rate of quota increase in 
advance of its removal. Even so, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions that would also apply in the 
case of other rates of quota removal. 
Aggregate EU milk production will not expand in line with a large quota increase. The expansion of 
milk production in some EU MS will be offset by contraction elsewhere. Other than Poland, large EU MS are 
not projected to see any major increase in their milk production, given the underlying assumptions used 
here. Ireland would seem to be well positioned to expand its milk production when quotas are relaxed or 
removed, as it has amongst the highest quota rents of any of the MS, according to most of the studies of 
rents available. High feed costs have improved the competitive position of Ireland’s pasture based production 
relative to feed grain based milk producers in continental EU MS. A slow rate of increase in the milk quota 
will depress milk prices while still constraining Irish milk production over the short-term. A more rapid 
rate of quota increase will make the milk quota largely redundant (even before its abolition) in much of the 
EU and will allow Ireland the scope to increase production and reach its potential more quickly.
The caveats set out in our baseline analysis (BINFIELD et al 2007) relating to WTO reform, exchange rates 
and the impact of weather events on agricultural markets, apply equally to the scenarios analysed here. For 
Figure 3: EU and Irish Dairy Production and Milk Prices under scenario 2 (S2)
Milk Production Volume (fat adjusted) EU and Irish Milk Price
Source:FAPRI estimates.
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example, if world dairy prices are maintained at 2007 levels into the future then, the production response 
from the EU to the removal of quota will be different. Not only would the level of production be different, 
but the experience of individual MS would be different, giving those MS whose production remains constant 
or decreases in this analysis the potential to expand production.
Table 2 Baseline Projections. EU 25 dairy supply and utilisation
2008 2007 2008 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 22,871 22,207 21,931 21,697 21,414 21,122 20,854 20,592 20,342 20,106 19,869
Production/cow 6,055 6,346 6,473 6,565 6,613 6,683 6,761 6,835 6,511 6,985 7,061
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 140.00 140.51 141.96 142.45 141.62 141.16 140.98 140.74 140.58 140.44 140.29
Milk quota 138.30 138.78 139.26 139.50 139.50 139.50 139.50 139.50 139.50 139.50 139.50
Other milk production 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21
Fluid consumption 35.68 35.67 39.61 39.52 35.52 35.72 39.54 39.37 35.20 39.02 38.84
Manufacturing use 58.97 88.98 100.21 100.52 89.75 89.57 99.67 98.70 89.80 99.92 100.03
Feed use, net exports 5.46 6.38 6.27 6.14 610 6.02 5.84 5.86 5.78 5.70 5.62
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 8,652 8,789 8,892 9,058 9,143 9,184 9,238 9,288 9,338 9,390 9,439
Imports 90 88 89 94 97 99 101 103 105 107 109
Domestic use 8,231 8,409 8,427 8,664 8,786 8,830 8,883 8,938 8,997 8,055 9,110
Exports 512 484 560 476 445 449 454 451 444 439 435
Ending stocks 498 482 476 488 497 500 503 505 508 512 515
Butter
Production 2,081 2,100 2,066 2,086 2,098 2,094 2,096 2,096 2,097 2,098 2,099
Imports 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Domestic use 1,925 1,809 1,870 1,913 1,919 1,911 1,906 1,900 1,896 1,891 1,885
Exports 276 409 295 257 259 263 269 275 280 286 293
Ending stocks 184 146 126 123 123 123 124 125 126 127 128
Skim powder
Production 838 967 1,001 867 839 827 817 807 796 786 777
Imports 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Domestic use 760 769 723 760 766 757 750 744 738 733 727
Exports 140 267 332 141 100 96 92 87 81 76 73
Ending stocks 157 111 79 67 61 57 54 52 50 50 49
Whole powder
Production 774 746 846 696 528 522 518 511 505 499 497
Imports 20 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 17
Domestic use 306 303 308 322 334 335 336 338 339 341 342
Exports 488 467 556 384 203 200 197 189 182 175 171
Ending stocks 42 33 30 35 43 46 48 48 49 49 49
Prices euro per 100 kilograms
Milk, 3.7% fat 27.6 33.1 33.0 30.6 30.0 30.4 30.7 30.8 31.0 31.1 31.2
Cheese market 384.4 427.9 442.8 419.3 413.9 420.1 424.5 427.7 430.3 432.6 435.0
Butter market 290.3 382.3 322.5 285.8 278.4 280.3 280.7 280.3 279.1 277.9 277.0
SMP market 219.4 307.1 311.0 264.8 254.1 260.3 264.5 267.9 270.7 273.0 276.1
WIMP market 247.9 319.1 311.7 261.8 231.9 236.1 239.1 241.1 243.0 244.6 246.9
Butter intervention 259.3 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2 246.2
SMP intervention 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7 174.7
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Table 3 Baseline Projections. Irish dairy supply and utilisation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 1,087 1,051 1,036 1,026 1,015 1,000 987 974 961 954 941
Production/cow 4,787 4,882 4,925 4,949 4,982 5,034 5,088 5,142 5,197 5,220 5,276
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 6.05 6.10 6.05 6.04 6.02 5.99 5.98 5.96 5.95 5.94 5.93
Milk quota 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40
Other milk production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fluid consumption 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70
Manufacturing use 5.26 5.31 5.25 5.23 5.20 5.17 SAS 5.13 5.11 5.09 5.07
Feed use, net exports 019 0.18 0.18 0.17 017 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 137 128 131 134 135 136 136 136 136 137 137
Imports 15 18 18 19 20 22 24 25 27 28 29
Domestic use 38 39 41 43 45 46 48 50 53 55 56
Exports 111 107 109 111 111 111 111 111 111 110 109
Ending stocks 29 29 29 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Butter
Production 150 159 154 151 150 150 149 149 148 148 148
Imports 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Domestic use 17 18 18 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 21
Exports 140 144 136 131 129 130 130 129 129 128 127
Ending stocks 73 71 72 76 80 82 83 84 84 85 86
Skim powder
Production 74 91 90 85 83 82 81 80 80 79 79
Imports 4 5 S 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
Domestic use 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Exports 72 93 89 79 76 77 76 76 75 75 75
Ending stocks 62 54 49 51 52 53 52 52 52 52 52
Whole powder
Production 39 38 39 38 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Imports 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Domestic use 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Exports 40 39 40 39 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Ending stocks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Milk price, 3.7% fat
euro/100 kg 24.2 32.9 30.5 271 25.7 26.2 26.5 26.7 26.9 27.0 27.2
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Table 4 Scenario 1: Changes from Baseline. EU 25 dairy supply and utilisation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Production/cow 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Milk quota 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other milk production 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fluid consumption 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Manufacturing use 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4%
Feed use, net exports 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% -1% -2%
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Imports 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -2%
Domestic use 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Exports 0% 0% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 12% 14%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Butter
Production 0% 0% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 5%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
Exports 0% 0% 11% 16% 16% 17% 16% 16% 15% 24% 28%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 7% 6% 6% 8% 6% 7%
Skim powder
Production 0% 0% 4% 7% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 6%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Exports 0% 0% 13% 38% 14% 14% 14% 15% 16% 25% 31%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 1% 4% 7% 8% 10% 11% 13% 16%
Whole powder
Production 0% 0% 7% 11% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 9% 10%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Exports 0% 0% 11% 21% 14% 13% 14% 14% 14% 22% 25%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 6%
Prices euro per 100 kilograms
Milk, 3.7% fat 0% 0% -2% -3% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -5% -6%
Cheese market 0% 0% -3% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -6% -7%
Butter market 0% 0% -3% -4% -3% -4% -4% -4% -4% -6% -7%
SMP market 0% 0% -1% -1% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -6% -7%
WIMP market 0% 0% 0% -1% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -6% -6%
Butter intervention 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% -5%
SMP intervention 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Table 5 Scenario 1: Changes from Baseline. Irish dairy supply and utilisation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 0% 0% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 8% 12%
Production/cow 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 4%
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 7% 11%
Milk quota 0% 0% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 100% 100%
Other milk production 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fluid consumption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Manufacturing use 0% 0% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 8% 12%
Feed use, net exports 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 9%
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% -1% -1%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Exports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Butter
Production 0% 0% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 12% 18%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Exports 0% 0% 3% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 15% 21%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 5% 6% 7% 8% 8% 7% 6% 8%
Skim powder
Production 0% 0% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 6% 11%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -2%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 6%
Exports 0% 0% 2% 3% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 6% 10%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4%
Whole powder
Production 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Exports 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Milk price, 3.7% fat
euro/100 kg 0% 0% -2% -3% -5% -4% -4% -4% -4% -7% -8%
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Table 6 Scenario 2: Changes from Baseline. EU 25 dairy supply and utilisation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Production/cow 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 0% 0% 1% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4%
Milk quota 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other milk production 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fluid consumption 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Manufacturing use 0% 0% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5%
Feed use, net exports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -2% -2% -3% -4%
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Imports 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2%
Domestic use 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Exports 0% 0% % 10% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 1%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Butter
Production 0% 0% 2% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Exports 0% 0% 11% 23% 26% 31% 31% 31% 32% 34% 32%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 5% 18% 11% 8% 6% 8% 6% 6%
Skim powder
Production 0% 0% 4% 9% % 5% 5% 6% 6% % 6%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Exports 0% 0% 13% 53% 23% 23% 25% 28% 31% 33% 34%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 1% 6% 10% 14% 17% 19% 21% 22%
Whole powder
Production 0% 0% 7% 16% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Exports 0% 0% 11% 28% 20% 21% 23% 24% 25% 27% 28%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 1% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8%
Prices euro per 100 kilograms
Milk, 3.7% fat 0% 0% -2% -4% -6% -6% -6% -7% -7% -7% -7%
Cheese market 0% 0% -3% -6% -7% -7% -7% -7% -8% -8% -8%
Butter market 0% 0% -3% -6% -5% -7% -8% -8% -8% -9% -10%
SMP market 0% -1% -1% -7% -6% -7% -7% -8% -8% -8%
WMP market 0% 0% 0% -1% -6% -6% -6% -6% -6% -7% -7%
Butter intervention 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% -5% -5% -5% -8% -10%
SMP intervention 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Table 7 Scenario 2: Changes from Baseline. Irish dairy supply and utilisation
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
thousand head, end of year
Dairy cows 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Production/cow 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 7%
Fluid milk million tonnes
Cow's milk production 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 7°% 90% 11% 13% 16% 18%
Milk quota 0% 0% 2% 5% 8% 11% 14% 17% 20% 100% 100%
Other milk produc-
tion
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fluid consumption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Manufacturing use 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 11% 13% 15% 18% 20%
Feed use, netexports 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 7% 9% 11% 14% 16% 18%
Cheese thousand tonnes
Production 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% -1% -1% -2% -2% -3% -3%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Exports 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% -2% -2% 2% 3%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Butter
Production 0% 0% 3% 7% 9% 12% 15% 19% 22% 26% 29%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Exports 0% 0% 3% 4% 9% 15% 18% 21% 25% 31% 35%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 1% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 6% 4%
Skim powder
Production 0% 0% 2% 4% 4% 6% 8% 11% 13% 16% 18%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Exports 0% 0% 2% 4% 2% 5% 8% 10% 12% 15% 18%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Whole powder
Production 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5%
Imports 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Domestic use 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Exports 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4%
Ending stocks 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Milk price, 3.7% fat
euro/100 kg 0% 0% -2% -4% -2% -7% -8% -8% -9% -9% -10%
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Abstract
This article analyses how credit market imperfections affect the impacts of subsidies by analysing the 
effects of agricultural subsidies in the New Eastern Member States of the European Union with a partial 
equilibrium model which integrates credit and land market imperfections. We show that credit constraints 
have important implications for the distribution of policy rents. Credit market imperfections may induce 
very different effects of direct payments and lump-sum transfers.
Keywords: agricultural policy, imperfect credit markets, land market, policy rents
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1. Introduction 
Distortions caused by farm policies and their policy effects on farm incomes has received renewed attention 
in the current WTO negotiations and policy reforms leading up to it. An important issue is whether “decoupled 
policies” are truly decoupled (e.g. HENNESSY 1998; OECD, 2001a). This not only holds for the impact of policies on 
production, and hence trade, but also on the distribution of the policy rents. An influential study by the OECD 
came to the conclusions that only 20% of all market and price support in OECD countries resulted in net farm 
surplus gains; the rest was dissipated to others, including owners of production factors (OECD, 2001b). Other 
studies also identified important differences among policy instruments in their costs and benefits (DEWBRE,
ANTON, THOMPSON 2001; SALHOFER, SCHMID 2004). There is considerable discussion on whether the standard policy 
and trade models are sufficiently complex to capture all the effects, and hence yield accurate conclusions.
The accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to the European Union (EU) 
presents an interesting case for the analysis of some of these issues. Agricultural issues have played a 
prominent role in the enlargement debate. Crucial issues were whether a reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) was needed to avoid conflicts with budgetary and WTO constraints when the CAP would be 
extended to CEECs and whether CEEC farmers would get access to the same subsidies as farmers from the 
EU-15 (HARTELL, SWINNEN 2000; TANGERMANN, BANSE 2000). In fact, the final days before this historic event 
were spent mostly on intense negotiations on agricultural subsidies and production quotas. 
While several studies estimated the impact of EU enlargement in agriculture on EU expenditures, 
protection levels, commodity markets, trade and WTO (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2007; Münch 2002), these 
studies generally ignored imperfections in factor markets and paid relatively little attention to the income 
distribution effects within the CEEC economies. These were important limitations since much of the policy 
debate centered on how the implementation of the CAP would affect rural incomes in CEECs, and since rural 
factor markets in New EU Member States (NEMS) were characterized by major imperfections (RIZOV, SWINNEN
2004). The first attempt to address these shortcomings was by CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006) who analysed 
how imperfections in land markets – an important problem in CEECs – affect efficiency implications and 
distributional effects of these payments. 
However, also rural credit markets were characterized by major imperfections. Credit constraints were a 
major problem for growth and restructuring during transition (SWINNEN, GOW, 1999) and were still considered 
an important problem at the time of accession in several of the NEMS (LATRUFFE, 2005; PETRICK, 2004).
Our objective is to analyse explicitly how these credit market imperfections affect the welfare effects 
of introducing the CAP in the NEMS. We develop a theoretical framework and use a model of the rural credit 
and land market to analyse how the income and efficiency effects of the implementation of CAP payments 
are affected by rural credit market constraints in the NEMS. We analyse the effects of both direct (area) 
payments and of decoupled single farm payments. The first are currently implemented in NEMS and the 
second will be implemented later in the decade. The full analysis is in CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007). We refer 
to this paper for details and formal derivations. Here we provide a summary of the arguments. 
Our conclusions are that credit market imperfections have major implications for the distribution of 
policy rents. More specifically, we find that when credit constraints are important, farms benefit from the 
subsidy directly and indirectly as they induce a reduction of the credit constraints. However, this also causes 
an increase in land demand, and consequently an increase in land prices. As a consequence, the dissipation of 
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policy rents to land owners will be larger with farm credit market constraints, and the benefits for farms will 
be smaller in most cases. We identify situations in which farms may not only gain less, but even lose, from the 
introduction of subsidies. This may occur both with coupled and decoupled payments. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section develops a model of the NEMS land market taking 
into account imperfections in the credit market. The third and fourth section analyses how CAP subsidies 
affect land allocation and surplus distribution. The final section presents our conclusions.
2. The Model3
The current production structure in the NEMS is heavily influenced by the 1990s transition process. 
Before the transition, production decisions, factor allocations and property rights in CEECs were largely 
controlled by the state. Land was used by large-scale state and collective farms. Land reform in the early 
1990s reallocated most land property rights to individual households in CEECs. We will refer to them as 
“landowners”. More or less simultaneous with the land reform, important farm restructuring took place 
which included privatization of farms and a restructuring of the management structure. This restructuring 
included a reorganization of collective and state farms into private cooperatives and farming companies. We 
will refer to them as “corporate farms” (CF), which are typically large-scale. The most dramatic restructuring 
was the break-up of collective and state farms into household plots and family farms. We will refer to these 
as “individual farms” (IF). 
Production is assumed to depend on the amount of land ( iA ) and on non-land inputs ( iK ) which we 
refer to as “fertilizer” but which captures also other inputs, 
),(
iii KAf  with 0>ijf , 0<
i
jjf , 0>
i
jnf , for 
i = I and C, and for j, n = A and K. p is the price of the final product, r is the price of land, t are transaction 
costs in the land market, k is the per unit price of fertilizers and i is interest rate. 
To keep the analysis tractable we model the land market in a stylized way, following the approach of 
CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006). We start from a situation where all the land is owned by individual households, 
but still used by corporate farms and assume that land transactions take place exclusively through rental 
agreements. This is consistent with the majority of land transactions in NEMS. Landowners receive a rent 
r for each unit of land that they rent to corporate farms. Several households, landowners or not, consider 
starting up an individual farm for which they need land. They can either withdraw land from corporate 
farms or rent from landowners who currently rent their land to corporate farms. In both cases the price 
they have to pay per unit of land is the sum of the rent paid by the corporate farms, r, (explicitly for rented 
land or implicitly as opportunity costs) and the transaction costs, t, involved in withdrawing the land from 
the corporate farms (CIAIAN, SWINNEN 2006). 
An important issue is the timing of the various activities and payments throughout the season. In this 
paper we assume that fertilizers have to be paid at the start of the season while payment of land rents and 
farms’ revenues, from selling the harvest, occur at the end of the season, after harvest. According to our 
information, these assumptions are consistent with reality in the NEMS. Land rents are generally paid at 
3 The basic structure of our model builds on Ciaian and Swinnen (2006).
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the end of the season. In several NEMS land rents are sometimes paid in kind or through sharecropping – 
effectively implying that they are paid after the harvest. Hence, credit is needed to finance other inputs, 
i.e. fertilizer K, at the start of the season.
2.1 Perfect Credit Market 
To establish a point of comparison let us first identify the equilibrium without credit market 
constraints. With perfect credit markets, farms are not constrained on the quantity of inputs they use. 
Farms will choose the quantity of land and fertilizers that will maximise their profits. 
Farms increase the quantity of land and fertilizers until marginal value products are equal to economic 
costs for both inputs. As illustrated in Figure 1, IF and CF land demands with zero transaction costs (
0=t
) are given by ID  and CD , respectively. The equilibrium is ( ** , rA ). With transaction costs ( 0>t ) IF land 
demand shifts downwards to 
I
tD . The new equilibrium is (
**
, tt rA ). Land rents are lower and IF use less land 
with transaction costs.
2.2 Imperfect Credit Market
To model the imperfect credit market, we use the approach of Feder (1985) and CARTER AND WIEBE
(1990) by introducing a farm credit constraint. It is assumed that the maximum amount of credit 
available to farm i, iS , depends on farm characteristics ( iW ) such as reputation, farm size and wealth. 
That is ( )iii WSS =  with 0>iWS , for i = I, C. Larger farms and farms with better reputation have access 
to more credit (LATRUFFE 2005).
The effect of credit constraints on land allocation and land market rent is illustrated in Figure 1. 
As explained before, the IF and CF land demand curves without credit constraints are Dt
I and DC. The 
equilibrium without credit constraint is (
**
, tt rA ). When credit is constrained, IF and CF land demands 
shift to DcI and DcC, respectively. The new equilibrium shifts to (
**
, cc rA ). The land market rent declines, 
**
tc rr < . The change in land allocation depends on the relative farm credit constraints. In the case shown 
in Figure 1, IF are assumed to be more credit constrained than CF. As a result, IF renting declines by 
**
tc AA − .
At low levels of output (and thus land use) the credit constraint is not binding, and the constrained 
demand curves Dc
I and Dc
C coincide with the unconstrained demand curves Dt
I and DC. This is up to the 
points ix  (i= I,C) where the constraint becomes binding and the constrained demand curve shifts below the 
unconstrained demand curves. In the Figure 1 we assume that credit constraints are more important for 
the (smaller) individual farms than for (larger) corporate farms.
3. Impact of CAP Payments
Since the 1992 MacSharry reform and the Agenda 2000 reforms, the vast majority of CAP subsidies are the 
so-called direct payments (DPs). These CAP subsidies were a hotly disputed issue in the EU enlargement, as 
the NEMS insisted on having full access to these direct payments (DPs), while the EU-15 Member States only 
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wanted to give partial DPs. The ultimate agreement, reached in Copenhagen in 2002, allowed for DPs to be 
partially introduced from the date of accession and then gradually increased, from a maximum of 55% in 
2004 to 100% in 2010.
In 2006 34.8 billion Euros were spent in the EU on DPs alone (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2006). They make 
up around two-thirds of the CAP budget and include both per hectare payments for crops and payments, 
per animal for livestock activities, and single farm payments. The latter result from the decision in 2003 to 
decouple CAP subsidies such that subsidies will be given as a fixed set of payments per farm: the so-called 
single farm payments (SFP). The implementation of the SFP started in 2005 in the EU-15 (the pre-2004 Member 
States), and later in the NEMS. By 2011 all EU countries, including the NEMS, must have shifted their direct 
payments to single farm payments. We first analyse the impact of the DPs as they have been introduced in the 
NEMS and afterwards we analyse the effect of SFPs which will be implemented in the future.
3.1 Impact of area payments
Define s as the subsidy (area payment) per unit of land, and assume that all land in the analysis 
qualifies for the subsidies. The objective function and the credit constraints are affected. Payments will 
alleviate credit constraints of farms. If farms receive subsidies at the beginning of the season, they can 
Figure 1:  Equilibria in the land market with credit constraints
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use them directly to pay for fertilizers. However, in reality farms seem to receive subsidies, most often, at 
the end of the season because eligibility needs to be checked and policy objectives must be enforced (eg. 
cross-compliance). For example, in February 2005 the media reported demonstrations by Hungarian farmers 
who were angry that the government was not fulfilling earlier promises regarding direct payments paid in 
advance (CZECH RADIO INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, 2005). 
Still, if farms receive subsidies at the end of the season, this can also improve their access to credits. 
We found from field interviews that banks and other lenders are more willing to provide credits to farms 
when they know that such subsidies will be paid. In a sense, (the promise of) subsidies are used as collateral 
for credit. In fact, banks in Slovakia provide credits to farms to pre-finance up to 100% of their direct 
payments in 2007, so they can use funds to finance expenses at the start of the growing season. Farms 
need to have an account at the bank where direct payments will be deposited later by the official paying 
agency, and where the banks have control to recuperate the pre-financing with interest. 
In our analysis, we allow subsidies to arrive either at the start of the season or after harvest. If 
farmers receive subsidies at the beginning of the season, farmers can use all these to alleviate their credit 
constraints. However, if farms receive subsidies at the end of the season, they may obtain an amount of 
credit equivalent to the size of subsidies or less, depending on the farms’ ability to borrow. 
In their analysis of NEMS land market imperfections, CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006) found that, with 
and without land market imperfections, all benefits of area payments go to landowners. However, with 
credit constraints this is no longer the case. The effects differ both in terms of rent distribution and land 
allocation. The results are summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1: When farms are credit constrained it holds that with the introduction of area payments:
a. Landowners gain disproportionately since land rents go up more than the subsidy.
b. On aggregate farms may gain or lose.
c. Some farms will lose and some farms may gain, depending on their relative credit 
constraints.
Proof: see CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007).
Land rents will increase with area payments, but contrary to when there are no credit constraints, the 
rent increase is higher than the allocated subsidy, s. This is because payments have two effects on land 
rents, a direct and an indirect one. First, because farms are granted subsidies per hectare they rent, this 
increases marginal returns to land, and increases farms’ willingness to pay a higher rent equivalent to 
the size of subsidy s. Second, land market rent increases because subsidies relax farms’ credit constraints 
allowing them to use more fertilizers. This increases the farms’ marginal land value product which further 
induces farms to hire more land, thereby inducing a higher rent, reinforcing the first effect. 
With credit constraints, area payments may change the land allocation in either direction, depending 
on the relative importance of the credit constraints and on the ability of farmers to use subsidies to 
alleviate credit constraints. If all farms are equally credit constrained and/or if all farms can use an 
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equivalent amount of subsidy to buy additional fertilizers, then there is no change in land allocation. 
However, if some of them are more constrained and/or if some can use more subsidies for credit alleviation, 
than land allocation changes. 
These effects are illustrated in Figure 2 where it is again assumed that IF are more credit constrained 
than CF and that farms can use all subsidies to alleviate their credit constraints. The initial equilibrium 
with credit constraints is (Ac*, rc*). With area payment s, the IF land demand shifts upwards, from DcI to 
DcsI. The CF demand shifts from DcC to DcsC. First, the direct subsidy effect shifts the demands of IF and CF 
to Dcs1I and to Dcs1C, respectively, because of subsidies which increase marginal returns to land. This results 
in higher land market rent, rcss. The increase in rent is equal to the size of subsidy s, rcss - rc* = s. Second, 
because farms can use subsidies to buy more fertilizers, this increases land marginal productivity and 
increases farms’ willingness to pay a higher rent. This indirect effect results in a further shift of IF land 
demand from Dcs1I to DcsI , and for CF from Dcs1C to DcsC. The equilibrium is (Acs*, rcs*). It is clear from Figure 2 
that the rent rises by more than the subsidy, rcs* - rc* > s. Moreover, farms which are most credit constrained 
before receiving the subsidy, i.e. the IF, will use more land because they benefit most from increased 
fertilizer use and higher land marginal productivity. 
Figure 2:  Equilibria in the land market with credit constraints and area payments
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Landowners gain from higher rental price equal to area ABCD. Their gains are larger than the total 
amount of subsidies given. Farms which are less credit constrained, i.e. the CF, lose because their land 
rental costs increase )(
**
ccs rr −  by more than the increase in marginal return of land (the distance between 
C
csD  and 
C
cD ). Their total losses are equal to area E – A (<0). Farms which are most credit constrained, i.e. 
the IF in Figure 2, may gain or lose, depending on whether the increase in returns to land (the distance 
between 
I
csD  and 
I
cD ) are larger or smaller than the increase in land rents )(
**
ccs rr − . In Figure 2 it is unclear 
whether F-D is positive or negative – and this result holds in general (see proof in CIAIAN, SWINNEN 2007).
Whether more credit constrained farms lose depends on the heterogeneity of the farms in terms of 
credit constraints and on the elasticities of their land demands. If there is no variation in credit constraints 
among farms then all farms will lose from area payments (see CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007) for more details).
3.2 Impact of single farm payments
As explained above, the EU decided in 2003 to decouple CAP subsidies such that subsidies will be given 
as a fixed set of payments per farm, the so-called single farm payments (SFP). The SFP for a specific farm 
equals the support the farm received in the previous “reference” period. The SFP is an entitlement, but 
future SFP payments depend on the farm operating an amount of “eligible hectares”, equivalent to the size 
of the entitlement. 
To model this, define CE  as the total payment for the corporate farm after the CAP reform, and CEA
as the amount of eligible area for payments. Assuming that CE  equals the total subsidies the corporate 
farm received with the area payment system, and that all the land used qualifies as eligible land, we have 
C
E
C sAE = . Making similar assumptions for the individual farms, IE
I sAE = . Hence, payments per eligible 
hectare, e, are equal in this case: e = eC = eI.4
The policy reform has important impacts on the distribution of policy rents. Without credit constraints, 
CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006) find that policy rents shift entirely from landowners to farms with the new CAP 
support system. However, as we will show below, this will no longer be the case when farms are credit 
constrained. The results are summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: When farmers are credit constrained it holds that with the introduction of SFP:
a. Landowners gain. 
b. Farm gains may be smaller than the SFP and some farms may even lose.
Proof: see CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007).
When credit constrained farms receive SFP these subsidies will relax credit constraints and will allow 
farms to purchase more fertilizers. As with area payments, this result in higher marginal land productivity 
4 We assume that the number of entitlements equals the number of eligible hectares. For other cases when the number of entitlements 
is larger than the number of eligible hectares see CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007) and CIAIAN, KANCS AND SWINNEN (2008).
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and therefore an upward shift in the land demand function (over the interval where the farm is credit 
constrained). However, in contrast to area payments, the only driving force behind the increase in land 
demand – and hence behind the resulting increase in land rents – is the marginal productivity increase 
from reduced credit constraints. In other words, there is only an indirect effect, while with area payments 
there was also a direct effect on land demand from the subsidies themselves. 
Figure 3 illustrates how SFP affect the equilibrium allocation of land and the distributional effects 
(assuming that farms can use SFP to alleviate their credit constraints). The equilibrium without SFP is (Ac*,
rc*). The eligible area of IF and CF is 
*
c
TI
E AAA −=  and AEC = Ac*, respectively. Starting in the left hand side 
of the Figure 3 and following the thick lines, IF demand with SFP is given by DceI. Analogously, CF demand 
with SFP is given by DceC. At Ac* demands are represented by the thick vertical lines. Note that this vertical 
shift at Ac* is larger than subsidy e when farms can use SFP to alleviate their credit constraints, because 
with each unit of land they rent less than the eligible area farms lose not only e (i.e. the direct effect) but 
lose also because of a decline of their land marginal productivity (as farms cannot buy as much fertilizers 
without e). With SFP the equilibrium shifts to (Ace*, rce*).5
5 This follows from the fact that at the equilibrium farms’ marginal willingness to pay for the land, renting is not affected by 
payment e.
Figure 3:  Equilibria in the land market with credit constraints and SFP
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In the situation illustrated in Figure 3 landowners benefit from SFP – in contrast to when there are 
no credit constraints when all the benefits from SFP go to the farms. By reducing credit constraints and 
increasing marginal productivity of land, SFP will lead to higher land productivity, thereby increasing land 
demand and, consequently, land rents, and therefore benefit landowners: their gains equal area B. Farms 
gain for two reasons: they benefit from the direct subsidy effect and from the increase in land productivity, 
but they also have a loss with the increase of rents. The net effect on farm profits is not clear ex ante. In 
the case illustrated in Figure 3, the land rent increases by less than the size of subsidies, err cce <−
** , and 
farms retain part of the subsidies, equal to area A for CF and D for IF. In addition, IF gain F because of the 
increase in land productivity, so their net gains are D+F (>0). CF gain E from increased productivity so 
their net gains are equal to area A+E (>0).
As with the area payments, benefits from productivity increases are higher for farms which are more 
credit constraint and/or have the strongest reduction in their credit constraint. In Figure 3, IF are more 
credit constraint than CF and benefit more on a per hectare basis. Whether they benefit more in total 
than CF obviously depends also on their share of land use, which does not change by the SFP in the case 
analysed in Figure 3.
If the impact of the SFP on farm’ credit constraint is even stronger than in the case illustrated in 
Figure 3, it is possible that both the land allocation may be affected and/or that farms may even lose from 
the SFP introduction (see CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2007) for more details). 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The distortions caused by farm policies and their effects on farm incomes has received renewed attention 
in the current WTO negotiations and policy reforms leading up to it. There is considerable discussion on 
whether the standard policy and trade models are sufficiently complex to capture all the policy effects 
which occur in reality, and hence yield accurate conclusions. 
The Eastern enlargement of the EU provides an interesting experiment to study these issues. Eastern 
enlargement implied integration of the agricultural economies of the NEMS in the CAP. As a consequence, 
farmers in the NEMS now receive subsidies per hectare of land they use, gradually increasing over a 
transition period. In well functioning markets such payments are incorporated in land values and thereby 
benefit mainly landowners and lead to increases in input costs for farmers. In the future NEMS farms will 
receive single farm payments, which are argued to be (more) decoupled. In well functioning markets such 
payments are not incorporated in land values and benefit farms. 
However, NEMS rural factor markets are characterized by important imperfections. In an earlier study 
CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006) demonstrated that imperfections in land markets do not change these conclusions 
and that the distribution of policy rents remains the same even with important transaction costs and 
imperfect competition in land markets. 
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In this article we have shown that imperfections in rural credit markets may lead to very different 
outcomes. When farms are credit constrained, the introduction of area payments will lead to even larger 
gains for landowners as land rents will increase by more than the subsidy. This is because subsidies 
will reduce farms’ credit constraints – for example because banks in some NEMS offer to provide credit 
with the subsidy payments as collateral – and thereby increase marginal productivity of land and thus 
land demand, in addition to the direct subsidy effect. The effect of area payments on farm profits 
can be positive or negative. Farms gain directly from the subsidy and indirectly from the increase in 
productivity. However they lose from the increase in land rents. Under certain conditions land rent 
increase may be larger than gains, causing a negative net impact. In general, the most credit constrained 
farms (ex ante) and those which are most effective in using subsidies to reduce their credit constraints 
are most likely to gain. 
Similar effects occur even with subsidies which are decoupled from current input use or output, such 
as the single farm payments in the CAP. While farms are better off with SFP than with area payments, 
since the SFP does not directly lead to an increase in land rents, the SFP will also induce an increase 
in land rents through their impact on the farms’ credit constraints and, hence, on land productivity. 
As a consequence, landowners gain from the SFP when farms are credit constrained. Moreover, we have 
illustrated in this paper that in extreme cases farms may actually be net losers even with the so-called 
decoupled payments such as the SFP. The effect on farm profits depends on how much farms are credit 
constrained, to what extent farms can use subsidies to alleviate their credit constraint (on the size of 
subsidies) and on the (unconstrained) land demand elasticities; all affecting the relative increase in 
land market rents. 
Care should be taken with simplistic interpretations of our results. The effects on rural households 
depend on whether these are landowners or farmers, or both, and on the importance of credit constraints. 
These structural conditions differ strongly between NEMS (ROZELLE, SWINNEN 2004). For example, farming 
in countries like Slovakia and the Czech Republic is concentrated on large-scale corporate farms, who 
rent most of their land. Land ownership is fragmented and many landowners are living in urban areas. 
In contrast, in countries such as Poland and Slovenia, farming is dominated by small family farms (IF), 
owning most of their land. Most other countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, have a mixed structure. 
In Hungary, IFs use 59% of farm land and CF use 41%. CF rent most of the land they use, while IFs 
use both owned and rented land. The share of rented land typically increases with the size of the IFs 
(VRANKEN, SWINNEN 2006). 
Obviously, the implications of our analysis are different for these countries with such different 
structures. Leakages of policy rents to land owners through increased rental rates is a major issue in 
countries like Slovakia and Hungary, while less of a problem in Poland since most farms are IFs owning the 
land themselves. However, also in Poland this analysis is relevant since (a) the most dynamic farmers are 
typically younger and land ownership is typically concentrated in older rural households, and (b) there are 
important regional variations: in the north and western regions of Poland, many larger farms operate on 
rented land (CSAKI, LERMAN, 2001; SABATES-WHEELER 2002). 
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Finally, an issue which needs further analysis is the interaction of the credit and land market 
imperfections and the subsidy systems with labour market imperfections. Labour market imperfections 
have an important impact on land allocation and farm structures in NEMS (Rizov, Swinnen 2004; 
Swinnen, Dries, Macours 2005). There are interactions between these imperfections and subsidy effects. 
For example, labour market constraints will affect the farm restructuring and land reallocation impact of 
the various subsidies. These interactions are beyond the scope of analysis in this article. This is the topic 
of our future research.
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Modelling Regional Agricultural Output Adjustments in 
Scotland in Response
to the CAP Reform1
CESAR REVOREDO-GIHA, PHILIP LEAT AND CATHERINE MILNE2
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present an agricultural supply model for Scotland used to estimate regional 
changes in agricultural outputs due to the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. Supply functions 
are estimated for several farm types based on generalised trans-logarithmic multiproduct cost functions 
(Caves, Christensen and Tretheway, 1981). The data used for the estimation were an unbalanced panel 
dataset constructed using farm level data from the Scottish Executive’s Farm Accounts Scheme (FAS) survey. 
Using the estimated supply adjustments, individual farm level responses to subsidy and price changes are 
aggregated using agricultural census weights to estimate the output changes for different regions. 
Keywords: Regional models, CAP reform, agricultural production econometrics
JEL classification: Q12
1 This paper derives from research conducted under a Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD) 
funded project on the implications of the CAP reform (IMCAPT) (SAC, 2006), conducted between April 2004 and June 2006.
2 Land Economy and Environment Research Group, Scottish Agricultural College (SAC). King’s Buildings, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh EH9 3JG, UK, Phone: (44-(0)131) 535 4344, Fax:(44-(0)131) 667 2601, E-mail: Cesar.Revoredo@sac.ac.uk.
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1 Introduction
Since its introduction, Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has had a sustained effect on farm 
production. In Scotland, in particular, the importance of CAP support payments to farm businesses can 
be seen in the proportion of total farm income derived from direct subsidy payments. For example, at one 
extreme, specialist sheep farms in Less Favoured Areas (LFA) on average derived around 45 per cent of 
total farm output from direct subsidies over the period 1997/98 to 2003/04. By comparison, on average 
approximately 6 per cent of total farm output from Scottish dairy farms during the same period was direct 
subsidy (SERAD, 2000; SEERAD, 2001; SEERAD, 2002; SEERAD, 2005; SEERAD, 2005a).
Although the Luxembourg agreement on the CAP reform was made in June 2003, key implementation 
decisions were not made until 2004. Prior to the June 2003 agreement, several assessments had been made 
which indicated that the then proposed measures would have a very significant effect on EU agricultural 
production (e.g. DEFRA, 2003; REVELL AND OGLETHORPE, 2003). Within Scotland, two significant studies had 
been undertaken on the future development of Scottish agriculture, including the impact of the CAP 
reform. These focused on the Highlands and Islands Enterprise area in the north west of the country 
(COOK AND COPUS, 2002) and the Borders in the south (KERR AND MITCHELL, 2003). Both studies indicated 
quite significant developments in nature, scale and distribution of stocking and cropping. Furthermore, the 
differences in the results of these studies indicated that one should expect important regional effects from 
the reform.
The purpose of this paper is to present an agricultural supply model for Scotland which was used 
to estimate regional changes in agricultural outputs due to the 2003 CAP reform and its associated 
consequences for agricultural returns.
The paper starts with an overview of the model with the purpose of guiding the discussion, followed 
by a description of the data used and the methodology for the estimation of the cost functions. Next is 
presented how the simulation model is assembled and the change in prices used in the exercise. Finally, we 
discuss the results. 
2 Empirical work
2.1 Overall description of the model
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the approach used in this paper to evaluate the 
impact of possible changes in output prices.
The main reason for selecting a detailed supply side model instead of a regional partial equilibrium 
model is due to the difficulty in estimating regional demands, for which we do not possess information. 
Instead, the strategy used here consisted of estimating possible price changes and evaluating them through 
the supply model in order to observe the change in regional production. 
The introduction of the Single Farm Payment by the 2003 reform is difficult to approximate, because 
whilst economic logic indicates that the impact on production of a decoupled payment should be nil, in 
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practice, farmers may decide due to their own motives, to subsidise their production, i.e., producing, given 
the current market prices, at levels that are above the profit maximisation level (i.e., they are subsidising 
their production because they are using part of their Single Farm Payment as if it were a coupled subsidy). 
Figure 1 presents a flowchart of the model. The Scottish Farm Accounts Scheme survey data were 
used to estimate the cost functions, which are the core of the supply response model. Similarly, changes 
in prices were estimated from various sources (e.g., FAPRI projections). Both, the cost functions and price 
changes were integrated into profit maximisation farm models to predict changes in the production of 
different farm products. The evaluation has been undertaken at the farm level and the individual farm 
type responses have been weighted up using agricultural census data to obtain the estimated production 
changes at the regional level.
2.2 Available data
The Farm Accounts Scheme (FAS) annually records a wide range of financial and non-financial data for 
a selection of full-time farms across Scotland. It is part of the Farm Accounts Data Network, which monitors 
farm performance across the EU. The data used cover the eight year period of 1997/98 to 2004/5 (i.e., the 
crop years of 1997 to 2004). The criteria used to select the farms were that they should be present in the 
2004/05 survey, and also that they were in the sample for at least five years. This resulted in an unbalanced 
panel dataset of 358 individual farms. Table 1 summarises this sample by farm types and their respective 
main outputs. The FAS dataset does not include information on pigs, poultry or horticultural producers. 
Costs and outputs by farm type were computed directly from the FAS data. Costs were allocated to one 
of four groups: materials (e.g., feed, fertiliser); purchased services (e.g., contract work, crop protection 
costs); labour (e.g., all labour used including that of the farmer, farm family, business partners and hired 
workers); and capital (e.g., rent and depreciation). The outputs considered were cereals, potatoes, oilseed 
rape, cattle, sheep, milk and milk products, wool and eggs.3
3 The sample farms produced minimal quantities of pigs, poultry and vegetables.
Figure 1: Flowchart of the model
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Table 1. Summary of sample by farm type
Farm type group Number of farms
in the sample Main outputs
Dairy 50 Milk, cattle
Specialist sheep 1/ 31 Sheep, cattle
Cattle and sheep 58 Cattle, sheep, cereals
Cereals and general cropping 65 Cereals
Mixed 154 Cereals, cattle, sheep
Total 358
Source: Derived from FAS data
Notes: 1/ Specialist sheep farms are all located in less favoured areas (LFA). However, other farm types include farms 
in both the LFA and non-LFA.
The estimation of cost functions requires input prices. However, a shortcoming of the FAS data for 
the estimation of cost functions (and also of other similar datasets such as the Farm Business Survey 
for England and Wales) is that it only presents input expenditures and not the prices paid for inputs (or 
quantities used). Therefore, Defra‘s (UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) input price 
data for the United Kingdom were used for agricultural materials, services and capital, as an estimate of 
those prices paid by FAS farmers over the study period (DEFRA, 2006). The labour input price was estimated 
from FAS data.
2.3 Estimation of cost functions
Data availability played an important role in our choice of method for estimating the cost functions. 
The maximum number of periods available in our panel was 8 years (80 per cent of the sample), whilst 8 
per cent of the sample had 6 consecutive years or less. Therefore, we chose to estimate the cost functions 
using a panel data fixed effects model (i.e., the within estimator, HSIAO, 1993). The fixed effect terms can 
be understood as terms representing farm efficiency. In addition, in order to test the presence of possible 
technical change, we included a quadratic trend in the cost equation. The trend variable took the value of 
one in 1997, two in 1998 and so forth.
The fixed effects cost function can be written in the following way (KUMBAKHAR AND KNOX LOVELL, 2003), 
where i denotes farms and t the periods:
  iittititit uvWQCE  ;,,lnln        (1)
In equation (1) 
it
Eln is the logarithm of the observed expenditure,   ;,W,QCln
titit
 is the 
logarithm of the deterministic cost function that depends on the outputs 
it
Q , the input prices 
it
W , a 
deterministic trend, 
t
 , to capture technological change, and a vector of parameters  . The statistical 
error is represented by 
it
v , which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero 
and variance 
2
v
 . The time invariant inefficiency term 
i
u  is positive. 
A generalised multiproduct translog cost function (CAVES, CHRISTENSEN AND TRETHEWAY, 1980) was selected 
for the term   ;,W,QCln
titit
 because it imposes a-priori fewer restrictions than other functional 
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forms commonly used for the task. As explained by Caves, Christensen and Tretheway in the context of 
multiproduct estimation, some outputs might not be present on a farm, and therefore the logarithm used in 
the translog function will produce an error. Instead, they propose the use of a Box-Cox transformation to 
substitute for the logarithm of the output terms. Thus, for the case of n inputs and m outputs, and naming 
f  as the Box-Cox transformation with parameter 4, the cost function is given by:
           (2)
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As the stochastic cost frontier is a cost function, it has to satisfy the properties of any cost function 
(Chambers, 1988). Price homogeneity and symmetry were directly imposed in (2) through the following 
restrictions to the parameters (3):
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As previously noted, the dataset does not contain input prices for each farm. In the context of cross 
section estimation, the approach is to assume that all farmers face the same prices. However, when 
estimating a cost function using panel data it is possible to introduce prices, assuming that all the farmers 
face the same input prices within a year (i.e., across farms), but that prices change over time.5 Thus, the 
parameters associated with input prices can be estimated from the cost share equations, where the fixed 
effect terms do not appear. The final equation to be estimated is presented in (4), where the intercept in 
(4) is 
i0i0
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Equation (4) was estimated for four inputs (i.e., n=4) and a maximum of eight outputs (i.e., m=8). 
Given the high number of parameters to be estimated (i.e., 97 parameters in the maximum case) and 
the fact that the Box-Cox transformation added a non-linear component to the estimation, the following 
econometric procedure was employed. 
First, the Box-Cox parameter  was estimated through a grid-search routine. For each given value of , the 
log-likelihood of the system of (n-1) cost shares was computed, using iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations (SURE) and imposing the constraints in (3). This produced a relationship between log-likelihoods 
4 The Box-Cox transformation with parameter   is given by: 
( )
( )


=λ
≠λ
= λ
−
λ
0xlog
0
xf
1x
5 In a different context, similar assumptions can be found in the estimation of demand systems, where price elasticities are 
sometimes estimated from time series because of the lack of variability of prices in cross-sectional datasets (HSIAO, 1993, 
p.206).
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and alternative values of   , from which the   with the maximum log-likelihood value was selected. This step 
also provided the values for all the terms in (4) that were associated to input prices.
Second, all the remaining parameters -except the fixed effect terms- of the cost function, i.e., output 
terms not associated with prices, were estimated using the within estimator (ordinary least squares applied 
to the variables expressed as deviations of the means by farm, HSIAO, 1993).
Finally, the fixed effect terms were estimated from equation (4) by evaluating the function at the 
mean value of the variables by farm (ATKINSON AND CORNWELL, 1993; KUMBAKHAR AND LOVELL, 2003, PIERANI AND
RIZZI, 2003). The estimated equations are available from the authors.
It is important to note that in addition to the cost function properties, introduced by directly imposing 
constraints (3) in the estimated equations (i.e., the cost functions were estimated by farm type), a well 
behaved cost function requires its input demand functions to be strictly positive and to satisfy concavity 
in input prices (CHAMBERS, 1988). Thus, we tested for all the points in the sample, the former by examining 
the positiveness of the predicted cost shares, and the latter by computing the hessian matrices (second 
derivative matrices with respect to the input prices and evaluated at each point in the sample) and testing 
their negative semifiniteness. All the predicted cost shares were positive and the negative semi-definiteness 
of the hessian matrices was satisfied for most of the points of the sample (87.3 per cent of the sample 
points in the case of dairy farms, 95.9 for cereals and general cropping, and for the entire sample in the 
case of the other farm types). Therefore, for most of the sample we could not reject the proposition that the 
estimated cost functions were consistent with the solution of cost minimisation problems.6
2.4 Agricultural supply side model
To evaluate the responses to prices, we assumed that each farmer (identified by the sub-index f) 
maximises his/her profits (
f
 ), where 
i
Q  are the farm outputs, 
i
P  are the farm output prices and ( )Q,WC
is the farm cost function that depends on a vector of input prices (W) and the outputs, such as in (5):
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Theoretically, having estimated the cost function, one should solve a system such as (6), which is 
obtained by differentiating the profit function with respect to all of the outputs. System (6) states the 
classical condition that the marginal cost for each output (MC(W,Q)) should be equal to its price. As 
is customary under perfect competition with atomistic producers, input and output prices are assumed 
exogenous and the endogenous variables in the system are the farm outputs.
6 It should be noted that while the homogeneity and symmetry properties were imposed in the estimation, the properties of 
concavity and cost share positiveness were not. If the last two properties had not been satisfied by the cost function, this 
function would have been rejected as the solution of a cost minimisation problem. 
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In practice, for a complex cost function such as the one used in this exercise (i.e., the generalised 
multi-product translog cost function, see CAVES et al., 1980), to solve a system such as (6) to obtain the 
equilibrium outputs, is quite difficult due to the non-linearities involved in the marginal cost functions. 
Instead, we will consider an alternative system that expresses (6) in terms of supply elasticities and 
percentage changes in outputs and output prices. Differentiating the system and expressing it in terms of 
rates of change, we obtain the following system that can be used to approximate the effect of changes in 
output prices on the output portfolio. The matrix multiplying the change in the quantities is the inverse of 
the supply elasticities matrix (7).
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Therefore, the required changes in output due to changes in output prices are given by (8):
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The first step to solve the system (8’) is to estimate a cost function in order to compute the terms 
of the supply elasticity matrix A. Since for the simulations using the model, input prices will remain 
unchanged, it is convenient to create the following expressions (i.e., 9-a to 9-d) in order to simplify the 
cost function expression:
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Replacing the previous expressions into the translog function (4) the function becomes:
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The marginal cost function for each output i is given by (11), which incorporates the Box Cox expression. 
Notice that the marginal cost for each product (and also for the factor demands) is different for each farm, 
since the term 
f
H  varies from farm to farm due to the fixed effect term. 
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To construct the matrix A, we need to differentiate the different marginal costs with respect to each 
one of the outputs. Thus, the diagonal and off-diagonal terms of the matrix are given by:
Diagonal terms of matrix A
The diagonal terms are given by (12):
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Which simplifies to an expression such as (13) 
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Using the expressions (13a to 13c):


 








	 

8
1
2
1
*
1
k
k
ikiiQ
QS



       (13a)
( )
1−
=
∂
∂ λQ
Q
Qf
i
i
         (13b)
( ) ( ) 22 1 −⋅−=
∂∂
∂ λλ i
ii
i Q
QQ
Qf
        (13c)
203
Modelling Agricultural and Rural Development Policies
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008
Off -diagonal terms of matrix A
The off-diagonal terms are given by (14)
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2.5 Prices used for the simulation
Projected price changes used in the model were assumed to consist of two components: first, the 
change (or elimination) of direct subsidies, and second, the change in market price. To approximate the 
first component, we subtracted from the total output value for cereals, cattle and sheep, the value of their 
direct subsidies, and divided the resulting net of subsidy value by the output quantity. This operation 
produced the farm level, implicit price for cereals, cattle and sheep. The second component (i.e., change in 
market prices) was approximated by adjusting (onto a Scottish basis) FAPRI’s forecasted change in prices 
for the EU under the CAP reform scenario. Table 2 presents the estimated changes in prices for cereal and 
livestock for the time horizons 2004-2012.
3 Results and discussion
Two sets of findings were computed using the model; they are meant to produce a representation of extreme 
situations. The first set, presented in Table 3, relates to changes in output as a response to estimated 
market price changes only. It should be noted that whilst CAP reform does not directly affect potatoes, 
wool and eggs, the adjustments shown in the following tables arise because of adjustments in farmers’ 
enterprise-mixes as they attempt to maximise profits as prices adjust.
The weakening of dairy and cereal prices leads to production declines, although modest in scale, whilst 
improvement in prices for cattle and sheep lead to increases in production which are greatest in the South 
East and South West. However, farmers may well not react to price changes alone. Instead, they may 
respond to the combined effect of price changes and the removal of production-related subsidies, thereby 
reacting to the overall change in revenue associated with an enterprise. Table 4 provides estimates of 
output changes in response to price changes and production-related, subsidy removal.
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Table 2. Scotland: Estimation of price changes for major products
Grain Quantities 1/ Weighted Cereal Prices
(tonnes)
With
AAPS
2004
(£/tonne)
Without
AAPS
2004
(£/tonne)
Change
due to
elimination
of AAPS 5/
(%)
Change
in market
price
2004-12 2/
(%)
Final
price
2012
(£/tonne)
Change
in price
2004/12
(%)
Wheat 20,456.9 124.5 96.6 -22.4 -9.0 87.9 -29.4
Barley 61,000.5 116.1 79.1 -31.9 -9.7 71.4 -38.5
Oats 3/ 4,300.9 116.8 77.8 -33.4 -9.7 70.3 -39.8
Cereals 4/ 85,758.3 118.1 83.2 -29.6 -9.5 75.3 -36.3
Livestock Animals 1/ Weighted Livestock Prices
(heads)
With
subsidies
2004
(£/head)
Without
subsidies
2004
(£/head)
Change
due to
elimination
of subsidies
(%)
Change
in market
price
2004-12 2/
(%)
Final
price
2012
(£/head)
Change
in price
2004/12
(%)
Cattle 39,535 487.4 314.1 -22.4 5.4 330.9 -32.1
Sheep 191,974 42.8 30.0 -31.9 8.1 32.4 -24.3
Source: Own computations based on FAS survey data.
Notes: 1/ Survey figures.
2/ Market prices were approximated by FAPRI’s projection for the EU under the CAP reform scenario.
3/ In the absence of price projection the change in oat prices was approximated by the change in barley prices.
4/ Weighted averages by quantities.
5/ AAPS stands for Arable Area Payments Scheme.
The much greater changes in effective prices (e.g. 36 per cent decline for cereals, 32 per cent decline 
for beef, 24 per cent decline for sheep) give rise to larger production falls. Thus, how farmers regard the 
Single Farm Payment, and how they use it to maintain their farming activities will be critical to how 
Scottish agriculture adjusts. If farmers seek to protect their SFP, by not using it to support their farming 
activities, then the scale of decline in Table 4 is possible. Cereals would see greatest decline in the North 
East, where the barley crop is most vulnerable because of a regional surplus of supply over local demand. 
Cattle production would decline massively across the whole country, with the decline greatest in the North 
West (with considerable areas of relatively extreme LFA land), and least in the South West (where the 
alternative farming enterprises are more limited). Sheep production would also fall markedly, with the 
decline in the North West restricted by the lack of alternatives. However, if a large-scale withdrawal from 
farming occurred in the North West then sheep numbers would decline substantially.
Results related to changes in output as a response to estimated market price changes only, show that 
the projected weakening of dairy and cereal prices leads to production declines, although modest in scale. 
By comparison, the projected improvement in prices for cattle and sheep lead to increases in production 
which are greatest in the South East and South West of Scotland. 
When the combined effect of price changes and the removal of production-related subsidies are 
considered, the result is much greater changes in effective prices (e.g. 36 per cent decline for cereals, 
32 per cent decline for beef, 24 per cent decline for sheep), which give rise to larger production falls. In 
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this situation, the greatest decline in cereals would occur in the North East, where barley crop is most 
vulnerable due to regional surplus of supply over local demand. Cattle production would decline across the 
whole country but by the greatest proportion in the North West, and least in the South West (where the 
alternative farming enterprises are more limited). Sheep production would also fall markedly, with the 
decline in the North West restricted by a lack of alternatives. However, if a large-scale withdrawal from 
farming occurred in the North West then sheep numbers would decline substantially.
The analysis illustrates the importance of farmers’ motivations and objectives in determining the 
implications of the CAP reform. Moreover, there may well be potential marked differences in product and 
regional adjustments arising from the reforms. Such differences may well give rise to regional variations 
in economic and other consequences, both on and off farms, and may thus generate a mixed pattern of 
rural development challenges across the country if welfare levels are to be maintained in rural areas. 
Table 3. Simulated changes in farm outputs due to a change in market prices only, 2004-2012 by region and output 
(Percentage changes with respect to 2004)
Region
Outputs
Cereals Potatoes Oilseed Rape Cattle Sheep Dairy Wool Eggs
Changes in prices -9.5 0.0 0.0 5.4 8.1 -10.8 0.0 0.0
Changes in outputs
Scotland -2.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 7.7 -0.5 9.6 1.7
 North West -0.7 0.0 0.0 6.5 2.2 0.0 2.2 ..
 North East -2.8 0.0 -0.1 2.9 7.7 0.0 4.2 ..
 South East -2.8 0.1 -0.1 9.5 11.2 0.1 13.7 2.8
 South West -0.1 -0.4 0.0 7.0 10.7 -0.6 14.4 -0.1
Source: Based on FAS data and own computations
Table 4. Simulated changes in farm outputs due to a change in effective output prices, 2004-2012 by region and 
output (Percentage changes with respect to 2004)
Region
Outputs
Cereals Potatoes Oilseed Rape Cattle Sheep Dairy Wool Eggs
Changes in prices -36.3 0.0 0.0 -32.1 -24.3 -10.8 0.0 0.0
Changes in outputs
Scotland -9.4 -0.1 0.6 -38.0 -21.2 -2.2 -18.9 -9.9
 North West -5.4 0.0 -0.1 -48.2 -6.7 -0.4 -2.3 ..
 North East -14.8 0.1 0.7 -40.7 -42.2 0.0 -28.3 ..
 South East -8.3 -0.9 1.1 -40.5 -32.5 -0.2 -28.7 -15.5
 South West -8.7 2.3 0.3 -27.4 -23.9 -2.6 -25.9 -0.1
Source: Based on FAS data and own computations
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4 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to present an agricultural supply model for Scotland used to estimate 
regional changes in agricultural outputs due to the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. 
The strengths of the model are two: firstly, it is focused on the individual farms and satisfies all the 
theoretical constraints imposed by economic theory (in contrast to models that calibrate aggregated cost 
structures, e.g., positive mathematical programming models): secondly the model aggregates individual 
cases weighting them; therefore, micro and macro situations are closely related. Furthermore, distributional 
impacts of policy can be analysed.
As regards the limitations of the analysis, the first one is that the CAP reform might be considered as 
a structural change as it modified the way farmers’ incomes were supported. As the performed econometric 
analysis is based on the available information (i.e., historical information), models and inferences may not 
fully represent future events. 
The second limitation is related to the fact that the estimated models are long term static models, 
and so are the estimated elasticities. Therefore, the results are not from dynamic models that differentiate 
between the short term and long term, or in other words, they do not show the path for future developments. 
In this sense, further research should be focused to produce dynamic models of individual behaviour (i.e., 
transform the static cost functions used in this model into dynamic ones).
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Modelling the Effects of EU Sugar Market 
Liberalization on Area Allocation,
Production and Trade
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Abstract
This paper presents a partial equilibrium simulation analysis of EU sugar market reforms based on the 
European Simulation Model (ESIM) addressing three issues: preferential EU imports are a function of the 
price differential between world market and EU price, EU supply functions are estimated based on FADN 
data, and the production of bioethanol in the EU and the rest of the world is taken into account as an 
important component in sugar beet and sugar cane demand. It is found that the current sugar market 
reform including the restructuring process until the end of 2007 is sufficient to allow the EU to comply 
with its WTO commitments only very narrowly. EU sugar supply is simulated to decrease from roughly 19 
million tonnes in the base period to 15.5 million tonnes by 2015 and the EU price remains at a level of 
about 450 `/t and thus significantly above the reference price. In case of full liberalization, production in 
the EU is projected to decrease to 7.5 million tonnes by 2015.
Keywords: Sugar, Common Agricultural Policy, Sugar Market Reform, Partial Equilibrium Modelling, 
Everything But Arms.
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1. Introduction
The 2006 Reform of the European Union’s (EU) sugar policies marked a first step in bringing this sector 
in line with the EU commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the preferences granted 
under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. So far, however, the reform has fallen short compared 
to expectations with respect to reducing sugar quotas as part of the restructuring process. Therefore, the 
European Commission has applied linear ad hoc quota cuts for all Member States in the first two years of the 
implementation of the reform. In addition, the restructuring scheme has been reformed in order to provide 
stronger incentives for sugar producers to return production quotas. Still, it is an open question whether 
the policy changes agreed upon so far will be sufficient to reach the target of a balanced EU market. It is, 
therefore, possible that the EU sugar policy will be further reformed. What would be the effect of further 
sugar market reforms in the EU? 
Simulation modelling of such changes is a challenge in several regards. First, the EU market balance 
is heavily impacted by future preferential imports under various preferential trade agreements such as the 
EBA initiative and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) to be closed with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. These imports are responsive to the EU price as well as prices which can be received 
in other markets and are difficult to model. Secondly, the empirical foundation of EU supply functions is 
difficult, as price changes under the current reform as well as under a potential complete liberalization 
are without historical precedent in the EU Member States over the last 50 years. Third, EU production of 
bioethanol has increased strongly in recent years. This establishes a non-traditional demand component for 
sugar beets which affects the EU sugar market balance.
This paper presents a partial equilibrium simulation analysis of EU sugar market reform with a version 
of the European Simulation Model (ESIM) which addresses these three issues: preferential EU imports are 
a function of the price differential between world market and EU price, EU supply functions are estimated 
based on Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data and the production of bioethanol in the EU and the 
rest of the world is taken into account as an important component in sugar beet and sugar cane demand. 
Section 2 presents an overview of recent EU sugar market reforms and an outlook on potential future 
reforms. Section 3 explains the model used for this analysis and Section 4 presents the two policy scenarios 
and results. Section 5 finalizes with some conclusions.
2. The Reform Process of the EU Sugar Market
In November 2005 the council of EU farm ministers agreed upon a reform of the EU’s sugar sector (Council 
Regulation (EC) 2006/318) which entered into force with the crop year 2006/07. The final decision followed 
upon an almost three year long process of internal discussion of various reform options. The sugar sector 
had so far been spared from major changes in the preceding rounds of reforms of agricultural policies 
which the EU embarked upon over the last two decades. Various external pressures, however, rendered 
a reform finally inevitable. Expected imports from Least Developed Countries (LDC) after completion of 
the phase-in period of the Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA) of the EU in 2009 threatened to cause a 
severe oversupply on the EU market. Additionally, in 2004 a WTO panel ruled against the EU in favour of a 
complaint filed by Thailand, Australia and Brazil (WTO, 2004). As a consequence, the EU was not allowed 
anymore to export C-sugar and a quantity equivalent to the imports under the sugar protocol with ACP 
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countries without counting these towards their WTO export subsidy limitation commitments. Finally, in 
the same year the EU committed itself to a full abolition of export subsidies, implying the loss of possibly 
exporting 1.4 million tonnes with subsidies in the long run. 
The major steps of the reform of the Common Market Organization (CMO) were the replacement of the 
intervention by a reference price system and a reduction of the reference price by 36% to ` 404.40/t as 
well as the reduction of the minimum price for sugar beets to be paid to farmers by 39.7% to ` 26.29/t. 
These price cuts are phased in over a period of four years. A further important element of the reform is 
the merger of A and B quotas and the limited options for the use of out-of-quota sugar, formerly C-sugar. 
Basically, out-of-quota sugar may only be used as industrial sugar or carried forward. The reform of the 
CMO was accompanied by the introduction of a decoupled payment to farmers amounting to 64.2% of the 
reference price cut, and a restructuring scheme for the sugar sector, in order to achieve a reduction of 
the overall quota, which is necessary to balance the EU sugar market by 2010. A restructuring fund was 
established from a levy collected on each tonne of quota from the sugar producing enterprises. This fund 
pays companies willing to sell quota a premium, which reduces from ` 730/t in 2006/07 to ` 520 in 2009/10 
(EUROPEAN UNION, 2005). 
The success of the restructuring scheme had, however, been unsatisfying till mid 2007. Merely 2.2 million 
t of quota had been renounced in the first two years. Furthermore, the new CMO offered former C-sugar 
producers the opportunity to buy additional quota subject to a plafond at Member State level which resulted 
in purchases of roughly one million tonnes. In March 2007 as well as in the year before, as a result of the slow 
progress, the European Commission temporarily withdrew about two million tonnes or 13.5% of quota from the 
market to avoid an oversupply (EUROPEAN UNION, 2007a). In September 2007 the Council decided upon a reform 
of the restructuring scheme, granting additional incentives for quota renouncement (EUROPEAN UNION, 2007b). 
There are no numbers available yet on final quota sales to the restructuring fund for the following crop year. 
It seems, however, to be the case that the new regulation will result in a sizeable quota renouncement by 
virtually all companies and Member States, also those which are relatively efficient. This is due to provisions 
of the new restructuring scheme which favour quota sales up to the level of the quota withdrawal mentioned 
above over sales beyond that level (NOLTE AND GRETHE, 2008). Should the EU market not be balanced by 2010, 
the quota will be cut without any compensation. These cuts will be based on how much quota will have been 
renounced by then by every Member State (EUROPEAN UNION, 2007a).
3. The Representation of Sugar Markets and Policies in ESIM
ESIM is a comparative static partial equilibrium net-trade multi-country model of agricultural production, 
consumption of agricultural products, and some first-stage processing activities. ESIM is a partial model 
as only a part of the economy, the agricultural sector, is modelled, i.e. macroeconomic variables (like 
income or exchange rates) are exogenous. As a world model it includes all countries, though in greatly 
varying degrees of disaggregation. All EU Member States as well as accession candidate Turkey plus the 
US are modelled as individual countries; all others are combined in one aggregate (the so-called Rest of 
the World (ROW)). ESIM is a price and policy-driven model with rich cross-commodity relations; it depicts 
price and trade policy instruments as well as direct payments. As ESIM is mainly designed to simulate the 
development of agricultural markets in the EU and accession candidates, policies are only modelled for 
these countries (i.e. for the USA and the ROW, production and consumption take place at world market 
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prices). Area allocation, yield and demand functions are isoelastic. An isoelastic area allocation curve with 
price elasticity below Unity has a shape such as the lower curve shown in Figure 1. 
For the area allocation of sugar a different functional form (1) is implemented, which is also shown 
in the figure. This function, unlike an isoelastic one, allows the model to let production in a country be 
ceased at a positive price.4 To achieve this, an additive (negative) parameter α is introduced in a generic 
isoelastic function. 
  	 ii PMAXArea *,0      (1)
It is not evident a priori to which price/area combination this function should be calibrated for each 
Member State. Due to the quota, the price for sugar in the EU does not reflect marginal production costs, 
and the production quantity, especially the production of C-sugar (GOHIN AND BUREAU, 2006), cannot solely 
be explained with profit maximization behaviour. To address this problem, Member State-specific supply 
functions in ESIM are calibrated in the following two steps.
Ë The course of the curve is derived from FADN data. All cost positions in FADN data e.g. for fertilizer 
are merely available on farm group level. This does not allow attributing costs to single production 
activities. It is, however, possible to rank all farm groups in the sample according to their overall 
cost efficiency, if all costs including opportunity costs for farm-owned factors are divided by total 
receipts. The sugar producing farms in the sample are ranked accordingly and graphed with the 
cost/receipts ratio on the vertical axis and the cumulative production area on the horizontal axis 
resulting in a curve shaped like the non-isoelastic one in Figure 1. With Ordinary Least Square 
regression, this data is used to estimate the parameters of equation (1) with Areai substituted for 
the cumulative area of beets and Pi substituted for the cost/receipts ratio.
Ë The curve is scaled such as to meet the Member State-specific shadow price/area combination. 
As a shadow price for sugar (the model does not explicitly depict beet production, but merely 
white sugar production) in EU 25 Member States, estimates by the EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003 and 
2005) are taken as a benchmark. For Romania and Bulgaria, prevailing market prices prior to their 
accession to the EU in 2007 are used as shadow prices. These are extracted from the ESIM 2004 
database (BANSE et al., 2005). Table 1 shows shadow prices for white sugar in the EU Member States 
that are applied in the generation of supply curves and the intercepts on the price axis, at which 
sugar production in a country ceases completely. It also shows implicit supply elasticities for sugar 
beet at the price quantity combination in the base period. As mentioned above, the model does 
not depict beet supply but white sugar supply. Since processing is assumed to be infinitely elastic, 
i.e. the processing margin is constant, the elasticities for beet supply are somewhat smaller than 
the supply elasticities for white sugar applied in the model. As base period area, the entire sugar 
area in the base period is chosen, including the area used for C-sugar.5
4  For details, refer to NOLTE AND GRETHE (2007).
5  This results in a slight overestimation of the price responsiveness of sugar supply. 
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Figure 1: Functional form of beet area allocation in ESIM compared to an  isoelastic function
Source: Own graph.
Table 1:   Shadow prices, intercepts and supply elasticities for sugar supply functions in the EU in ` per tonne (2002 – 2005)
Member State Shadow price Intercept Supply elasticitya
Austria 400 285 1.6
Belgium and Luxembourg 400 298 1.4
Bulgaria 459 251 0.9
Czech Republic 475 280 1.0
Germany 400 298 1.8
Denmark 450 330 2.1
Spain 550 357 1.2
Finland 550 307 1.1
France 400 289 2.0
United Kingdom 400 260 1.8
Greece 550 373 1.1
Hungary 475 299 1.0
Ireland 550 422 1.8
Italy 550 346 0.7
Lithuania 525 326 1.1
Latvia 525 364 1.5
Netherlands 400 290 1.4
Poland 425 306 1.5
Portugal 550 359 1.1
Romania 467 256 0.9
Sweden 400 242 1.2
Slovenia 525 297 0.9
Slovakia 525 309 1.0
Notes: a Elasticities presented in this table are those for beet supply, not for white sugar supply.
Sources: BANSE et al. (2005), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003, 2005), WITZKE AND KUHN (2003), own calculations. 
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Despite being a net-trade model, ESIM also contains a price responsive export supply function to 
represent preferential EU imports under various schemes. In a former version of the model, these where 
modelled as a fixed quantity entering the EU market each year. Under the new CMO with decreasing prices 
this is not appropriate anymore. The preferential export supply function for sugar is a function of the 
price difference between the internal price in the EU and the world market price, plus a specific amount 
accounting for a possible freight cost differential, transaction costs, and costs of “swapping”. If this 
difference approaches zero, preferential exports fall to zero as well. For each country an export supply 
function is specified for every year as a function of this price differential. These functions are calibrated 
on shadow prices from the literature and export supply elasticities and technical progress coefficients are 
chosen based on plausibility considerations. Individual countries’ exports are restricted by the tariff rate 
quota (TRQ) prevailing in the respective year.6 These individual export supply functions are finally added 
up to an aggregate export supply function for every year of the projection horizon. 
ESIM also depicts the use of oilseeds for biodiesel production and cereals and sugar crops for bioethanol 
production. The production of bioethanol and biodiesel each depend on the bioethanol/biodiesel price 
and the weighted prices of energy crops/oils. The shares of feedstocks in bioethanol production/oils in 
biodiesel production are determined by a CES function based on energy crop prices (minus prices of related 
feed outputs). EU production of biofuels and biofuel inputs competes with imports from other countries.
4. Scenario Description and Results
4.1 Scenario Description
Two scenarios are formulated for 2015. For the baseline, several assumptions are made with respect to 
variables which are exogenous to this analysis such as demographic developments, macro-economic growth, 
consumer preferences and agri-technology. Most assumptions are based on the Scenar 2020 project (NOWICKI
et al., 2007). Furthermore, many assumptions are made for the baseline with respect to the development of 
the CAP; these are depicted in Table 2.
The liberalisation scenario contains an abolishment of all tariffs, TRQs and production quotas for sugar 
implemented between 2009 and 2013. Voluntary quota reductions being part of the baseline are assumed to 
be irreversible: sugar production remains restricted not to exceed the 2007 quota level in these cases.
6 This relates mainly to the implementation of EBA und the subsequent abolishment of SPS imports. The provisions of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) granting duty and quota free access to ACP Member States in 2015/16 are not yet 
accounted for. Also the increase of preferential imports due to quotas which had to be opened for Brazil after the Accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 are not accounted for.
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Table 2: Assumptions on agricultural policy development in the baseline
Topic Assumption
Market Policies
Intervention
u Current system of intervention prices 
u Exclusion of maize from intervention in 2009
u Adjustment of intervention prices to balance markets where necessary in 
order to comply with WTO restrictions on export subsidies:
ß  Intervention price for butter decreases by 15% from 2012 onwards
Regulations for quota products
(milk, sugar)
u Reform of the 2006 sugar MO including the first steps of the restructuring 
process:
ß For all Member States quotas are reduced by 15% from 2006 onwards
ß Reductions to zero for Ireland from 2006 and Slovenia and Latvia from 
2007 onwards
ß Reduction for Italy, Portugal and Finland by 50%, 70% and 40%, 
respectively, from 2007 onwards
u Maintenance of quotas
Changes in biofuel policies u Human demand shifters set to reach a biofuel share of 5.2% in total EU transport fuel consumption by 2015
Trade Policies
Tariffs u EU offer, no consideration of sensitive products, implementation period 2009-2013
Export subsidies u EU offer, implementation period 2009-2013
TRQs u Constant level of current TRQs, no new TRQsu But full phase in of unrestricted sugar market access for LDCs in 2009/10
Direct Payments
Development of direct payments u SAPS and SFP per ha payments constant in nominal terms (deflated by EU inflation rate)
Modulation rate u 20%
Decoupling of direct payments u Full decoupling from 2011 onwards
Application of the Single Farm 
Payment in the EU-10
u Prolongation of the SAPS system until 2011 as recently decided by the 
Council
Obligatory set-aside rates u Removal of mandatory set-aside in 2011
Source: Own composition.
Scenario Results
As a first impression of the baseline Figure 2 displays the development of world market prices in 
real terms. The overall trend of world market prices under the baseline is based on projections published 
by FAPRI for 2015 (FAPRI, 2006). Technical progress and demand shifters in the Rest of the World are 
programmed in order to approximate FAPRI projections. An exception is price projections for biofuels, plant 
oils and oilseeds, for which the implementation of human demand shifters for biofuels in the EU – in order 
to meet the projections of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007a) – leads to significantly higher prices which apply 
in the baseline.
World market prices are projected to fall by about 8% in real terms for crops and animal products 
until 2015. EU prices can be expressed relative to the world market price, reflecting the degree of political 
protection. Figure 3 displays the development of weighted (with fixed supply quantities in the base period) 
EU prices for agricultural products expressed in relative terms compared to the world market price. 
For agricultural products, the EU price declines on average from almost 120% compared to the world 
market price in 2005 to about 113% in 2013. Most of this decline is due to the implementation of the 
tariff reductions that are part of the EU offer in the Doha Round, which is included in the baseline. From 
2013 onwards, EU crop prices remain fairly constant relative to the world market level. This reflects the 
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fact that the EU is at the world market price level for most crop products over this period, and no other 
policy changes are implemented except a deflation of remaining institutional prices and specific duties. For 
animal products, EU prices start rising from 2013 on. This is caused by declining net exports of all animal 
products, which tends to result in higher prices: domestic prices are increasingly influenced by the relevant 
import price, which is the world market price plus a tariff that is higher for all animal products than the 
relevant export price, which is the maximum of the world market price and the institutional price (if any). 
Sugar specific results for the EU are depicted in Table 3.
Figure 3:  Development of EU price relative to world market price indices for agricultural products 2005-2015
(production value-weighted)
Note: Under a situation with no distortion between EU prices and prices on world markets, all numbers in Figure 2 would be 
exactly 100. Numbers above 100 indicate higher prices on EU markets compared to prices on world markets, while numbers 
below 100 describe an EU price level below international prices.
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 2: Real world market price indices for agricultural products 2005-2015
Source: Own calculations.
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Under the baseline, the domestic price decreases by 37% in real terms until 2015. The world market 
price increases slightly by 1.5% during the same period. EU sugar supply decreases from roughly 19 million 
tonnes in the base period to 15.5 million tonnes by 2015 and sugar beet area declines by 32%. Preferential 
imports decrease slightly by 100 thousand tonnes in spite of the full implementation of the EBA initiative. 
This is because of the declining EU price which establishes a declining incentive for preferential imports. 
But substantial Most Favoured Nation (MFN) imports occur and the EU turns into a strong net-importer 
of sugar at a level of about 3.2 m tonnes. Ethanol demand increases strongly in the EU, but most of it is 
covered by imports. This is because of the strong reduction in the EU ethanol price which results from the 
tariff reduction as part of the Doha Agreement envisaged under the baseline.
Table 3: Simulation results for the EU sugar market in the baseline and under full EU sugar liberalization
Base (2005) Baseline (2015) EU Liberalization (2015)
Change relative 
to base
Change relative
to baseline
World Price (`/t) 259 263 1.5% 270 1.9%
EU-27 Price (`/t) 712 451 -36.7% 332 -27.0%
Sugar production (mill. t) 19.4 15.5 -20.0% 7.5 -52.0%
Sugar beet area (mill. Ha) 2.2 1.5 -31.6% 0.7 -54.1%
Sugar demand (mill. t) 16.2 18.5 14.7% 19.2 3.8%
Sugar net-exports (mill. t) 3.1 -3.2 -11.9
Sugar pref. imports (mill. t) 1.9 1.81 -4.9% 1.09 -39.8%
Ethanol production (mill. T) 0.66 0.53 -19.5% 0.51 -4.5%
Sugar use in ethanol (mill. t) 0.2 0.16 -17.6% 0.15 -7.9%
Ethanol net-imports (mill. t) 0.06 5.61 5.52
Source: Own simulations.
In the liberalization scenario, the domestic price in the EU falls to world market level. EU imports 
amount to 12 million tonnes and sugar production in the EU-27 decreases to roughly 7.5 million tonnes by 
2015. The world market price increases slightly by 2% compared to the baseline. It amounts to 270 real 2005 
` (Caribbean, fob) and to 332 ` (Europe, cif landed), respectively. 
Table 4 displays sugar production per Member State. The production decreases in single Member States 
under the baseline scenario reflect the quota sales to the restructuring fund, which are implemented 
exogenously. As mentioned above these quota sales are in some cases higher than the 15% of quota cuts 
which are implemented in the baseline. The picture changes under the liberalization scenario. No Member 
State except for Sweden is, under the open market conditions, able to fill its quota anymore. There are 
differences in decreases between Member States. The southern Member States, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
and Bulgaria end production almost completely. Only in Bulgaria, the scenario results in a minor quantity 
being produced, for which it is, however, questionable, whether a sugar factory can be operated profitably. 
Also in Poland sugar production ceases. The remainder of the new Member States is relatively strongly 
affected by the liberalization of the EU sugar market. Production decreases are in all cases by more than 
50% compared to the baseline, with the strongest decline in Hungary, where almost 70% of the production 
is abandoned. The remainder of the EU-15 countries reduces sugar production compared to the baseline by 
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lower percentages. In most cases reduction rates are at or somewhat below 40%. In the UK, the production 
decreases by merely 13%. The two exemptions within the northern EU-15 countries are Denmark and 
Finland, where production decreases by 91% and 65%, respectively.
Table 4: EU sugar production per member state (1000 tonnes)
Base (2004/2005) Baseline (2015) EU Liberalization (2015)
Member State Change relativeto base
Change relative 
to baseline
Germany 3,940 3,318 -16% 2,012 -39%
Austria 449 382 -15% 242 -37%
Belgium/Luxembourg 985 834 -15% 480 -42%
Denmark 453 385 -15% 34 -91%
Finland 155 93 -40% 33 -65%
France 4,331 3,669 -15% 2,346 -36%
Greece 255 154 -40% 0 -100%
Ireland 203 0 -100% 0
Italy 1,458 722 -50% 0 -100%
Netherlands 918 770 -16% 508 -34%
Portugal 80 24 -70% 0 -100%
Spain 1,011 844 -17% 0 -100%
Sweden 385 319 -17% 329 3%
United Kingdom 1,313 1,112 -15% 969 -13%
Latvia 68 0 -100% 0
Romania 42 45 7% 18 -60%
Slovenia 36 0 -100% 0
Lithuania 119 101 -15% 39 -61%
Bulgaria 3 3 0% 1 -67%
Poland 2,014 1,712 -15% 0 -100%
Hungary 494 421 -15% 132 -69%
Czech Republic 518 441 -15% 215 -51%
Slovak Republic 229 195 -15% 88 -55%
Source: Own simulations.
Conclusions 
One of the core results of this analysis is that the sugar market reform including the restructuring process 
until the end of 2007 is sufficient to allow the EU to comply with its WTO commitments only very narrowly. 
The EU is projected to import about 1.4 m tonnes of sugar at MFN conditions in 2015. But our analysis does 
not yet account for non LDC imports resulting under potential EPA from 2015/16 on and the preferential 
TRQ which had to be opened for Brazil after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. 
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A second conclusion is that a MFN tariff reduction for sugar at the size which can be expected in the 
Doha Round affects the EU market price, as the EU price is simulated substantially above the reference 
price level.
Third, compared to full liberalization, the current reform only reaches about two thirds with respect to 
the price reduction which would result under full liberalization: the EU price falls by 37%, whereas it would 
fall by about 53% in case of full liberalization. At the same time, the simulated sugar production quantity 
reduction in the baseline is only about one third (from 19 m tonnes to 15.4 m tonnes) of what would result 
from full liberalization (reduction to 7.5 m tonnes). These results must be interpreted critically, however, as 
ESIM underestimates the positive world market price effect of EU liberalization significantly. This is because 
policies of other than those of EU countries are not depicted. Models which explicitly depict world wide 
sugar policies project higher world market price effects which would dampen the effect of EU liberalization 
on EU prices and production (NOLTE, 2008, ELOBEID AND BEGHIN, 2006). In the long run, however, a strong 
effect of sugar policies on world sugar prices may be questioned: the higher the prices for fossil energy, the 
stronger the development of bioethanol refineries in countries such as Brazil and the more the pressure on 
the development of substitution technology such as flex fuel motors. As a result, the international sugar 
price may be determined by energy prices in the future rather than by agricultural policies.
To conclude, critical parameters for the determination of the future EU market balance are the level 
of shadow prices in the model base period, the competitiveness of preferential suppliers, assumptions on 
ethanol driven sugar beet demand in the EU and international energy prices.
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Agri-environmental Schemes in the European Union:
The Role of Ex-ante Costs
JACK PEERLINGS1 AND NICO POLMAN2
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse land allocation between competing agri-environmental contracts 
taking into account institutional issues and farm household and farm characteristics. We consider a 
Biodiversity Protection Contract, Landscape Management Contract and a Restriction on Intensive Practises 
Contract. The paper shows that it is important to study the choice for an agri-environmental contract in 
combination with the choice for other agri-environmental contracts. The reasons for this being that a 
unit of land can only be allocated to one contract (although a farm can select more than one contract) 
and perceived relative marginal costs of contracts can change if institutional settings and farm household 
and farm characteristics alter. The model uses a two stage method. In the first step the probability of 
contract choice is determined. In the second stage these probabilities are linked to ex-ante costs (including 
transaction costs) and optimal contract choice is determined.
Keywords: Agri-environmental contracts, transaction costs, contract choice
JEL classification: Q12, Q57, Q58
1 Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy Group, Wageningen University
2 Researcher at the Agricultural Economics Institute, The Hague, The Netherlands. Nico.Polman@wur.nl.
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1. Introduction
In the European Union (EU), the purpose of agri-environmental schemes (AES) is to promote a more 
environmental friendly way of farming. A mix of agri-environmental measures is often brought together in 
an agri-environmental contract to address one or more environmental objectives. These measures generally 
complement each other, but they can conflict internally within the mix and externally with other agri-
environmental policies (JONES, 2005; 44). Agri-environmental contracts in the EU are optional for farmers. 
This optional nature tends to promote constructive cooperation and a positive attitude to wildlife and 
landscape on the part of farmers, in which respect it has an advantage over statutory environmental 
obligations (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005: 9). Member States have a wide degree of discretion in how to 
implement agri-environmental contracts (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005: 9). This means that institutional issues 
within Member States, as well as attitudes, have a great influence on the uptake of agri-environmental 
contracts and their environmental effectiveness. Policy makers aiming at improving the agri-environment 
are interested in the reasons for which farms choose a specific agri-environmental contract, or why they do 
not contract, so as to design contracts that increase contracting.
To analyse contract choice several studies focus on the characteristics of farms and farmers that 
conclude agri-environmental contracts, e.g. CRABTREE ET AL. (1998); BEEDELL AND REHMAN (2000); WENUM (2002); 
AND WYNN ET AL. (2001). These studies typically use logit or probit models. VAN HUYLENBROECK ET AL. (2000) 
AND PEERLINGS AND POLMAN (2004) developed simulation models to evaluate the impact of agri-environmental 
programmes on production and economic results of dairy farms in order to better explain contract choice. 
The first group of studies is not able to determine how much land is contracted; the latter two studies fail 
to include institutional issues and farm household characteristics in their models. None of the studies 
explicitly analyses how contracts compete. Competition comes from the fact that a farm can only choose 
one contract on a unit of land while it can conclude more than one contract.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse agri-environmental contract uptake taking into account institutional 
issues, farm and farmers’ characteristics and competition between contracts3. To reach this goal a model that 
allocates land between competing agri-environmental contracts for individual farms will be developed. 
In this paper we assume that farms maximize utility from profit (income). This profit is earned by 
selecting a mix of different types of contracts (or no contract). Uptake is assumed to depend on the 
probability that an individual farm will select a specific contract type. Probabilities are derived using 
a multinomial logit model and are assumed to depend on institutional issues and farm and farmers’ 
characteristics. Selecting a contract is assumed to imply allocating land to a specific contract. An economic 
model is used to model land allocation. In this paper three different contract types are distinguished: 
landscape management; biodiversity protection; and restrictions on intensive practices. The model is 
applied to 848 farms in study areas in Belgium, France, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
3 This document presents results obtained within the EU project SSPE-CT-2003-502070 on Integrated tools to design and 
implemented Agro Environmental Schemes (http//:merlin.lusignan.inra.fr/ITAES). It does not necessary reflect the view of 
the European Union and in no way anticipates the commission’s future policy in this area.
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A theoretical model of contract choice is presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 
discusses the empirical model. Section 5 gives the estimation results. In Section 6 the effect of institutional 
design and contract payments on farm choice between agri-environmental contracts is analysed.  Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical model
The theoretical model is presented in equations 1-6. It is assumed that farms maximise utility (see equation 
1) derived from the individual contracts selected. Utility from contracting is represented by an additive 
utility function. Selecting a contract implies that farms allocate (part of) their land to that contract. If a 
hectare of land is used for contract A it cannot be used for contract B. However, we will assume that more 
than one contract can be selected by one farm. So the model can be perceived as a land allocation model. 
The utility maximization problem of an individual farm is given by:
1
[ ]
si
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i siA s
Max E U U
=
= ∑
       (1)
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 1 expsi siU    s S        (2)
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s


 0 1si  s S     (4)
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si i
s
A A
=
=∑
         (5)
0siA ≥ s S         (6)
Where: 
iU  utility of farm i; E expectations operator; si  probability that contract s is selected by farm 
i; siU  utility of farm i of selecting contract s; F vector of farm’s characteristics; Q vector of farmer’s 
characteristics; I vector of farm’s institutional performance; S vector of farm’s social capital; V vector 
of extension variables; si  profit of selecting contract s by farm i; sip  compensation paid for selecting 1 
hectare of land of contract s by farm i; siA  land used for contract s by farm i; siC  total cost of contract s by 
farm i; iA  land availability of farm i.
Equation 2 shows that utility per contract is derived from profit (income) from that contract. Not 
contracting is also seen as a contracting possibility with zero profit. As functional form the negative 
exponential utility function has been selected. This implies utility is an increasing function of profit. The 
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increase in marginal utility of profit is decreasing with the level of profit. Here we ignore profit from other 
activities. 
Equation 3 shows that profit from a contract equals revenue minus costs. Revenue equals payments per 
hectare times the number of hectares contracted. Costs of contracting include transaction costs, costs of 
inputs needed to meet the requirements set by the contract (e.g. labour) and opportunity costs of production 
(forgone profit). Unfortunately these costs are unknown in this research. We will assume that contract 
and farm specific cost functions can be specified depending on the area contracted and the probabilities 
to contract. It is assumed that costs are increasing in the area contracted and decreasing the probability 
to contract. A high probability is assumed to be correlated to low (expected) costs of contracting while a 
low probability is linked to high (expected) costs of contracting. Farm characteristics that increase the 
probability are likely to correlate with low actual costs, farmers’ characteristics with perceived costs. Also 
institutional issues have a link with both actual and perceived costs.
Equation 4 gives the probabilities to select a contract as a function of farm characteristics, farmers’ 
characteristics and institutional issues (see section 3 for a description of the variables). So, the probabilities 
should be interpreted as the probability that a specific contract is chosen given a number of explanatory 
variables. Two strong assumptions are made here. First, the probability to contract is also influenced by 
contract characteristics as contract payment, duration, types of measures, etc. These are not taken into 
account because of lack of information. Contract payments known are farm-specific and only known for 
those contracts a farm has already selected. So if a contract is not selected information is lacking. Obtaining 
contract characteristics is also difficult because the contracts considered are actually group of contracts of 
a certain type. Second, we assume an inverse relationship between the probability and costs. 
Equation (5) shows that the total availability of land equals the hectares used under different types of 
contracts (or not contracting). Equation (6) gives the non negativity constraints for land.
Because utility is increasing in profit the higher the profit the higher the utility. So utility maximisation 
can be replaced by profit maximisation for each individual contract. The optimal amount of land contracted 
by farm i can be found by taking the first order derivatives of equation 3:
'
( , ) 0
si
si
si si si
si
p C A
A



  
 s S       (7)
Where: 
'
siC  marginal cost of contract s by farm i.
Equation 7 shows that in the profit maximising, optimum marginal costs of selecting a contract equal 
the contract payment. Solving equation (7) gives the optimal amount of land allocated to contract s by 
farm i. Substituting the optimal amount of land in the model (equation 1-6) gives profit and utility from 
contracting for each farm.
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3. Data
In 2005, a survey was carried out in specific areas in Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands4.
The questionnaire used addresses issues concerning their farm, their perception of agri-environmental 
contracts, information on income, social capital, motivation issues and hobbies. In addition, several 
questions were asked to contracting farmers on how they manage their contracts and their required farming 
practices. Contracting farmers were on purpose over represented in the sample in order to obtain better 
information on agri-environmental contracts. For all these areas participants and non-participants were 
interviewed face to face (990 farmers in total). Response rates differ for the regions. In this paper data on 
848 farms are used, 236 Belgium, 93 Finnish, 262 French, 132 Italian and 125 Dutch farms.
From the questionnaire several variables were constructed. They describe the farming family (education 
level and age), their production system (farm legal status, farms size in Standard Gross Margins (SGM5), etc.), 
the professional environment (involvement in agricultural organisations, the use of extension services), 
and social capital (trust and participation in networks). Some variables clearly describe the farmer and his 
farm. These variables serve as control variables. A second set of variables focuses on information related 
variables. The third set addresses the relation with the contracting partner (= the government). The final 
set of variables addresses social capital. Table 1 gives an overview of the data used for the estimation.
The contracts mentioned are different with respect to operational requirements in the contract. We 
distinguished three types of contracts: focusing on landscape management, biodiversity protection and 
the restriction of intensive practices (see also BONNIEUX ET AL., 2002). Landscape management focuses on the 
maintenance of landscape elements. Biodiversity protection refers to contracts like extensive management 
of grassland and management to promote flora and fauna.  Winter cover on arable land and reduced use of 
fertilizers are examples of the restriction of intensive practices.
Farm and farmer characteristics are relevant for the uptake of AES. From previous studies it follows 
that farm size and farm type influence the uptake of AES (e.g. WYNN ET AL, 2001 and VANSLEMBROUCK ET AL.,
2002). The type of service delivered by the farmer is different depending on farming type. Implementing 
biodiversity protection contract on a specialized dairy farm will be different from implementing the same 
contract on a specialized arable farm. Farmers who develop their farm in a direction not related to AES are 
expected to be less willing to be involved in agri-environmental contracts. WYNN ET AL. (2001) show also the 
importance of the “fit” of the scheme with the farm.  
Based on the literature, we included a number of farmer characteristics in the model (see for example, 
WILSON, 1997). Dummy variables for age and education are added to the model. Reference categories for age 
and education are dropped from the model in order to avoid a dummy trap (WOOLRIDGE, 2006). Further, a 
variable for off-farm income is added to represent labor availability. 
4 The survey was carried out within the ITAES project, see footnote 1.
5 The standard Gross Margin (SGM) of a crop or livestock item is defined as the value of output from one hectare or from one 
animal less the cost of variable inputs required to produce that output. For each region all crop and livestock items are 
accorded an SGM. To avoid bias caused by fluctuations, e.g. in production (due to bad weather) or in input/output prices, 
three year averages are taken.
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Table 1.  Overview of data used for estimation, (number of observations = 848), 2005 
Mean Std. error
Farm characteristics
Percentage SGM in dairy production 33.3 30.5
Percentage SGM in beef production 1.8 5.3
Farm size in SGM 16.7 45.9
Dummy indicating whether farm is organic 0.9
Number of technical changes past five years 3.3 1.8
Dummy indicating whether farm is expected to be continued the next 10 years 0.8
Farmers’ characteristics
Dummy age farmer between 40-55+ 0.5
Dummy age farmer older than 55+ 0.2
Dummy indicating medium education level+ 0.9
Dummy indicating high education level+ 0.1
Dummy indicating whether off-farm income is more than 50% of total income 0.3
Institutional performance and trust
Score on 6 items related to institutional design6 2.6 0.5
Score indicating the government can be trusted7 2.3 0.6
Dummy indicating AES will remain the same over time8 0.2
Social capital
Dummy indicating that most people can be trusted9 0.7
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities of non-agricultural organizations 0.3
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities of agricultural organizations 0.5
Extension services
Dummy indicating use of public extension 0.6
Dummy indicating use of private extension 0.7
Extension services, both private and public are expected to influence uptake. The questions on 
extension services did not focus on AES and were asked in a general way. It can be expected that 
information on AES are only part of these extension services.  Private extension follows from feed 
suppliers, banks, researchers, and the processing industry. Public extension will also follow the complete 
range of governmental regulation including AES and, therefore, a positive influence is expected on the 
uptake of AES. Given the type of private extension (focused on general farming practices) it is expected 
that these will negatively influence the uptake of AES. A positive assessment of institutional design is 
expected to increase the uptake of AES. 
6 Average score on 6 items on a Likert scale  related to institutional design:
- “The eligibility rules are fair”
- “The procedures for application are easy”
- “The rules and requirements are easy to understand”
- “The intended environmental benefits are clear and easy to understand”
- “It is easy to find the right person to contact in the administration when there are problems”
- “Regarding AES, administration behavior is fair and responsible”
7 “The … can be trusted” where ... stands for average score on trust in agricultural administration, environmental 
administration, and EU (on a Likert scale)
8 The current policy rules and regulations will remain constant over a longer period.
9 See footnote 6 where… stands for most people
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Social capital is measured using the following indicators: (1) trust in general; (2) trust in the 
government (3) participation in social networks; (4) participation in agricultural networks. Higher levels 
of trust in general and trust in the government (as contracting partner) are also expected to increase 
the uptake. The social networks are more general networks not related to agriculture but, for example, 
involvement in sports clubs. Agricultural networks focus on improving agricultural practices. The more 
general networks are thought to increase the probability of uptake of AES because these farmers feel a 
high social responsibility. Participation in agricultural networks is expected to negatively influence uptake 
because farmers are more oriented towards improving on agricultural operation.
4. Empirical model
In the empirical model we first have to derive the probabilities of contracting as a function of explanatory 
variables. From an econometric point of view there is no obvious solution for estimating a model where 
farms have more than one choice that does not exclude each other.
A possibility would be to estimate a set of logit or probit models (see VERBEEK, 2004: 190-192; GREENE,
2008: 772-775) to determine the probabilities of contracting each contract separately. So in case of selecting 
contract A, B or not contracting one estimates two logit or probit models (1) one for choosing contract A 
(and not choosing contract A) and one for (2) choosing contract B (and not choosing contract B). This would 
lead to a system of (two) equations. An alternative would be to estimate a multivariate probit model (see 
Greene, 2008: 826-831). With the multivariate probit model again there are several decisions, each between 
two alternatives. For each choice a probit model is estimated, however, it is assumed that the error terms of 
the equations are correlated. This implies that there are unobserved variables affecting the choices made. 
In the logit, probit and multivariate probit model the explanatory variables can but are not necessarily 
identical between equations (choices made). So each choice can have its own explanatory variables. 
The disadvantage of the logit, probit and multivariate probit models for the purpose we want to use 
it is that probabilities are difficult to interpret because a normalisation of probabilities is missing (see 
VERBEEK, 2004: 204-205). Each contract is compared to all other choices. In other words the probability of 
choosing contract A cannot explicitly be linked to the probability of choosing contract B. In a multinomial 
logit model (see VERBEEK, 2004: 208-210; GREENE, 2003: 843-847) such a normalisation takes place because 
the probability of selecting a contract is determined relative to the probabilities of other possible choices 
(so all probabilities are known and can be related). Probabilities, therefore, also add up to 1. Disadvantage 
of the multinomial logit is that it assumes that one contract is selected (just as in a normal logit or probit). 
Running a multinomial logit for each choice separately is not an option because each choice is already 
compared to the other choices. We solved this problem by including a farm in the dataset for every time it 
selects a contract. So if a farm selects both contract A and B this farm appears twice in the dataset, one 
time selecting contact A and the other time contract B. This is similar to what we do when we estimate a 
set of logit or probit model or the multivariate probit model and assume that in each equation we have the 
same explanatory variables.
With a multinomial logit function the probability that a farm i selects a contract (or not contracting) 
s ( )si  is given by:
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Where:
s  vector of coefficients for contract s; ix  vector of explanatory variables for farm i.
In equation 8 coefficients are contract specific while the explanatory variables are identical for all 
contracts but their value is farm-specific. Equation 8 guarantees that the probabilities lie between 0 and 
1 and add up to 1. An assumption made when using the multinomial logit model is that it assumes that 
conditional upon observed characteristics, the probabilities of any two alternatives are independent (the 
independence of the alternatives assumption, see GREENE, 2008: 847). This is particularly troublesome if 
two or more alternatives are very similar. However, given that the alternative contracts are rather different 
(this is how they are defined, see data section) we maintain this assumption. This assumption is also made 
if we estimate a system of logit or probit models or estimate the multivariate probit model. A Wald test 
confirms the independence of the alternatives assumption.
Having estimated the probabilities to contract and assuming that these probabilities influence costs of 
contracting we can specify a farm and contract specific cost function. For the cost function in equation 4 
we take the following function:
[ ]1 1exp (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
si si si si
si si si si
C Aγ β
γ β γ β= − −− −
1s S      (9)
Where:
si  vector of farm and contract specific coefficients.
Marginal costs equal:
 ' exp (1 )si si si siC A  
1s S         (10)
We know that if a farm is contracting in the profit maximising, optimum marginal revenue (contract 
payment) equals marginal cost. So, substituting marginal cost by contract payment sip  and solving for the 
optimal amount of land contracted gives:
1
ln
(1 )
si si
si si
A p
 

 1s S 
       (11)
So the amount of land under contract s increases if the contract payment goes up (but with a decreasing 
rate) and the probability of selecting contract s increases. Notice that if contract payments are zero no land 
is contracted although there can be a positive probability of contracting land. Also in the multinomial logit 
there can be a positive probability to select a contract although a farm does not actually select that contract. 
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Equation 10 shows that contract payments should not be included in the multinomial logit model because 
marginal costs and contract payment are equal, and marginal costs are determined by the probabilities.
The amount of land not contracted can be found by adding up the amounts of land under contract and 
subtracting this amount from the total amount of land:
1
1
S
Si i si
s
A A A
−
=
= − ∑          (12)
For a farm contracting land we can derive the cost function (equation 9). For this we have to determine 
the value of si . Assuming that the actual amount of contracted land equals the utility maximizing amount 
of land and using equation 11 we can calculate the si ’s:
1
ln
(1 )
si si
si si
p
A



         (13)
The si ’s are coefficients of the contract and farm specific inverse marginal cost functions (the land 
allocation function, equation 12) that equalise the actual amount of land contracted with the calculated 
amount. 
Equations 8-12 make it then possible to calculate, with changing exogenous variables (variables in 
vector ix , and contract payments) the optimal amount of land contracted. Using equation 3 and 4 makes it 
possible to calculate changes in profit and utility.
5. Estimation results
Given that the estimates are difficult to interpret the marginal effects are calculated, see Table 2 (estimation 
results are available upon request by the authors). They show how a small change in a variable affects the 
probabilities. In the case of dummy variables the marginal effects indicate the discrete change of the 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in Table 2 are calculated using averages for the explanatory 
variables. Marginal effects will differ between farms because the value of the explanatory variables will 
differ between farms.
5.1 Landscape Management Contract
Results indicate that selecting a Landscape Management Contract is positively influenced by a medium 
and high education level of the farmer and the participation of the farmer in non-agricultural organisations. 
Also, trust in the government positively relates to selecting this type of contract. A relatively high education 
level, focus on non-agricultural activities, and trust in the government probably reflect an open attitude 
towards landscape and wildlife, and therefore, have a positive effect on participation. 
The contract is selected less in case of beef farms and participation of the farmer in agricultural 
organisations. Also being an organic farm and making use of public extension negatively affect selecting a 
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Landscape Management Contract. Participation of the farmer in agricultural organisations and making use 
of public extension could be indicators for a negative attitude of a farmer towards contracting (‘conservative’ 
farmers). The negative sign for organic farms could indicate that landscape management contracts and 
organic farming compete. Landscape Management Contracts imply relatively high marginal costs of farms 
(reflected by the relatively high contract payments) indicating it is a big step to select such a contract. 
Table 2. Marginal effects calculated from the multinomial logit model for not contracting (not), Landscape 
Management Contract (land), Biodiversity Protection Contract (diversity) and Restriction on Intensive 
Practices Contract (intensive). 
not land diversity intensive
Farm characteristics
Percentage SGM in dairy production -0.000 0.000 0.002* -0.002*
Percentage SGM in beef production 0.001 -0.006* 0.004* 0.000
Farm size in SGM 0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Dummy indicating whether farm is organic+ -0.160* -0.064* 0.044 0.181*
Number of technical changes -0.026* -0.001 0.009 0.018*
Dummy indicating whether farm is expected to be continued 
the next 10 years+ -0.014 -0.008 0.035 -0.014
Farmers’ characteristics
Dummy age farmer between 40-55+ 0.087* -0.007 0.020 -0.100*
Dummy age farmer older than 55+ 0.068* 0.007 -0.017 -0.058*
Dummy indicating medium education level+ 0.021 0.028* -0.003 -0.046
Dummy indicating high education level+ -0.009 0.062* -0.024 -0.029
Dummy indicating whether off-farm income is more than 50% 
of total income+ -0.125* -0.003 0.042 0.087*
Institutional performance and trust
Score on 6 items related to institutional design -0.158* 0.009 0.080* 0.068*
Dummy indicating the government can be trusted -0.050* 0.017* -0.017 0.050*
Dummy indicating AES will remain the same over time+ -0.072* 0.008 0.082* -0.018
Social capital
Dummy indicating that most people can be trusted+ -0.011 -0.005 -0.017 0.033
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities 
of non-agricultural organization+ -0.068* 0.033* 0.013 0.021
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities 
of agricultural organization+ -0.084* -0.028* -0.015 -0.040
Extension services
Dummy indicating use of public extension+ -0.131* -0.020* 0.042* 0.110*
Dummy indicating use of private extension+ 0.083* 0.009 -0.071* -0.021
*: Significant at 10% level.
+: Marginal effects is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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5.2 Biodiversity Protection Contract
The probability to select a Biodiversity Protection Contract is positively related to being a dairy or 
beef farm. The trust of the farmer in contract design and that the government will not change contract 
conditions in the future also positively relate to selecting this type of contract. 
Making use of private extension services negatively affects contract choice while the use of public 
extension services has a positive effect. 
The Biodiversity Protection Contract is relatively easy to implement on grassland, and therefore, dairy 
and beef farms are the obvious contractors. The more farmers trust the contract the more it is selected. Results 
suggest that this type of contract is chosen by conservative farmers: a group that is probably using public 
extension services more than private ones, that without too much extra costs can implement the contract.
5.3 Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract
The probability to select a contract imposing restrictions on intensive practises is positively affected 
by being an organic farm. This seems obvious given that organic farms are in general relatively extensive 
compared to regular farms. Probabilities are also positively affected when farmers have trust in the 
government and contract design. Also off-farm income and the use of public extension services contribute 
to an increase in the probabilities of selecting this contract.
The probability that this type of contract is chosen decreases when the farm is a dairy farm and the 
farmer is old. Unexpectedly the probability also goes down when the farmer believes that there will be no 
time inconsistencies (contract terms will be changed over time). This is caused by the fact that farmers 
in this case choose other contract types first (especially the Biodiversity Protection Contract). This is a 
consequence of using the multinomial logit model. Although there is a positive coefficient the sign could be 
negative in Table 2 because the estimated coefficient is small compared to the other coefficients.
5.4 Not contracting
The probability of not selecting a contract is positively influenced by higher age of farmer, farm size 
(small effect) and using private extension services. It is negatively determined by being an organic farm, 
the number of technical changes adopted, trust in government and contract design, participation in 
agricultural and non-agricultural organisations, and the use of public extension services. These results are, 
not surprisingly, opposite to the reasons for selecting a contract.
6. Simulations and results
6.1 Scenarios
There are three possible routes to analyse how the government can increase participation in AES taking 
into account the competition between contracts. First, the government can increase contract payments. 
This will lead ceteris paribus to an increase in participation. Second, is to change contract terms excluding 
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contract payments, as contract duration and measures to be applied. Finally, the government can determine 
to influence factors that influence contract uptake but are not contract related. In terms of our model 
the first possibility can be analysed i.e. to increase payments sip . The second possibility is impossible to 
analyse with our model because the exact contract conditions are not known because contracts analysed 
are groups of actual contracts. The latter possibility can be analysed by looking at the possible effects 
of changes in the variable that represents the perceived institutional design of contracts (which is not 
contract specific). Moreover, we analyse the possible effect of the variable that represents the trust of 
farmers that the government will not change contract terms during the course of the contract. So farmers 
trust that time inconsistency will not take place. The latter two variables might be influenced by the 
government by improving communication and being as transparent as possible. Increasing these variables 
implies an increase in the probability that a contract is selected. However, since the probabilities add up 
to one it could be that the increase of the amount of land selected for one contract is at the expense of the 
amount of land selected for another contract. 
In order to analyse the effects of these variables we define three scenarios. Results of these scenarios 
will be compared with the base scenario. In the scenarios we determine contract choice for each 
individual farm in the sample (848 farms) using the model described in Section 4 (plus the estimated 
model of Section 5) and individual farm data from the sample. Notice that the outcomes of the model in 
the base scenario are exactly equal to the initial situation with respect to the farm specific amount of 
land selected for each contract.
Scenario I:
In order to look at the possible effects of an increase in payments we increase the payments for all 
three contracts by10%.
Scenario II:
In order to look at the effects of an increase in perceived institutional performance we increase the 
variable representing trust in contractual design by 1. Since this variable represents a score on 6 items the 
total maximum value remains 6 (so there is no increase for farms already scoring the maximum value). This 
variable is not contract specific.
Scenario III:
In order to look at the effects of (perceived) time inconsistency for farms we change for those farms 
that have a value 0 for this dummy variable its value into 1.
In the remaining Section results of the three scenarios are presented. Since it is not convenient to 
present the results for 848 farms we aggregate the outcomes for each country.
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6.2 Results
Base scenario
Results with respect to land allocation and profit for the base scenario are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
The land allocation (Table 3) reflects the actual land allocation. We see large differences between 
countries with respect to land allocation. However, in all countries most land is allocated to non-
contracting. The Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract is the second most important land allocation 
category (except for the Netherlands where the Biodiversity Protection Contract is most important) The 
Landscape Management Contract is least important for all countries except for Italy. Table 4 shows the profit 
earned with each contract. Profit is determined by land allocation (see Table 3), contract payments, and 
probabilities to contract (higher probabilities, less costs, more profit). On average the contract payments are 
lowest for the Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract and the highest for the Landscape Management 
Contract. The Biodiversity Protection Contract takes an intermediate position. For the probabilities the 
opposite is the case. Profits show that high contract payments do not compensate for the higher costs. 
Profits are high for the Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract and Biodiversity Protection Contract.
Table 3. Initial allocation of land over contracts in shares (base scenario).
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0.785 0.001 0.035 0.179 1
Finland 0.514 0.000 0.022 0.464 1
France 0.664 0.028 0.150 0.157 1
Italy 0.770 0.010 0.008 0.212 1
Netherlands 0.628 0.009 0.307 0.056 1
Total 0.693 0.012 0.105 0.191 1
Table 4. Initial profit per farm (base scenario).
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 15.45 348.41 917.46 1281.33
Finland 0 3.00 60.01 87.43 150.44
France 0 148.92 1790.64 1119.62 3059.18
Italy 0 471.91 377.07 1278.92 2127.90
Netherlands 0 199.15 996.69 989.54 2185.37
Total 0 153.46 862.40 955.78 1971.64
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Scenario 1: Increase in contract payments
An increase in contract payments for one contract increases profit for that contract. However, 
probabilities of contracting do not change. This implies (see equation 7) that only for the contract that 
has become more profitable the amount of land contracted increases. This increase is at the expense of 
land that is previously not contracted. So in the model contract payments do influence the choice whether 
to contract or not but do not lead to competition between contracts. In Scenario 1 we increased contract 
payments for all three contracts with 10%. Table 5 and 6 show the effect on land allocation and profit 
respectively.
Results indicate that especially for Finland the increase in contract payments for the Restriction on 
Intensive Practices Contract leads to a relatively large increase in land allocated to this contract and also 
results in a relatively large increase in profit. For all countries the increase in land allocated to a contract 
is less than 10% and in a large number of cases smaller than 2%. ‘Price elasticities’ of land contracted are, 
therefore, (much) smaller than one. However, profit increases are larger than 10%. With an increase in 
land allocated to a contract the extra revenue is larger than the extra cost (however in profit maximizing 
optimum marginal cost equal marginal revenue). The reason is that also for the land that was contracted 
before the contract payments increased revenue goes up. 
Table 5. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario.
Scenario 1: 10% increase in contract payments
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium -0.71 1.49 1.74 2.78 0
Finland -8.54 1.64 3.64 9.29 0
France -1.29 4.13 2.15 2.65 0
Italy -0.52 1.35 1.58 1.77 0
Netherlands -1.31 1.87 2.28 2.00 0
Total -1.57 3.44 2.20 4.28 0
Table 6. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario.
Scenario 1: 10% increase in contract payments
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 11.74 12.03 12.38 12.28
Finland 0 12.17 13.35 19.50 16.90
France 0 13.16 12.58 13.17 12.82
Italy 0 11.71 11.98 12.36 12.15
Netherlands 0 11.99 13.05 11.93 12.42
Total 0 12.20 12.55 12.66 12.56
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Scenario 2: Increase in institutional performance
If the institutional performance is improved probabilities to contract land increase. This increase is 
the largest for the Biodiversity Protection Contract and the smallest for Landscape Management Contract. 
The Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract takes an intermediate position (see Table 2). The increases 
in probabilities lead to a decrease in marginal cost, and therefore, given the same contract payments, to a 
larger amount of land contracted (see equation 11, and Table 7).
Table 7. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario. 
Scenario 2: increase in institutional performance
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium -2.40 2.45 12.74 8.00 0
Finland -9.25 0.18 6.62 9.94 0
France -5.23 1.18 13.96 8.53 0
Italy -3.56 1.61 9.43 12.48 0
Netherlands -8.55 0.86 16.44 5.66 0
Total -4.82 1.22 14.70 9.33 0
Table 8. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario.
Scenario 2: increase in institutional performance
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 3.31 13.13 7.02 8.63
Finland 0 0.18 7.42 2.36 4.33
France 0 0.68 14.20 7.44 11.07
Italy 0 1.79 10.30 13.29 10.21
Netherlands 0 0.68 16.04 4.51 9.42
Total 0 1.28 14.08 8.05 10.16
Table 2 shows that the coefficients for the marginal effects are positive for all three contracts. This 
implies that the increase in the amount of land contracted is at the expense of the land that is initially 
not contracted. Cost curves are farm specific so the effects per farm differ in size. The outcomes per 
country show for example that the Biodiversity Protection contract is relatively important in France and 
the Netherlands. The increase in profit (see Table 8) for this type of contract is, therefore, also relatively 
large for these countries (cost decrease for all units of land already contracted).
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Scenario 3: No time inconsistency
If there is no time inconsistency the probabilities to contract change but the change is not positive for 
every contract. 
Table 9. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario. 
Scenario 3: no perceived time inconsistency
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0.33 2.40 5.55 -2.55 0
Finland 3.75 1.16 5.92 -4.43 0
France -1.81 0.90 9.54 -1.65 0
Italy 0.10 1.55 6.69 -0.66 0
Netherlands -5.67 0.82 12.25 -3.61 0
Total -0.87 1.01 10.21 -2.54 0
Table 10. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario.
Scenario 3: no perceived time inconsistency
Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 2.98 5.81 -3.35 -0.78
Finland 0 1.15 7.51 -3.05 1.25
France 0 0.51 10.37 -2.02 5.36
Italy 0 1.86 5.76 -0.84 0.93
Netherlands 0 0.73 12.04 -3.67 3.90
Total 0 1.27 9.81 -2.39 3.23
Although the coefficient α for time consistency in equation 8 is positive for every contract, the 
probability of selecting an individual contract can decrease because the relative increase can be smaller 
than for the other contracts. Table 3 shows that the marginal effect for the Restriction on Intensive 
Practices Contract is negative. Table 3 represents average effects and in the simulation model the marginal 
effects differ between farms and also do not necessary have the same sign for one type of contract. 
Results show indeed that with no time inconsistency less land is allocated to the Restriction on Intensive 
Practices Contract and more to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and to a lesser extent the Landscape 
Management Contract (see Table 9). We also see a small decrease in the land not contracted although the 
average marginal effect in Table 3 has a (small) positive sign. Besides the increase in the amount of land 
allocated to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and Landscape Management Contract, profit from both 
contracts increases (see Table 10). Overall there is an increase in profit. However, for some farms profit 
exactly falls (see also average for Belgium). This unexpected result comes from the fact that a farm shifts 
from a contract with an initial high profit but now low profit (because of a lower probability) to a contract 
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that now has a high profit but had a low profit (because of a higher probability). However the new profit is 
lower than old profit, decreasing overall profit. 
7. Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyse agri-environmental contract uptake taking into account institutional 
issues, farm and farmers’ characteristics and competition between contracts. To reach this goal a model that 
allocates land between competing agri-environmental contracts for individual farms has been developed. 
In the model utility from profit earned with contracting is maximised. Profit is defined as the revenue 
from contracting (contract payments times the amount of land contracted) minus costs. Costs are actual and 
perceived costs of contracting like opportunity costs of contracted land, transaction costs, costs to be made 
to fulfil contract requirements. Since data on perceived and actual costs of contracting are lacking a farm-
specific exponential, cost function is specified. The cost function runs through two points: no contracting 
gives zero costs and the point where marginal cost equal contract payments (marginal revenue). Costs are 
assumed to decrease when the probability of contracting is higher. This probability depends on farm household 
characteristics, farm characteristics, institutional performance and trust, social capital and the use of extension 
services. All these variables are assumed to relate to both perceived and actual costs of contracting.
As expected we find that an increase in contract payments increases the amount of land contracted. 
In the model a change in contract payments for one contract only increases the amount of land under that 
specific contract (at the costs of the area not contracted). We also find that an improvement in institutional 
performance of contracts increases the amount of land contracted. It is not possible to analyse the effects 
of institutional performance of individual contracts because the contracts simulated are aggregates of real 
contracts and the contracts are of similar institutional design. Real contracts, however, would not change 
the basic message of this paper and would require a larger number of observations. A change in institutional 
performance increases especially the land allocated to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and to a lesser 
extent the amount of land allocated to the Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract. A reduction in time 
inconsistency increases the amount of land contracted allocated to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and 
Landscape Management Contract but decreases the amount of land allocated to the Restriction on Intensive 
Practises Contract. This is caused by the fact that the increase in probabilities (and associated cost reduction) 
for the first two contracts is at the expense of the Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract. 
A caveat of the model is that contracts that in the dataset are not selected will not be selected in the 
simulations because it was not possible to specify the farm and contract cost function. Despite this caveat 
the model is a flexible tool to study contract choice because it includes a wide variety of explanatory 
variables in combination with utility maximising behaviour of farmers. 
This paper indicates that it is important to study the choice for an agri-environmental contract in 
combination with the choice for other agri-environmental contracts. Reducing time inconsistency can 
e.g. lead to the unexpected result that the choice for an agri-environmental contract decreases because 
other agri-environmental contracts become more attractive. This implies that in order to design effective 
and efficient policies knowledge about locally existing agri-environmental policies, farming systems and 
preferences of farmers is needed.
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Impacts of Policy Reform on Sustainability of Hill
Farming in UK by Means of Bio-economic Modelling
SZVETLANA ACS1, NICK HANLEY, MARTIN DALLIMER2, PHILIP ROBERTSON3, KEVIN GASTON, PAUL R. ARMSWORTH
Abstract
Hill farming in UK is experiencing very difficult economic circumstances and many farmers rely on 
subsidies provided by the government for a large fraction of their income. The Peak District National Park 
is used as a case study to examine how farmers might respond to current policy changes – in particular, 
the move from area- and headage-based payments to the Single Farm Payment, and how optimal business 
plans should respond to these changes. The objective of this paper is thus to develop production models 
that predict how farmers will respond to changing policy framework conditions. For this purpose socio-
economic surveys were carried out on 44 sample farms, in order to investigate how the land is managed 
on hill farms including ongoing policies and future farm management planning. Based on these surveys a 
series of representative farm linear programming models was developed, which represent typical farm types 
in the uplands in the Peak District. In this study the focus is on typical sheep and beef farm type, the most 
common in this region. This model is used to calculate the effect of different policies, carried out under 
the CAP reform, on incomes, land use and the intensity of production. We also consider the impacts of a 
complete removal of subsidies.
Key words: CAP reform, Single Farm Payment, hill farming, linear programming model
JEL classification: Q18, Q12,Q15, C61
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1. Introduction
The uplands are nationally and internationally important for biodiversity as well as being of significant 
landscape, archaeological, recreational, heritage, and natural resource value. In much of Europe, agricultural 
activity has largely shaped the upland landscape, and without some form of management these areas 
could lose much of their valuable biodiversity. Governments in many countries in the EU are increasingly 
recognising these values, and incorporating them into rural development policies (HANLEY et al, 2007).
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the most visible and expensive land use policy within the EU. In 
the early 1990s, it was recognised by the Commission that, production-based (headage) payments under 
the CAP had provided an incentive for farmers to keep high numbers of animals and that some farmers 
in receipt of these payments were damaging natural and semi-natural vegetation through overgrazing. 
Problems of surplus accumulation and trade interventions were also important factors for reform of the CAP 
(HM TREASURY & DEFRA 2005). The CAP has undergone a series of significant reforms, most recently those of 
AGENDA 2000 (1999) and the Mid Term Review (June 2003 and April 2004). These reforms are bringing about 
a phasing out of production-linked support and protection, and a re-targeting of measures on non-market 
and environmental outcomes. In 2005 11 direct payments were replaced by the Single Farm Payment (SFP), 
which is not linked to the production of the farm. The SFP is planned to be progressively reduced and 
phased out, being currently only guaranteed until 2013 (HM TREASURY & DEFRA 2005). 
In this study the aim is to investigate how these policy changes affect farmer’s income and land use in 
the English uplands. We use hill farms in the Peak District as a case study area. Different policy scenarios 
are analysed and compared by using a linear programming model for typical farm types in the uplands. 
2. Methodology
2.1. Socio-economic farm survey
The purpose of this survey was to investigate how land is managed on hill farms in the Peak District, 
and to provide inputs to the linear programming (LP) models. The survey was designed and carried out 
with the help of experienced agricultural surveyors from the University of Nottingham through the winter 
months of 2006/2007. It included 44 farm visits. Farms were chosen on the basis of their location and their 
access to moorland grazing. The survey included questions on land area and land types (moorland and in-
bye), land use (grazing, fodder and crop), production activities on the farm and subsidy payments received 
during the reference period of 2006. 
According to the survey results of the 44 farms in the Peak District, six types of typical farms can be 
distinguished based on their dominant production activities and depending on whether a part of the farm has 
moorland coverage or not: sheep & beef moorland, sheep moorland, sheep & dairy moorland, sheep & beef inbye, 
sheep & dairy inbye and beef inbye. The surveyed farms are characterized by farms, 75 % of which range from 50 
to 500 ha and 25% from 500 to 3000 ha. The average farm size also differs according to the farm types (Figure 1).
Concerning land types, 70 % of the total surveyed area (24 000 ha) is covered by moorland, 30% by in-
bye land type, which includes permanent pasture, rough grazing, rough pasture, temporary grassland and 
traditional hay meadow. Of the in-bye land types 85% are occupied by permanent pasture.
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The survey showed that most of the farmers receive Single Farm Payment and Hill Farm Allowance (HFA) 
and many of them participating in different Agri-Environmental Schemes (AESs), such as Environmental 
Sensitive Area (ESA) and Countryside Stewardship Schemes (CSS), which are currently being replaced by 
the new Environmental Stewardship Schemes such as Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) and Higher Level 
Stewardship (HLS) schemes (Figure 2).
The technical and economic data from the survey was used to parameterise the linear programming 
farm models. Based on the survey results, the most typical sheep & beef farm is taken as an example to show 
the effect of subsidy changes based on the CAP reform. The effect of the payment on farm management, 
land use, livestock density and income is analysed in more detail. 
For our analysis the average sheep & beef type of farm, representing more than 25% of total farm types 
in the area, is used for illustrative modelling purposes, assuming a total area of 1070 ha, 86% of which 
Figure 1. Average farm sizes for different farm types
Figure 2. Participation in different schemes as a % of all farms in the survey
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is moorland and 14% is in-bye land. In-bye land is represented by permanent pasture, which is the most 
common in-bye land type for this farm type.
2.2. Farm models
The general structure of the models is shown in Table 1 and has the mathematical form of the standard 
linear programming model (HAZELL & NORTON, 1986):
Maximise {Z c’x}
Subject to Ax ≤ b
and x ≥ 0
where:
x = vector of activities
c = vector of gross margins or costs per unit of activity
A = matrix of technical coefficients
b = vector of right hand side values
The group of activities are shown at the top of the Table 1 under 12 headings: activities for different 
land types, production activities representing several fodder crops and animal production systems, seasonal 
labour, purchase of fertilizer and feed and activities for sold animal products and subsidy payments. The 
rows of the matrix indicate the type and form of the constraints included: land availability, supply and 
demand of fixed and seasonal labour, feeding and housing requirements for sheep and cattle, fertilizing 
requirements per land type, constraints on organic manure use in Nitrate Vulnerable Zone and constraints 
on subsidies for headage and Single Farm Payment based on production and land type, respectively. The 
objective function of the LP model is to maximise the gross margin, i.e. total returns from animal production 
and subsidy payments minus variable costs, including variable operations, fertilizers and seasonal labour. 
The output of the model includes the corresponding optimal production plan with optimal land use, labour 
use and fertilizer application. To get the optimal solution for the LP models, the CONOPT solver was used in 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) programming language.
The central element in the LP model is animal production with two types of livestock: sheep and beef. 
The production and the feeding requirements for each of these types are described below.
As a central element for the sheep production is an average upland crossbreed ewe with finished and 
stored lamb production based on grazing and lambing in March-April. The feeding requirements per ewe, 
with lambs included for the whole year are taken from The Farm Management Handbook 2006/07 (BEATON,
2007). The feeding requirement consists of grass grazing, silage, hay and ewe concentrate. In the model 
it is assumed that 1.5 lambs are borne per average ewe with a 4% mortality rate. Due to voluntary and 
involuntary disposal of ewes, it is assumed that per year 25% of the ewes are replaced by gimmers raised 
on the farm. The ram requirement is also included, 2.5 per 100 ewe. The returns from ewe production come 
from finished and stored lambs, cull ewes and wool sales. The costs per ewe include costs of health care, 
feed additives, straw bedding, shearing, and other costs (commission, levies, haulage and tags).
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As a central element for the beef cattle production an average hill suckler cow is used with calving in 
February-April, and sale in October with 220 days (235 kg). This includes 10% calf mortality and 1% cow 
mortality. Bull ratio is 1 to 35 cows. In winter the suckler cows are kept inside. The feeding requirement of 
cows and calves in winter days consists of silage, straw, creep feed, cow concentrates, cow cobs and some 
grazing on hill pasture. In summer the cows with calves are kept outside and fed by silage and grazing. 
The returns from beef production come from calf sales of steers and heifers, minus the replacements after 7 
years. The cost per suckler cow include concentrate costs, cow cobs and creep feed costs, health care, straw 
bedding and other costs (commission, haulage and tags).
The land on the farm can be used for growing grass, which can be used for grazing and for producing 
silage and hay. Silage can be fed in winter and summer. In addition to the home-grown feed, concentrates 
can be purchased. Dry matter production of grass, silage and hay makes the link between the feeding 
requirements of sheep and cattle and supply of it by each land type. On in-bye (permanent pasture) land, 
grass can be grown and fed to sheep and to cattle. On heather moorland only sheep can graze, and this 
fulfils part of their feeding requirement. 
The dry matter production of grassland per year depends mainly on the amounts of water and nutrients 
and on growing conditions. The water level based on weather conditions are kept constant. For the inclusion 
of the effect of nutrients in the model, different levels of N use were distinguished. The most commonly 
used combination of N use and cutting frequencies (1-3 cuts for silage and 1 cut for hay) were represented 
with separate activities ranging from 0 – 375kg N/ha (BEATON, 2007). The following main types of land 
use were distinguished: grass used only for grazing (N: 75, 125, 175, 250 or 375 kg/ha), used for silage 
with aftermath grazing (1, 2 or 3 cuts; N: 0, 125, 220, 250, 275, 300 or 375 kg/ha) and used for hay with 
aftermath grazing (1 cut; N: 0, 70, 125, 200). On moorland no activity is assumed in the model, such as 
cutting or fertiliser-use, only it is used for grazing sheep. The costs of grassland include cost of renewing 
grassland, sprays, costs of mowing and ensiling.
Sheep and beef cattle require labour. Throughout the year a particular amount is necessary for each 
period. Therefore the year is divided on a monthly basis. The amount of available family labour is assumed 
to be 2 full-time labour units or 5500 hours/year, which is an average labour supply in this region for a 1070 
ha farm. Apart from family labour there is the option of hiring seasonal labour. Labour can be hired any 
time of the year at a cost of 6 £/h assuming a standard worker (BEATON, 2007). Information about the labour 
requirement per head (ewe or cattle) and per ha is derived from Farm Management Pocketbook (NIX, 2007).
Fixed costs are calculated separately from the LP-model, given input factors such as the size of the farm, 
basic machinery and buildings (i.e. housing capacity of the barn), the land rent and other miscellaneous costs.
2.3. Land management schemes and regulations
Farmers in the uplands can take part in different support schemes. Payments under the CAP (headage 
payment, SFP) are explained below, along with other important schemes for the uplands such as the Hill 
Farm Allowance and different Agri-Environmental Schemes.
Headage payments (HP) have long been used to support farming in the uplands. These payments 
supported farmers in the sheep and cattle sector. The support was connected to the production of livestock 
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on the farm, for each type of livestock separately. These direct subsidy schemes for sheep, beef and dairy 
production can be seen in Table 2. Most have now been phased-out as part of the decoupling process, but 
underlie the calculation of the SFP in terms of historic payment rates. These payments were included in the 
model for calculation of the headage payment for the “HP” scenario.
The Single Farm Payment Scheme (SFPS) was introduced by EC Council Regulation 1782/2003. It replaced 
most existing crop and livestock payments from 1 January 2005, including the above mentioned ones in Table 
2. This new scheme breaks the link between production and support. To comply with this scheme, farmers 
need to keep their land in good agricultural and environmental condition and comply with specified legal 
requirements relating to the environment, public and plant health and animal health and welfare (“cross-
compliance”). In England, the payment consists of two elements: historical and flat-rate regional average 
payment elements. The historical payment is additional to the flat-rate payment, the amount of which is 
based on producers’ historical claims during the 2000-2002 reference period. During the period 2005-2012 
the scheme will move from low percentage flat-rate and high percentage, based on historical payments, to a 
simple flat-rate across all eligible land in England. The proportion of these payments can be seen in Table 3. 
The flat-rate payments for 2005 and the estimated flat-rate payment in 2012, when it will account for 
100% of payments can be seen in Table 4. For the model calculations these estimated payments, excluding 
deductions from modulation, were included to calculate the effect of the SFP.
Table 2. Headage payments for sheep, beef and dairy cattle production in 2004 (Nix 2007)
Headage payment £/head
Suckler Cow Premium 161.50
Beef Special Premium (steer) 102.00
Beef Special Premium (bulls) 142.80
Sheep Annual Premium 14.82
Sheep Annual Premium Suplement (LFA) 4.76
Dairy (2006) £/liter 0.0248
Table 3. Percentage of historical and flat-rate payment over the years (Nix 2007)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Historical (%) 90 85 70 55 40 25 10 0
Flat-rate (%) 10 15 30 45 60 75 90 100
Table 4. Flat-rate payments for 2005 and estimated for 2012 for the upland areas
Year 2005 2012
before
deduction
after
deduction*
Non-MoorlandSDA 16 175 131
MoorlandSDA 2.29 24 18
* estimated 25% deduction after EU and national modulation
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The Hill Farm Allowance is a compensatory allowance for beef and sheep farmers in the English Less 
Favoured Areas (LFAs) in recognition of the difficulties they face and the vital role they play in maintaining 
the landscape and rural communities of the uplands. HFA is based on area payment, which is paid at 
different rates for different types of land and size of holding. The first payments of HFA were made in 
2001 and will currently continue until 2009. However the Government is revising these payments and 
have proposed moving away from the compensatory nature of the HFA towards a more targeted scheme 
which rewards farmers for maintaining the upland landscape and environment. Hence, from 2010 uplands 
support is going to be integrated into Environmental Stewardship as a specific uplands standard (Uplands 
Stewardship Scheme) (DEFRA, 2006). 
Agri-environment payments are intended to compensate or provide an incentive for farmers to 
undertake measures which go beyond Good Farming Practice. Current Environmentally Sensitive Area 
and Countryside Stewardship Schemes are going to be completely replaced by 2014 by new AES, so called 
Environmental Stewardship Schemes. These new schemes were introduced in 2006 and they aim to provide 
funding to farmers and other land managers in England who deliver effective environmental management 
on their land.
Most of the farms, in uplands, in this region are situated within a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone. It means 
there is a limit on organic manure applications. The maximum is at 250kg/ha of total nitrogen each year, 
averaged over the area of grass on the farm. This limit is also included in the model as a constraint.
In the model the focus is on HP and SFP and the other environmental payments (HFA and AES) are 
added, as average payments per farm for sheep & beef farm type, to the gross margin of the farm to 
calculate the labour income. It should be noted that these payments are based on additional activities 
performed by the farmer to preserve the nature and environment, and might have an effect on farmers’ 
gross margin, however, currently these activities are not included in the model.
3. Results
In order to analyse the effect of the CAP reform three different scenarios were compared using the average 
sheep and beef farm type in the Peak District as a representative for the uplands in England. The three 
scenarios are the following: Headage payments, Single Farm Payment and No payments. The effect of the 
different types of payment on the optimal farm plan and the economic results of the farm are described in 
this section.
3.1. Optimal production plan
The optimal land use of the farm for the three policy scenarios can be seen in Figure 3. In the Headage 
payment (HP) scenario it is optimal to use the land for beef at a maximum capacity of the grassland. On 
moorland only sheep can be grazed and the need for hay and silage is provided by the grassland. In this 
scenario the beef production is more profitable than sheep farming, which explains the maximum number 
of beef production under land and animal housing capacity constraints. In the SFP scenario, keeping a large 
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number of sheep and small number of beef cattle would be the optimal strategy. Without headage payments 
sheep are more profitable than beef production. Since the payment is not connected directly to the type of 
production, the optimal production plan is identical with the No payment (NP) scenario.
These optimal strategies influence the production intensity of the farm. Since, livestock density and 
fertiliser-use have an important effect on the natural habitat and biodiversity, we will focus on these. With 
HP more beef is kept on the farm, with SFP more sheep, however, the total livestock unit on the farm is 
lower in the case of SFP than that of headage payments. The higher livestock unit on the farm requires more 
fodder which leads to more intensive grass production for grazing, silage and hay. This higher production 
on the farm is supplied by higher amount of fertiliser-use per ha on grassland. This high fertiliser-use is 
covered by the higher headage payment compared to the SFP. With no payment it is more optimal for the 
farmer to produce more extensively. The feed requirement of sheep is lower than that of the beef cattle, 
which makes lower fertiliser-use more attractive for the farmer. 
3.2. Economic results
The economic results show that the HP scenario brings the highest income compared to the SFP or NP 
scenarios. Farm revenue comes from sales of sheep and beef production. The revenues in the HP scenario are 
higher, since the production is more intensive. The variable costs show the same trend. Farm variable costs 
include direct costs for grass, silage and hay production, costs of hired labour, and fertiliser purchase.
In addition to the revenue from production, the farmer also receives a subsidy which is higher in the 
case of headage payment than the SFP. Since the intensity of production is rewarded the farmer tries to 
obtain the best out of his land. In the case of SFP the payment is connected to the land type which is fixed 
for the farmer. In this case his/her actions do not influence the amount of payment he/she receives.
Since upland farmers are also involved in different Agri-Environmental Schemes and receive payments 
for environmental friendly farming, this forms part of their income. The HFA is calculated on a hectare 
base per land type, which is a fixed amount for the farmer. This HFA and AES payments were taken from 
the survey results as an average for this farm type and added to the farmer’s income calculations. Labour 
Figure 3. Optimal land use for different policy scenarios
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income is the income the farmer receives from all his revenues and subsidies (HP and SFP) and HFA and AES 
payments, after variable and fixed costs are deducted. As a result, the scenario of HP shows the highest 
labour income, compared to the two other scenarios, which is due to higher headage payment. The SFP 
scenario shows lower labour income but there is still a positive sign. Without any subsidy with the NP 
scenario, the income of the farmer would become negative.
The comparison of the fertiliser-use and livestock density of the model and survey results can be seen 
in Figure 5. 
Figure 4. Economic results from the LP model with Hill Farm Allowance and Agri-Environmental Schemes payments
Figure 5. Comparison of survey and LP model results with HP and SFP scenarios.
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The fertiliser-use is much lower in the survey results than in the HP scenario but higher than in the 
SFP scenario, which is identical with No payment scenario. Sheep numbers are quite similar between the 
survey and HP scenario results, but the HP shows higher beef production which means more intensive 
production compared to the current situation. In the case of the SFP, more sheep is produced on the farm 
and a bit less beef. However, it also can be seen that the model maximises the gross margin of the farm 
which means more production than in reality. This also shows that there are some other constraints on the 
farms that lead farmers to more extensive production. These could be i.e. the labour availability or housing 
capacity for the cattle on the farm, or constraints to comply with different agri-environmental schemes. On 
the other hand, farmers could be still in a period of policy changes and have not fully adjusted to the new 
policy environment.
4. Conclusion
In this study the aim was to investigate how policy changes under the CAP reform affect farmer’s income 
and land use in the uplands. Different policy scenarios were analysed and compared by using a developed 
linear programming model for a typical sheep and beef farm type in the uplands. The results show that 
the headage payment strongly increases production intensity, through high fertiliser-use supporting 
high stocking density, while beef production is preferred to sheep production. The Single Farm Payment 
motivates the farmers to operate more extensively, since the high fertiliser costs, linked to more intensive 
production, are not “compensated” by the payments or market revenues. In this scenario, sheep production 
is preferred to beef production, as is also the case for the No payment scenario. The extensification, lower 
fertiliser-use and the shift from beef to sheep production in the uplands due to the recent CAP reform has 
been also projected in other studies (OGLETHORPE, 2005; MATTHEWS et al., 2006).
The analysis of the subsidy payments by farm type shows that LFAs grazing livestock farmers received 
£125 per hectare on average in 2004 before the reform (DEFRA, 2007). In the LP model this figure was £120 
per hectare for the HP scenario.
Grazing livestock farms are heavily dependent on support payments, and tend to lose under the new 
scheme (HOLLAND, 2007). This study shows that the switch of the subsidy payment from HP to SFP will 
decrease labour income for the farmer. This is due to lower revenues due to more extensive farming and 
lower subsidy payments, which are hectare-based in the case of the SFP. The analysis also shows that 40% 
(60% after modulation) of the LFAs grazing livestock farms will lose some subsidy from this change, while 
beef farms are more affected by this change than sheep farms in the uplands (HOLLAND, 2007). 
Other analysis has indicated that without any support, farm income will become negative (OGLETHORPE,
2005). This finding is also supported by the results of this study. It should be also noted that in most cases, 
SFP by itself is not enough to cover the production costs of the farmer. Thus, other types of support payments 
such as those from the Agri-Environmental Schemes play an important role in maintaining hill farming.
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On Nature Inclusion in Farmers’ Objective
Functions and Eco-System-Provision
in Bio-economic Modelling
ERNST-AUGUST NUPPENAU1
Abstract
As objectives influence behaviour, economists have to pay appropriate attention on stating objective 
functions. A question is, is there an alternative to income maximization? It is the aim of this paper to 
get a deeper insight into deliberations on objective functions. We show how an approach on lifestyles 
may deliver better insights than pure profit maximization. We suggest the use of different objectives as 
associated with different lifestyles and their probabilities if humans do not know their status (lifestyle). 
Labour intensive and nature providing farming is contrasted with eco-system service extracting farming. 
For this, a dynamic bio-economic approach is used and we depict behavioural equations of lifestyles. Then, 
we discuss how farmers, by help of eco-system service planners, learn and change probabilities. 
Keywords: farmers’ objective function, programming, provision of eco-system services.
JEL classification: L21; L23; Q12; Q21
1 Department of Agricultural Policy and Market Research, Justus-Liebig-University, Giessen, Germany. Email: ernst-august.
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1. Introduction
In positive analyses of farm behaviour, there is a current practice of using profit maximization as the 
dominant objective of farmers; even in bio-economic and landscape modelling (SEGERSON et al. 2006). The 
use of this context is justified by methodological individualism (see DE JANVRY et al. 1991). But, when 
it comes to normative problems of sustainability, issues on objectives emerge (MCNEELY, SCHERR 2003). 
Traditionally there has been a distinction between social and private objectives (CIRARY-WANTRUP 1985) 
and it seemed that traditional societies better coped with problems of environmental sustainability than 
expected (OSTROM 1990 AND NORONHA 1997). Major questions at hand are, are there alternatives in formal 
modelling, which better incorporate farmers’ knowledge on dangers to overexploit nature?
Our main departure from a common assignment of commercial strategies (cash, profit, income, or utility 
maximization) has to be seen along the need of finding an assertion of ecologically more sound strategies 
for fragile situations. A major criticism of the income maximization approach, from a system perspective, 
is that profit maximization can only work under “good” conditions. But, a switch in underlying parameters, 
which enabled extraction, can happen (NAEVDAL 2003). Note, we can contrast extracting or polluting, as 
strategies imposing negative externalities, with rehabilitating or working for maintenance of nature, as 
strategies of more sustainable resource use. Eventually, a change of strategies (rehabilitation at minimal 
efforts, living within limits, etc.) can be ‘wiser’ than extraction. We must portrait how to frame a typical 
set of equations taking environmental impacts as part of the description of a ‘necessary’ environmental 
decline (including eco-system services). The derived equations should serve as a representation of behaviour 
under good and bad conditions. This new ‘rational’ should be an integral part of a forward looking decision 
making. A new strategy is needed, when a live support system is impeded. A question is how could we 
more correctly portray potential views of decision makers? It is the aim of this paper to show the rational 
of using a mixed objective function which is composed of peasant, commercial and transition farming 
systems and corresponding objectives. We will exemplify the objectives of peasants (simply seen as effort 
minimization), commercial farmers (simply identified as profit maximization), and transition (illustrated 
as mixed objectives of peasant and commercial farmers in case of adjustment needs) in more details, in 
a deliberation on finding objectives. Finally, as dynamic constraints, we introduce eco-system dynamics 
including a system switch between collapse and rehabilitation. 
The contribution is organized as follows: firstly we give a conceptual outline of the problem; secondly 
the method is outlined and applied to different types of objective functions and decision making; thirdly 
we unify different objective function components; finally how the unified objective function can be 
brought in a dynamic modelling concept of eco-system service conservation and public decision making 
will be shown. For this purpose we use a dynamic control approach.
2. Basic Concepts of a Unified Objective 
The basic concept starts with the description of individual behaviour contingent on lifestyles.
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2.1 Peasant Farming Approach 
A methodological entry to specify an objective for a “new peasant”, i.e. a person who works for nature, 
is to assume simultaneous deliveries of both food and nature. Food is not delivered for the sake of a 
preference but rather for survival. Nature and its eco-system service delivery are part of a deliberate choice. 
This peasant is then minimizing labour efforts “e”, given that a certain set of criteria for minima of food 
and nature (re)construction are met. In the objective, function efforts can be measured by the energy use 
in particular crop production systems “ς”. Next, we split the criteria, to be met, into “c” crops (food), “an”
area for nature, “nn” nature elements, and “i” income. In this respect similarities to goal programming 
prevail (WALLACE, MOSS 2002). The area for nature is treated in a distinguished manner, since it requires 
additional efforts of land preparation for nature, while labour relates to land and nature. Energy, as effort 
related, is minimized. Also we see efforts for income generation. Income generation is needed to buy other 
commodities such as medicine, shelter, transport, etc. Income is generated through cash crops that need 
different efforts than food crops. Then, in case of a linear programming approach (1), the eco-system 
services can be explicitly modelled as nature elements and area to be provided. 
Min Pp = πς e + g          (1)
Α11 e > nn
 Α31 e > an
 Α21 e > c 
 α31 e > i 
 e > e
 where: e = effort
π= probability to be a peasant (set one)
n = nature provided measured as biodiversity index of eco-system service (for example bees)
a = area released for nature
c = crops produced
i = income generated from cash crops
e = effort observed
g = fix minimum effort
Αij = technology matrices
We assume that labour is sufficiently available for peasants and efforts count. This assumption portraits 
the observation, that labour is not short. The effort devotion to nature can be tree planting, pruning, 
watering and other maintenance activities. This supported nature has a positive impact on biodiversity, 
i.e. the eco-system services. The category for it is nn; it is counted in efforts needed. Hereby we assume 
that nature needs a fixed portion of efforts. As an alternative we can specify nature as land, dropping one 
equation and assuming that farmers choose how to combine factors. Finally the probability to be a peasant 
is “π” (it can be π =1). 
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Subsequently, private and public goods are distinguished. Private goods are crops “c”. Public goods, 
“n”, are “goods” provided as nature in a community. For this, we presume, in peasant economies and 
communities that soil fertility heavily relies on the proper functioning of the eco-system (eco-system 
service); peasants extract, but also support nature. Nature has a caring and an extraction aspect for 
them. Extraction needs are determined by the need for food. Hence “c” is related to the extraction 
for food. Food corresponds to a diet, been identified as appropriate to sustain a certain number of 
humans within a peasant community. This enables a specification of crops as constraints containing 
physical objectives. Being formulate as constraints in a primal problem statement constraints are dual 
(objectives) to effort minimization (PARIS, HOWITT 1999). The same applies in the formulation of a certain 
amount of income “i”.
In terms of methodology, the dual of minimization of efforts, as specified above, is a maximization 
of “utility” measured in units of cost accounts, i.e. efforts; there is still a “utility” from consumption of 
food and nature provision perspective. “Utility” is energy in food consumed, measured by energy used 
to produce food. (Note the utility from consumed food, measured in energy equivalents is grater than 
the used energy to produce food.) This duality shall count for peasants; it allows us to include exchange 
merely as a financial constraint. Notice, it is different from income or “subjective” utility. For instance, 
the unit of measurement is “kcal”. But, though it is a linear programming problem, by the receipt of corner 
solutions, the problem is still flexible. We can apply, as generalization, a maximum entropy approach, while 
several analytical functions are possible (see for a quadratic exposition: PARIS, HOWITT 1999). With respect 
to shadow prices we calculate a dual of the above problem giving us cost functions: 
Max nn λ1 + c λ2 + i λ3          (2)
 A´ 1 λ1 + A´ 1 λ2+ A´ 3 λ3 < π ς 
where: λ = shadow price
In the dual case, the constraints in (2) determine a link between shadow prices and the criterion for 
the objective function. Notify that the criterion in front of labour for effort minimization determines the 
criterion income. We see a straight link in calculation of the shadow price of the constraint and income as 
well “price”. Each constraint of “n” as vector has a “value function”. 
 A´ n λn + λ0,n = π ς           (3)
However, under the above description of a linear relationship in optimization, notably as linear 
programming, which gives a pre-determination of functional forms for supply and factor demand functions, 
a quadratic expression can be obtained (PARIS, HOWITT 1999). A simple expression of equation (3) is 
that shadow prices are calculated as dependent on the constraints and corresponding “utility: N”. This 
corresponding “utility” (4) is a function of a minimization of efforts: 
Ns(e,λ)= e´ψ11+ λ´ ψ21 +.5 e´ Ψ11 e + e´ Ψ21λ+.5 λ´  Ψ31 λ     (4)
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The coefficients Ψ2j of representation (4) give the account of the benefit function; they are part of 
a calibration; and they can be retrievable from a Maximum Entropy(ME) approach (HOWITT, PARIS, 1999). 
ME means that one or few observations, which are the results of programming, can be used to reconstruct 
quadratic objective functions and linear behavioural equations. Then the previous expression is a net 
calculus given by E which is a surplus for peasants: 
Ep = Nn(e,ς) - π ς e          (5)
This corresponds to efforts measured in effort units; and income and shadow prices are linked.
Nn(e,πς) = e´ψ11+[A´ nπ ς]´ ψ21 +.5 e´ Ψ11 e + e´ Ψ21 A´ n ςπ + .5 [A´ n ςπ]´  Ψ31 A´ n ς π  (6)
Equation (6) is a description of the benefits of the peasant as the objective function presumes effort 
minimization and constraint: A e = [nn,an,c1,i]. Given equation (6), the expression in the formula is equivalent 
to the problem of minimizing costs minus benefits (5). Behavioural functions can be depicted and we 
receive linear response functions which are the result of derivatives assuming analytical optimization. 
The behavioural equations (7) depict the equilibrium between effort determination and exogenous factors 
derived from minimizing efforts for obtaining the benefits. For instance, taking derivatives we obtain 
expressions (7):
∂Ep/∂e = ψ11+ Ψ11 e + Ψ21 A´ n ς π = ς π      (7a)
∂Ep/∂πς = ψ21 + Ψ21e +´ Ψ31 λ = A e = [nn,an, c1, i]     (7b)
The advantage of the approach is the detection of a flexible objective function, which is calibrated for 
a given technology (programming). A crucial question is: what is an eventual incentive for a peasant to 
provide nature? In the above analysis we received a shadow price for nature by including a constraint of 
nature delivery “nn”. The shadow price can be used to provide ‘payment’ or incentive needed. It is expressed 
in physical terms to compensate efforts. Shadow prices are given as marginal improvements in a diet being 
expressed as wishes “c”. The peasant is just requested to offer land and efforts for nature.
2.2 Commercial Farm Approach 
For commercial farmers (or the probability to be in a situation of profit maximizing, extractive farmer) we 
suggest a conventional approach on income maximization given availabilities. 
Max In = (1-π) p cc          (8)
A21 cc < nu
A22 cc < s
a22 cc < lc
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where p: gross margin
l = labor availability 
s = eco-system service
c = cash crop
The optimization includes an eco-system service “nu“ and results in a quadratic cost function:
Cn(cc,p(1-π)) =(1-π)p c´c-cc´ψ21-(1-π) p´ψ22+.5cc´Ψ21cc-cc´Ψ22(1-π)p+.5(1-π)´ p´Ψ23(1-π) p (9)
This “cost” correspond to a maximization problem of net income = cash minus costs:
In = M - Cn(cc, p(1-π))         (10)
The core indicator is income received from farming which translates into utility (DE JANVRY et al 1991). 
For comparison in peasant economies consumption-needs are given as constraints and efforts are minimized. 
Optimization of profits, either by the delivery of a primal or a dual characterization, is synonym to joint-
welfare maximization (DE JANVRY et al 1991). Our focus is on labour and its costs. Labour is creating disutility 
as work in a commercial context. Technically, even operating in a commercial environment, cost (disutility) 
minimization is sufficient to depict a welfare problem. For a primal, if it is measured in disutility of labour 
“D”, we obtain (11), to be minimized. 
FP = D(…) – U(…)          (11)
By this function, net welfare FP(…) is optimized. Hereby D(…) is the equivalent of a cost measure which 
mirrors the utility derived from income. The cost equivalent “D” disutility function stands for labouring. 
It corresponds to a normal cost function C(…) which is a monetary disutility, measured as equivalent to 
constant levels of monetary costs C(.). For the dual accounting, we can artificially maximize the cash 
surplus (difference between net income and expenditure on food. Anyhow we get the same behavioural 
function as in case of utility maximization. This means that it is reasonable for farmers to minimize 
expenditure, disutility and maximize income (FD): 
FD = M(…) – I(…) + C (…)         (12)
A monetary objective, by coincidence, results in objective functions as from (11). It provides a basis 
for a completely commercial oriented farmer if we put π=0. From here on we integrate the peasant and the 
commercial farm approaches synthesizing them in a new approach. 
2.3 New Approach 
Now we may think of merging the disutility and utility of commercial farms with the “disutility” and 
“utility” from peasant farming. The aim is to get a strategic decision to combine both. The further idea is 
that a decision maker looks into the future and assigns probabilities π to strategies (lifestyles), which he 
can pursue (MAYUMI, 2001). The suggestion is that a joint objective function (13) can be formulated as a 
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materially measurable surplus S, which is a combination of the farmer’s objective ((1- π): life-style) and the 
peasant’s objective (π: life-style). 
S = (1- π) [D – U] + π [E – N]        (13)
N is nutrition and E effort as energy. D is disutility and U is utility. The approach can be expressed in 
monetary terms if we use mirrored M expenditures and I income in the objective function of farmers as well 
as expressed in physical efforts E for labour and nutrition N of peasants. 
S = (1- π) λ [I - M≥ P] + π [N – E] or S = [I - M≥ P] + π* [N – E]   (14)
Equation (14) enables a revelation of π if the behavioural assumptions are correct, for instance if 
we use the joint function in ME approaches. The function can be considered a net generalized benefit-
cost approach and it has to be amended for the net surplus which is now a likely outcome. A decision 
maker following that strategy offers, by his programming, similar functional outlines as if he pursues 
selected life-styles; but, by using probabilities, he also offers a joint strategy. Probability is the regulatory 
mechanism here. The basic aim is utility from food, given probabilities on lifestyles. Only thanks to a 
fully established exchange system (see limitations in DE JANVRY et al. 1991) for farm operation, farmers can 
reduce the problem to profits. 
3. Concept and need for transitional behavior of peasants 
For the reason of transition between farmers and peasants, we categorize behaviour in four sections (Diagram 
1). Categories are constructed according to the logic of a combination of effects of eco-system states, 
services and life-style and commercial scope. If we assume two categories/lifestyles; commercially good and 
ecologically sound. We assign these categories joint probabilities; combinations of probabilities result in four 
new categories which come into existence. For each category, probabilities are given as: β is a probability that 
a favourable economic situation occurs and ε is a probability that a favourable ecological situation exists. The 
probabilities substitute previous “π”s, whereas π is now a combination such as π = ε·β.
Figure 1: Overview on transitional state
 Probabilities: Categories:
 Com. β  1-β commercial peasant/eco
ε  ε·β  ε(1-β) semi-commercial no longer commercial but eco
eco (overall good) (ecological sound but poor)
1-ε (1-ε)·β (1-ε)·(1-β) no longer eco but commercial neither commercial nor eco
no-eco (ecologically bad,still good comm.) (disaster)
Source: own deliberations
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To understand the logic behind the probabilities and lifestyles in Diagram 1 we need to know what type 
of lifestyle and corresponding scenario is anticipated and how it is categorized as well as see by interactions. 
We combine simple categories to ecological prospect and commercialization prospects, for instance π =ε(1-β) is 
a peasant lifestyle. To make concepts more operational, a combined probability is used.
To have a benchmark, as a scenario for example, we can use the state of “commercial with no need of 
eco-system service” (a rather common practice). Then the building up of eco-system services is understood 
as nature provision at minimal efforts (peasant behaviour). Note that we distinguish nature provision 
and eco-system service. Nature provision is a pre-caution activity; it contributes, though does not directly 
deliver. A dynamic approach is needed here. We work soon with the concept of NAEVDAL (2003) that the eco-
system service is linked to thresholds of nature prevalence. Thresholds are given by ecological knowledge. 
4. Dynamics of probabilities and ecological transition
For the elaboration of, first, the ecological background, second, corresponding probabilities and, third, their 
perception by farmers as well as for, fourth, a consensus with ecologist and, fifth, forecasting, we further 
have to clarify on the emergence of our endogenous probabilities. Especially the consensus with ecologist 
and economists needs attention. We see it as a, so far, missing learning process of farmers which has to 
be dynamically obtained (technically explained later). The idea is that farmers become receptive to future 
eco-system services by learning changes in probabilities. Probabilities are linked to prevailing services. 
We assume a farmer in this respect is adaptively rational (PASHIGAN, 1970). Then we introduce a planner. 
Like in NAEVDAL (2003) we assume that the objective function of a benevolent eco-system manager/planer 
is `benefit-cost´ maximization of a farm-sector objective function. This function includes the partial life-
styles and probabilities (see above). The planner seeks to forecast the dynamics in probabilities and conveys 
them to cultivators as been directed by the eco-system behaviour. The idea is to depict the increasing 
likelihood that farmers lose eco-system services. There is ample literature on detection of probabilities 
support this idea (KAHNEMAN, TVERSKY, 2000).
4.1 General outline of eco-system service
For the purpose of probability injection in decision-making, it may be sufficient that farmers work with so 
called “expected” probabilities and learn them, as well as the planer/predictor provides the probabilities. 
By including probabilities in foresight, a consistent pathway for eco-system services emerges. A consecutive 
question is, do we have other tools, for instance, of enforced learning and how can we expand the list of 
instruments? Since the coordination of the eco-system service is assigned to a public planner/predictor, 
this planner has to think “what is the objective function of a farmer/peasant under changing conditions 
and how he learns?”. He has to think about a divergence between a social optimum and private behaviour 
under different behavioural assumptions on learning. In the given case, for a start, we see the planner 
(eco-system service coordinator) as a social planner who first seeks an optimum and then thinks about 
instruments. Because, this paper is primarily about the design of the objective function and delineation of 
a plan on eco-system development, we limit our scope to that.
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The consecutive issue is a depiction of the effective eco-system dynamics as viewed from the ecologists’ 
point of view. We assume two regimes of eco-system service (NEAVDAL, 2001) with different steady states, 
and see them as a dynamic process with a threshold:
ε’(t) = [1- Φ21] ε(t) + α        (15)
with: (1): α = 0, if N(t) <= N0  or  (2) α = α1, if N(t) > N0
where: εo = is an index (0<ε<1)
ε’ = change of index (first differential) 
No = is a threshold
The two cases are to be distinguished: a deteriorated or collapsing system as compared to that of a 
functioning as well as resilient system. In case one, the eco-system service fails in the future, though a 
current service is available. Because the steady state is α = 0 the dynamics move towards a disaster or 
extinction of services. Extracting farmers face that. In case two, α = 9, a steady state equilibrium can be 
reached (NAEVDAL, 2001); this happens because nature exceeds a threshold. Hereby we assume that the eco-
system service is exposed to a self-regulating system which is characterized by thresholds and adjustment 
Φ. Note further that the status of nature is not considered as coincident with the eco-system service. For 
example, if we look at the pollination by bees, bees need a decent environment (nature) and their survival 
depends on the opportunities to feed on nature elements. Hence, a landscape with hedges, small ponds and 
forest elements will be a good guarantee in its provision (WOSSINK et al., 1998). This is what we mean by 
nature as an entity provided by peasants. If one wants to re-establish a certain eco-system, farmers have 
to rebuild nature, at least, up to a threshold. (Labour) costs for nature rehabilitation are part of the above 
specified problem of peasants and probabilities. A second equation of eco-system services (also in 18b) and 
its dependency on nature is additionally crucial for our type of decision making, envisaged. In a fourth 
equation (dynamic constraint: 18d) the probable eco-system conditions for the pertinence of services in 
future are described by a growth or dynamic nature prevalence concept. As usually applied in resource 
economics, nature follows its own growth path or dynamics; though it can be augmented by influx n(t). It 
is difficult to measure nature as stock variable N(t). We can either use area or work with key species. For 
example the sizes of trees, heath, or moor cover would make sense. It measures available area for flowering 
meadows and organic matter to indicate the food sources for bees. 
4.2 Commercial prospects
The commercial prospect can be depicted by modifying known models of learning of probabilities, i.e. like 
those given for price formation as reference. Learning can be linked to rational expectation (see PASHIGIAN,
1970). For our purpose we assume that farmers/peasants use a common learning model or “strategy” for a 
development of the commercial scope like in (16a):
βe
t
 = βe
t-1
 + Φ1[β
e
t-1
- β
t-1
]         (16a)
It can be written in continuous presentation using differential equations such as 
βe’(t) = [1-Φ1] β
e(t) + Φ2 β(t)         (16b)
Mo
de
llin
g A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 R
ur
al 
De
ve
lop
me
nt
 P
oli
cie
s
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008266
where: βe = expected probability of commercial scope
  βe’ = change in expected probability of commercial scope
  β = observed probability of commercial scope
A clarification on this forecast method is needed. We assume that, under certain conditions (PASHIGIAN,
1970), it is rational for a farmer to build expectations along the concept of adaptive learning, especially if 
a trend can be verified. Then, we have to explain how β(t) is observed. We can introduce probability β as a 
relative measure, i.e. a benchmark for a perfect commercial environment is needed. For example, prices for 
inputs (as an index) become a relative measure between 0 and 1. Additionally two major aspects are involved; 
first, a difference between sales and purchase price will most likely increase due to increased transport 
costs (de JANVRY, SADOULET, 1991) and; second, the price level of other energy-dependent inputs would most 
likely increase. At least currently (HELBLING, 2008) energy price increases seem to be imminent. 
4.3 Eco-system service probability learning
Also eco-service expectations are qualified and modelled as learning. The real system behaviour is depicted 
and we join it soon. For the moment let us start with the learning process: 
εe’(t) = [1-Φ21] ε
e (t) + Φ22 ε(t) + Φ23 Np(t)       (17)
where: εe = expected probability of eco-system service
  εe’ = change in expected probability of eco-system service
  β = observed probability of eco-system service
In this depiction εe is an index; then we include nature prevalence in terms of Np(t). Nature, for 
instance, can be an ecological main structure, EMS, as explained. A planer controls the eco-system and 
asks for contributions n(t) of peasants. The peasant knows the current probability as well as the central 
planner. Both interact with assertions of life-styles. However, a planner, using objective functions of the 
rural decision makers and the knowledge on eco-system dynamics as well as commercial scope, develops 
the optimal path for future probabilities.
4.4 Constraints 
Combing the dynamics of the eco-system and learning, gives the system dynamics. Nature has its own 
dynamics N(t) but by n(t) human contributions are necessary, for example by new stonewalls, hedges, and 
labour, nature can improve. Expectations are driven by learning and own contributions of peasant lifestyle, 
and a notification of the status of the eco-system gives:
βe’(t) = [1-Φ1] β
e(t) + Φ2 β(t)        (18a)
εe’(t) = [1-Φ2] ε
e(t) + Φ2 ε(t) + Φ3N(t)       (18b)
ε’(t) = Φ31ε(t) + z         (18c)
Ν’(t) = Φ31 Ν(t) + Φ32 n(t)        (18d)
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In equation (18) the system dynamics are described. Nature can be directed by annual contributions 
of humans n(t). In principle, equations (18) provide a recursive scheme of differential equations including 
dynamics of learning. The instrument variable is n(t) in equation (18d).
5. Setting the objective function, probabilities and the role of the 
planer 
The so far elaborated knowledge gaining and eco-system development processes become now part of a 
further analysis and optimization. As already noted, the knowledge of the farmer is dependent on his 
situational assertion; it is repetitive and does not go beyond a specific forecasting. The task of the planner 
is to assure a “translation” of the eco-system development into the objective of farmers, knowing that 
probabilities are learned. On the side of the planner this means that the future of the eco-system service 
has to be put into an anticipation of likely life-styles as well as initiation of the learning process. The 
instrument is n(t) to assure the prevalence of eco-system services as land set aside and labour. Resource 
devotions by humans, given farm plans (notified in n(t)), are crucial. Interfering in objective functions 
means that instrument variables have to be explicitly modelled and that they impose a reduction in the 
short-term benefits. Since they infer in the “optimal” allocation from a private calculus, farmers will feel a 
decline in their short run personal benefits; but if they will work harder probabilities tell imply a future. 
The “well-being” and hence “interest” of peasant/farmers can be “manipulated” for future scope. The task 
of the planner is to use the instrument n(t) such ways that farmers themselves are responding according to 
the inclusion of the probable outcomes, which are learnt. 
For this purpose, we suggest a link between framing practices on the eco-system services. However, 
for a further delineation and real anticipation of plans for land use change, it is important to specify the 
particular instrument in more detail. For the moment we refer to the general outline of an ecological main 
structure, EMS (WOSSINK et al., 1998). However, these are suggestions that require a rather complicated 
exposition of real world concepts by complementary activities of landscape modelling; our choice merely 
has a demonstrative purpose.
5.1 Planer’s objective function
Having clarified the number of variables in the dynamic constraint setup, the objective function needs 
some further comments. As already highlighted, the expected value or probability of the eco-system service, 
conducive for a lifestyle, is a state variable for the planner of the system. Given types of farmer and peasant life-
style and behaviour, the predictor/planner summarizes and assures that probabilities add to one. Additionally, 
the expected eco-system service is an element to be included in the particular objective functions. We can 
presume that, as an example, the number of bee colonies (size of services) has positive impacts on the yields 
of the farmer/peasants; in practice, the impact of the size of service is different according to decision making 
on life-style and eco-system stats. To maintain a mathematically feasible structure, we could just take a linear 
dependency of the absolute volume of eco-system service in the specific objective functions of the decision 
making on life-styles. An alternative is to take a Taylor approximation on behaviour which is structurally 
more conducive to a quadratic outline, which includes probabilities and volumetric effects (MOOD et al., 1974).
Finally, the contemplations enable a recombination of probabilities with the volume of eco-system services ε,
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determining the expected profitability of profits or utility functions as dependent on the system dynamics. 
The unit of measurement for eco-system-service remains ε. In principle if we assign probabilities to the 
predetermined sections and we would get a joint function:
W(ε,N,n,t) = ε·β A11 (ε,N,n) + ε·(1- β) A12 (ε,N,n) + (1-ε)·β A13(N,n) + (1-ε)·(1-β) A14(n) (19)
where: A11 (…) = benefits transition peasant segment
A12 (…) = benefit peasant segment
A13 (…) = welfare commercial farmer segment
A14 (…) = objective disaster segment
In this function each segment (peasant, commercial, transition and collapse) has received a weight 
by a probability (actually the collapse is excluded for being of nil interest). The probabilities are assigned 
according to the life-styles and vary with future learning (as explained above). In the concepts we use 
partially defined behavioural equation as derived in the initial introduction on flexible forms; these 
behavioural equations were initially linked to the empirical assignment of being a peasant, farmer, or 
transition land user, but now are aggregated. The advantage of this procedure of empirical foundation 
of behavioural segments and empirical foundation by observation and partial planning is that we can 
use observable probabilities and connect them with optimization in linear programming of lifestyles (on 
functional forms see the above outline). The formulation is best given by a quadratic outline. Then, instead 
of the initial framing as a combination of a given probability with a deterministic accounting of costs 
and benefits in each lifestyle, the overall picture appears as function of probabilities: Eco-system services 
become involved in objective functions. In fact, the partial elements and their aggregation deliver a final 
quadratic exposition for the planner as given in: 
Wt=ε·βA*11β·ε+ε·(1-β)A
*
12(1-β)·ε+(1-ε)·βA
*
13β·(1-ε)+(1-ε)·(1-β)A
*
14(1-β)·(1-ε)+ε·βA
*
21
[N+B*21n]+ε(1-β)A*22[N+B*22n]+(1-ε)·βA*23[N+B*23n]+(1-ε)·(1-β)A*24[N+B*44n]   (20)
where: A*ij and B*ij : modified coefficients for variables representing the farming system and lifestyle
“β” is determined exogenously (following a secular trend, see below competing with discounting). A 
technical issue is, to determine state and control variables. In this case, eco-system service “ε” and nature 
“N” are state variables, while “n” is a control variable.
5.2 Planer’s deliberations on commercial prospects 
The open question is how the expectation of the commercial “decline” can be modelled. We assume 
the decline is independent of an ecological pathway. In such a case a link between ecology and commercial 
prospects does not exist. Commercial prospects are independent; otherwise modelling can be quite 
complicated. One can postulate a rapid decline of prospects noticed and learned by farmers/peasants; the 
solution is then a differential equation (21a): 
βe’(t) = [1-Φ2] β
e(t) + Φ2 β(t)          (21a)
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βe(t) = βe(0) exp{[1-Φ2]
-1 t } + ∫exp{[1-Φ2]
-1 t}] Φ2 β(t) dτ     (21b)
With such an exponential decline of the economic prospect we can simplify the issue to 
βe(t) = βe(0) exp{[1-Φ2]
-1 t} + Φ
20
*  exp {Φ21
*  t}      (21c)
This element can directly substitute the probability in the objective functions and it can be become 
easily linked to discounting. If commercial prospects play a role, scenarios are possible on different speed 
of decline. That will demonstrate the importance of eco-services. If the central planner has foresight and 
forecasts for farmers he contributes to residual discounting: 
βe(t) = β(0) exp{Φ21
* · t}        (21d)
5.3 Planer’s deliberations for operational choices 
For a further depiction and analysis the commercial prospect can now be used as information within 
usual discounting, simply by multiplication exp{-ι·t}·exp{ Φ21
*·t} = exp{(-ι+Φ21
*)·t}. For residual, since we 
expect the development of the commercial component as discounting, it changes perspective. Then we can 
set up a new control problem (NAEVDAL, 2001 and 2003) where we use probabilities as arguments in objective 
function (22) for the predictor/planner: 
∫ β(0) exp{-ι+Φ21
* )·t} W(ε, N, n, t) dt        (22)
It emerges as a temporal objective function. In (23) as a generic representation of farmers is: 
∫ exp{(-ι*·)t}W(ε, N, n, t) dt        (23)
where: ι*: adjusted discounting
The approach of Naevdal is given is a new outline. The expected eco-service “ε” remains a state variable. 
Another state variable is nature N. For the moment the model does not provide incentive mechanisms 
to encourage peasants. It just calculates the needed periodical nature provision. We can proceed with a 
quadratic objective function of the planner (24). Function (24) is a condensed version of (20). For those 
who are interested in optimization we refer to Naevdal. The amendment is that probabilities influence the 
recognition of the eco-system: 
∫ ι
0
exp{- ι*t}[ ε a´
10
 + N a´
20
 + n a´
30
 +.5 ε´ A11 ε + ε A´12 N + ε A´12n +.5 N A´13N] +.5 n A´14N] dt 
s.t. ε’ = A21 ε’ + z
 N’= A31N+A32n         (24)
 z = z
o
 if y(τ) > y
thres
(τ)
 z = 0 if y(τ) < ythres(τ)
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For the optimization we can specify a corresponding Hamilton function (NAEVDAL, 2001), in which a 
switching of regimes is included and N and ε are states which have a shadow price. 
H(t,ε,N,n) = ι
 0
 exp{- ι1t}[ ε a´10 + N a´20 +.5 ε´ A11 ε + ε A´12 N + .5 N A´13N]
 + λ1[ε’ - A21 ε’ + z] + λ2[N’ - A31 N + A32 n ]      (25)
One receives optimality conditions similar to NAEVDAL (2001 and 2003). A strong similarity can be 
established with these papers, but the expectations are now part of the process. 
6 Conclusions 
Our peasant/farmer, who is considered to be conservative and risk averse, will avoid climbing over the 
edge. He will make plausible judgments on his life-style, based on expected declines (improvements) of 
both, commercial opportunities and the eco-system services. Hereby he may feel sometimes trapped as 
peasant, but for the benefit of a future which avoids climbing over the edge, eco-system services will 
count. Hopefully, disasters can be mitigated. 
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Modelling the Rural-Urban Effects of Chances
in Agricultural Policies: a Bi-Regional CGE Analysis
of Two Case Study Regions
EUDOKIA BALAMOU1, KOSTAS POULIAKAS2, DEBORAH ROBERTS2, DEMETRIOS PSALTOPOULOS1
Abstract
A bi-regional CGE model is used to analyze the rural-urban effects of changes in agricultural support in two 
very different case study regions, one in Scotland and one in Greece. The results show that the negative 
effects of a reduction in CAP price support are contained within rural primary sectors in the Scottish 
region, while non-farm rural and all urban sectors benefit from such a policy shock. In the Greek region, 
the negative impacts are more widely spread with losers in both the urban and rural areas. A full decoupling 
scenario has negative aggregate effects in both study regions, driven by the high import intensity of 
commodities consumed by households. However, there are gainers as well as losers from this policy shock, 
suggesting a case for spatially and sectorally targeted support aiming to alleviate the potentially negative 
effects of the CAP reform at a regional level.
Keywords: agricultural policy, CGE model, rural-urban linkages, rural development 
JEL classification: Q18, C67, R58, R12.
1 Department of Economics, University of Patras, Greece. Email: ebalamou@upatras.gr
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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has influenced the development of rural 
areas in the EU (THOMSON, 2005; PSALTOPOULOS et al., 2006). Positive effects include the improvement of farm 
as well as non-agricultural incomes (the latter through multiplicative effects or through adjustments of 
economic capacity ‘induced’ by rural development policy). In addition, some argue that Pillars 1 and 2 of the 
CAP have helped to diversify the economic base of rural areas and to reverse depopulation trends (SCHMITT et 
al., 2003; LEON, 2005). The CAP has also been associated with negative effects on rural development; in more 
detail, the distribution of CAP support has been found to be contrary to the objective of cohesion policy, 
with richer areas and farmers benefiting most (SHUCKSMITH et al., 2005), it has had adverse impacts on farm 
competitiveness (PSALTOPOULOS et al., 2004), and it has led to negative effects for the rural environment. 
It follows that current and future changes in the CAP will have rural development implications. 
Moreover, links between agriculture and the rest of the economy mean that adjustment processes will not 
be contained within the agricultural sector or even rural areas. Instead, effects will spread to urban areas 
through rural-urban interactions. While relatively few economic actors will be directly affected by changes 
in agricultural policy, many will be indirectly affected through interactions in factor and goods market. 
A growing number of studies have attempted to analyse the economy-wide effect of CAP reforms at 
national, regional or EU level. Recently, these have mostly focused on the (ex ante) effects of the re-design 
of Pillar 1 support instruments (e.g. BASCOU et al., 2006; BINFIELD et al., 2005; CHANTREUIL et al., 2005; FAPRI, 
2002) and have produced results pointing in the same direction. Issues raised by such models include 
increases in allocative efficiency due to decoupling, greater market orientation in producers’ decisions, 
decreases in agricultural labour remuneration, less intensive production methods, increases in regional 
specialization, and positive impacts on off-farm work. The EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003) has also projected 
that “rural economic activities linked to agriculture will be affected due to the reduction of agricultural 
output and input use”. In general, studies have not explicitly addressed the rural-urban effects of the CAP 
(or agricultural policy more generally) reform, except insofar as some sectors and actors can be related to 
rural or urban territory.
An exception is Kilkenny, who used an inter-regional CGE model for the US economy to show how the 
effects of reducing agricultural support can spread beyond rural areas (KILKENNY, 1993). In her model, urban 
household incomes, employment and rents were found to increase following the removal of agricultural 
support. Also, some positive effects were estimated for rural areas, with rural non-farm sectors benefiting 
from lower factor costs and the cost of living in rural areas falling relative to urban levels. Whilst providing 
useful insights, the utility of this analysis is constrained by its national focus. There is no unitary type 
of rural area, and obviously similar rural economies may have very different links with contiguous and/or 
distant urban areas. Within some regions there may be strong rural-urban interactions through commodity 
flows, ownership of capital, or commuting. In other cases, the rural area might be relatively self-contained, 
export its products outside the region, and rely solely on rural factors and inputs or on factors and inputs 
from distant sources. The spatial distribution of impacts as well as the overall magnitude of regional impacts 
following a change in agricultural policy will clearly differ between such cases. 
Against this background, this paper focuses on the rural-urban effects of changes in the CAP in two 
specific regional economies within the EU: the East Highlands of Scotland UK, and Archanes-Heraklion, in 
Crete, Greece. Both comprise an urban area and its rural hinterland. The type of agriculture and the extent 
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to which agriculture is linked to the wider regional economy varies between the two case-study regions. 
The food processing sector is important, but the type of processing activity and location of processing 
within the regions differ. There is a significant degree of rural-to-urban commuting in both regions but 
of different labour types. In the Greek study area, some urban residents have ownership of rural farm 
land, while counter-urbanisation processes in the Scottish area has led to rural households owning urban 
capital. Both regions are relatively open, and increasingly dependent on tourism, but have other traditional 
exports markets associated with the primary sectors. The objective of the paper is to show how these 
regional characteristics influence the nature and magnitude of rural and urban impacts following a change 
in agricultural support. 
A bi-regional CGE model is used based on the framework developed by IFPRI (LOFGREN et al., 2002). 
Although the model is essentially neoclassical, it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a fairly wide range 
of views on how regional economies adjust to the specified agricultural policy shocks. The CGE models 
specified here include the differentiation of rural and urban production sectors, factors and households 
plus several specific characteristics of the regional economies under analysis.
Specially constructed bi-regional SAMs for the case study areas were utilized to calibrate the CGE 
models, and two contrasting policy scenarios are explored. In the first scenario, the level of coupled 
agricultural price support is reduced by 30% in order to simulate the effects of a decline of price support. 
In the second scenario, the total value of agricultural subsidies (price support plus direct subsidies flowing 
to the agriculture sector) is switched to a payment flowing direct to agricultural households, in order to 
capture the potential economy-wide effects of fully decoupling agricultural support from farm production. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the nature and specific characteristics 
of the CGE modelling framework used in the analysis. Section 3 provides background information on the 
two case study areas. Section 4 presents the results from the analysis, while Section 5 concludes.
2. The Modelling Framework
Over the last few decades, CGE models have become a common tool of empirical economic and policy analysis 
in both developed and developing countries, and a standard methodology has been developed to formulate, 
calibrate and solve such models. The CGE model implemented here draws especially on one of the standard 
frameworks made available by IFPRI (LOFGREN et al., 2002). Starting with this basic structure, a number of 
modifications have been made, so that the model is adapted to reflect specific characteristics of the two 
study regions and to account for key rural-urban interactions.
2.1 The Bi-Regional SAMs
Almost all CGE models use a SAM to provide the base-year values which, in conjunction with other data (e.g. 
physical quantities, elasticities), are used to calibrate the CGE model. In the SAMs used for this analysis, 
the productive activities of firms, the factors of production (labour, land and capital) and the household 
accounts have been spatially disaggregated into urban and rural regions. Although not explicit, households 
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in the SAMs are not only spatially differentiated, but are also distinguished according to a) whether they 
derive income from agriculture, b) whether they commute, work locally, or have some other status (e.g. 
retiree household or extra-regional commuter etc.) and (in the case of the Greek SAM) c) income level. In 
contrast, the commodities accounts have been kept identical across the whole study region. Also important 
in terms of interpreting the figures in the SAM and associated CGE model, the Rest of the World (ROW) 
account covers transactions with both the rest of the national economy and foreign imports/exports. 
Based on this structure, a SAM was constructed for each case study region using a combination of 
primary and secondary data and mechanical and manual methods. The construction process differed 
somewhat between the two regions, as did the base year of the matrices (2005 for East Highlands, 2004 for 
Archanes-Heraklion), but both involved the regionalization of national tables, superiorisation of entries in 
the regionalized tables based on extensive household, business and key informant surveys, and finally the 
use of cross-entropy methods to balance the superiorised SAMs (ROBINSON et al., 2001).
2.2 The Bi-Regional CGE Models
As stated above, the CGE models used in the analysis were based upon the IFPRI standard framework (LOFGREN
et al., 2002) but were modified so as to capture key rural-urban interdependencies at a regional level. The 
model comprises a set of (linear and non-linear) simultaneous equations. Production and consumption 
behaviour is captured by a number of non-linear profit and utility maximization optimality conditions. 
The equations also include a set of constraints that have to be satisfied by the system as a whole, covering 
markets (for factors and commodities) and macroeconomic aggregates (savings-investment, government 
and the external balances). The description that follows presents key features of the model.
Production behaviour
Production is based around activities, where each activity is based in either the rural or urban part of 
the region and produces one or more commodities in fixed proportions per unit of activity. This structure 
allows for multiple outputs, which was considered important, given the nature of the agricultural sector 
and level of disaggregation of the model (and SAMs). 
Production is modelled as a two-layered structure. At the top level, technology is specified by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function of the quantities of value-added and aggregate intermediate input. 
This implies a derived demand for the factors of production up to the point where the marginal revenue 
product of the factor is equal to the cost of the factor.
Factor payments accrue to the owners of the factors (households) as reflected in the base SAMs. The 
CGE model requires certain assumptions in relation to the way in which supply and demand in factor 
markets come about. The results presented below are based on the assumption that the economies have 
segmented labour markets in terms of skilled and unskilled employment but both of these are integrated 
across space, that is, labour of a given skills level can move between sectors and across space. In contrast, 
capital and land are treated as immobile between activities. 
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Commodities
Commodities (either produced within the region or imported) enter markets, and activity-specific 
commodity prices serve to clear the implicit market for each disaggregated commodity. At the first stage, 
regional (domestic) output is produced from the aggregation of output of different activities within the 
region of a given commodity. At the next stage, the aggregated regional output is split into the quantity 
of regional output sold domestically and of that exported via a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. 
As is widely practised in the CGE literature, an “Armington” function is used to prevent over-
specialization and to better reflect the empirical realities of most regions. This approach assumes imperfect 
substitutability between imports, exports and commodities produced within the region. Regional market 
demands are thus assumed to be for a composite commodity made up of imports and regional output, as 
captured by a CES aggregation function. The model assumes that export and import demands are infinitely 
elastic at given world prices. Flexible prices are also assumed to equilibrate demands and supplies of 
domestically marketed domestic output.
Institutions
Institutions are represented by households, the government and the Rest of World (ROW). Each 
household type receives income from factors (in proportions fixed at the base year level), and transfers 
from the government and from the ROW. They use their income to pay direct taxes, save, consume, and 
make transfers to other institutions, while the remaining income is spent on the consumption of marketed 
commodities. Household consumption is allocated across commodities according to linear expenditure 
system (LES) demand functions, derived from maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function. 
The combined government account (representing both central and local government activity) collects 
taxes (direct tax from households, activity taxes from production sectors, indirect tax on commodities and 
transfers from ROW) and receives transfers from other institutions. It then uses this income to purchase 
commodities for its consumption and for transfers to other institutions. Government savings are the 
residual given by the difference between government income and spending. Finally, from the ROW account 
one can deduce the amount of foreign savings (or the current account deficit) as the difference between 
foreign currency spending and receipts.
The model includes three macroeconomic balances, namely the savings-investment, government, and 
external balances. In both bi-regional models, the government balance was achieved by allowing government 
savings to be flexible, while direct tax rates were fixed. The external balance was achieved through flexible 
foreign savings while the real exchange rate was fixed. Finally, for the savings-investment balance, the 
economies under analysis were savings-driven (the value of investment adjusts), with fixed MPS for all non 
government institutions.
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2.3 Policy Simulations and Causal Mechanisms
According to the model structure, agricultural subsidies (whose base-year reflects the “old” CAP) are 
portrayed as a negative indirect activity tax. The first policy scenario (SC1) involves a 30% decrease 
in coupled support for agriculture, in line with the 1992-2007 trends of EU agricultural support prices 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). This price support reduction is modelled as an increase in the indirect activity 
tax rate of the agricultural sector, which implies a direct decrease of value added for the agricultural sector. 
This leads to a decrease in the value of output of the agricultural sector, a decline in farm activity, and 
consequently a decrease in agricultural production. Labour is, thus, freed from agriculture and the prices 
of capital and land tied to agriculture decrease as an effect of the policy. As farming is a major employer 
and source of income in the rural economy, changes in the sector affect other rural non-farm and urban 
sectors, due to a decrease in household spending. Further, as agriculture is linked with other sectors of 
the economy (buying inputs from or selling output to them), a decline in agricultural output affects their 
production levels through second-order production and price effects, both of which may be positive or 
negative depending on inter-industry and household relationships. Similarly, the income of households in 
the urban and rural areas is affected by changes in factor markets. The net aggregate regional effect and 
the net rural-urban effect are determined by the relative strength of the competing forces. 
In the second scenario (full decoupling – SC2), there are two functional mechanisms, the termination of 
coupled support, and the direct transfer of the equivalent value of support to agricultural households. The 
latter is modelled as a direct transfer from government to the income of agricultural households, leading to 
a direct increase in their income and, consequently, their spending on market commodities. If a considerable 
share of this demand is directed towards goods produced in the study regions, it could generate pressure 
for an increase in local factor prices, with a concomitant expectation that the prices of domestic goods and, 
hence, production, would increase. However, if the consumption patterns of agricultural households “leak” 
considerably into the Rest of the World, this would lead to different effects. Second-order effects on prices, 
production and income of other household-categories could go in either direction. The net aggregate effect 
for this scenario is thus determined by the interaction of these two functional mechanisms. 
The above discussion suggests that the key factors influencing the magnitude and rural-urban distribution 
of effects in each of the case study regions are the nature of inter-industry dependencies (as reflected in the 
Leontief input-output coefficients) which in turn relates to the economic structure of the rural and urban 
areas, household consumption patterns and the import intensity of commodities sold in the region, factor 
ownership patterns, and the extent to which rural factors are owned by urban households and vice versa.
3. Description of the two Case Study Areas
The Greek study area consists of the urban centre of Heraklion and the rural municipality of Archanes (NUTS 5 
areas), both of which are part of the Prefecture of Heraklion, located in North Central Crete, Greece. Archanes 
is very close (about 15–20 km) to Heraklion, the major administrative centre and entry point of the island of 
Crete. Per capita GDP in the region in the base year SAM was 10,711 euros (Table 1), with per capita GDP (by 
place of work) in the rural part of the Greek study area being 35% higher than that in the urban area. 
The Archanes economy is dominated by agriculture, and in particular by vine and olive production. 
Employment in agriculture accounts for over 40 per cent of total employment in Archanes, and more than 
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94 per cent of agricultural land is utilized by small, full-time, family farms with an average area of 2.6 ha. 
The secondary sector has strong links with the rest of the rural economy and particularly with agriculture. 
During the last decade there has been a gradual development of the tertiary sector, including retail and 
wholesale trade units, and firms serving a continuously expanding tourist demand (local restaurants, 
accommodation facilities, banks, etc.). 
Heraklion is amongst the largest urban centres of Greece. Administrative changes in 1996 led to several 
villages (with vine and olive oil production) being amalgamated with the Municipality of Heraklion to 
form a large Municipality of Heraklion. In addition, many residents of Heraklion own land in their home 
villages (either close to or far from Heraklion). As a result, a survey of local households has shown that 
around 60% of the Heraklion (urban) labour force receives some CAP Pillar 1 subsidies. The economy of the 
city area itself consists of a large number of industries, and especially a modern tertiary sector. Economic 
performance in recent years has been strong, and reflected in increases in local employment.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the two study areas
Greek study area: Archanes-Heraklion Scottish study area: East Highlands
Population 142,259 115,899
GDP (ml Euros) 1,524.1 2,749.1
Rural share (%) 4.28 40.5
Urban share (%) 95.72 59.5
GDP per Capita (Euros) 10,711 23,724
Rural GDP per Capita 14,345 15,559
Urban GDP per Capita 10,593 36,731
Source: Statistical Services; Authors’ calculations
The Scottish case study area, the East Highlands, is a NUTS 3 region (UKM42) and consists of the urban 
centre of Inverness and its surrounding rural hinterland. In terms of agriculture, much of the land area is 
comprised of extensive grazing and forestry. There is some good-quality farmland on which a variety of 
crops (e.g. cereals, seed potatoes) are grown and more intensive livestock enterprises are based. Around 91% 
of the region lies within the Scottish LFA (all but 2% as Severely Disadvantaged). More generally, the rural 
part of the region faces several typical rural development issues, such as low population density, an ageing 
demographic structure, a narrow economic base, and seasonal employment. The area is extremely important 
in terms of environmental and landscape designation, and this influences (positively and negatively) the 
range and types of economic developments that take place locally. Per capita GDP (by place of work) is 
less than half that in the urban core of the region, although, because of commuting, this indicator is not 
necessarily a good measure of the economic welfare of rural residents. 
In contrast, the urban centre of the region, Inverness, has experienced significant growth in recent 
years. In-migration and associated increases in local house prices have changed the nature of the 
relationship of the city with its rural hinterland. In recent years, the city has successfully managed to 
attract new sectors, including pharmaceuticals, medical products and knowledge-based activities. There is 
no agricultural activity within the urban area of the region, although there is first-stage processing of food 
products and also agricultural input suppliers based within Inverness.
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4. Findings from the Analysis
In this section, main results from the two agricultural policy scenarios are presented in terms of impacts 
on GDP, production, prices, employment, factor income and the distribution of income between different 
household categories. The effects of the scenarios are measured as deviations from base-year values. 
Table 2 shows scenario-specific impacts on real GDP, and indicates that a 30% decrease in the level 
of coupled agricultural support will have negative effects on total real GDP in both regions. However, the 
magnitude of total effect is very small (-0.03% in the East Highlands, -0.01% in Archanes-Heraklion), 
though masking larger percentage impacts in different sectors within sub-areas of the regions. In particular, 
although Scenario 1 has a net negative impact on real GDP in the East Highlands, losses are retained within 
the rural primary sectors in the region: the secondary and tertiary sectors in the rural and the urban 
areas all gain GDP, reflecting increases in allocative efficiency from the removal of price support. In the 
Greek study area, there is a significant reduction in the urban primary sector’s GDP, which accounts for the 
overall negative urban GDP impact (again the secondary and tertiary sectors in the urban area gain from 
the policy shock). Within the rural area, it is the secondary sectors that are most negatively affected, due 
to their high linkages with local agriculture.
Turning to the impacts of the full decoupling scenario (the removal of headage and LFA payments as 
well as price support with re-direction to agricultural households), the model predicts higher negative 
impacts for both regions, and especially for the East Highlands. In Scotland, the impacts of full decoupling 
seem to be significantly negative for the rural primary sector, while, as with the coupled support reduction, 
the non-farm rural sectors and the whole urban economy seem to benefit marginally from this Scenario. 
In the case of the Greek region, total impacts are almost identical to those of Scenario 1 although their 
distribution is different. The urban area marginally gains from this Scenario, while in contrast to Scotland, 
full decoupling seems mostly to hit the urban primary sector and the rural secondary sector. Thus, rural 
areas lose from both Scenarios, but these losses are not drastic. Moreover, the results suggest that coupled 
agricultural support is constraining urban economic activity within rural regions, especially in the East 
Highlands, since real GDP in the urban centre increases following its removal.
Table 2: Impacts on real GDP at factor cost 
East Highlands Archanes-Heraklion 
Base Year
£ million
SC1
%
SC2
%
Base Year
` million
SC1
%
SC2
%
Rural Area 71.5 -0.12 -0.64 65.2 -0.13 -0,45
Primary 5.1 -1.84 -9.56 28.5 -0.32 -1.01
Secondary 12.1 0.04 0.06 5.4 -0.49 -2.36
Tertiary 54.3 0.003 0.04 31.3 0.10 0.39
Urban Area 105.5 0.03 0.11 1458.8 -0.01 0.01
Primary 0.8 0.73 1.88 53.3 -2.44 -8.20
Secondary 21.8 0.06 0.11 202.1 0.59 0.71
Tertiary 82.9 0.01 0.09 1203.5 0.00 0.25
Total 177.0 -0.032 -0.195 1524.1 -0.013 -0.014
Source: Authors’ calculations
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In terms of production activity (Table 3), it seems that the two regions respond very differently. 
Scenario 1 results in a decrease in the quantity of output in the East Highlands but an overall increase in 
the Greek study area. In both areas there is a reduction in rural output and an increase in urban output. In 
Scotland, negative impacts are solely attributed to a contraction in rural primary activity, while in Greece 
negative effects are also projected for rural manufacturing and urban primary activities. In other words, 
in East Highlands the decrease in coupled agricultural support and associated contraction in agricultural 
production diverts labour and capital to the non-agricultural sectors, allowing them to expand their 
production. In the Greek study area, only rural tertiary and urban secondary and tertiary sectors increase 
their production. In the Greek rural area, the secondary sector is more affected due to the fact that it is 
highly linked with the agricultural sector, and a decrease in its domestic activity has greater negative 
impacts on its production.
The full decoupling scenario reveals an even higher decrease in total output in the East Highlands but 
an increase for the Greek area. In the case of Archanes-Heraklion, it seems that full decoupling generates 
higher (compared to Scenario 1) total benefits; however, this is due to an increase in urban secondary and 
tertiary activity, since the rural area (and especially its secondary and primary sectors) are negatively 
affected by decoupling.
In terms of price effects (Table 4), Scenario 1 results into an increase in producer prices of (most) 
agricultural commodities, which can be attributed to the projected decline in agricultural production. The 
Greek study area presents higher percentage changes as well as an increase in the prices of the secondary 
goods (due to the fact that most secondary production is linked to agriculture). In both regions, there 
are small negative effects on the price of services. The price effects associated with the full decoupling 
scenario are more or less in the same direction (apart from secondary goods in East Highlands) but are 
generally higher compared to those of Scenario 1.
Table 3: Impacts on output quantity (% changes from base year)
East Highlands Archanes-Heraklion 
SC1 SC2 SC1 SC2
Rural Area -0.16 -0.85 -0.07 -0.39
Primary -1.95 -10.14 -0.33 -1.03
Secondary 0.05 0.08 -0.38 -2.08
Tertiary 0.003 0.04 0.15 0.40
Urban Area 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.10
Primary 0.86 2.20 -2.45 -8.19
Secondary 0.07 0.12 0.56 0.68
Tertiary 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.28
Total -0.03 -0.22 0.04 0.08
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 4: Aggregate impacts on producer prices (% changes from base year)
East Highlands Archanes-Heraklion 
SC1 SC2 SC1 SC2
Primary 0.37 2.13 2.07 8.01
Secondary 0.01 -0.13 0.24 0.31
Tertiary -0.05 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 5 presents the effects of the two Scenarios on employment. It is estimated that a 30% decrease in 
coupled agricultural support leads to a decrease in total rural employment, much higher in the Greek study 
area. In both study areas, this results from the decrease of the production in the agricultural sector, and leads 
to an excess surplus of labour for this sector. In contrast, urban areas report an increase in total employment, 
mainly due to the increase in secondary and tertiary employment (both skilled and unskilled). A more detailed 
analysis of the results reveals differences in the projected employment effects between the two study areas. In 
the Scottish rural area, skilled and unskilled employment levels decline by the same rates, while job losses are 
only recorded in agriculture. However, in the Greek rural area the reduction in coupled support mostly affects 
unskilled labour and all economic sectors (with the exception of unskilled labour in the tertiary sectors).
Table 5: Employment effects
East Highlands Archanes-Heraklion 
FTEs SC1 % SC2 % FTEs SC1 % SC2 %
Rural Area 21707 -0.05 -0.21 1957 -0.81 -2.65
Unskilled Labour 8462 -0.05 -0.18 1516 -0.90 -2.94
Primary 198 -2.53 -11.11 802 -1.75 -5.59
Secondary 1426 0.00 0.07 148 -1.15 -4.53
Tertiary 6838 0.01 0.09 566 0.37 1.24
Skilled Labour 13245 -0.05 -0.23 441 -0.48 -1.66
Primary 439 -2.49 -10.72 53 -1.98 -6.23
Secondary 2406 0.12 0.12 93 -0.48 -2.93
Tertiary 10400 0.00 0.10 295 -0.21 -0.44
Urban Area 33746 0.04 0.12 57398 0.03 0.09
Unskilled Labour 13048 0.04 0.08 32333 0.04 0.14
Primary 57 0.00 -1.75 2683 -4.43 -14.32
Secondary 1480 0.20 0.20 5721 0.98 1.72
Tertiary 11511 0.02 0.08 23929 0.32 1.38
Skilled Labour 20698 0.04 0.14 25065 0.01 0.03
Primary 150 0.00 -0.86 47 -4.73 15.12
Secondary 3624 0.08 0.16 4711 0.92 0.75
Tertiary 16924 0.03 0.14 20307 -0.19 -0.10
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 6: Impacts on factor income
East Highlands Archanes-Heraklion 
SC1 SC2 SC1 SC2
Unskilled Labour -0.12 -0.41 -0.34 -1.20
Skilled Labour -0.14 -0.47 0.09 0.08
Urban Capital 0.04 0.25
0.07 0.08
Rural Capital 0.01 0.19
Agricultural Capital -18.61 -60.58 -5.68 -17.95
Agricultural Rents -19.75 -64.31 -5.25 -16.63
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 6 shows the effects of the two policy scenarios on factor incomes. In Scotland, Scenario 1 leads to 
significant decreases in agricultural capital and rents (which are sectorally immobile); the incomes of both 
skilled and unskilled labour also decrease, while the incomes of other types of capital marginally increase. 
In the Greek area, a much lower decrease in agricultural capital and rents is projected, while negative 
effects on unskilled labour incomes seem higher compared to Scotland. The results of the full decoupling 
scenario are similar in direction but larger in magnitude.
As for the impacts on the distribution of income of different household categories, Scenario 1 in 
the case of East Highlands leads to a marginal decrease in household income but it causes a significant 
reduction for agricultural households. Also, Scenario 1 decreases the income of all households’ categories in 
the Greek study area with rural households to lose more than their urban counterparts. The same pattern of 
results is projected by the full decoupling Scenario 2 for both study areas. The only difference is observed 
in the income of agricultural households, which record a large percentage rise due to the direct transfer 
of agricultural support. Also, Scenario 2 generates higher negative income impacts in the Greek study 
area, with the exception of agricultural households that record a small income increase. However, due to 
the lower importance of farm subsidies in agricultural incomes in the Greek area, related effects are lower 
compared to those in the East Highlands.
5. Conclusions
This paper has focused on the magnitude and distribution of effects associated with a change in agricultural 
policy in two predominantly rural regions of the EU. Results show that the impacts of the CAP reform spread 
from rural to urban areas within regions. Importantly, they suggest that, while coupled price support 
sustains rural GDP in both study areas, the removal of such support will not lead to drastic negative 
effects, due to price and substitution adjustments in the regions. Moreover, results indicate that coupled 
agricultural support may be constraining economic activity within the urban areas of the regions, especially 
in the case of the Scottish East Highlands, with urban real GDP predicted to increase following its removal. 
Contrary to what one would expect at a national level, the decoupled policy scenario leads to stronger 
negative aggregate effects as household spending leaks from the region more than agricultural production 
“spending” and macro balances adjust to allow for such leakages. Should agricultural households choose 
to use their extra income to support production rather than consumption (as assumed in the model), the 
Mo
de
llin
g A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 R
ur
al 
De
ve
lop
me
nt
 P
oli
cie
s
Proceedings of the 107th EAAE Seminar  -  29th January – 1st February, 2008286
magnitude and distribution of impacts would be more similar to those of Scenario 1. The main factors 
influencing the difference in results between the two regions of the EU were identified as the stronger 
links between agriculture and first-stage processing sectors in the Greek study area, and also the ownership 
of agricultural factors by urban residents.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to test for the robustness of the findings. In particular, the 
policy simulations were repeated assuming a) different levels of the Armington elasticities and b) different 
labour market closure rules (Keynesian as opposed to neoclassical in the base model). In both cases, as 
anticipated, the results were affected, but only by small amounts, and there were no qualitative changes in 
terms of direction of impacts or distribution of effects across rural-urban space. 
In the first few years of its implementation, there have been signs that the new CAP has induced 
several of the above-mentioned changes. In several EU Member States, developments in agricultural activity 
(including changes in production mix and production intensity) have induced effects on farm incomes and 
farm output value. The results reported in this paper suggest that other wider effects may be in force as 
price and income effects work their way around regional economies and across rural and urban boundaries, 
but that these wider effects will be region-specific. However, results suggest that there may be a case (and 
opportunities) for intra-regional targeted compensation to alleviate the negative effects of the CAP reform 
while nurturing the positive effects of a move towards a less distorting policy environment. More modelling 
and analysis is required to explore this further.
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Abstract
The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well 
as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate mechanisms of control and sanctions. The 
objective of this paper is to present a framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric 
information and to test the empirical relevance of the problem. The methodology is applied to a case 
study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions 
of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. 
The profitability of the choice of compliance/non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of single 
farm payment entitlements compared with the total land. The main message, however, is that, in order 
to increase effectiveness, environmental prescriptions as well as control efforts should be considered as a 
variable to be adapted to each local condition according to the incentive compatible criteria.
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1. Objectives
The effects of cross-compliance, introduced with the reform 2003 of the CAP, depend on the strategies of 
participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of the public administration to govern such 
phenomena through appropriate mechanisms of control and sanctions. Cross-compliance is a structural 
part of the present EU policy and is likely to maintain a major importance in the future EU policy strategy 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007b). However, the ability of cross-compliance to achieve environmental objectives 
and the costs of such achievements are still largely unexplored. The expectations and assumptions about 
the ability to control compliance affect both the evaluation of its outcomes and the consideration of future 
design options. In this paper we address the issue of optimal cross-compliance design when diverse agents 
can cheat and control is costly.
The objective of this paper is to present a framework for the modelling of cross-compliance and for the 
design of cross-compliance under asymmetric information, and to test it empirically in order to check the 
relevance of the problem.
This paper first develops a model of optimal control effort, based on the logic of the principal-agent 
approach under moral hazard. Then the model is tested using empirical information from an area of Emilia-
Romagna (Italy).
The remainder of the paper is broadly divided into four parts. Section 2 gives account of the literature 
related to the issue of cross-compliance under asymmetric information. A model of cross-compliance is presented 
in section 3, followed by the results in section 4. The paper ends with some discussion in section 5.
2. Moral hazard issues in cross-compliance
The incentive mechanism adopted in cross-compliance relies on the threat of sanctions (reduction of 
payment) in the case non-compliance is detected.
It is widespread expectation that in many cases this mechanism will not work, either because of the 
insufficient controls or of the difficulties in detecting non-compliance. However, if the control/sanction 
mechanism works, the environmental effects are still conditioned by the ability of the payment to cover 
the costs of compliance. Farmers could prefer to give up the payment rather than have to comply with cross-
compliance prescriptions. This consideration may be of major importance where payments are distributed 
in very small amounts by farm, as in Italy (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007a)
The information situation of the decision maker can be examined, in economic terms, under the 
heading of asymmetric information, with both moral hazard (possibility of cheating) and adverse selection 
(unknowingly differentiated agents).
This problem is to a large extent not addressed in the literature on cross-compliance, in spite of its 
practical importance. Previous works on cross-compliance and the administrative costs of the CAP have 
already highlighted the role of controls and their costs (BENNET et al., 2006; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007c). The 
understanding of these issues may be relevant either in the ex-ante stage, in order to design appropriate 
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incentive mechanisms, and in the evaluation stage, in order to take properly account of the most likely 
additional environmental effects of cross-compliance.
As incentive mechanisms are concerned, the issue of appropriate level and targeting of monitoring/
control activities is a crucial one. Targeting of control activities may be based on past performance or on 
an ex-ante announced concentration of monitoring effort on some sub-groups of agents (FRASER, FRASER
2005). FRASER AND FRASER (2005) show the existence of a robust theoretical background supporting a higher 
targeting of resource for controls. An improved targeting can increase compliance and this can potentially 
contribute to alleviating the moral hazard problem, i.e. the possibility of farmers cheating through non-
complying with cross-compliance (FRASER, 2004).
However, also tailoring of prescriptions in relation to payments and to environmental priorities has a 
clear role in policy design (CLAASSEN, 2005).
Related literature in the field of agriculture has mostly concerned voluntary agri-environmental 
schemes and their policy parameters, including mechanism design or compliance monitoring design LATACZ-
LOHMANN (2004).
Based on numerous general economic literature (LAFFONT, MARTIMORT, 2002), the problem of moral hazard 
in agricultural policy has been developed in recent years in a few papers (e.g., CHOE, FRASER, 1998; 1999), 
assuming the possibility of sanctions connected to the detection of non-compliance through monitoring, 
increasing the probability of detecting fraud. Less frequently moral hazard is considered together with 
adverse selection (e.g., WHITE, 2002). FRASER (2004) developed a model where the designs of targeting and 
compliance controls are considered together and in an intertemporal framework.
These papers emphasise the importance of adequate systems of monitoring and sanctions. However, 
the mechanisms for non-compliance are much more complex than these. For example there may be lack 
of information among farmers. Also, farmers may be different in terms of attitude to cheating or being 
honest, with implications for the optimal policy design and for the probability of non-compliance (HART,
LATACZ-LOHMANN, 2005). Risk aversion may also have a role here (FRASER, 2004).
Building on this literature, this paper adopts a principal agent structure, with possibility of non-
compliance and differentiated agents. However, contrary to most moral hazard literature, we assume that 
non-compliance can be perfectly detected with a sufficient level of control.
3. The model
We model compliance to a generic set of prescriptions through a continuous variable [ ]1,0=ie , where e
represents the degree of compliance and i represents the farm type. The cost of compliance is represented 
by a function  ii e , with   0'  ii e ,   0''  ii e ,   00 i  and   00' i .
Hence both the level of compliance and its cost may be different in different farm types and the cost 
increases more than proportionally with the increase of the level of compliance. The latest assumption is 
adopted as it is judged, at the same time, very convenient analytically and the best representation of reality 
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(at the level of complexity targeted by the model). The rationale behind, is that cross-compliance includes 
a whole group of different constraints, each one with a different cost. Hence, it is consistent with economic 
theory that farmers start to comply with the cheapest constraints and continue with the next cheaper 
one, and so on. The result of this behaviour is that additional compliance will have a higher marginal cost. 
According to the empirical experience of authors, costs of different cross-compliance constraints are much 
differentiated and this justifies a strictly increasing marginal cost of compliance.
The farmer receives a payment iP (amount per hectare as the average of the whole farm land of 
each farm) determined by his historical payment entitlements. In case he does not comply, a sanction 
is raised. The sanction is calculated as a function of the payment, P , where  represents the share of 
payment subtracted as a sanction. As the punishment for non-compliance relates to the right for receive 
the payments, in the model we always assume 1 . This parameter may be treated as a policy design 
variable, as the regulator may have the option of changing/adapting its value to encourage compliance, 
also by differentiating it across farms. However, as this may create political/equity difficulties we assume 
it cannot be differentiated among farms. 
In reality, the probability of non-compliance being detected depends on a number of parameters, including 
some random effects (e.g. seasonality of controls, mistakes of the personnel in charge of the controls, weather 
conditions). However, to the best knowledge of the authors, there is no empirical information that could allow 
estimating the relationship between all these variables and the probability of detecting non-compliance. We 
simplify the problem by calculating the probability of the non-compliance being detected based on the two 
parameters that can be expected to be more strongly correlated with the detection of non-compliance: a) 
non-compliance itself; b) monitoring intensity. The former variable would be the only determinant of non-
compliance detection in the case of a world with perfect knowledge by the public administration. In this 
case, the probability that non-compliance is detected, if some non-compliance exists, is exactly equal to the 
degree of non-compliance ( ie−1 ). In the absence of empirical information about the ability of detecting 
non-compliance when the monitoring occurs, we maintain this assumption. However, we mediate it with 
the intensity of monitoring (b). Monitoring intensity ( im ) is the expectation that a farm is monitored. An 
estimate of this may be reasonably derived by the announced percent of farms monitored each year. It can 
take a value between 0 and 1 and can be differentiated by farm. We use it as a direct representation of 
the probability that non-compliance is detected, i.e. the higher m, the higher the probability of the non-
compliance being detected, if such non-compliance exists. In other words, in any farm monitored, if it is non-
compliant, non-compliance is detected with probability ( ie−1 ) and the total probability that non-compliance 
is detected is equal to )1( ii em − .
Under this assumption, the problem of the private optimal level of cross-compliance may be written as:
Max          iiiiiiiiiiiii ePPemePemm   )1()1(   (1)
The profit of the farm i ( i ) is determined by two components: the profit in case the non-compliance is 
not detected and the profit in case the non-compliance is detected, each one multiplied by the respective 
probability. Note again that the probability of each event is determined by the monitoring level (exogenous 
to the farm) and by the degree of compliance (endogenous) and there is no further stochasticity due to 
errors in detection or other factors.
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The possibility that the farms consider the costs of compliance too high and decides to give up the 
payment is not considered here. This is motivated by the fact that considering 1  and likely 
1≤im , such 
option will always yield a lower result compared with staying in the payment scheme and give up (part of) 
the payment only if the non-compliance is detected. Note that this does not apply anymore in case 
1 , as 
the sanction could produce a cost beyond the payment and would be potentially profitable to stay out of the 
scheme in order to avoid such cost. This does not imply however that if 1 , the farmer is never profitable 
to accept the payment, as the actual expected sanction also depends on the probability of detection.
We first note that ( )iii emm +− )1(  and ( ))1( ii em −  are complements to one, which simplifies the 
profit function to:
    iiiiiii PemeP   )1(      (2)
Taking derivatives for e, the first order conditions are:
  0' 
	
	
iiii
i
i Pme
e


Which yields:
  iiii Pme  '         (3)
The optimal level of compliance depends on monitoring, the degree of sanction and the payments. 
When any of the three is zero, the cost of compliance (hence compliance) will be zero.
Let us now define a function f, such that    iiii eef ' . This is the inverse function of the cost 
function. It may also be written as:
     iiiiiii ePmfef   '       (4)
Taking now the point of view of a public administration, we consider the problem of maximising the 
welfare produced by the policy, by identifying optimal policy parameters. In principle the environmental 
value of cross-compliance, farmers’ cost of compliance and shadow cost of public funds should be considered 
here. However, assuming a local administrative body in charge of cross-compliance implementation, the 
problem could be largely simplified. In particular, as payments are exogenous and there is no particular 
benefit from the recovery of payments through sanctions, the problem could be represented as the 
maximisation of non-weighted compliance, subject to a budget constraint and taking into account farmers’ 
optimal solution.
Assuming a given frequency of each farm type in hectares ( i ), a total budget for controls B, and a 
cost per hectare of monitored land ikm , where k is the cost of 100% monitoring, we can write the public 
decision making problem as:
Max
i
iie         (5)
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s.t. (3) and:
Bkm
i
ii          (6)
This representation appears realistic enough for the case of Italy and simple enough to be easily 
tractable both in the derivation of the theoretical solution and for computational purposes.
Based on 4, we can rewrite 5 as:
Max  
i
iiii Pmf         (5’)
Taking the Lagrangian this yields:
  


		



  BkmPmf
i
ii
i
iiii       (7)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint. Optimisation (first derivative equalled to zero) 
with respect to the degree of monitoring yields, after some arrangements:
( )
i
iii P
kPmf
ρ
γρ ='         (8)
Given the properties of  ii e ,   0' iii Pmf   and   0'' iii Pmf  .
The left hand side of equation 8 is a positive number which decreases when the monitoring effort or the 
expected sanction increases. Hence Equation 8 says that, at the optimal level of monitoring, the marginal 
increase in compliance with respect to cost equals the ratio between the marginal cost of monitoring and 
the marginal sanction for each farm. This means that the optimal amount of monitoring increases for 
low costs of monitoring and for low shadow cost of the budget constraint, while it decreases for higher 
sanctions. As the sanction is determined by iP , both a higher percent of payment used as sanction and 
a higher payment contribute to lower optimal monitoring. In particular, as iP is the only component of 
the right hand side of equation (8) which is differentiated by farm type, this implies that farms with 
higher payments should be monitored less, ceteris paribus. This may appear against the logic that public 
administration should be more careful in checking what happens in farms using a largest share of public 
funds. However, it is motivated by the fact that increasing the level of payment also increases the level of 
punishment in case fraud is detected and so discourages farmers from being non-compliant.
This also means that for farms types with 0>iP :
( )
ρ
γρ kPPmf iiii ='         (9)
will hold for all farms and   iiii PPmf ' will be equal across farms in the optimal solution.
Farms with zero payments will have both compliance and optimal monitoring equal to zero.
The budget constraint may be expected to hold with equality for all cases with average 1<e . When 
this does not apply, i.e. there is an excessive budget available,   0' iii Pmf   in the optimal solution.
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The model presented here considers explicitly the possibility that im  is differentiated by farm type. 
This guarantees the maximum flexibility to the regulator, but may not be realistic in some cases. Reasons 
may derive from political opposition to differentiate controls (that could be seen as not equitable) or 
from technical problems. The latter is also connected to the way farm types are defined. In particular, the 
differentiation of m could be designed based on some characteristic j different from i.
In order to estimate the potential benefit from the targeting of controls, we simply consider the 
possibility of a uniform m across farms, i.e. all the farms have the same probability to be controlled.
Substituting m to im  in the previous formulation, optimisation from the point of view of the regulator 
yields:
( )
ρ
γ
λ
ρλ
k
PmfP
i
i
i
iiii
=∑
∑ '
        (10)
Equation 10 says that the optimal solution already found in equation 8 holds here only on average, 
while it will not be possible for individual farm types. This is enough to grasp the fact that this solution 
yields a worst result for the regulator compared to a targeted im .
4. Case study
The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (NUTS 3, Emilia 
Romagna, Italy). The province has been selected as it offers a range of different environmental conditions, 
farm structure and Single payment entitlements. It covers a UAA of 146 thousand ha.
This province consists of 60 municipalities distributed on plain, hilly and mountain areas. The data 
used are based on the 2000 census. On the basis of the census structural data, farm types have been 
defined based on the average characteristics of each combination of municipality and farm size. This yields 
600 farm types (60 municipalities by 10 classes of farm size). Payments assigned to every farm type are 
based on the crop mix and payments in place in the period 2000-2002.
Operationally the cost of compliance has been calculated as a quadratic function with the form 
  2iii ee   and   iii ee 2'  . As   is considered as equal for all farm types, also  iii Pmf '  will be 
the same and the difference between farms will be only due to Pi. Differences in Pi  may depend on three 
reasons: the different location, the different mix of eligible crops and the different ratio between eligible 
crops and non-eligible crops in the crop mix.
About the latest point, an important factor is that cross-compliance applies to the whole farm, while 
payments do not. As a result, the difference between farms is strictly connected to the difference in the 
share of area eligible for payments. In fact, the higher the area eligible for payments, the higher the 
payment/cost ratio connected to cross-compliance.
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To the knowledge of the authors, a clear estimations of   does not exist. Based on values reported in 
local literature (DE ROEST, CORRADINI 2006), however, a reasonable range of such value has been identified 
between 10 and 40 euro/ha.
The main reason to consider a uniform   (which is somehow a departure from the general model 
discussed above) is the lack of data on the distribution of costs of non-compliance and on their correlation 
with the payment. Direct empirical experience of the authors suggests that some components of cross-
compliance should be rather uniform across farms (e.g. costs for the disposal of pesticide packages) while 
other could very differentiated (e.g. restrictions to input use), also in relationship to the previous technology 
adopted by the farm. The direct effect of this homogeneity assumption in this paper is that we underestimate 
the need to target controls (because underestimate differentiation) and overestimate the responsibility for 
differentiation in compliance incentive due to different amounts of payments received by the farm.
Based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007), the control cost has been calculated in the range 5-15 euro/ha. 
Given the level of uncertainty, the model has been used mainly for paramerisation purposes. In particular, 
values have been generated for all combinations of the extreme values of the two variables listed above, three 
levels of sanction (=0.1, 0.5, 1) and two levels of budget availability (B=20.000, 100.000) for the whole area.
5. Results 
The results in the hypotheses of B= 20.000 euro show little relevant effects in terms of compliance (Table 1).
As the percent of area under farm types that receive no payment is only 4.6%, in all cases the vast 
majority of land (total land, minus land without payments, minus compliant land) will receive payments 
without complying with cross-compliance commitments.
Actually only when the sanction can be high enough to equal the whole amount of the payments and 
the cost of monitoring is sufficiently low, some relevant amount of land is compliant (about 30%). This 
combination, however, is rather far from the actual situation, particularly as the sanction/payment ratio 
is concerned, so that the actual expected outcome would probably be closer to the first lines in the table 
(
1.0 ), with likely negligible effects. However, it should be clear that the amount of 20.000 euro is 
very low for the area, as it corresponds to less than 0.2 euro/ha.
The controlled UAA is very small in percentage and only varies with k, as, due to the model structure, 
it is always preferable to use all the budget for controls till 100% compliance is achieved in a group before 
shifting to the next.
If a differentiated control is not possible, the results are sharply worse than in the previous case (Table 2).
The compliant UAA, in this case, is mostly around two thirds compared with the differentiated controls. 
This difference may be underestimated in the model as the choice of a uniform cost of compliance tends to 
reduce the variability of optimal monitoring compared to reality. Altogether this shows the importance of 
an improved targeting in order to improve value for money out of control activities.
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The picture changes sharply when a more substantial budget for controls is assumed (Table 3).
In this case, due to the much higher budget (5 times, but still below 1 euro/ha), the area under control 
increases substantially, however staying always below 14%. With this level of controls, the lowest levels of 
sanctions are still connected to negligible amounts of compliance. However, for higher level of sanctions, it 
is possible to reach more than 90% compliance, when the cost of controls and the costs of compliance are 
assumed low. Actually, in the case of =1, k=5 and  =10, 13.7% monitoring is enough to reach almost the 
optimal level of compliance without budget constraint (93.5%). However, reaching such level would require 
an increase of monitoring to up to 18.2% of the total UAA.
Again, the results are much worse in the case of uniform controls (Table 4).
Table 1: Results at the optimal monitoring level (B=20.000 euro, differentiated controls)
R K UAA controlled J UAA compliant
euro/ha % euro/ha ha %
0.1
5 2.7%
10
40
5782
1459
4%
1%
15 0.9%
10
40
1997
506
1%
0%
0.5
5 2.7%
10
40
 24842
7156
17%
5%
15 0.9%
10
40
9341
2470
6%
2%
1
5 2.7%
10
40
45209
13438
31%
9%
15 0.9%
10
40
17363
4838
12%
3%
Table 2: Results at the optimal monitoring level (B=20.000 euro, uniform controls)
R K UAA controlled J UAA compliant
euro/ha % euro/ha ha %
0.1
5 2.7%
10
40
2977
744
2%
1%
15 0.9%
10
40
992
248
1%
0%
0.5
5 2.7%
10
40
 14886
3722
10%
3%
15 0.9%
10
40
4962
1241
3%
1%
1
5 2.7%
10
40
29772
7443
20%
5%
15 0.9%
10
40
9924
2481
7%
2%
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Table 4: Results at the optimal monitoring level (B=100.000 euro, uniform controls)
R K UAA controlled J UAA compliant
euro/ha % euro/ha ha %
0.1
5 13.7%
10
40
14886
3722
10%
3%
15 4.6%
10
40
4962
1241
3%
1%
0.5
5
10.0%
13.7%
10
40
 54369
18608
37%
13%
15 4.6%
10
40
24810
6203
17%
4%
1
5
5.0%
13.7%
10
40
54369
37215
37%
25%
15 4.6%
10
40
49621
12405
37%
8%
Noticeably, the differences are more important the higher the area is under control, with at least a 
couple of cases where the percentage of compliant UAA falls well below percentage of corresponding cases 
with differentiated controls in Table 3.
6. Discussion
The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is 
interested in complying with cross-compliance prescriptions. The profitability of the choice of compliance/
non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of the single farm payment entitlements and the costs. In 
turn these depend on the ratio between areas receiving payments and total farm land, as cross-compliance 
Table 3: Results at the optimal monitoring level (B=100.000 euro, differentiated controls)
R K UAA controlled J UAA compliant
euro/ha % euro/ha ha %
0.1
5 13.7%
10
40
24842
6451
17%
4%
15 4.6%
10
40
9341
2397
6%
2%
0.5
5 13.7%
10
40
 92933
30158
64%
21%
15 4.6%
10
40
38693
11423
26%
8%
1
5 13.7%
10
40
132388
54592
91%
37%
15 4.6%
10
40
69041
21158
47%
14%
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is compulsory for the whole farm. These parameters, in turn, also depend on the peculiarity of each area 
(mountain/plain, protected/non protected).
An improvement may be obtained through a (costly) increase of control or sanctions, or through a 
better targeting of controls. The latter option, while interesting in terms of efficiency, opens the problem 
of an equitable treatment of different groups of farmers, as well as of the identification of clear priorities of 
territorial development of farming.
The main message, however, is that, in order to increase effectiveness, controls and environmental 
prescriptions themselves should be considered as a variable to be adapted to incentive compatibility criteria. 
This is somehow informally considered in the way regions plan actual cross-compliance and related control 
mechanisms. However, on a formal (regulatory) ground, there appear to be potential conflicts between 
incentive compatibility and property rights rationale to cross-compliance design.
While the main points of compliance are caught by the model, it is clearly based on simplified 
assumptions with respect to the complexity of cross-compliance prescriptions, cost structure and the 
ability to detect non-compliance. Improvements may go in the direction of better specified compliance 
costs functions, possibly distinguishing the cost of single commitments and a better representation of 
differentiated farmers, for example in relation to their production specialisation. The environmental 
benefits of cross-compliance should be also considered, at least in relation to the combination of the 
location of different farms and of the commitments with which the farms are compliant.
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Revenue and Cost Functions in PMP:
a Methodological Integration for
a Territorial Analysis of CAP
F. ARFINI1, M. DONATI1, L. GROSSI2, Q. PARIS3
Abstract
An integrated policy evaluation tool is proposed for assessing the effects of agricultural policy measures 
using all the information available at farm level. The tool combines the positive mathematical programming 
methodology with the cluster analysis technique by using the same panel of data. The PMP model proposed 
here allows measuring the effects of policy in terms of agricultural supply responses including output 
market price variations. The novel procedure by which the PMP model is articulated permits to recover 
the set of farm level demand functions for agricultural products and the cost function characterizing the 
selective sample of farms. Cluster analysis is useful for better appreciating the behaviour of farms before 
and after the policy scenario analysis by considering the transfers of farms among clusters. A decoupling 
scenario assessment presents the responses that the integrated tool can provide for evaluating agricultural 
policy instruments. 
Key words: Positive mathematical programming, Cluster analysis, Integrated tool, Agricultural policies, 
Policy evaluation
JEL classification: Q11, Q12, C61, Q18
1 University of Parma
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1. Introduction
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) is widely used for evaluating the effects of the CAP instruments 
on the dynamics of the agricultural processes and farm economic variables, both for ex-post and ex-ante 
analysis. The main contribution of this methodology to agricultural economics is due to its capacity to 
maximize the information contents in the agricultural datasets available at European level, as FADN, REGIO, 
IACS (ARFINI et al., 2003; PARIS AND HOWITT, 1998). 
Many papers have adopted the PMP methodology for developing models capable of assessing the impact 
of proposed or already implemented CAP reforms. Also in European research projects, this approach is used 
with micro-based information, like FADN4. In most cases, the PMP is proposed in the so-called “classical” 
form, where the procedure is articulated in three phases: the differential costs recovering, the estimation 
of the non-linear cost function and, finally, the calibration by using a non constrained production model 
with non-linear objective functions (HOWITT, 1995). Applications of this basic version are the most diffused, 
e.g. for evaluating the impacts of the CAP reform (ARFINI et al., 2005; JUDEZ et al., 2002).
An attempt at introducing innovations in the basic approach is due to HECKELEI AND WOLFF (2003) that 
proposed a methodology to overcome the first phase for calibrating the observed situation by directly 
imposing the first order conditions in the cost function estimation phase. This approach was also used with 
cross-section data in order to enhance the consistency of the cost estimation (HECKELEI AND BRITZ, 2000). 
More advanced extensions of the PMP are due to PARIS (2001) that generalise the method adopting an 
equilibrium model in a static framework and in a dynamic price expectation approach.
The demand for an assessment of agricultural policy measures rose strongly during this last decade and 
contributed to the development of a set of economic tools that would respond to such needs using all the 
available information. In this field, the PMP plays a first order role. This methodology can provide useful 
results to policy makers even in the presence of a limited set of information as it generally happens when 
European agricultural databases are adopted. PMP can respond with flexibility and in a consistent way to a 
large spectrum of policy issues, typically concerning the land use change, production dynamics, variation 
in gross margin and in other main economic variables (costs, subsidies, gross saleable production, etc.). 
However, all these applications are developed exploring the supply side of the agricultural sector, while 
avoiding implementing an evaluation of the demand side by measuring the effects on the output market 
prices. Indeed, the literature about PMP models application seems to indicate that such class of models was 
just developed for investigating the supply side of the agricultural sector, delegating the demand issues 
side to well-posed problems solved by econometric techniques.
For improving the analysis, some studies integrate PMP models by other approaches, as cluster analysis 
(BUYSSE et al., 2007; ARFINI et al., 2005) and convergence evaluation (ARFINI et al., 2005). This allows researchers 
to reach more readable, comparable and synthetic results by assessments based on very detailed information5.
4 Several European research projects have developed and applied models based on the Positive Mathematical Programming 
methodology, as CAPRI (HECKELEI, 1997; HECKHELEI AND BRITZ, 2000) and EUROTOOLS (PARIS AND ARFINI, 2000) in the V FP, 
GENEDEC (contract no. SSPE-CT-2004-502184 and CARERA (contract no. SSPE-CT-2005-022653) in the VI FP.
5 Cluster analysis is used when massive information deriving from farm model solutions have to be systematized in order to form 
groups of similar farms on the basis of variables that are relevant in measuring the degree of homogeneity in and among the 
groups. Two examples of application of such techniques are included in PARIS et al. (2000) and BUYSSE et al. (2007).
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The objective of this paper is to present a new quantitative tool for assessing the CAP instruments 
effects on the agricultural supply dynamics and on the market price modifications, using a PMP 
approach based on individual farm information. This tool is projected for responding to specific demand 
of policy makers on the issues related to the impact of CAP measures with respect to land allocation, 
production levels, price variations and farm revenue modifications. The PMP model that represents 
the core of such a tool is integrated by a cluster analysis that is incorporated inside the mathematical 
structure of the same tool. The cluster analysis is useful in evaluating the degree of homogeneity of 
agriculture sector before and after the application of policy scenarios, by using the same set of farm 
data adopted for PMP evaluation.
2. The integrated approach 
The core of the tool is represented by a PMP model able to capture the farm decision variables in order 
to simulate the impact of policy instruments as realistically as possible. The PMP model described in 
the next section keeps into account the farm level demand functions that characterize the agricultural 
outputs produced by the group of farms under evaluation. The PMP model is suitable for using individual 
farm information and to have a solution at the farm level. To achieve this goal, it requires a database 
collecting farm variables at the individual level, as FADN or IACS databases that represent a sector 
or a region. Before using the farm information for the policy analysis, it is important to know the 
characteristics of the sample. A statistical technique that is useful for analysing a cross-section panel 
of data, with respect the degree of homogeneity of the elements (farms) composing the sample, is 
the multivariate analysis and, more specifically, the cluster analysis (CA). A tool performed by GAMS 
integrates such a technique with the PMP. 
This kind of approach was used for analysing the impact of the CAP reform on the state of cohesion in 
EU (ARFINI et al., 2005) and, more recently, for evaluating the sugar CMO reform (BUYSSE, 2007). The combined 
use of the cluster analysis and the PMP approach allows the analyst to portray the situation before the 
modification or the introduction of policy measures and to infer the likely changes inside the groups 
of farms identified by CA after the application of such measures. When the evaluation considers a large 
number of farm observations, while the PMP can foresee the variation in the main agricultural variables, 
the CA allows understanding the behaviour of the farms with respect to their response to agricultural 
policy. Indeed, the groups identified by this statistical approach represent groups of farms characterized 
by a similarity with respect to the variables under evaluation (land allocation, gross margin, gross saleable 
production, variable costs, etc.). The classification obtained by the CA evaluates the degree of homogeneity 
among the farms in a dynamic perspective, before and after the policy scenarios.
As we have explained above, the dataset feeds the CA in the first step, before the agricultural 
policy scenario evaluation, and the PMP model. The results generated by the PMP model are the new 
data for a second CA run. This second run carries out a new configuration of the group of farms, 
highlighting how the groups have reacted to the policy instruments. The integrated tool is, thus, 
composed by different modules that are developed, in a unique modelling environment, using the 
specific algebraic software GAMS.
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3. Revenue and cost functions in PMP model
The methodology approach proposed in this paper considers the problem of estimating the farm level 
demand functions associated with a group of farms selected for a policy scenario evaluation inside a PMP 
framework. More specifically, the approach is articulated in four phases: 1) cross-section estimation of farm 
level demand functions using individual data; 2) recovering of the differential marginal costs that lead 
farmers to choose the observed production plan, considering inside the objective function a non-linear 
revenue function; 3) estimation of a quadratic cost function; 4) calibration of the base observed situation 
(the observed production plan) maximizing an objective function composed of the non-linear revenue 
function estimated in the first phase and the non-linear cost function derived in the third phase. 
Phase I – Estimation of farm level demand functions
The farm level demand functions that we want to estimate have the following linear form:
     = −p d xD      (1)
or, in a sample formulation  
'
, , ' , ,
' 1
J
n j j j j n j n j
j
p d D x v
=
= − +∑
where p, d and x are vectors with dimensions (Jx1) and D a matrix with dimension (JxJ); p, d and x
are vectors of agricultural product prices, of intercepts of demand functions and of production quantities, 
respectively; D is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix of quantity slopes. J (j=1,…,J) is the number of 
agricultural processes. 
Economic theory assumes that market prices paid to producers vary in relation with the aggregated 
demand function. Under this assumption, a set of demand functions can be estimated on the basis of a 
sample of N farms. The term 
,n jv  in (1) represents the deviation of the n-th farm from the regional j-th 
demand function. If the sample of farms concerns a given geographical region or a sector, it is possible to 
estimate a set of demand functions for the agricultural products of such a region or a sector. The objective 
is, thus, to obtain the set of demand function (1) using the information of a sample of individual farms. 
The relevant information required for estimating (1), consists of prices paid for selling the farm 
products at the farm level and of output quantities introduced into market. Both types of information are 
generally available from the most used agricultural database, as FADN. In this framework, the estimation 
is performed considering the information about output prices and production levels of each farm, so that 
the demand function is relied on the farm production decision of all the considered farms. Some other 
relevant information could be considered in the estimation phase, like the import and export quantities for 
each agricultural product. The objective of this analysis is, although, to estimate a cross-section demand 
function using the basic information available at farm level, in order to simulate in the last methodology 
phase a partial market equilibrium. 
The methods of estimation that one can implement varies from generalized least squares, to maximum 
likelihood, to maximum entropy, etc. In this work, we choose the maximum entropy approach to estimate 
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a well-posed problem. Furthermore, the choice of ME is related to our empirical experience demonstrating 
that a maximum entropy estimator seems to provide rather realistic results in a simulation phase.
The estimation carried out in the present section consists in recovering the demand functions (1) 
governing the output markets of a sample of 50 farms. The first group of parameters to estimate is the 
intercept vector d, while the second group is the matrix D. According to the generalized maximum entropy 
theory of GOLAN, JUDGE AND MILLER (1996), each parameter to recover is equal to the product between a 
set of probabilities and a set support values. The objective of the problem is to identify the probability 
distribution that maximizes the entropy function. The support values are chosen by the researcher6.
Thus, the intercept can be written as:
     
P
j j,p j,p
p=1
= ∑d zd pd     (2)
where, 
,j pzd  is the vector of support values, while 
,j ppd  is the vector of the p (p=1,...,P) probabilities.
We assume that the matrix D is symmetric, positive semidefinite. The simplest and most efficient way 
to respect those properties is to decompose the matrix D in three components according to the Cholesky 
factorization method (PARIS AND HOWITT, 1998). On the basis of this method the matrix D is divided in three 
matrices as follows:
     'D = LHL      (3)
where, D is equal to the product among a unit lower triangular matrix L, a non-negative diagonal matrix 
H and the transposed of L. The decomposition guarantees in every case to obtain a symmetric, positive and 
semidefinite matrix. This same decomposition can be rewritten in a more compact form, so that:
     ' '= =D LHL RR     (4)
where the matrix 1/ 2=R LH .
In order to estimate the parameters of L and H, it is required to specify a suitable set of support values 
to associate to an unknown probability distribution, as presented in the following equations:
    , ' , ', , ',
1
'
P
j j j j p j j p
p
L Zl Pl j j

      (5)
    
, ' , ', , ',
1
'
P
j j j j p j j p
p
H Zh Ph j j

      (6)
Equation (5) states the relation about the unitary triangular matrix
, 'j jL and the product between 
the matrix of support values 
, ',j j pZl  and the matrix of probability distribution , ',j j pPl . The matrix L is a 
triangular matrix with unitary values on the diagonal and null values above the diagonal. In equation (6), 
6 One of the main criticism addressed to the maximum entropy methods concerns the choice of support values that are 
submitted to the subjective decision of the researcher (LANSINK, 1997). 
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the matrix 
, 'j jH  is equal to the product of the support values , ',j j pZh  and the unknown matrix of probability 
distribution 
, ',j j pPh . H is a non-negative diagonal matrix with null values outside the diagonal.
Keeping into account the statements above, the maximum entropy problem that recovers the demand 
function (1) starting from a cross-section panel of individual farms is as follows:
'
, , , ', , ',
( )
1 1 1 ' 1 1
'
, ', , ', , , , ,
1 ' 1 1 1 1 1
max ( ) log log
log log
J P J J P
j p j p j j p j j p
p j p j j p
J J P N J P
j j p j j p n j p n j p
j j p n j p
Hd p pd pd Pl Pl
Ph Ph pe pe
= = = = =
= = = = = =
= − −
− −
∑∑ ∑∑∑
∑∑∑ ∑∑∑
i
(7)
Subject to:
'
, , , , , , , , ' , ' ,
1 1 1 ' 1
,
P P K J
n j n j p n j p j p j p j j k j n k
p p k j
pr ze pe zd pd R R x n j
   
         (8)
1/ 2
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The entropic objective function of the problem (7)-(11) is maximized with respect to the unknown 
probability distributions associated with the support values identified by the researcher. Equation (8) states 
that the observed prices 
,n jpr  are equal to unique demand function plus a farm deviation, , , , ,n j p n j pze pe , that 
measures the distances between n-th observed farm price and the common/regional demand function. 
Equation (9) performs the Cholesky’s decomposition rule established inside the relation (4). The constraint 
(10) concerns the summation to zero of the farm deviations and the set of constraints (11) state the 
adding-up relations for the probability distributions. This problem estimates the demand functions of the 
agricultural market generating the output prices of each farm.
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Phase II – Recovering of differential marginal costs
The second phase of PMP is devoted to estimating the marginal costs borne by farmers in their input 
allocation process. When information about accounting variable costs is available, the estimation deals 
with the differential amount leading to a true economic marginal cost.
The novelty of the proposed PMP approach consists in defining an objective function that depends on 
the set of farm level demand functions estimated in phase I.
This revenue function is derived integrating the demand function with respect the output levels:
     ( )
0
1
' ' '
2
x
dxd x d x x x− = −∫ D D    (12)
The objective of this phase is to maximize a non-linear gross margin function subject to typical farm 
structural constraints (i.e. land) and to calibrating constraints that force the model to reproduce the 
observed production plan. In algebraic terms, the problem for the n-th farm is written as follows: 
'
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, , ,
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where ˆ jv  is the deviation of each farm process from the demand function estimated on the sample of 
farms. The vectors of deviations are obtained from the previous phase as:
     
,
, ,
n jn j n j=v ze pe      (17)
cnj is the explicit accounting variable cost associated with each output unit at n-th farm level; while 
, ,n j iA  and ,n ib  are respectively the matrix of technology, that is the matrix with the coefficients of input use 
for obtaining one unit of product, and the vector of input farm capacity i (i.e. land acreage), for i=1,…,I.
The coefficients ˆ jd  and , 'ˆ j jD  are the estimates of the corresponding parameters obtained in phase I.
Problem (13)-(16) is optimized when the difference between total revenue and total variable cost is 
maximized with respect the level of output x. The solution of this problem is known before solving it, 
because the calibrating constraint (15) imposes that each variable x cannot exceed the observed level of 
those outputs x plus a terms very small  7. The tautological problem (13)-(16) leads to obtaining the dual 
information linked to the calibrating constraint (15), that is j . j  is the differential costs to add to the 
7 The meaning of ε is to avoid the linear dependency between the structural constraint and calibrating constraint. For a 
deeper explanation about the role of e see HOWITT (1995), PARIS AND HOWITT (1998) and GOHIN AND CHANTREUIL (2000).
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accounting marginal costs jc  in order to obtain a total marginal cost needed for estimating the non-linear 
cost function of the third phase.
Phase III – Non-linear cost function estimation
The objective of the third phase is to estimate the farm cost function starting from the vector of 
marginal costs estimated in phase II, using the shadow prices associated with the calibration constraints. 
The chosen functional form of the cost function is: 
    
1
( ) ( ) x '
2
C x = + = +ë c x á x xQ     (18)
where  and c are, respectively, the vector of the dual values identified in the previous phase and the 
vector of the farm accounting costs, x  is the vector of the known production levels and Q the matrix 
of the non-linear cost function. á  is the vector of intercepts for the marginal cost associated to farm 
processes. In equation (18) the elements for matrix Q are still unknown and must be obtained through 
suitable estimation methods. On the basis of maximum entropy principle and the arrangement given by 
Paris and Howitt (1998), the parameters of vector   and matrix Q can be recovered by maximizing the 
probability distribution associated with an interval of specified support values. The non linear programme 
of maximum entropy is presented here in the form derived by Cholesky’s decomposition according to which 
the matrix ' '= =Q ÃWÃ TT , where Ã is a triangular matrix, W a diagonal matrix and 1/ 2T W  . The 
problem can then be solved by maximizing a probability distribution for which we know the expected value, 
which corresponds to the marginal cost ( ) c  determined in the second phase. The objective function of 
the problem of maximum entropy is, thus, presented as follows:
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where 
,j pp  are the unknown probability distributions of the intercepts of the cost function, , ',j j pp
and 
, ',j j ppw  are the probability of the distribution associated with elements of the triangular matrix Ã
and of the diagonal matrix W respectively. 
, ,n j ppu  are elements of the probability of errors. The objective 
function (19) is maximized considering the information about the process marginal costs at farm level, as 
follows: 
For 0x >  at farm level:
( )'
, , , , , , ' , , , ,
1 ' 1 1 1
,
P J K P
n j n j j p j p j k k j k n j p n j p
p j k p
c p z T T x pu zu n j
= = = =
+ = + + ∀ ∀   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑λ α α (20)
For x not activated at farm level:
( )'
, , , , , , ' , , , ,
1 ' 1 1 1
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P J K P
n j n j j p j p j k k j k n j p n j p
p j k p
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The equations (20-21) state that the total marginal cost 
( ) ( )
( ) ë c  is equal/less or equal to a new 
marginal cost function common for all farm in sample plus a farm error. 
( )T  is an element of the matrix T
obtained through Cholesky’s decomposition. In fact: 
      
1/ 2
, ' , ', . ', , ', , ',
' 1 1 1
J P P
j j j j w j j w j j p j j p
j p p
T p z pw zw 
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 	
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 
     (22)
The relations inserted in (22) clarify the role of the support values in the process of estimating the 
cost matrix. The components 
( )
z i  and ( )zw i  are the appropriately selected support values (PARIS AND HOWITT,
1998). Associated with the distribution of probability, 
( )
p i  and 
( )
pw i , they define the elements of the 
triangular matrix Ã and of the diagonal matrix W. It must be pointed out that the matrix Q is unique and 
is derived from the marginal costs. 
In order to impose that the distribution of deviations is normal, the following adding-up equation is 
considered:
     pun,j,p zun,j,p  0
p=1
P

n=1
N
  , j    (23)
All the probability distributions referred to above must meet the following condition: 
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1; 1; 1; 1
P P P P
p p p p
p p pw pu                (24)
Problem (19)-(24) provides the probability distribution values for the elements of the triangular matrix 
Ã, the diagonal matrix W and for the vector of the residual marginal variable costs for each farm in the 
sample. The cost function specified according to the above method preserves the technical information 
regarding the calibration constraints.
Phase IV – Calibrating observed situation
Finally, after having estimated the revenue and cost functions, we can develop a problem very similar 
to those in the second phase of the procedure, where a new cost function is inserted and the calibrating 
constraints are not considered. The problem of the n-th farm can be stated as follows:
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The error terms ˆjv  and ˆju  are derived from the first and third phase of the procedure respectively, and 
they are specific to each farm. In other terms, they measure the distance between the prices and the costs 
observed at n-th farm level and the prices and costs estimated for the region considered by the analyst.
Inside the objective function (25) the new quadratic cost function takes the place of the calibrating 
constraints, establishing the economic bound for the activity allocation choice. In other terms, the latent 
decision variables revealed in the second phase enter inside the objective function (25) providing an 
economic calibrating constraint instead of a technical constraint such as the equation (15). The gross 
margin maximized in (25) is less than the gross margin specified in (13), 
0 1
GM GM< , because the 
1
GM
also integrates the dual values associated to the farm activities. For this reason, we can say that the 
objective function (25) should be considered economic et revenue in the sense of the economic theory.
The problem (25)-(27) permits to exactly reproduce the base situation without specific calibrating constraints. 
Furthermore, applying policy scenario simulations, the non-linear revenue function provide information on the 
likely variation in agricultural product prices in relation with changes in production levels. 
4. Non-hierarchical cluster analysis: the k-means procedure
The aim of partitioning methods is to get a single partition of n points in p dimensions into k clusters ( nk < ), 
following an optimizing criteria and where k is chosen by the researcher. The k-means algorithm is, even if according 
to various versions, the best-known and applied partitioning method (ATKINSON et al., 2004). This procedure leads 
to classifying the n units into k distinct clusters, with k chosen a priori by the analyst, according to an iterative 
method the steps of which can be resumed as follows:
1) k initial cluster centres are selected, that is k p-dimensional points which are the cluster centroids 
in the initial partition. Centres can be detected using different methods, but usually are such that 
they are as much as possible distant to each other. The initial k-clusters partition is then built, 
adding each element to the closest cluster.
2) For each unit, the distance to the k cluster’s centroids is computed: if the minimum distance is 
different from that gained by the centroid of the group to which the unit belongs, the unit is 
moved and included to the closest group. When one unit is reallocated the new and old cluster’s 
centroids are re-estimated. 
3) Step 2 is iterated to the convergence of the algorithm, that is until clusters and centroids remain 
stable and unchanged with respect to the previous iteration.
Alternatively, when the computational burden of the procedure is an issue, the stopping rule 
introduced in step 3 can be replaced by less restrictive rules which end the procedure when one of 
the following events occurs:
a) The algorithm comes to convergence in the previously stated sense;
b) The distance of each centroid, at current iterations to the corresponding centroid at previous 
iteration, is not greater than a given threshold;
c) Maximum number of iterations has been reached.
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To get a partition with a different number of clusters, for instance *k , all the steps must be repeated, 
starting from the first stage where k is replaced by *k .
In order to apply the above suggested procedure, the distance between each unit and the centroids 
must be iteratively computed and a suitable metric must be chosen. The most frequently applied metrics 
is the Euclidean distance, because it usually ensures the convergence of the iterative procedure (RENCHER,
1997). Thus, at iteration t, the distance between unit i and the centroid of group l (i=1,2, …, n; l=1,2, …, k)
is given by:
    ( )∑
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l xxxx  is the centroid of group l computed at iteration t.
From a practical point of view, it is not possible to enumerate the whole set of possible partitions of 
n elements in k groups, so that the optimal classification obtained by applying the k-means method can 
actually lead to a local minima of the objective function. As a consequence, the initial choices performed 
by the researcher are crucial and must be examined carefully, particularly with reference to: a) choice of 
the number of clusters k; b) selection of the initial cluster centres.
The choice of the number of clusters k is a primary concern by the researcher. From (28) it is clear that 
the main goal of the k-means partitioning method, with Euclidean distance, is to find a partition (with 
k clusters) which satisfies criteria of internal homogeneity based on the minimization of the deviance 
within. A natural measure of the goodness of fit of the procedure is then given by the following index:
    
T
B
T
WR =−=12      (29)
where W, B and T are, respectively, within-groups, between-groups and total deviance and BWT += .
A good partition usually presents a small within-group deviance. Index introduced by equation (29) is 
contained in the interval [0,1] and can be used to compare partitions with a different number of groups. 
When 2R  is close to 1, the corresponding partition turns out to be homogeneous because units, belonging 
to the same cluster are very similar ( 0lW , for each kl ,...,2,1= ) and clusters are strongly separated 
( TB  ). Nevertheless, a trade-off can be observed between the number of clusters and the internal 
homogeneity, because 
2R  is not-decreasing for increasing values of k. A good compromise between good 
separation of clusters and reduction of complexity of the partition can be achieved selecting the number of 
clusters k which produce a very high gain in internal cluster homogeneity with respect to a partition with 
k-1 clusters. An alternative method has been suggested by CALINSKI AND HARABASZ (1974). The index, which 
is usually called pseudo-F index, can be summarized as follows
    
)/(
)1/(
knW
kBCH
−
−
=
where the symbols have already been introduced. The main advantage of such index with respect to 
the R2 is that the curve of the CH is plotted for different values of k (number of clusters) and the user 
chooses the optimal number k by visual inspection, often where the curve has an “elbow”. Thus, the 
optimal number of clusters corresponds to an absolute or relative maximum of the curve. Once the number 
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of clusters has been chosen, the initial cluster centres must be selected. A very simple criterion is to select 
the first k observations of the dataset, while a lightly more sophisticated method is to pull out a random 
sample of size k from the n units of the dataset.
5. Policy evaluation
The integrated tool presented in the previous sections is applied to a sample of farms belonging to the 
Emilia-Romagna region. The sample is composed by 50 farms placed in the provinces of Parma, Reggio-
Emilia, Modena and Bologna and it is extracted from the IACS database, that is the dataset concerning 
the demand for subsidy payments that farmers must submit every year to the national agency charged of 
the communitarian agricultural subsidies payments8. The IACS information, concerning the crop area of 
each farm, is completed with the information derived from Italian FADN. More specifically, the information 
concerning the yields, prices and specific variable costs are obtained from the national FADN9. 2003 is the 
reference year. The sample presents a production set of ten crops: cereal mix, alfalfa, sugar beet, durum 
wheat, fodder crops, maize, barley, silage, soya and soft wheat.
Table 1: Characteristics of the sample
Main information
Number of farms 50
Incidence of cereals (in %) 64.5
Incidence of oilseeds (in %) 4.9
Incidence of fodder crops (in %) 19.4
Incidence of sugar beet (in %) 11.2
Revenue by ha (in euros) 2,001
Variable costs by ha (in euros) 1,466
The aim of the analysis is to get a response on the effects of the single farm payment introduced by 
the EU regulation 1782/2003 with respect of farm behaviour. More in detail, the integrated tool is applied 
to the policy scenario that concerns the total decoupling of the COP crops. The reform of sugar beet support 
system is not considered. 
5.1 PMP outcomes
Thanks to the reconstruction of the revenue function and the cost function, the PMP model is able 
to provide a picture of the supply and demand side of the considered sample. The first aspect concerns 
the changes of land allocation operated by farmers in relation with the decoupling. Table 2 presents the 
8 The Italian agency charged of EU payments is AGEA (AGenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura).
9 For further details on the method of merging IACS with FADN database, see ARFINI et al. (2005).
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variation of each crop after the decoupling implementation. The separation between payments and quantity 
of agricultural product seems to lead farmers to abandon part of the cereal acreage for investing on fodder 
crops, oilseeds and sugar beet. 
The variation in land use has consequences on the production levels and, thus, on market prices. This 
PMP approach is capable of capturing the price signals in relation to output variations. This is the second 
relevant aspect of the model: the simulation can provide variations about market prices of each product. 
From table 2, it is possible to note the negative variation in the hectares of cereals that leads to an increase 
in market prices for such products. For example, maize reduces of around 15% its acreage, while its prices 
improve of 19%. Similarly, fodder crops see a strong increase in the number of hectares (+48%), while their 
prices are foreseen to decrease dramatically (-40%).
Table 2: PMP simulation results – Land allocation and Prices
Activities*
Land use Prices
Baseline
(ha)
Scenario
(Var. %)
Baseline
(euros/ton)
Scenario
(var. %)
Soft Wheat 503.9 -16.5 145.4 +8.2
Durum Wheat 10.1 -26.2 204.5 +4.5
Maize 386.3 -14.8 149.6 +18.9
Barley 130.1 -24.5 131.9 +9.6
Cereals Mix 49.6 -34.8 144.1 +4.5
Silage 58.2 -9.9 40.2 +11.4
Soya 86.5 +11.5 231.7 -7.2
Alfalfa 338.4 +0.5 100.9 -9.9
Other fodder 3.7 +48.4 12.4 -39.9
Sugar beet 197.7 +6.5 43.1 -10.0
* The model considers also the possibility to activate agricultural area submitted to good practices. The model results 
indicate that around 10% of the agricultural area would be dedicated to such non-productive activity.
The new production plan due to decoupling has effects on the main farm economic variables. Table 3 
presents a situation where the declines in revenues and costs leads to improving the farm gross margin (+2%). 
This is due to a much more intensive reduction of the variable costs (-8.8%) that the farm revenues (-5,9%). 
The farm strategy within decoupling seems addressed to minimize as much as possible the production costs.
Table 3: PMP simulation results – Main economic variables
Economic variables Baseline (euros/ha) Scenario (var. %)
Revenues (gsp+subs.) 2,001 -5.9
Costs 1,466 -8.8
Gross Margin 536 +2.1
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The responses of the model in terms of quantities, prices and economic variable dynamics depend 
in large part to the estimated matrices ˆQ and ˆD, that integrate the information about the degree of 
substitution and complementarity among activities.
5.2 Cluster analysis
The k-means approach for the cluster analysis carried out to identify three groups of farms, internally 
homogeneous with respect the following variables: the incidence of each type of crop on the total 
agricultural surface, the yields for each type of crop, the revenue per hectare and the total variable cost 
per hectare. The number of clusters is coherent with the Calinski index. The first clusterization developed 
in the base situation, before the policy scenario implementation, is presented by the table 4. The first 
cluster is composed by 7 farms with the least average surface, if compared with the other clusters, with 
low revenue by hectare and low average cost by hectare. The difference between the unitary revenue and 
the unitary cost is the lowest among the groups. The presence of an important incidence of fodder crops is 
significant to explain the low level of farming intensity inside such a group.
The second group composed by 18 farms highlights an average surface of 35 hectares higher than the 
previous group and the revenue by hectare and the variable cost per hectare are much higher than every 
other group. This group presents the largest difference between the revenue per hectare and the cost per 
hectare, demonstrating that the farms belonging to such a group are more intensive in producing cereals 
and with a relevant quota (15%) of land invested in harvesting sugar beet.
The last group is very similar to the second one, but with a lower economic margin per hectare. Those 
farms are specialized in producing cereals (68% of the total acreage). The quota of land dedicated to sugar 
beet is not as large as in the second group, but it represents a non marginal investment (10.4%).
Table 4: Cluster analysis – Base situation 
Clusters No. Farms
Average 
acreage 
(ha)
Average 
revenue 
(euros/ha)
Average 
Costs 
(euros/ha)
Cereals
(%)
Oilseeds 
(%)
Fodder 
crops
(%)
Sugar beet
(%)
1 7 21 1215 959 48.4 1.9 48.3 1.4
2 18 35 2126 1538 62.6 7.0 15.6 14.8
3 25 40 2039 1495 68.1 4.0 17.5 10.4
Table 5: Cluster analysis – Policy scenario 
Clusters No. Farms
Average 
acreage 
(ha)
Average 
revenue 
(euros/ha)
Average 
Costs 
(euros/ha)
Cereals
(%)
Oilseeds 
(%)
Fodder 
crops
(%)
Sugar beet 
(%)
1 7 21 1117 848 40.7 2.2 53.7 3.4
2 27 42 1967 1356 63.8 5.2 18.3 12.7
3 16 30 1920 1444 53.7 9.2 19.4 17.7
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The impact of decoupling has been relevant for every farm. As we can observe in table 5, the decoupling 
has produced an increase of the economic margin by hectares (revenues/ha – variables costs/ha) in every 
group, but the most relevant effect concerns the third group. Indeed, 9 farms which in the base situation 
belonged to the third group, move toward the second group when decoupling is applied. This means that for 
such farms, the decoupling amplifies the gross margin per hectare, in relation to the process of minimization 
of the costs explained above. Only the farms of the first group do not move: decoupling improves significantly 
their economic results but the gap with respect the other clusters is too high for transfers.
6. Conclusions
The integrated tool proposed in this paper combines the PMP methodology with the cluster analysis 
technique. The aim of the first approach is to recover the hidden decision variables of farmers in order to 
estimate their behaviour in presence of agricultural policy changes. The implemented PMP model introduces 
a generalization of the traditional methodology. Indeed, the model is able to derive both the demand 
function that characterizes the agricultural market product of the sample of farms considered and the cost 
function kept in account by farmers during the production plan definition. The unknown parameters of the 
revenue and cost functions are recovered by adopting the maximum entropy approach. The last calibration 
phase maximizes the difference between the farm revenue and cost functions derived by a procedure 
articulated on four phases. 
The results achieved by using the PMP model in assessing policy scenarios can give responses on the 
supply side, providing the likely modification of the land use and the production level, and on the demand 
side, providing information about the variation of prices. This is why this method can be considered as a 
generalization of the method firstly proposed by HOWITT AND PARIS (1995, 1998).
The use of the cluster analysis for evaluating the behaviour of farms, with respect a new policy scenario, 
is useful in order to better understand the driving forces leading farmers to adopting a given strategy to 
respond to new policy measures. Indeed, the cluster analysis groups farms according to a homogeneity 
criteria with respect to variables assumed to be relevant for explaining the main characteristics of the farms 
considered. The picture given by the cluster analysis in the base situation can change when a simulation is 
carried out. The cluster analysis is important to portray the movement of farms among clusters.
So, when the analysis is developed using a sample of individual farms, the cluster analysis becomes 
a natural policy analysis component to integrate with the PMP model. In our work, the PMP model and 
the cluster analysis technique have been used in a same policy evaluation environment, using a common 
algebraic language package (GAMS).
The policy assessment presented in this paper shows the added value that an integrated tool can give 
to policy makers, in order to evaluate the effects of the policy measures using farm database information 
at the maximum degree of extension. All the information used inside the PMP model and the CA technique 
concerns individual farms: the policy scenario simulation and the evaluation of the degree of homogeneity 
among farms are carried out with respect of each individual farm. 
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This work highlights that the PMP approach is not just a calibration technique, as frequently is 
affirmed, but it is an efficient methodology able to reveal relevant information about the farm decision 
process when changes in observed variables occur. Moreover, the information generated by the PMP model 
can be enhanced by using the CA technique. The tool proposed here is consistently coherent because it uses 
all the available information, explicit and implicit, included in a dataset and also because it is capable of 
responding in a very complete and detailed level of analysis to the agricultural policy evaluation needs. 
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Why Stochastics Matter:
Analyzing Farm and Biofuel Policies
PATRICK WESTHOFF, SCOTT BROWN AND JULIAN BINFIELD1
Abstract
Standard deterministic analysis of agricultural and biofuel policies can yield incomplete or misleading 
results. Stochastic analysis is especially important when policies have asymmetric effects and when there 
is intrinsic interest in uncommon events or the distribution of possible outcomes.
The paper examines four cases when a stochastic approach was critical to a balanced examination of 
important US policy issues. Changes in support levels, a proposed revenue-based program, possible World 
Trade Organization limits, and biofuel use mandates were found to have potential impacts that could have 
been missed by traditional deterministic analysis. A stochastic approach could also be valuable in looking 
at EU policy questions such as possible reductions of intervention prices and export subsidies.
Keywords: Agricultural policy, biofuels, stochastic analysis, structural model
JEL Classification: Q11, Q18
1 P. Westhoff is a co-director, S. Brown is an associate director and J. Binfield is a research associate with the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri–Columbia (MU).
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1. Introduction
What difference does it make if policy x is adopted? A high proportion of work at the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) has focused on answering such “what-if” questions. For many years, FAPRI’s 
main tool was a deterministic model of the world agricultural sector that produced point estimates for each of 
the next ten years of prices, production, consumption, stocks, trade, government expenditures, farm income 
and other indicators of interest. FAPRI still uses such a model to develop its annual baseline projections for 
world agricultural markets, and to examine a variety of policy questions (FAPRI 2005, FAPRI 2007a).
For many issues related to US agricultural and biofuel policy, FAPRI has found that deterministic point 
estimates only tell part of the story. In many cases, deterministic estimates are incomplete at best and 
wholly misleading at worst. Consider the following cases based on actual policy analysis requests received 
by FAPRI in 2007:
s  )N THE 53 FARM BILL DEBATE BOTH THE (OUSE AND THE 3ENATE HAVE PROPOSED INCREASES IN SELECTED LOAN 
RATES AND TARGET PRICES (IGHER LOAN RATES AND TARGET PRICES CAN TRIGGER AN INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT 
payments to producers, but only if market prices are sufficiently low. The grain and oilseed prices in 
FAPRI’s 2007 deterministic baseline are consistently above the levels that would trigger payments. 
Does that mean the increase in support prices would have no impact?
s  4HE 53 3ENATE AND (OUSE FARM BILLS CREATE NEW PROGRAMS THAT WOULD MAKE PAYMENTS TO PRODUCERS 
when per-acre revenues (price times yield) fall below specified triggers. The per-acre revenues for 
grains and oilseeds in FAPRI’s 2007 deterministic baseline are above the levels that would trigger 
payments under the proposals. Does that mean these new programs would have no effect?
s  53 PROPOSALS  IN THE 7ORLD 4RADE /RGANIZATION 74/	 NEGOTIATIONS WOULD  LIMIT THE 53 !GGREGATE 
Measure of Support (AMS) to $7.6 billion per year. At the prices and quantities in FAPRI’s 2007 
deterministic baseline, the US AMS is slightly below the proposed limit. Does that mean the US 
proposal would have no effect on US farm programs?
s  .EWLY ENACTED 53 ENERGY  LEGISLATION EFFECTIVELY  REQUIRES A CERTAIN  LEVEL OF MAIZEBASED ETHANOL 
production. FAPRI analysis indicates that at the petroleum prices prevailing in world markets in 
early January 2008, maize-based ethanol production would exceed the levels required by the new 
law. Does that mean the mandate does not matter?
In each of these cases, deterministic analysis tells only part of the story. Actual market outcomes are 
certain to differ from the FAPRI deterministic baseline. Prices and yields, for example, will sometimes be 
lower than projected in the deterministic baseline, with important implications for all four cases.
Because of the limitations of deterministic analysis, FAPRI has adopted a stochastic approach to 
analysis of US farm and biofuel policies. The approach allows FAPRI to evaluate how policy proposals 
perform over a wide range of possible market outcomes. In some cases, this primarily provides a broader 
perspective on the policy issue at hand. But, in many cases, primarily when the distribution of outcomes 
from the stochastic process deviates from a normal distribution, the average values from the stochastic 
analysis are qualitatively different than the results from deterministic analysis.
The remainder of this paper will examine the four cases in more detail, briefly describe FAPRI’s 
stochastic modelling approach, and discuss implications for analysis of European policy issues.
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2. Examples from US policy analysis
In 2007, debate over the US farm bill, WTO negotiations, and biofuel policies led to a heavy demand for FAPRI 
analysis by members of the US Congress and other policy makers. The four cases discussed here demonstrate 
the limitations of deterministic analysis and the value that was added by a stochastic approach.
2.1. Increases in crop support prices
In early stages of the farm bill debate, many commodity groups sought increases in loan rates and target 
prices for their commodities (FAPRI 2007c). Loan rates determine benefits under the marketing loan program. 
For grains and oilseeds, marketing loan benefits are available when an indicator of county market prices 
is below the county loan rate. Producers can receive marketing loan benefits on all of their production, 
and, generally, can only receive the benefit if they produce the crop in question.2 The program is therefore 
directly coupled to production decisions, as producers can use the loan program to place an effective floor 
BENEATH THEIR PERUNIT RETURNS .ATIONAL AVERAGE LOAN RATES ARE SET BY LAW COUNTY LOAN RATES FOR GRAINS AND 
oilseeds are set by USDA to reflect typical regional price basis patterns.
Target prices are part of formulas used to determine benefits under the countercyclical payment (CCP) 
program established by the 2002 farm bill. CCPs are available when the US season-average farm price for 
a commodity is less than the target price minus the direct payment rate.3 CCPs are paid on a fixed base 
determined by historical plantings and yields.4 As such, CCPs are less tied to current production choices 
than are marketing loan benefits.
The current national average loan rate for wheat is $2.75 per bushel ($101 per ton). The wheat target 
price is $3.92 per bushel ($144 per ton), and the wheat direct payment rate is $0.52 per bushel ($19 per 
ton), so CCPs occur when the US season average price falls below ($3.92 - $0.52) or $3.40 per bushel ($125 
PER TON	 "OTH THE (OUSE AND 3ENATE PASSED FARM BILL VERSIONS WOULD INCREASE BOTH THE LOAN RATE AND THE 
target price for wheat. For example, the Senate bill raises the wheat loan rate to $2.94 per bushel ($108 
per ton) and the target price to $4.20 per bushel ($154 per ton). The target price increase would raise the 
trigger price for CCPs to ($4.20 - $0.52) or $3.68 per bushel ($135 per ton).5
In the FAPRI (2007a) deterministic baseline, the projected US farm price for wheat is consistently above 
current and proposed loan rates and CCP trigger prices (Figure 1).6 Ignoring the importance of uncertainty, 
a naïve deterministic analysis might therefore conclude that the proposed increases in support prices 
would have no market impacts. Payments under both the marketing loan and CCP programs are zero in the 
baseline. The deterministic price projections suggest they would be zero even if the increase in support 
prices were implemented.
2 As with many aspects of US policy, there are some minor exceptions to this general rule.
3 Direct payment rates are also set by law. Direct payments are not tied to prices and do not require production.
4 The 2002 farm bill gave producers an opportunity to update their base acreage to reflect 1998-2001 planted acreage and 
THEIR ##0 PAYMENT YIELDS TO REmECT A PORTION OF  ACTUAL YIELDS .O SUCH UPDATING OF PROGRAM BASES IS INCLUDED IN 
THE NEW FARM BILLS PASSED BY THE 53 3ENATE AND 53 (OUSE OF 2EPRESENTATIVES
5 See FAPRI 2007b for provisions of the bill for other commodities.
6 Based on market developments since the 2007 baseline was prepared, it is clear that at least 2007/08 wheat prices will be 
much higher than projected in early 2007.
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To conclude that the proposed increase in support prices is innocuous is to ignore the role of uncertainty. 
Actual market price outcomes are, of course, uncertain. Even if the FAPRI model were a perfect forecasting 
tool, given a particular set of assumptions, actual market outcomes will deviate from the deterministic 
baseline values because many of the underlying assumptions will not hold true in practice. To take the 
most obvious example, the baseline assumes average weather conditions and steady rates of technological 
change. So, crop yields generally grow in line with long-term trends with no weather-induced annual 
variation. Just introducing random weather conditions would result in crop production and prices that 
could deviate significantly from the deterministic baseline values. A wide range of other random factors 
will also help make actual market outcomes far different from the deterministic baseline projections.
The FAPRI stochastic model incorporates a number of important sources of variability in agricultural 
and biofuel markets, as described later in the paper. The model generates 500 unique market outcomes, 
where each outcome is based on a particular set of assumptions about selected exogenous variables that 
drive model results. These different assumptions result in a range of market outcomes for production, 
prices, trade, government budgetary costs, farm income, consumer food prices, and other variables of 
interest (WESTHOFF, BROWN AND HART 2006).
Consider the 2007 stochastic baseline projections for US wheat prices relative to the proposed Senate 
trigger price for CCPs (Figure 2). The mean price from the stochastic analysis is almost identical to the 
DETERMINISTIC PRICE PROJECTION SHOWN IN &IGURE  (OWEVER THE STOCHASTIC MODEL GENERATES A RANGE OF WHEAT 
price outcomes, and more than 10 percent of the outcomes are lower than the Senate-proposed CCP trigger 
price. Thus, even though the deterministic baseline suggested no CCPs or marketing loan benefits would 
result even with the Senate-proposed increases in target prices, the stochastic analysis suggests there is at 
least some chance there would be CCPs at the higher target prices.
Model results confirm this conclusion. In the scenario that incorporates the proposed changes in target 
prices and loan rates included in the Senate farm bill, CCPs for wheat occur in 84 (17 percent) of the 500 
stochastic outcomes for 2008/09, and the mean value of wheat CCP’s in 2008/09 across all 500 outcomes is 
approximately $81 million. In comparison, with 2002 farm bill target prices in place, CCPs occur in only 24 
(5 percent) of the 500 baseline stochastic outcomes for 2008/09, and the mean value of wheat CCPs is just 
$12 million. Thus, the stochastic analysis suggests that the proposed change in policies increases average 
budgetary outlays on the CCP program for wheat by approximately $69 million in 2008/09.
These results demonstrate the strength of the stochastic analysis. By recognizing that future market 
prices cannot be known with certainty, the stochastic analysis finds that a support price increase that 
would appear to have no impact when examined using a naïve deterministic approach could actually have 
an impact on market outcomes, budgetary expenditures, and other variables of interest.
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Figure 1. US wheat policy prices under current policies and Senate farm bill proposals, compared to the FAPRI 2007 
deterministic projection of wheat farm prices.
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Source: FAPRI estimates.
At the same time, Figure 2 encourages a note of humility. In retrospect, the projected wheat price 
distributions in the 2007 stochastic baseline now appear far too narrow. Actual US wheat market prices 
in 2007/08 will not only exceed the 90th percentile price shown in Figure 2, but actually will exceed all 
500 stochastic outcomes. While this has been an exceptional year, it does not seem reasonable to assume 
that this year’s wheat market is really a once-in-500-year phenomenon. The experience is a reminder that 
the partial stochastic approach utilised here captures only a few possible sources of uncertainty and is 
not meant to provide the full range of uncertainty that exists in agricultural markets. Selected exogenous 
variables are allowed to vary, but other exogenous variables are held fixed and the model structure and 
parameters are treated as if they were known with certainty. A series of model adjustments were made 
prior to the development of the 2008 FAPRI stochastic baseline to ensure that the resulting distribution of 
wheat market prices would appear more reasonable in light of recent experience.
2.2. Average crop revenue program
"OTH THE (OUSE AND 3ENATE FARM BILLS INCLUDE PROGRAMS THAT WOULD MAKE PAYMENTS TO PRODUCERS WHEN 
PERACRE CROP REVENUES FALL SHORT OF TRIGGER LEVELS 4HE (OUSE BILL PROVIDES A NATIONAL REVENUEBASED OPTION 
that is patterned on a proposal by the Bush Administration. The “average crop revenue” (ACR) program in 
the Senate bill is based on outcomes at the state level.
If the Senate ACR program becomes law, producers will have to make a one-time choice whether to 
participate in current commodity programs or the ACR program before the latter begins operation in 2010. 
Those who choose the ACR would forego direct payments, countercyclical payments and marketing loan 
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benefits in favour of a program that would make a fixed payment of $15 per base acre ($37 per hectare) and 
additional payments when state-level revenues fall short of a trigger level.
Figure 2. The trigger for CCP payments under the Senate farm bill and the mean, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile 
estimates for US wheat prices in the FAPRI 2007 stochastic baseline.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
do
lla
rs
 p
er
 b
us
he
l
Senate CCP trigger 90th percentile price Mean price 10th percentile price
Source: FAPRI estimates.
For a given commodity and state, the revenue level that triggers revenue-based ACR payments is equal to 
90 percent of a state level trend yield7 multiplied by a three-year average of prices.8 Payments occur when 
this trigger is greater than the product of actual state yields and a national harvest-time price.9 Payments 
are made on base acreage, which has been fixed since 2002, rather than on actual planted or harvested 
acreage. Therefore, the revenue-based part of the ACR program has a number of features in common with 
the current CCP program in that payments are based on market conditions but not on individual production 
decisions. The fixed payment portion of the ACR program, in contrast, is essentially the same as the current 
direct payment program, in that payments are tied neither to market conditions nor current production 
decisions.10
7 Based on a linear trend fit over 1980-2006 yields per planted acre for each state and commodity.
8 The prices used are pre-planting prices in the crop insurance program. In the case of maize, for example, the pre-planting 
price is the February average of December futures on the Chicago Board of Trade.
9 The actual yield is a yield per planted acre and the price is the harvest-time price under the crop insurance program. In the 
CASE OF MAIZE THE HARVEST PRICE IS BASED ON THE .OVEMBER AVERAGE OF $ECEMBER FUTURES PRICES
10 An important qualification is that payments under both the CCP and direct payment programs are not available to producers 
who plant fruits and vegetables on base acreage, with some exceptions. The U St has notified the WTO that it considers direct 
payments to be green box subsidies. Other countries have argued that the fruit and vegetable planting restriction means 
that the payments are not truly decoupled from production decisions and should not qualify for green box treatment.
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The program poses a number of analytical challenges. For example, how would the payments affect 
production decisions? FAPRI assumed that fixed ACR payments would have only small production effects, similar 
to direct payments, given the degree to which the payments are decoupled from both production and prices. The 
revenue-based ACR payments were assumed to have slightly larger production effects, similar to those of the CCP 
program. Besides these more theoretical issues, there were also major practical concerns, such as how to proxy 
price triggers based on futures prices when the model solves for actual and expected market prices.11
Most relevant to this discussion is the calculation of projected payments under the revenue-based part 
of the ACR program. Consider the case of maize. Given the FAPRI 2007 deterministic baseline and some 
simplifying assumptions, it would appear the program would never result in revenue-based ACR payments 
to maize producers. Over the 2010/11-2014/15 period, the national average revenue per acre is consistently 
above the level that would trigger revenue-based payments under the program (Figure 3).
Clearly, a deterministic approach to the question is inadequate. Prices, yields and revenues are 
uncertain, as is the level of guaranteed revenue, since it is based on a moving average of market prices. 
Actual revenues are likely to decline enough to trigger variable ACR payments, at least occasionally. 
Furthermore, it is not enough to look at the question using the distribution of national level prices, yields 
and per-acre revenues, because the program is based on state-level revenue calculations. Finally, the 
program is optional, so some assessment must be made of how many producers will choose to participate in 
the program. All of these concerns add layers of complication to the analysis.
FAPRI’s stochastic analysis of the ACR proposal (FAPRI 2007b) used a three step approach to the problem. 
The first step treated the program as if it were mandatory and based on national-level revenue triggers. 
In this most direct application of the model, the national average revenue per acre for each crop was 
compared to an estimated revenue guarantee based national trend yields and a three-year moving average 
of expected prices in the model.
The distribution of revenues per acre depends not just on the distributions of prices and yields, but 
also on the (negative) covariance between the two. This provides a prime example of why the way in 
which the model is made stochastic matters a great deal. Suppose, for example, that the model were made 
stochastic simply by introducing random weather shocks that made yields deviate from their deterministic 
values. Also suppose for the sake of argument that the elasticity of total demand is approximately negative 
one. With such an approach, drawing a yield that increases supply of a given commodity by, say, 10 percent 
would result in an offsetting 10 percent reduction in prices, leaving revenues unchanged. If a revenue-
based program did not result in any payments when examined deterministically, it would also result in no 
payments when examined stochastically using such a simplistic approach.
11 Assuming a fairly constant basis between futures prices and season-average market prices, the model utilized season-average 
market prices as a proxy for the harvest price. For the pre-planting price, the model used the expected prices generated by 
the model, which are lagged prices adjusted for deviations from trend yields.
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Figure 3. Maize revenue per acre that would trigger payments under the ACR program and 2007 FAPRI deterministic 
baseline estimates of maize revenue per acre.
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The distribution of revenues per acre depends not just on the distributions of prices and yields, but 
also on the (negative) covariance between the two. This provides a prime example of why the way in 
which the model is made stochastic matters a great deal. Suppose, for example, that the model were made 
stochastic simply by introducing random weather shocks that made yields deviate from their deterministic 
values. Also suppose for the sake of argument that the elasticity of total demand is approximately negative 
one. With such an approach, drawing a yield that increases supply of a given commodity by, say, 10 percent 
would result in an offsetting 10 percent reduction in prices, leaving revenues unchanged. If a revenue-
based program did not result in any payments when examined deterministically, it would also result in no 
payments when examined stochastically using such a simplistic approach.
FAPRI’s stochastic model uses correlated draws of a variety of exogenous supply-side and demand-side 
variables to generate the assumption sets for each of the 500 stochastic outcomes. Because both supply- 
and demand-side shocks are considered, revenues will be variable even if demand elasticities are near 
negative one (actual demand elasticities vary across crops and across time).
Under the counterfactual assumption of an ACR program based on national yield triggers and mandatory 
participation, mean revenue-based program expenditures for maize rise from $123 million in 2010/11 to $263 
million in 2014/15 (Figure 4). These estimates represent the mean of 500 outcomes where payments are zero in 
most outcomes. For example, in 2010/11, ACR revenue-based payments for maize occur in only 50 (10 percent) 
of the 500 stochastic outcomes, but in 27 (5 percent) of the outcomes, the payments exceed $1 billion.
The second step of the analysis recognises that the program is based on state revenues instead of national 
revenues. Even when national revenues per acre are above the implied national trigger, producers in states 
suffering local yield shortfalls might qualify for payments. To evaluate a state-level program with a national-
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level model requires some way to proxy the relationship between state and national yields and revenues. 
This was done by using observed data for state-level yields and revenues for the last 27 years to calculate 
what payments would have been had the program been in place over that period with state-level triggers, as 
compared to payments over the same period if national-level triggers had been in place. From this, equations 
were created that reproduce the historical payments with state-based triggers in place. The results suggest 
that payments are much higher with state-based revenue triggers than with national level triggers. Program 
expenditures on maize are more than double the level implied by a national set of triggers.
Figure 4. Revenue-based ACR expenditures on maize using alternative approaches.
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The final step is to recognise that the proposed program is optional. Each producer must make a one-time 
choice whether to participate in the ACR program or stay with traditional programs, and the choice applies to 
all commodities for which the producer has base acreage. Thus, it is not sufficient to observe that estimated 
mean ACR payments on maize base acreage are slightly less than payments under traditional programs12 and 
therefore conclude that maize producers will choose not to participate. Instead, it is necessary to consider 
typical mixes of base acreage on farms and other region and farm-specific issues. Because mean ACR payments 
per soybean base acre exceed those under traditional programs, and most maize producers have both maize 
and soybean base, the participation choice is less obvious. With limited time to conduct the analysis, FAPRI 
assumed that 50 percent of maize base acreage would participate in the ACR program.13
12 Mean revenue-based ACR payments for maize are greater than the sum of marketing loan benefits and CCPs under traditional 
programs, but this effect is more than offset by the fact that the $15 per base acre fixed ACR payment is less than the 
average maize direct payment of $24 per base acre. 
13 Participation rates were assumed to be greater for wheat (70 percent) and soybeans (60 percent), but zero for upland cotton 
and rice. For cotton and rice, foregone direct payments are much larger than plausible ACR benefits.
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Taking this assumed participation rate into account, the final estimates of mean ACR revenue-based 
payments on maize base acreage rise from $161 million in 2010/11 to $282 million in 2014/15. These 
estimates, of course, are sensitive to all of the assumptions used in the analysis. Furthermore, while the 
stochastic approach provides richer results than a deterministic analysis, it does not completely avoid the 
issue of baseline dependence. If mean prices were rising over time or if mean yields were growing more 
rapidly than the 1980-2006 trend, program expenditures would decline over time.14 If prices were falling 
or yields were declining relative to the historical trend, expenditures would rise. A different answer will 
result under a new stochastic baseline simply because there will be changes in mean prices and yields.
2.3. US AMS estimates
As part of current WTO negotiations, the United States has offered to reduce its amber box commitment 
by 60 percent from the current bound level, to $7.6 billion per year. The AMS is a complex measure that 
is distinct from alternative measures of government support, such as budgetary expenditures or producer 
subsidy equivalents. In US notifications15 the portion of the AMS that counts toward WTO commitments to 
limit the “total current AMS” is comprised primarily of two components:
s  !CTUAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES UNDER THE MARKETING LOAN PROGRAM 4HESE EXPENDITURES CAN VARY 
dramatically from year to year, and are expected to be near zero in 2008.
s  4HE  IMPUTED VALUE  TO PRODUCERS  OF  THE DAIRY  AND  SUGAR PRICE  SUPPORT PROGRAMS  )N  ESSENCE  THE 
calculation multiplies total US production by the difference between US support prices and a 
measure of international prices in the late 1980s. Combined, these two components total slightly 
over $6 billion in 2008.
In FAPRI’s 2007 deterministic baseline, marketing loan benefits were projected to be zero or very small 
for most commodities. Given the accounting approach used in US notifications, this would result in a total 
current AMS below the US-proposed limit in every year of the projection period (Figure 5). Based on the 
FAPRI 2007 deterministic baseline, the imputed value of the dairy and sugar price support programs would 
account for almost the entire US total current AMS.
From the deterministic results, one might conclude that the US offer would not require any US policy 
changes. If market prices for major commodities remain high, it is true that current US policies would be 
CONSISTENT WITH THE 53 PROPOSAL )NDEED EVEN THE INCREASES IN TARGET PRICES AND LOAN RATES INCLUDED IN THE (OUSE 
and Senate versions of the new farm bill would be consistent with the US proposal, as neither would increase 
support levels enough to significantly increase the AMS when the problem is looked at in a deterministic sense.
14 A more fully stochastic approach would recognize that yield trends themselves are uncertain and would allow them to vary. 
The current approach treats yield trends as fixed and merely estimates variation around those fixed trends.
15 There is considerable controversy over the appropriateness of the US AMS notification. The accounting scheme used here 
reflects the practices of recent US notifications, without judging their appropriateness.
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Figure 5. US total current AMS under the US WTO proposal and in FAPRI’s 2007 deterministic baseline.
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Once again, stochastic analysis suggests the full story is more complicated. In at least some of the 
stochastic outcomes under current US policies, commodity prices are low enough to generate significant 
expenditures under the marketing loan program. While the mean level of the total current AMS remains 
slightly below the US-proposed commitment level, there are a number of outcomes where the proposed AMS 
limit is exceeded (Figure 6). In 2008, for example, the proposed limit is exceeded in about 25 percent of the 
stochastic outcomes. Over the period from 2008-2016, the proposed limit is exceeded in at least one year in 
91 percent of the stochastic outcomes.
The stochastic analysis suggests that policy changes almost certainly would be required to conform to 
the US proposal. While it would be a mistake to read the stochastic results as true probabilities of various 
occurrences, given the design and limitations of the stochastic analysis, it is interesting to note that most 
of the stochastic results for any given year are below the proposed limit, but that the limit is almost always 
exceeded at least once over the nine-year period.
The stochastic results also have other implications for the WTO negotiations and the farm bill debate. The 
focus here has been on amber box support, but proposals to limit “overall trade-distorting support” (OTDS) 
have received even more attention in the negotiations. FAPRI stochastic analysis suggests the OTDS limit 
would have to be set below $14 billion before it would become as binding as the proposed $7.6 billion AMS 
limit. If the OTDS limit is set at a higher level and current US policies remain in place, the US exceeds the 
proposed AMS limit more often than it exceeds the hypothetical OTDS limit in the 2007 stochastic analysis.
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Figure 6. US total current AMS under the US WTO proposal and in FAPRI’s 2007 stochastic baseline.
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#ONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT THE (OUSE AND 3ENATE FARM BILLS WOULD INCREASE 74/ SUPPORT MEASURES 
(IGHER LOAN RATES FOR EXAMPLE INCREASE THE STOCHASTIC MEAN VALUE OF THE TOTAL CURRENT !-3 (OWEVER THE 
increases in budgetary expenditures and AMS measures are relatively small, given high projected average 
grain and oilseed prices. Another component of the proposed farm bills may actually reduce the US AMS. 
4HE (OUSE AND 3ENATE DAIRY PROPOSALS WOULD REPLACE THE CURRENT PRICE SUPPORT FOR MILK WITH PRICE SUPPORTS 
for butter, nonfat dry milk and cheese. It is argued that removing the price support for fluid milk, per se, 
will reduce the calculated AMS for the dairy sector, even though the support levels for butter, cheese and 
nonfat dry milk will remain at current levels.
2.4. New energy legislation mandating biofuel use
The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), signed into law in December 2007, mandates the use 
of specified levels of biofuels in each year between 2008 and 2022. Specific mandates are established for 
total biofuel use, biodiesel, cellulosic ethanol and “advanced biofuels.”16 To slightly oversimplify, the bill 
implicitly mandates the use of 15 billion gallons (57 billion litres) of maize starch-based ethanol by 2015. 
For comparison, actual 2007 US ethanol production was approximately 6.5 billion gallons (25 billion litres).
Large increases in biofuel production are certain to have major implications for commodity markets. 
A distinct question, however, is how much difference the new mandates will make. If production and 
16 Advanced biofuels are defined it a way that explicitly excludes maize starch-based ethanol.
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use were already going to exceed the proposed mandates, its impact on markets may be minimal. Indeed, 
earlier biofuel use mandates established by a 2005 energy bill have been greatly exceeded, suggesting they 
may have had little marginal impact on the market.
FAPRI’s model for US biofuel markets is based on the assumption that both producers and consumers 
of biofuels will react to market signals, as with any other commodity, except when constrained by policy. 
On the supply side, ethanol production capacity and capacity utilization rates are functions of industry 
profitability measures. Capacity expansion takes time and therefore sets limits on production growth in 
any given year. Capacity utilization rates are specified as logistic functions so that most capacity is utilised 
when net returns over operating costs are sufficiently positive, but operating rates drop rapidly when 
RETURNS NEAR ZERO OR TURN NEGATIVE .ET  RETURN CALCULATIONS CONSIDER THE VALUE OF ETHANOL AND COPRODUCT 
feeds and the cost of maize, energy and other variable inputs.
On the demand side, the model considers three major uses of ethanol. Before EISA, mandatory additive 
uses of ethanol reflected its use as an oxygenate to meet clean air requirements and to satisfy other mandates. 
This use of ethanol is relatively inelastic and generally is essentially a fixed fraction of gasoline use.17
The second use of ethanol reflected in the model is in the voluntary E10 (a blend of 10 percent ethanol 
and 90 percent gasoline) blend market. In most of the country, there is no current requirement to use 
ethanol to meet regulatory requirements, so use of E10 is essentially voluntary. In the model, it is assumed 
that limited E10 use will occur even at ethanol prices greater than ethanol’s energy value as a fuel, reflecting 
ethanol’s value as an octane enhancer, state policies that favour E10, and other factors. E10 use becomes 
much more elastic when ethanol prices fall to levels more consistent with ethanol’s energy value (roughly 
two-thirds that of gasoline on a volume basis).
Finally, the third use of ethanol in the model is E85 (a blend containing up to 85 percent ethanol). 
Current E85 use is modest, in part because of limited availability of vehicles equipped to run on the fuel 
and service stations dispensing it, but also because, until recently, ethanol prices were above its value as 
fuel based on the energy content. In the model, the size of the potential E85 market expands over time 
and responds to price incentives. The portion of the potential market that is filled is a function of relative 
ethanol and gasoline prices. KRUSE ET AL. (2007) provides a more complete description of the model and 
discuss impacts of several potential pre-EISA scenarios.
Without EISA in place, US ethanol prices are expected to be positively correlated with petroleum and 
gasoline prices, and strongly affected by the availability and size of tax credits provided to those who blend 
ethanol with gasoline. All else equal, higher gasoline prices increase demand for ethanol, which results in 
HIGHER ETHANOL PRICES FOR A GIVEN LEVEL OF SUPPLY (IGHER ETHANOL PRICES RESULT IN GREATER PROlTS FOR ETHANOL 
producers, resulting in higher levels of capacity utilization and increased investment in new capacity.
As a result, ethanol production in 2016/17, as shown in the 2007 FAPRI stochastic baseline, is strongly 
correlated with petroleum prices (Figure 7). The stochastic baseline utilises a distribution of petroleum prices 
centered on forecasts prepared by Global Insight, Inc. In early 2007, their forecast called for a decline in the US 
17 Regulatory changes, including policy changes that led to the elimination of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) from the 
domestic fuel supply, accounted for much of the growth in ethanol use from 2005-2007.
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refiner’s acquisition price for petroleum from roughly $60 per barrel in 2006 to about $50 in 2016.18 With current 
petroleum prices much higher, projections based on the early 2007 estimates may now appear out of date.
The mean projected level of 2016/17 maize-based ethanol production in the 2007 FAPRI stochastic 
baseline is significantly below the EISA mandated level. But, that could be ascribed, in part, to the 
assumption that average petroleum prices would be much lower than prices observed in early 2008. With 
petroleum prices over $70 per barrel, projected maize-based ethanol production levels exceeded the levels 
required by EISA.
Figure 7. US production of maize starch-based ethanol in 2016/17, sorted by petroleum price outcomes, based on 
the 2007 FAPRI stochastic baseline and analysis of EISA.
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Results suggest that EISA could have little market impact at high petroleum prices but potentially large 
impacts at low petroleum prices. By requiring 15 billion gallons of maize-based ethanol use, even when low 
petroleum prices would otherwise lead to low demand for ethanol, the bill effectively places a floor beneath 
one important component of demand for maize. This has broad implications for the agricultural sector as 
a whole, affecting not just the level but the variability of commodity prices. Average estimated impacts 
OF %)3! ON COMMODITY MARKETS ARE FAR GREATER THAN THOSE RESULTING FROM ADOPTION OF EITHER THE (OUSE OR 
Senate farm bills.19
18 The more commonly cited price for West Texas Intermediate petroleum, which corresponds closely to the contract for light 
SWEET CRUDE TRADED ON THE .EW 9ORK -ERCANTILE %XCHANGE WAS FORECAST TO DECLINE FROM  PER BARREL IN  TO  PER 
barrel in 2016.
19 FAPRI 2008 provides more in-depth discussion of the implications of EISA for commodity markets and farm income.
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3. Implications for analysis of European agricultural markets and policies
In the examples that have been used for the US in the sections above, a primary motivation for stochastic 
analysis is to correctly reflect outcomes of different policies on actual government spending. The focus on 
the cost of policies reflects both the way that policies are operated in the US, with many payments still 
linked to market conditions, and the nature of the policy making process. In the US, agricultural support 
expenditure is not generally limited by a budget, rather projected spending is limited at a level related to 
projected baseline spending, and thus medium term projections are central to the policy making process.
In the EU, expenditure on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is much less volatile than its counterpart 
in the US. Successive reforms have replaced price support with direct payments that are largely fixed in 
nominal euro terms.20 In addition to this, reductions in the levels of the remaining price support measures 
have meant that public stock holding activities and export subsidization have fallen and disappeared in 
many cases. The 2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR), as well as strong commodity markets, contributed to this. 
Does this mean that there is no role for stochastic analysis in the analysis of EU policy?
For an example of where a stochastic analysis would yield improved analysis of policy consequences, 
CONSIDER  THE UPCOMING (EALTH #HECK  REFORM OF  THE #!0  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007a). As in the first US 
example, a change in EU price support is suggested, although the EU is proposing to reduce support prices 
rather than to increase them. It is proposed that, following a virtual removal of support for maize, this is 
extended to other products while maintaining support only for bread-making wheat. What impact is that 
likely to have?
Most models of the EU agricultural sector (including those currently maintained by FAPRI) are likely 
to suggest that reducing support for the cereals sector is likely to have little effect on the market. Given 
strong global cereals markets, due to increasing incomes and additional demand for biofuels, it is likely 
that for most of the countries of the EU, projected cereals prices will be above intervention. Therefore, the 
models will not include any intervention purchases of grain, so there would be no implications in terms 
of lower prices or reduced intervention stocks from this part of the reform. That may indeed be the most 
likely outcome because intervention stocks are close to zero now and all indications are that prices will 
remain high.
Even with the new biofuel policies in place, prices could fall dramatically. Several years of average 
weather would see stocks replenished and prices fall, and under those circumstances a good production 
year such as that experienced in 2004 could again lead to intervention stock build up and prices below 
100 euro per ton in some parts of Europe. Stochastic analysis can give us information as to how likely that 
eventuality might be. In addition, one of the major determinants of the path of the cereals sector in the 
EU is likely to be the evolution of yields in Romania post accession. Analysis of this type is a challenge 
for stochastic modelling, as past experience of yields in Romania may not be an indication of the future. 
Any re-specification of yield distribution on the basis of past accessions would be difficult, but could, 
nonetheless, yield important results for the EU.
20 For countries such as the UK, that are not in the euro zone, these payments can fluctuate significantly in national currency 
terms.
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The fact that US notifications of the AMS vary with market conditions means that stochastic analysis 
has a role to play in determining the implications of any WTO deal. For the EU, the amount notified for the 
AMS is fixed. Unlike the US, however, the issue of export subsidies is more important. The EU has virtually 
committed itself to eliminating export subsidies as part of the Doha negotiations. At present, the level of 
export subsidies is low, and zero for most cereals and dairy products. Again, in an environment of high 
global commodity prices, models are likely to show export subsidy expenditure remaining low for their 
medium term projections.
The high dairy prices in 2007 and early 2008 have quelled some of the fears of the dairy sector as to 
the impact of the complete removal of export subsidies. It had been a source of concern, given the very 
high proportion of dairy exports that required subsidies, until very recently. As with the cereals example, 
a recovery in the weather in key producing regions, plus an expansion in production in the EU, as is very 
likely, could push prices back down towards historical levels. It appears that the “thinness” of trade on the 
world market means that world prices can be very volatile. Will the prices of butter and skim milk powder 
remain above their support levels in the absence of export subsidies? Stochastic analysis is likely to show 
at least some likelihood that export subsidy limitations matter.
The two examples above also suggest a further role for stochastic analysis. In the past, the projection 
of prices for most of the major commodities in the EU has been a straightforward task. Given the high 
prices guaranteed under the CAP before the MacSharry reform, then it was reasonable to assume that EU 
prices would be close to this level. As price support levels were reduced, market prices sometimes began to 
float above their support level. Even in the case of dairy, where market prices have, on the whole, followed 
the support price, they had begun to deviate even before the 2007 explosion in world prices. Therefore, 
European producers face a future in which prices are increasingly more volatile.
Under these circumstances, the role of agricultural policy is likely to change. Producers are likely to be 
more interested in risk management tools (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006), such as making more use of futures 
markets or crop insurance. Stochastic analysis can yield important information as to the distribution of 
future prices, outputs or incomes that go beyond that available from standard models of the agricultural 
sector. Policy will still play an important role in the determination of these risks, with agricultural policy 
being joined, and perhaps even surpassed, by energy policy as determinants of market volatility.
Why, then, are the FAPRI models of the EU not stochastic? Running the models in this way is a complex 
undertaking. At present, the US stochastic model is simulated in SAS whereas the EU models are only 
simulated in spreadsheet form. The EU model used for the FAPRI-Ireland and FAPRI-UK project use models 
that are built, maintained and simulated in different countries. In this case, time is the restricting factor.
Producing stochastic projections faces other challenges in the case of the EU. The CAP has undergone 
significant reforms in the last 20 years. Even the policy tools that have persisted through that time may 
have been operated in different ways, such as export subsidies that perhaps are managed more aggressively 
than in the past. The EU model is an annual model and that raises the question of how to generate the 
necessary distributions. In the case of the US, it is usual to generate the distributions from the errors in 
the equations, but it is questionable what relevance the errors from, for example, 1988, are in the current 
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EU market environment.21 &OR THE .EW -EMBER 3TATES THESE PROBLEMS ARE COMPOUNDED BECAUSE DATA SETS 
going back further than the most recent years may not be available at all.
The example of the biofuels sector is illustrative here. The 2007 Renewable Energy Sources Directive 
proposal (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007b) outlines aggressive new targets for the use of renewable fuels for 
transport. The subsequent demand for ethanol and biodiesel are likely to be major drivers of demand in 
the EU. But widespread production and consumption of these products are relatively new phenomena, and 
datasets are therefore maybe only one or two annual observations. As mandated incorporation rates drive 
the consumption side, the modelling issues may ease for consumption, but for production and trade there is 
precious little information to operationalize a model. This is not to say that the stochastic modelling of the 
EU cannot be done, just that it requires much time and intellectual effort.
4. Concluding remarks
For many market and policy questions, standard deterministic approaches to analysis are quite limited. 
The paper presents four recent examples from FAPRI analysis of US policy issues where standard approaches 
would yield results that would be incomplete at best and misleading at worst. In all four cases, policy 
changes that would appear to be innocuous when evaluated against a deterministic baseline are found to 
entail significant potential costs and/or benefits when considered stochastically. Incorporating a stochastic 
process increases the robustness of the analysis.
Extending a stochastic approach to analysis of European markets and policies would be valuable and 
challenging. The European situation is distinct in terms of the policy environment and of the information 
AVAILABLE TO APPLY A STOCHASTIC MODELLING APPROACH (OWEVER THERE ARE CASES WHERE APPROACHES THAT EXPLICITLY 
recognize uncertainty in agricultural markets would produce more satisfactory results than traditional 
deterministic approaches.
21 The EU GOLD model is not estimated, but rather calibrated on recent years’ data, in part, as a result of these types of 
concerns.
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